area handbook series 

Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan 

country studies 



Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan 

country studies 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Glenn E. Curtis 
Research Completed 
March 1996 



On the cover: Cultural artifacts from Kazakstan, Kyr- 
gyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 



First Edition, First Printing, 1997. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbeki- 
stan : country studies / Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress ; edited by Glenn E. Curtis. — 1st ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam; 550-114) 

"Research completed March 1996." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 491-519) and 
index. 

ISBN 0-8444-0938-3 (hard : alk. paper) 
1. Asia, Central. I. Curtis, Glenn E. (Glenn Eldon), 
1946- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Divi- 
sion. III. Series. IV. Series: DA Pam ; 550-114. 
DK851.K34 1997 97-5110 
958— dc21 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-114 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written 
by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors 
seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, 
striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular 
attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, 
their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common inter- 
ests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and 
extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-4840 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors are indebted to numerous individuals and orga- 
nizations who gave their time, research materials, and expertise 
on the five republics of Central Asia to provide data, perspec- 
tive, and material support for this volume. 

Raymond Zickel organized the early stages of the book's 
compilation and identified its chapter authors. Helen Fedor 
collected, selected, and organized the book's photographs, 
which were contributed by numerous individuals. Those indi- 
viduals are acknowledged in the photo captions. 

Thanks also go to Ralph K. Benesch, former monitor of the 
Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department 
of the Army, under whose guidance the plan for the six vol- 
umes on the post-Soviet states was formulated. In addition, the 
authors appreciate the advice and guidance of Sandra W. Med- 
itz, Federal Research Division coordinator of the handbook 
series. Special thanks go to Marilyn L. Majeska, who supervised 
editing and managed production; and to David R Cabitto, who 
designed the book cover and the illustrations on the title page 
of each chapter, provided graphics support, and, together with 
the firm of Maryland Mapping and Graphics, prepared the 
maps. The following individuals are gratefully acknowledged as 
well: Askar Tazhiyev of the Embassy of Kazakstan, who provided 
economic statistics; Raymond Milefsky of the Defense Mapping 
Agency, who provided invaluable guidance on geographic 
names; Vincent Ercolano, who edited the chapters; Beverly 
Wolpert, who performed the final prepublication editorial 
review; Joan C. Cook, who indexed the volume; Barbara Edger- 
ton and Izella Watson, who did the word processing and initial 
typesetting; and Janie L. Gilchrist and David R Cabitto, who 
prepared the camera-ready copy. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xvii 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events xix 

Introduction xxxi 

Chapter 1. Kazakstan 1 

Martha Brill Olcott 

COUNTRY PROFILE 3 

HISTORICAL SETTING 12 

Early Tribal Movements 12 

Forming the Modern Nation 13 

Russian Control 14 

In the Soviet Union 15 

Reform and Nationalist Conflict 16 

The Rise of Nazarbayev 18 

Sovereignty and Independence 19 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 20 

Topography and Drainage 21 

Climate 22 

Environmental Problems 22 

POPULATION AND SOCIETY 24 

Demographic Factors 24 

Ethnic Groups 27 

The Role of Women 28 

Clans 29 

RELIGION 30 

Islam in the Past 30 

Islam and the State 30 

NATIONAL IDENTITY 31 

Language 32 

Culture 33 



vii 



EDUCATION 36 

HEALTH 38 

Health System 38 

Health Conditions 40 

SOCIAL WELFARE 42 

THE ECONOMY 44 

Natural Resources 44 

Agriculture 45 

Industry 46 

Energy 48 

Work Force 57 

Post-Soviet Economic Developments 57 

Banking and Finance 60 

Prices, Wages, and Currency 62 

International Financial Relations 63 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 66 

Transportation 66 

Telecommunications 70 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 71 

Constitution 72 

Structure of Government 72 

The Election of 1994 and Its Aftermath 76 

Political Organizations 77 

Nazarbayev and Political Prospects 79 

The Media 81 

Human Rights 82 

Foreign Policy 83 

NATIONAL SECURITY 87 

Military Establishment 87 

Military Infrastructure 90 

Military Doctrine 92 

Law Enforcement Systems 93 

National Security Prospects 97 

Chapter 2. Kyrgyzstan 99 

Martha Brill Olcott 

COUNTRY PROFILE 101 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 110 

Early History 110 

Mongol Domination Ill 

Russian Control 112 

viii 



Into the Soviet Union 112 

Recent History 113 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 118 

Topography and Drainage 119 

Climate 120 

Environmental Problems 120 

POPULATION 126 

Demographic Characteristics 126 

Ethnic Groups 126 

Geographic Factors 127 

SOCIETY AND CULTURE 1 29 

Language 129 

Ethnic Traditions 130 

Social Structure 132 

Contemporary Culture 135 

RELIGION 135 

The Introduction of Islam 136 

Tribal Religion 136 

Islam and the State 137 

EDUCATION 138 

Education System 138 

Instruction 139 

Curriculum 140 

Higher Education 141 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 141 

Health Care System 142 

Health Conditions 144 

Social Welfare 145 

THE ECONOMY 147 

Role in the Soviet Economy 148 

Natural Resources 149 

Agriculture 150 

Industry 154 

Energy 155 

Economic Reform 157 

Financial System 159 

Prices, Monetary Policy, and Debt 160 

Foreign Investment 162 

Foreign Trade 163 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 165 



ix 



Transportation 165 

Telecommunications 167 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1 68 

Background 168 

Constitution 169 

Structure of Government 170 

Political Parties 174 

The Media 175 

Human Rights 178 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 1 78 

Central Asian Neighbors 179 

Russia 182 

NATIONAL SECURITY 183 

Armed Forces 184 

Internal Security 188 

National Security Prospects 192 

Chapter 3. Tajikistan 195 

Muriel Atkin 

COUNTRY PROFILE 197 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 206 

Ethnic Background 206 

Early History 207 

The Russian Conquest 209 

The Revolutionary Era 212 

Impact of the Civil War 213 

The Basmachi 214 

Creation of Tajikistan 215 

Collectivization 216 

The Purges 216 

The Postwar Period 217 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 219 

Dimensions and Borders 219 

Topography and Drainage 219 

Climate 223 

Environmental Problems 223 

POPULATION 225 

Population Characteristics 225 

Urbanization 228 

The Rural Majority 229 

Gender and Family Structure 230 



x 



Emigration 232 

Ethnic Groups 233 

Forces of Nationalism 236 

RELIGION 237 

Islam 238 

Other Religions 241 

CULTURE AND THE ARTS 241 

Literature 242 

Cultural Institutions 242 

EDUCATION 243 

Historical Development 243 

Education in the 1980s and 1990s 244 

Vocational Education. . 245 

Higher Education and Research 245 

HEALTH 246 

Health Care System 246 

Health Conditions 248 

THE ECONOMY 249 

Agriculture 250 

Industry 252 

Energy 254 

Labor 256 

Standard of Living 257 

Economic Conditions in the Early 1990s 258 

Transition to a Market Economy 259 

Foreign Economic Relations 261 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 264 

Railroads 265 

Roads 265 

Air Travel 266 

Telecommunications 266 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 267 

Transition to Post-Soviet Government 267 

Government Structure 270 

Political Parties 273 

The Media 276 

Human Rights 276 

Foreign Relations 277 

NATIONAL SECURITY. 283 

Russia's Role in the Early 1990s 283 

xi 



The Armed Forces 285 

Internal Security 286 

Chapter 4. Turkmenistan 291 

Larry Clark, Michael Thurman, and David Tyson 

COUNTRY PROFILE 293 

HISTORICAL SETTING 301 

Origins and Early History 301 

Formation of the Turkmen Nation 303 

Incorporation into Russia 305 

Soviet Turkmenistan 305 

Sovereignty and Independence 306 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 307 

Physical Features 307 

Climate 308 

Hydrological Conditions 308 

Environmental Issues 309 

POPULATION 311 

Size and Distribution 311 

Migration Trends 312 

SOCIETY 312 

National Traditions 312 

Social Structure 313 

The Spoken Language 317 

The Written Language 318 

RELIGION 319 

History and Structure 319 

Religion after Independence 320 

EDUCATION 321 

Education System 322 

Curriculum 322 

Higher Education 323 

HEALTH 324 

Structure of Health Care 324 

Health Care Conditions 324 

Health Conditions 325 

WELFARE 326 

Living Standards 326 

Government Welfare Programs 328 

THE ECONOMY 329 

Natural Resources 329 

xii 



Agriculture 330 

Industry 333 

Labor 336 

Economic Structure 338 

Privatization 339 

Fiscal and Monetary Conditions 340 

Foreign Trade 342 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 348 

Railroads 348 

Roads 349 

Pipelines 350 

Airlines 351 

Merchant Marine 351 

Telecommunications 351 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 352 

Centers of Political Power 352 

Government Structure 354 

Political Parties 357 

Human Rights 358 

FOREIGN POLICY 359 

Background 359 

Foreign Relations Issues 360 

The United States 361 

Western Europe 361 

Asian Neighbors 361 

CIS Relations 363 

Caspian Sea Issues 363 

NATIONAL SECURITY. 364 

Strategic Considerations 365 

Military Doctrine 365 

Role of Russia and the CIS 366 

Force Structure 368 

Internal Security Forces 371 

Criminal Justice 371 

Chapter 5. Uzbekistan 375 

Nancy Lubin 

COUNTRY PROFILE 377 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 385 

Early History 385 

The Early Islamic Period 386 

xiii 



The Turkifi cation of Mawarannahr 387 

The Mongol Period 388 

TheRuleofTimur 389 

The Uzbek Period 390 

Arrival of the Russians 391 

The Russian Conquest 392 

Entering the Twentieth Century 395 

The Jadidists and Basmachis 395 

The Stalinist Period 397 

Russification and Resistance 398 

The 1980s 398 

Independence 400 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 401 

Topography and Drainage 401 

Climate 402 

Environmental Problems 402 

POPULATION 406 

Size and Distribution 406 

Ethnic Composition 409 

Other Social Affiliations 411 

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE 411 

Linguistic Background 412 

Influences in the Soviet Period 413 

Language in the 1990s 414 

Literature 415 

RELIGION 415 

Islam in the Soviet Era 416 

The Issue of Fundamentalism 416 

Mainstream Islam in the 1990s 417 

EDUCATION 418 

Education System 418 

Curriculum 420 

Instruction 421 

HEALTH 421 

Health Care System 422 

Health Conditions 423 

THE ECONOMY 424 

Mineral Resources 425 

Energy 425 

Agriculture 426 



xiv 



Industry 428 

Labor Force 430 

Postcommunist Economic Reform 431 

Structural and Legal Reform 431 

Banking and Finance 435 

International Financial Relations 435 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 438 

Transportation 438 

Telecommunications 443 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 445 

Postindependence Changes 446 

The Constitution 448 

Local Government 449 

Opposition Parties 449 

The Media 450 

Human Rights 451 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 452 

Central Asian States 453 

Russia and the CIS 455 

The Middle East and Pakistan 456 

China 457 

Western Europe and Japan 458 

The United States 459 

NATIONAL SECURITY. 460 

External Security Conditions 461 

Background of Military Development 462 

The Armed Forces 463 

Internal Security 465 

Appendix. Tables 469 

Bibliography 491 

Glossary 521 

Index 527 

Contributors 567 

List of Figures 

1 Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan: Geographic Setting, 1996 xxx 



xv 



2 Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan: Topography and Drainage xxxiv 

3 Central Asia in 1868 xxxviii 

4 Kazakstan: Administrative Divisions, 1996 10 

5 Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan: Industrial Activity, 1996 50 

6 Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan: Fuel and Energy Centers, 1996 . . 54 

7 Kazakstan: Transportation System, 1996 68 

8 Kyrgyzstan: Administrative Divisions and 

Transportation System, 1996 108 

9 Kyrgyzstan: Topography 122 

10 Tajikistan: Administrative Divisions and 

Transportation System, 1996 204 

11 Tajikistan: Topography 222 

12 Turkmenistan: Administrative Divisions and 

Transportation System, 1996 300 

13 Uzbekistan: Administrative Divisions, 1996 384 

14 Uzbekistan: Transportation System, 1996 440 



xvi 



Preface 



At the end of 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union trans- 
formed the fifteen republics of that union into independent 
states with various capabilities for survival. Among them were 
the five republics of Central Asia: Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki- 
stan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Until that time, Central 
Asia had received less attention from the outside world than 
most of the other Soviet republics, simply because it was the 
most remote part of the Soviet Union. Aside from their inci- 
dental coverage in the 1991 Soviet Union: A Country Study, the 
Central Asian republics have received no treatment in this 
series. Since their independence, these republics have 
attracted considerable attention in the West, largely because of 
the improved opportunities for exploitation of their rich natu- 
ral resources, notably oil and natural gas. As the fourth of the 
six-volume subseries covering all the post-Soviet states, this vol- 
ume brings new information about a region of enhanced rele- 
vance in the world's economy and geopolitical structure. 

The marked relaxation of information restrictions, which 
began in the late 1980s and has continued into the mid-1990s, 
allows the reporting of much more complete information on 
Central Asia than what was available one decade ago. Scholarly 
articles and periodical reports have been especially helpful in 
accounting for most aspects of the five republics' activities since 
they achieved independence. The authors have provided a con- 
text for their current evaluations with descriptions of the his- 
torical, political, and social backgrounds of the countries. In 
each case, the author's goal was to provide a compact, accessi- 
ble, and objective treatment of five main topics: historical back- 
ground, the society and its environment, the economy, 
government and politics, and national security. Brief com- 
ments on some of the more useful, readily accessible sources 
used in preparing this volume appear at the end of each chap- 
ter. Full references to these and other sources used by the 
authors are listed in the Bibliography. 

In most cases, personal names have been transliterated from 
the vernacular according to the transliteration system of the 
United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN). Some 
names, such as Boris N. Yeltsin and Joseph V. Stalin, are ren- 
dered in the conventional form widely used in Western 



xvii 



sources. The same distinction has been applied to geographic 
names: the BGN spelling is used for the vast majority, but a few, 
such as the largest cities, Tashkent and Moscow, are given in 
their widely used conventional forms. Some geographical 
names regrettably are missing diacritics because the typesetting 
software being used cannot produce all the necessary charac- 
ters (although they do appear on the maps). Organizations 
commonly known by their acronyms (such as the IMF — Inter- 
national Monetary Fund) are introduced by their full names, 
in both vernacular and English forms where appropriate. 
Adjectives derived from the name of a republic ("Kazakstani" 
and "Uzbekistani," for example) are used in all cases except 
where such a term denotes persons or groups of a specific eth- 
nic origin. In the latter cases, the adjective is in the form 
"Kazak" or "Uzbek." The same distinction applies to the proper 
nouns for citizens of a republic ("Kazakstanis," for example) as 
distinguished from individuals of an ethnic group ("Kazaks"). 

A chronology at the beginning of the book combines signifi- 
cant historical events of the five countries. To amplify points in 
the text and provide standards of comparison, tables in the 
Appendix offer statistics on aspects of the five societies and 
national economies. Measurements are given in the metric sys- 
tem; a conversion table is provided in the Appendix. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of 
March 1996. Certain other portions of the text, however, have 
been updated beyond that point. The Introduction discusses 
significant events and trends that have occurred since the com- 
pletion of research; the Country Profiles and the Chronology 
include updated information as available; and the Bibliography 
lists recently published sources thought to be particularly help- 
ful to the reader. 



xviii 



Table A . Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



EARLY HISTORY 
Fifth century B.C. 



Fourth-third centuries B.C. 
329 B.C. 

First century AD. 

First-fourth centuries AD. 

ca. AD. 500 
EIGHTH-TENTH CENTURIES 
750 

766 

Eighth-ninth centuries 

Late eighth-tenth centuries 

Ninth century 
840 

Tenth century 

Late tenth century 
999 

ELEVENTH-SIXTEENTH 
CENTURIES 

Eleventh century 
ca. 1100 
1130s 

Mid-twelfth century 



Bactrian, Soghdian, and Tokharian states dominate 
area of present-day Uzbekistan, including cities of 
Bukhoro (Bukhara) and Samarqand (Samarkand) 
and begin profit from trade on Silk Route. Province 
of Mawarannahr begins long period of prosperity 
in eastern Uzbekistan. 

Kyrgyz tribes invade northern China. 

Alexander the Great captures Maracanda (Samar- 
qand) in conquest of southern Central Asia from 
Persian Achamenid Empire. 

Han Dynasty of China trades with Soghdians and Bac- 
trians of Central Asia. 

Present-day Tajikistan ruled by Buddhist Kushans, who 
spread their faith to Soghdians. 

Feudal society emerges in present-day Kyrgyzstan. 



Arabs complete conquest of Central Asia with victory 
over Chinese at Talas River, imposing Islam and 
new culture. 

Turkic Qarluq confederation establishes state in 
present-day eastern Kazakstan. 

Under Arab Abbasid Caliphate, golden age of Central 
Asia; Bukhoro becomes a cultural center of Muslim 
world. 

Turkic Oghuz tribes migrate into Central Asia from 
Mongolia and southern Siberia. 

Islam becomes dominant religion of all Central Asia. 

Kyrgyz Khanate reaches greatest extent, defeating 
Uygur Khanate in Mongolia. 

Term Turkmen first applied to southern Islamic Oghuz 
tribes; Persian Samanid Dynasty replaces Abbasids, 
continues cultural activity of Mawarannahr. 

Seljuk Empire founded, based on Oghuz tribes, 
including Turkmen. 

Turkic Qarakhanids overthrow Samanids, ending last 
major Persian state in Central Asia. 



Seljuks and Qarakhanids end dominance of 

Ghaznavid Empire in south Central Asia, dominat- 
ing west and east, respectively. 

Persian replaces Arabic as standard written language 
in most of Central Asia, remains in official use 
through fifteenth century. 

Turkic Karakitais conquer Qarakhanids; dominate 
region for 100 years. 

Revolts by Turkmen hasten disintegration of Seljuk 
Empire; Turkmen begin settling present-day Turk- 
menistan, notably Merv on Silk Route. 



Table A. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1200 



1219-25 



ca. 1250 
1380-1405 



Fourteenth-sixteenth centuries 
Sixteenth century 

1501-10 

1511 

Sixteenth-nineteenth centuries 

SEVENTEENTH-EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURIES 

Seventeenth— eighteenth 
centuries 



1700 



1726 



Mid-eighteenth century 
1758 

1785 

Eighteenth-early nineteenth 
centuries 

NINETEENTH CENTURY 
1820s 

1836-47 

1855-67 

1860s 
1861 



Khorazm (Khorezm, Khwarazm), split from Seljuk 
Empire, consolidates empire including Mawaran- 
nahr and most of Central Asia; cultural activity con- 
tinues. 

Mongols conquer Central Asia, pushing Turkmen 
westward toward Caspian Sea, intensifying Turkifi- 
cation of Mawarannahr, reducing Iranian influ- 
ence, and destroying cultural centers. 

Son of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan conquers Yenisey 
Kyrgyz, beginning 200 years of Mongol domination. 

Timur (Tamerlane) unifies Mongol holdings in Cen- 
tral Asia, fosters last cultural flowering of Mawaran- 
nahr; Turkish first rivals Persian as literary 
language. 

Turkmen tribes reorganize and consolidate. 

Uzbek empire fragmented by fighting among khan- 
ates; decline of Silk Route. 

Uzbek nomadic tribes conquer Central Asia, establish 
Khanate of Bukhoro. 

Khan Kasym unites Kazak tribes. 

Migration east and southeast of large nomadic Turk- 
men tribal groups descending from Salor group. 



Kazak nomads and Mongols raid and weaken Uzbek 
khanates; conflict with Iran isolates Uzbeks in Mus- 
lim world; Kyrgyz tribes overrun by Kalmyks and 
Manchus. 

Khanate of Bukhoro loses Fergana region; Quqon 
(Kokand) Khanate founded, based in Fergana Val- 
ley. 

Kazak Khan Abul Khair seeks Russian protection from 
Kalmyk invaders, beginning permanent Russian 
presence in Kazakstan. 

Turkmen Yomud tribes invade Khorazm. 

Kyrgyz tribes become Chinese subjects with substantial 
autonomy. 

Kyrgyz seek Russian protection from Quqon Khanate. 

Three Uzbek khanates revived by strong dynasties, 
centralized states; British and Russians begin rivalry 
for Central Asia. 



Kazak Great Horde is last of three hordes to come 
under Russian control. 

Under Khan Kene (KenisaryKasimov), Kazaks rise up 
against Russian occupation. 

Yomud tribes rebel against Uzbek authority, which dis- 
perses the eastern Yomud. 

Jadidist reform movement founded. 

Abolition of serfdom in Russian Empire begins migra- 
tion of Russian peasants to Kazakstan. 



XX 



Table A. (Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1865-68 



1867 



1869 
1870s 

1873 
1876 

1881 
1890s 

TWENTIETH CENTURY 
1900 

1906- 07 

1907- 17 
1916 



1917 May 



November 



1918 



1918-19 
1920 



Russian conquest of Tashkent, Bukhoro, and Samar- 
qand; Khanate of Bukhoro becomes Russian pro- 
tectorate. 

Guberniya (Governorate General) of Turkestan estab- 
lished as central Russian administration, eventually 
including (1899) present-day Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and southeastern 
Kazakstan; remainder of Kazakstan becomes Steppe 
District. 

Russians establish foothold in Turkmen territory at 
Krasnovodsk. 

Russian cotton cultivation significantly expanded; Rus- 
sians carry out punitive raids against Turkmen in 
Khorazm. 

Russians capture Khiva. 

Russians incorporate Quqon Khanate; all Uzbekistan 
and northern Kyrgyzstan in Russian Empire. 

Russians crush Turkmen resistance at Gokdepe for- 
tress; Turkmen territory annexed into Guberniya 
of Turkestan. 

Uzbek revolts against Russian rule quelled easily; 
large-scale Russian setdement begins in northern 
Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, diminishing Kazak and 
Kyrgyz nomadism. 



Jadidism becomes first major movement of Central 
Asian political resistance. 

Central Asians have six seats in first and second Rus- 
sian Dumas. 

Central Asians have no seats in third and fourth Rus- 
sian Dumas. 

Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbeks rebel against 
Russian land confiscation, conscription; many 
Kazaks, Kyrgyz flee to China. 

Russian provisional government abolishes Guberniya 
of Turkestan; power divided among various groups, 
including Tashkent Soviet. 

Bolshevik Revolution begins establishment of Soviet 
state. 

Bolsheviks declare Turkestan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic, including most of present-day 
Central Asia in Russia; Bolsheviks crush autono- 
mous government in Quqon; Jadidists and others 
begin decade-long Basmachi revolt involving ele- 
ments from all five republics and mercenaries; 
Alash Orda establishes independent Kazak state. 

Widespread famine. 

Soviet General Frunze captures Ashgabat, ending anti- 
communist government there, and Bukhoro, end- 
ing khanate; Faizulla Khojayev becomes president 
of newly established Soviet Bukhoran People's 
Republic; Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic established, including Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakstan. 



Table A. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1921 

1921-27 

1924 

1925 

1927-34 

1929 
1929-34 
1930s 
1936 

Late 1930s 
1941-43 

1956-64 

1959-82 
1985 

1986 



December 



Late 1980s 
1989 



Communists win in Russian Civil War, reduce power of 
Central Asian party branches. 

New Economic Policy (NEP) expands cotton cultiva- 
tion in Central Asia. 

Soviet socialist republics of Turkmenistan and Uzbeki- 
stan formed, with Tajikistan an autonomous repub- 
lic in latter. 

Most Basmachi resistance in Tajikistan overcome; 
large-scale refugee movement from eastern 
Bukhoro; Kazak Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Kazak ASSR) separated from Kyrgyz 
ASSR 

Waves of communist party purges in all republic 
branches; Central Asian autonomy drives intensify 
purges there. 

Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan established, 
northern territory added. 

Soviet collectivization induces widespread famine in 
Central Asia. 

Khojayev, other Central Asian communist leaders exe- 
cuted in Stalin purges, replaced by Russians. 

Kazak and Kyrgyz ASSRs given full republic status in 
Soviet Union; Karakalpakstan transferred from Rus- 
sia to Republic of Uzbekistan. 

Nomadic lifestyle ends for most Turkmen. 

Many European Soviet plants moved to Central Asia to 
avoid capture by invading Nazis. 

Rehabilitation of some Central Asian communist lead- 
ers purged by Stalin; Russification remains prereq- 
uisite for party advancement; Virgin Lands 
program restructures agriculture in Central Asian 
republics. 

Tenure of Sharaf Rashidov as first secretary of Com- 
munist Party of Uzbekistan. 

Election of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as first secretary of 
Communist Party of Soviet Union, heralding 
impact of Moscow reform programs in Central Asia. 

Widespread purge of Communist Party of Uzbekistan 
leadership begins after exposure of corruption in 
Rashidov regime; nationalism, anti-Russian feeling 
intensify. 

Widespread demonstrations in Kazakstan after 

appointment of Gennadiy Kolbin as party leader in 
Kazakstan; Kazak opposition groups appear; unrest 
continues through 1989. 

Uzbekistani intellectuals begin forming opposition 
political groups. 

Uzbeks clash with Meskhetian Turks and Kyrgyz in 
Osh; Moscow names Islam Karimov first secretary 
of Communist Party of Uzbekistan. 

Political opposition group Agzybirlik formed in Turk- 
menistan; refused credentials. 



Table A. (Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1990 February 
June-August 

August 

October 

November 

1991 August 

September 

October 

November 
December 



1992 



March 
May 

June 

Mid-year 

July 



Nursultan Nazarbayev named communist party head 
in Kazakstan. 

Riots in Dushanbe protest communist housing policy 
in Tajikistan; state of emergency declared, opposi- 
tion parties suppressed. 

Violent conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and anti- 
communist demonstrations in Kyrgyz cities; opposi- 
tion group, Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, 
emerges. 

Republic of Turkmenistan declares sovereignty within 
Soviet Union. 

Saparmyrat Niyazov elected president of Turkmeni- 
stan, running unopposed. 

Askar Akayev elected president of Republic of Kyr- 
gyzstan, defeating communist incumbent. 

Coup against Gorbachev government fails in Moscow; 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan declare independence from 
Soviet Union. 

Tajikistan declares independence from Soviet Union; 
communist Rahmon Nabiyev named president 
after ban of Communist Party of Tajikistan fails. 

Turkmenistan declares independence from Soviet 
Union; Akayev elected president of independent 
Kyrgyzstan, running unopposed. 

Communist Party of Uzbekistan reorganized, renamed 
People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. 

Nazarbayev elected president of Kazakstan, which 
declares independence from Soviet Union; five 
Central Asian states sign Alma-Ata Declaration for- 
mally establishing Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS); Communist Party of Turkmenistan 
renamed Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, 
retains political domination; Uzbekistan elects new 
parliament and Karimov its first president. 

Five Central Asian states join Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO). 

Niyazov introduces "Ten Years of Prosperity" economic 
reform program for Turkmenistan. 

Antigovernment riots begin in Dushanbe, escalate into 
civil war in April. 

Turkmenistan adopts new constitution; Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan sign treaties of friendship and coopera- 
tion with Russia. 

Niyazov reelected president of Turkmenistan, running 
unopposed; Kyrgyzstan signs treaty of friendship 
and cooperation with Russia. 

Five Central Asian states begin taking over former 
Soviet military installations on their respective terri- 
tories. 

Tajikistan signs treaty of cooperation and assistance 
with Russia, allowing Russian forces to clear anti- 
government forces from Tajikistan. 



Table A. (Continued) Chronotogy of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1993 



September 
November 

December 



January 



April 
June 

September 

November 
December 



1994 January 
March 
May-July 

June 

September 
October 



Tajikistan's president Nabiyev forced to resign; coali- 
tion government takes power. 

Tajikistan's coalition government resigns, communist 
Rahmonov named head of state; opposition forces 
continue civil war. 

Uzbekistan adopts new constitution; Birlik, main 
opposition party, banned in Uzbekistan; Dushanbe 
falls to Tajikistani government forces. 

"Cult of personality" of Niyazov extended in Turkmen- 
istan with renaming of streets, buildings, and city of 
Krasnovodsk (Turkmenbashy) . 

Repression of opposition and media increases in 

Uzbekistan; by December, only state organs can reg- 
ister. 

New Kazakstani constitution adopted, names Kazak 
official state language; Akayev requests government 
emergency measures to end Kyrgyzstan's drastic 
economic decline. Kazakstani government forms 
National Council for Economic Reform; govern- 
ment of Tajikistan makes criminal charges against 
opposition leader Hajji Akbar Turajonzoda. 

Chevron Oil finalizes joint venture to develop Tengiz 
offshore oil fields with Kazakstan. 

Tajikistan bans three major opposition parties; Gorno- 
Badakhshan Autonomous Province ends claims of 
independence from Tajikistan. 

Kyrgyzstan signs military cooperation agreements with 
Russia; Afghan and Tajik rebels kill twenty-eight 
Russians in capturing border post in Tajikistan. 

Agreement for new ruble zone signed by Kazakstan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; four Central Asian 
states, excluding Turkmenistan, join five other CIS 
states, including Russia, in economic union. 

Tenge becomes official currency of Kazakstan; Tajik 
rebels resume fighting in Gorno-Badakhshan. 

Turkmenistan signs treaty of cooperation, mutual 
assistance, and joint border security with Russia; 
Akayev dismisses Kyrgyzstani government of Tur- 
sunbek Chyngyshev after vote of no confidence; 
Kazakstan approves Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty as non-nuclear signatory, Kazakstan's parlia- 
ment dissolves itself. 

Referendum approves extension of Niyazov's term as 
president of Turkmenistan to 2002. 

First multiparty elections in Kazakstan (for parlia- 
ment) , dominated by Nazarbayev supporters. 

Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 
join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Partnership for Peace. 

Kyrgyzstan eases language, citizenship restricdons to 

slow emigration of Russians. 
Kyrgyzstani government resigns; parliament dissolved. 
Cease-fire begins in Tajikistani civil war. 



xxiv 



Table A. (Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period Description 

November Rahmonov elected president of Tajikistan, without 

participation of major opposition parties; plebiscite 
approves newTajikistani constitution. 

December New Majlis (assembly) elected in Turkmenistan, domi- 

nated by Democratic Party. 

December-January Uzbekistan's parliamentary elections dominated by 

1995 People's Democratic Party. 

1995 Sporadic cease-fires, peace talks, and resumption of 

fighting in Tajikistan. 

February Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan sign ten-year partnership 

and cooperation agreement with European Union 
(EU); parliamentary elections in Tajikistan boy- 
cotted by opposition; first of three election rounds 
for new bicameral parliament of Kyrgyzstan. 

March Referendum extends Karimov's term as president of 

Uzbekistan to 2000; Kazakstani parliament resigns, 
Nazarbayev begins rule by decree. 

April Referendum extends Nazarbayev's term to 2000. 

May Tajikistan introduces new currency, Tajikistani ruble. 

June Two Turkmen opposition leaders sentenced to prison 

terms. 

August Kazakstan's new constitution approved by popular ref- 

erendum. 

December Parliamentary elections held in Kazakstan under pro- 

test by opposition parties. 

1996 February Referendum extends presidential powers of Akayev, 

Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan sign extended customs 
union agreement with Belarus and Russia; Turk- 
menistan signs major natural gas sales agreement 
with Turkey. 

March After resignation of Kyrgyzstan's government, Akayev 

names new cabinet headed by Apas Jumagulov, 
prime minister of previous government. 

April Directors of seventeen banks in Kyrgyzstan charged 

with illegal use of funds, triggering national bank 
scandal; Kyrgyzstan bans Ittipak, Uygur separatist 
organization; Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 
sign Shanghai border security treaty with China 
and Russia, pledging aid to China against separat- 
ists from Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. 

May Kazakstan bans Russian newspaper Komsomol 'skay a 

pravda for article by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn claim- 
ing parts of Kazakstan as Russian territory, to ease 
severe economic crisis, Kazakstani government can- 
cels US$300 million of agriculture sector's debts; 
Uzbekistan's Karimov threatens withdrawal from 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) for 
Iran's "politicization" of ECO by criticism of Israel 
and United States; Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan support Karimov. 

June Kazakstan opens widespread antinarcodcs offensive 

and amnesties 20,000 prisoners to relieve prison 
overcrowding; Tajikistan signs plan for energy 
export to Russia; Karimov makes official visit to 



XXV 



Table A. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



July 



August 



October 



October-November 



November 



December 



1997 January 



United States to improve bilateral and UN rela- 
tions; Uygurs in Kazakstan continue protests 
against Shanghai treaty, Nazarbayev's threat to dis- 
solve parliament gains passage of unpopular pen- 
sion bill; chairman of Kazakstan's Supreme Court 
dismissed for corruption. 

Rahmonov of Tajikistan consolidates power by orga- 
nizing National Security Council under presidential 
control and by antinarcotics campaign in rebel 
stronghold Gorno-Badakhshan, using nominally 
neutral Russian border troops. 

Presidents of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 
sign accord for creation of single economic market 
by 1998; UN-sponsored cease-fire of July is broken 
by heavy fighting in Tajikistan's central region, as 
rebels renew thrust toward Dushanbe. 

Antigovernment United Tajikistan Opposition pro- 
poses National Reconciliation Council including 80 
percent opposition and 20 percent government 
members; Tajikistan government rejects formula. 
Japan commits US$140 million to upgrade three 
airports in Uzbekistan and US$200 million for 
infrastructure and medical centers in Kazakstan; 
bilateral accords with Iran and Russia reaffirm 
Turkmenistan's "permanent neutrality." 

Turkmenistan's Nabiyev confers in Moscow with Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin, reaching no agreement 
on natural gas deliveries to Russia or on ownership 
of Caspian Sea resources. 

Rebel forces open corridors from Afghanistan into 
eastern Tajikistan, threatening to take full control 
of eastern and central regions; government forces 
offer weak resistance. 

Acute energy shortage brings winter rationing of elec- 
tric power and heat in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. 

Tajikistan's Rahmonov signs new cease-fire agreement 
with rebel coalition; ensuing peace agreement calls 
for reconciliation council to amend constitution; 
Kazakstan sells its first bond issue on the interna- 
tional bond market; Turkmenistan's 1996 inflation 
rate estimated at 140 percent, highest among Cen- 
tral Asian republics; Kazakstan and international 
consortium set terms for pipeline construction to 
export Kazakstan's Tengiz oil. 

Kazakstan begins shipping oil from its Tengiz field by 
tanker across Caspian Sea for resale by Iran; 2 mil- 
lion tons to be shipped annually until new export 
pipeline completed; two Japanese firms agree to 
build $US138 million telephone network in Uzbeki- 
stan; at meeting of Central Asian Economic Union, 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan sign mutual 
defense treaty and discuss mutual convertibility of 
currencies; Topchubek Turgunaligev, head of 
opposition Erkin Party in Kyrgyzstan, sentenced to 
prison for embezzlement as political repression 
tightens. 



xxvi 



Table A. (Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



January-March Six rounds of peace talks between Tajikistan govern- 

ment and United Tajikistan Opposition yield signif- 
icant agreements on reintegration of political and 
military organizations. 

February Japan signs US$580 million agreement to build 

polypropylene plant in Turkmenistan. 

March Kyrgyzstan extends Russian border troop presence 

through end of 1997. 

Nazarbayev restructures Kazakhstan's government, 
reducing power of Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhe- 
geldin. 

May Terms set for pipeline connecting Tengiz oil field in 

Kazakstan with Russia's Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk, to open September 1999. 

June Peace accord between Rahmonov government and 

United Tajik Opposition formally ends civil war in 
Tajikistan. 

July New National Reconciliation Commission scheduled 

to begin work on procedures for parliamentary 
elections to be held in Tajikistan by the end of 
1998. 

Andijan-Osh-Kashgar Highway opens, connecting 
points in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with China. 

August Kazakstan and Russia sign treaty easing conditions for 

Russians in Kazakstan, aimed at reducing emigra- 
tion of Russian technical experts. 

Political negotiations in Tajikistan delayed by scattered 
fighting and disagreements over conditions. 

September United States forces join troops of Kazakstan, Kyr- 

gyzstan, Russia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan in peace- 
keeping exercise in south-central Kazakstan, the 
first such combined exercise. 



xxvii 



BULGARIA 1 



<Btac 
Sea 



TURKEY 

^Mediterranean 
3 Sea 



SYRIA 



7~~- 



International 

boundary 

® National capital 

200 400 Kilometers 
200 400 Miles 



N 



A 



AN 



Lake. <Balkfrash 

Q %k Almaty 
GYZSTAnS/ 



KUW4I1 



SAUDIA 
ARABIA 



( < 2trs\ 
X Qu\) 



Figure 1. Kazakstan, Kyr 



CHINA 



Boundary representation not 
necessarily authoritative 



XXX 



Introduction 



IN 1991 THE FIVE SOVIET REPUBLICS of Central Asia— 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbeki- 
stan — were faced for the first time with the prospect of exist- 
ence as independent states. In critical respects, they were 
unprepared for this event: their economies all had performed 
specific tasks in the Soviet system, mainly the supply of raw 
materials; only outdated Soviet-era political structures 
remained behind in the five republics, with no tradition of 
national political institutions; and the end of the union frag- 
mented the armed forces units of the former Soviet Union that 
remained on the republics' territory. In the 1990s, the progress 
of the five republics toward resolving these problems has been 
quite uneven. The republics with the richest natural 
resources — Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — have 
developed the strongest economies — albeit with serious defects 
in each case — and have attracted substantial Western invest- 
ment. In all cases, movement away from the Soviet model of 
strong, one-party central government has been extremely slow. 
Some degree of military autonomy has appeared in all repub- 
lics save Tajikistan, which still is bedeviled by rebel forces and a 
porous southern border. At the same time, the strategic doc- 
trine of all Central Asian countries remains based on protec- 
tion from Russia's military. 

The total area of the five republics is approximately 3.9 mil- 
lion square kilometers, slightly more than 40 percent of the 
area of the United States and less than one-quarter of the area 
of Russia (see fig. 1). The region stretches from the Caspian 
Sea in the west to China in the east, and from central Siberia in 
the north to Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan in the south. The 
area of the republics varies greatly: Kazakstan, by far the larg- 
est, occupies about 2.7 million square kilometers, more than 
two-thirds of the region. The smallest republic, Kyrgyzstan, 
occupies only 198,500 square kilometers. The Central Asian 
republics also feature quite different topographies, varying 
from the wide expanses of desert in primarily flat Kazakstan 
and Turkmenistan to the steep slopes and river valleys of 
mountainous Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (see fig. 2). 

The region contains enormous natural and agricultural 
resources. All five republics have favorable agricultural regions 



xxxi 



n 



UKRAINE 



RUSSIA 



<BCaci 

, Sea \ 



— — International 
boundary 
® National capital 

200 400 Kilometers 
200 400 Miles 



TURKEY 

'Mediterranean 

"'-i Sea 



I 



AZERBAIJAN ^ / -fi^T 



KAZAKSTAN 



Caspian.' 



IRAQ 



/ v. ^ 

TURKMENISTAN ~' N f Hi 



Xafc 'Balkhash 



^'KUWAIT 



IRAN 



SAUDIA 
ARABIA 



s Wi 



\ks h ^r^t-^ maty 

{Ashgabat \ V® \ 

— - v-"Z . s ^KYRGYZSTAN > 

( /- 'l^®Dushan6e '{ 

AFGHANISTAN 



CHINA 



TAJIKISTAN 



PAKISTAN; Boundary representation not 
-j necessarily authoritative 



Figure J. Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Geographic Setting, 1996 



and some combination of attractive minerals and fuels. Their 
industrial bases include trained workers, and their populations 
have relatively high educational levels and literacy rates. Unfor- 
tunately, the moribund, highly inefficient system through 
which the Soviet Union exploited those resources has proved 
very difficult to disassemble. The Central Asians have suffered 
all the typical transitional ills of former communist states mov- 
ing toward a market economy: erratic supply of critical indus- 
trial inputs, increased unemployment, sharply increased 
inflation, declining capacity utilization and output by industry, 
and acute shortages of goods. In response, all five governments 
have pledged meaningful reform, but obstacles such as 
unworkable government structure, ethnic rivalries, and a vari- 
ety of social tensions have made all five move cautiously. 

Central Asia has a rich history to which numerous tribes and 
nationalities have contributed over at least 2,500 years. A vital 
factor in the history of the southern part of the region was its 
location astride the most direct trade route between China and 
Europe, the so-called Silk Route, which began to develop in the 
heyday of the Roman Empire (see fig. 3). Cities such as Samar- 
qand (Samarkand) and Bukhoro (Bukhara), founded by Irani- 
ans, became powerful cultural and commercial centers as East- 
West trade increased. That prosperity made part or all of the 
region the object of many conquests (including those by the 
Arabs in the eighth century A.D., several Turkic groups begin- 
ning in the ninth century, and the Mongols in the early thir- 
teenth century). The Arabs and the Turks brought Islam to 
much of Central Asia. Meanwhile, the northern part of the 
region was inhabited by nomadic herding peoples, including 
the Turkic predecessors of the Kazaks and Kyrgyz, who also fell 
under the control of the Mongols. 

In the sixteenth century, the Uzbeks established powerful 
khanates along the Silk Route. Those entities flourished until 
the nineteenth century, when they were overtaken gradually by 
the traders and settlers of the expanding Russian Empire. The 
Russians moved southward from the steppes of Kazaks tan in 
search of trade and later of the cotton that could be grown in 
present-day Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In the 
ensuing decades, cotton became the vital economic magnet for 
increased Russian occupation, and large tracts of the region 
were devoted to that crop to supply Russia's domestic needs. 

In 1917 the region passed from the Russian Empire to the 
Soviet Union, with little participation by its inhabitants. Full 



xxxii 



Soviet control did not occur until the mid-1920s, as guerrilla 
bands continued to resist Soviet authority. In the 1920s, four of 
the five republics came into existence for the first time as 
Soviet authorities drew borders in anticipation of reordering 
all of Central Asian society. (Kyrgyzstan gained full republic sta- 
tus in 1936.) In the 1930s, the primarily agricultural region was 
traumatized by the forced collectivization campaign of Joseph 
V. Stalin's regime; episodes of widespread famine were com- 
mon. (By 1900 the Kazak, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen nomads 
already had suffered massive disruption of their traditional life- 
styles as a result of Russian settlers taking their grazing land for 
farms.) 

Throughout the Soviet period, the Central Asian republics 
participated in the life of the union in a rather peripheral 
sense, and many phases of cultural life were unaffected by 
Soviet rule. Local communist parties suffered the same purges 
as those in other republics, but they exercised little political 
influence in Moscow. Regional economies were stunted by 
increased demands for production of cotton and other specifi- 
cally assigned items. As was discovered in the 1980s, decades of 
Soviet intensive cultivation caused massive pollution, from 
which the region still suffers. Interrepublican animosities over 
access to scarce resources went largely ignored by Soviet 
authorities. The more liberal Soviet regime of Mikhail S. Gor- 
bachev (in office 1985-91) saw increased airing of grievances 
that long had been withheld by the peoples of the Central 
Asian republics, but before 1991 no organized movement for 
independence had evolved from that discontent. 

The five post-Soviet states of Central Asia still are defined by 
the arbitrary borders created in the early years of the Soviet 
era, and the demarcation among them still fails to correspond 
to the ethnic and linguistic situation of the region. Thus, Kyr- 
gyzstan and Turkmenistan have substantial Uzbek minorities, 
and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have large numbers of their 
respective neighbor's people. Kazakstan has few Central Asian 
people of other nationalities; its largest minorities are Russian, 
Ukrainian, and German. 

Until the 1990s, the Soviet Central Asian states were viewed 
from the outside world largely as parts of a single, homoge- 
neous region. Since 1991, however, the Western world has 
begun to discover substantial differences in almost all aspects 
of those new nations. The West also has discovered the possibil- 
ity of commercial gain from oil, natural gas, gold, and other 



xxxv 



natural resources abundant in the region. The presence of 
these materials was known in the Soviet era, but they were 
accessible only by way of Moscow. 

In responding to their neighbors in the new independence 
period, the policy makers of the five states have moved in two 
contrary directions: toward establishing common goals and 
greater unity in a regional grouping, and toward individual 
economic and political development and identification with 
countries outside the region. The philosophical ideal of Pan- 
Turkism, an ethnically based unity concept that originated 
among Central Asian intellectuals in the nineteenth century, 
still receives support, but relatively few concrete steps have 
been taken to realize the ideal. Furthermore, the people of 
Tajikistan are of predominantly Persian rather than Turkic ori- 
gin. Meanwhile, Central Asians have placed special emphasis 
on ethnic self-differentiation as a belated reaction against the 
stereotyping of non-Slavs that was common practice in the 
Soviet Union. That ethnic generalization continues in the Rus- 
sian Federation, which still exerts enormous influence in the 
Central Asian republics. 

The most important single cultural commonality among the 
republics is the practice of Sunni Islam, which is the professed 
religion of a very large majority of the peoples of the five 
republics and which has experienced a significant revival 
throughout the region in the 1990s. Propaganda from Russia 
and from the ruling regimes in the republics identifies Islamic 
political activity as a vague, monolithic threat to political stabil- 
ity everywhere in the region. However, the role of Islam in the 
five cultures is far from uniform, and its role in politics has 
been minimal everywhere except in Tajikistan. For Kazaks, Kyr- 
gyz, and Turkmen, whose society was based on a nomadic life- 
style that carried on many traditional tribal beliefs after their 
nominal conversion, Islam has had a less profound influence 
on culture than for the sedentary Tajik and Uzbek Muslims, 
who have a conventional religious hierarchy. 

Regional economic cooperation, another type of unity that 
has received substantial lip service in the 1990s, has failed to 
materialize on a large scale. All five republics joined the Eco- 
nomic Cooperation Organization (ECO — see Glossary) shortly 
after independence, and Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbeki- 
stan established a limited common market in 1994. But Uzbeki- 
stan vetoed the membership of unstable Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan refused to join. Existing arrangements within 



xxxvi 




Figure 3. Central Asia i 
xxxviii 



the free-trade zone have not significantly promoted large-scale 
commerce within the group of three. For all five republics, Rus- 
sia remains the top trading partner because much of the 
emphasis in their agricultural and industrial infrastructures 
remains the same as when the republics had assigned roles in 
supplying Moscow. Those roles and dependence on Russian 
trade are changing slowly in the mid-1990s, however, as diversi- 
fication occurs. 

Several factors encourage economic rivalry rather than 
cooperation. Water, a crucial resource for agriculture and 
power generation, has been the object of bitter bilateral and 
multilateral disputes both before and after independence. In 
the 1990s, the republics at the headwaters of major rivers, Kyr- 
gyzstan and Tajikistan, have chafed at apportionment of water 
consumption favoring downstream consumers Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan has complained about 
excessive water consumption by the Uzbekistanis upstream. 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have come close to conflict over 
water in the Fergana Valley, where vital agricultural reform and 
land privatization programs are endangered by unresolved 
water disputes. 

The republics still offer a similar range of commodities for 
trade. Their common emphasis on cotton, natural gas, and oil 
limits the potential for advantageous commerce within the 
group and fosters rivalry in trade with outside customers. Some 
of the commercial relationships that have developed — such as 
the sale of fuels to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan by the other three 
fuel-rich republics — have been one-sided and subject to shut- 
down in response to nonpayment or in attempts to gain eco- 
nomic and political leverage. 

The five republics have several major problems in common. 
All remain in the economic, military, and political shadow of 
their giant neighbor to the north. In the mid-1990s, Russian 
policy makers, encouraged by a very vocal nationalist faction in 
the federation, speak openly of recapturing influence in the 
"near abroad"; Central Asia usually is the first region cited as an 
example. In the first two years of independence, the five repub- 
lics remained in the ruble zone (see Glossary), their monetary 
activities restricted by the nonconvertibility of the old Soviet 
ruble that remained the currency of that grouping. In 1993 all 
but Tajikistan introduced new currencies with limited convert- 
ibility. Russia had attempted to keep Kazakstan and Uzbekistan 
in a new Russian ruble zone, but ruble distribution problems 



xxx ix 




XXXY111 



and harsh conversion conditions forced those republics to fol- 
low the independent course of Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. 
The Tajikistani ruble (for value of the Tajikistani ruble — see 
Glossary) introduced in 1995 remained closely connected with 
its Russian counterpart. In 1996 Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan 
established a new customs union and other economic ties with 
Russia and Belarus, hoping to gain selected advantages while 
avoiding large-scale concessions that would increase Russian 
influence. 

The Soviet legacy includes an economic infrastructure in 
which all republics depend heavily on other republics for vital 
inputs. A complex Soviet-designed system of pipelines and elec- 
tric cables connects the five republics. Pending completion of 
Turkmenistan's new line to Iran, only one railroad line leading 
out of Central Asia connects the region with a destination 
other than Russia (the one line goes only to the Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region in China). Heavy industry in all 
five republics also has depended heavily on local Russian 
skilled labor. 

The Central Asian republics also suffer common geographic 
disadvantages. All are landlocked and located far from poten- 
tial markets outside the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS — see Glossary) and the Middle East. Nations such as Azer- 
baijan and Afghanistan, through which goods must travel over- 
land to reach Western markets, still are quite unstable, and 
others such as China and Russia are powerful neighbors with a 
history of taking advantage of weaker nations that need com- 
mercial favors. Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, both in need of a 
route to move oil and gas to Western customers, have been 
especially frustrated by Russia's failure to support new pipe- 
lines. The landlocked position also presents a national security 
obstacle. 

Although the region is blessed with ample arable land, most 
of that land becomes useful only when irrigated. Large-scale 
irrigation, in turn, has taken a huge toll on the hydrological 
systems of the region — in the most obvious case, the system 
that feeds the fast-disappearing Aral Sea. Regional cooperation 
on the Aral Sea problem, recognized as one of the most serious 
environmental crises in the world, received much lip service 
and little action in the first half of the 1990s. By 1995 an esti- 
mated 36,000 square kilometers of the sea's bed had been 
exposed, and an estimated 3 million inhabitants of nearby 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakstan had developed 



xl 



chronic health problems associated with that process. In Octo- 
ber 1995, a United Nations (UN)-sponsored regional confer- 
ence produced the Nukus Declaration, which resulted in the 
promise of intensified joint efforts to stabilize the sea and a 
pledge of US$200 million from the UN and the World Bank 
(see Glossary) for regional development and aid. 

When independence was declared in 1991, none of the five 
republics had experienced an independence movement or had 
a corps of leaders who had considered how such a change 
might be managed. Five years after independence, in four of 
the states political leadership remains in the hands of the same 
individual as in the last years of the Soviet Union: Nursultan 
Nazarbayev in Kazakstan, Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan, Sapar- 
myrat Niyazov in Turkmenistan, and Islam Karimov in Uzbeki- 
stan. President Imomali Rahmonov of Tajikistan was not 
president in 1991, but, like his cohorts, his roots are in his 
republic's pre-1992 political world. Political power in all five 
republics is based on clan and regional groupings that make 
national coalitions risky and fragile. Clan rivalries have played a 
particular role in the civil war of Tajikistan and in Akayev's diffi- 
culties in unifying Kyrgyzstan behind a reform program. 

Although all the republics had adopted new constitutions by 
1995, the three government branches prescribed by those doc- 
uments are severely imbalanced in favor of the executive. In all 
five cases, the political opposition of the early 1990s has been 
virtually extinguished in the name of preserving stability and 
preventing the putative onset of Islamic politicization. 
Although the new constitutions of the republics specify inde- 
pendent judicial branches, the concept of due process has not 
been established consistently anywhere. 

All five republics have suffered increasing rates of crime in 
the liberalized atmosphere of the postindependence years. 
Drug trafficking, official corruption, and white-collar crime 
have increased most noticeably. All republics lack the resources 
to equip and train qualified police and specialized forces, and 
their judicial systems are not sufficiently removed from their 
Soviet antecedents to deal equitably with new generations of 
criminals. Evaluation and quantification of crime in post-Soviet 
Central Asia have been hampered by changes in responsible 
agencies, by irregularities in reporting procedures, and by lack 
of control and responsiveness in law enforcement agencies, 
particularly in Tajikistan. Statistics for the years 1990 and 1994 
from Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan show dramatic increases in 



xli 



every type of crime, although those from the other three 
republics, where record keeping is known to be substantially 
less comprehensive, show considerable drops in many catego- 
ries. In 1995 and 1996, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan set up new, 
specialized police units to deal with economic and organized 
crime. 

Kazakstan 

By far the largest of the Central Asian republics, Kazakstan 
extends almost 2,000 kilometers from the Caspian Sea in the 
west to the border of China in the east and nearly 1,300 kilome- 
ters from central Siberia in the north to eastern Uzbekistan in 
the south. Despite its size, in population Kazakstan is a distant 
second to Uzbekistan among the Central Asian republics. With 
the lowest birth rate and the highest emigration rate in the 
region, Kazakstan's population has remained virtually stable for 
the past ten years. Kazakstan has by far the largest non-Asian 
population (45 percent in 1994, equaling the Kazak popula- 
tion) and the smallest population of other Central Asian ethnic 
groups (for example, only 2 percent are Uzbek). 

The largest minority in Kazakstan is its Russian population 
(36 percent in 1994), which until the 1990s was the plurality 
group. The status of the Russians, whose number includes 
many irreplaceable technical experts, has been one of Kazak- 
stan's burning post-Soviet issues. The government has resisted 
making Russian an official second language, although Russian 
is understood by most Kazaks and used in most official commu- 
nications. In May 1996, a treaty established the status of Kazak 
and Russian citizens in Russia and Kazakstan, respectively, end- 
ing a long disputed aspect of the nationality issue. 

Of the five Central Asian republics, Kazakstan played the 
most important industrial role in the Soviet system because of 
the abundant coal and oil deposits in the northern sector of 
the republic, closest to Russia. Although the Soviet Union 
developed specific sectors of industry such as chemicals, met- 
als, and military equipment, the republic also inherited an anti- 
quated industrial infrastructure geared to feed materials into 
the Soviet economy. Energy industries, which also played a 
large part in the economy, have suffered from substantial 
reductions in Russia's post-Soviet demand, as have other indus- 
tries that remain dependent on Russian markets. 

In 1996 most of Kazakstan's economy was still state-owned 
and lacked fundamental restructuring, despite large-scale 



xlii 



privatization of smaller enterprises in the preceding years. 
Some large firms have been sold to solid international compa- 
nies (such as the Republic of Korea's (South Korea's) Samsung, 
which now manages the Zhezqazghan Nonferrous Metallurgy 
complex and refinery), but many were awarded to unknown 
companies whose contracts later were cancelled. In June 1996, 
the government sold the country's largest oil refinery at Shym- 
kent, Yuzhneftegaz, one of its largest oil enterprises, and the 
Vasilevskoye gold mine, one of the largest in the world, by pub- 
lic tender to foreign companies. Those sales, together worth an 
estimated US$1 billion, were a major departure from previous 
policy and were aimed at improving the confidence of interna- 
tional investors. 

In 1996 the healthiest parts of the economy were the oil, gas, 
and mineral extraction industries. However, infrastructural 
decay and slow structural reform have delayed the recovery of 
those sectors from post-Soviet lethargy. Many of the state enter- 
prises concentrated in northern Kazakstan are far in debt and 
unable to pay wages to their workers. The transfer of the 
national capital from Almaty along the border of Uzbekistan to 
Aqmola in the industrial north, planned for 1998, is an attempt 
to revive that zone, as well as to retain the cadre of Russian 
technical experts who continue to leave the country. 

Foreign investment in Kazakstan has been frustrated by com- 
plex bureaucratic rules, and the domestic consumer market is 
restricted by the very low average wage of US$96 per month. 
The Western oil companies Chevron and Mobil have invested 
heavily in the Tengiz oil fields offshore in the Caspian Sea, but 
they have been frustrated by a long dispute with the consor- 
tium of Kazakstan, Oman, and Russia over the structure of a 
new delivery pipeline. The common customs regime estab- 
lished with Russia in 1995 has accelerated trade, but conditions 
favored Russia in the first year. 

The Central Bank of Kazakstan, President Nazarbayev, and 
the Council of Ministers play a strong role in economic policy 
making. The bank has advocated market reform and inflation 
control the most strongly of the three. Experts rate 
Nazarbayev's economic initiatives as erratic. Government goals 
for 1996 included reducing inflation to 28 percent (the 1995 
rate was 60 percent), reducing the budget deficit to about 3.3 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary); 
and limiting devaluation of the tenge (for value of the tenge — 
see Glossary) to a 10 percent decline against the dollar. 



xliii 



The exchange rate of the tenge against the United States 
dollar has improved steadily, allowing upper-class Kazaks to 
expand foreign goods purchases. For 1997 the Economist 
Intelligence Unit forecasts significant stabilization and recov- 
ery, with overall GDP growth of 1 percent and consumer price 
inflation of 45 percent. Substantial aid was expected from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) in 1996. 
Full membership in the Islamic Development Bank, achieved 
in mid-1996, brought Kazaks tan additional aid for trade opera- 
tions, personnel training, and infrastructure improvements. 

Despite the abundance of fuel in Kazakstan, in 1996 the 
republic continued to be plagued by its Soviet-era transporta- 
tion system, which failed to connect population centers with 
distant hydrocarbon deposits within the country. As a result, in 
the winter of 1996-97 Almaty and others cities suffered severe 
shortages of electric power and heat. 

In December 1996, Russia finally stopped blocking a multi- 
national agreement to build an export pipeline that would 
allow Kazakstan to sell its abundant oil directly to Western cus- 
tomers. Because the pipeline will not be available until 1999 or 
later, in 1997 Kazakstan began shipping oil across the Caspian 
Sea for resale in Iran — a procedure that risked Western con- 
demnation because of the ongoing economic embargo of Iran. 

As the Soviet Union faced dissolution late in 1991, 
Nazarbayev was one of the last advocates of the union's preser- 
vation in some form. Since that time, he has pursued a careful 
foreign policy aimed at preserving both close relations with 
Russia and as much as possible of his nation's economic and 
political independence. In domestic politics, he nominally 
expanded some of the republic's democratic institutions, push- 
ing through a new constitution and a popularly elected parlia- 
ment. However, Nazarbayev also consolidated his executive 
power steadily in the mid-1990s. Parliaments were dissolved in 
1993 and 1995, and Nazarbayev made numerous changes in 
the personnel and structure of his cabinets, all in an effort to 
obtain cooperation in his reform programs. In April 1995, a 
referendum overwhelmingly extended the president's term to 
2000, canceling the 1995 presidential election. Decrees by 
Nazarbayev in December 1995 and April 1996 further 
extended the president's powers. Nazarbayev also dissolved the 
Constitutional Court in 1995 and replaced members of the 
Supreme Court in 1996. 



xliv 



Party politics in Kazakstan have not worked well, although a 
substantial opposition movement exists. Despite efforts by the 
ruling People's Unity Party (SNEK) to minimize opposition 
activity, the top three opposition parties gained twenty-two of 
sixty-seven seats in the lower house (Majilis) of parliament in 
the December 1995 elections, and another fourteen seats went 
to independent candidates. Indicating the inferior role of par- 
liament in the Kazakstani government, however, was the lack of 
competition in those elections; only forty-nine candidates vied 
for the forty Senate (upper-house) seats being contested. In 
both houses, Kazaks outnumbered Russians, by forty-two to 
nineteen in the Majilis and by twenty-nine to fifteen in the Sen- 
ate (the president appoints seven senators). 

In the Soviet era, Semipalatinsk (now Semey) in northeast- 
ern Kazakstan was the world's largest and most frequently used 
test site for nuclear weapons. During the long Cold-War period 
of nuclear weapons testing, an estimated 1.5 to 2 million peo- 
ple were affected by radioactive pollution in northern Kazak- 
stan. Demonstrations against nuclear testing began in 1989, 
and a major environmental movement sprang from that oppo- 
sition. 

When the Soviet Union dissolved, Kazakstan was one of four 
republics possessing nuclear weapons and materials. In Novem- 
ber 1994, the United States completed Project Sapphire, which 
involved the purchase and removal of more than 600 kilograms 
of weapons-grade plutonium from Kazakstan, whose insecure 
storage facilities and possible nuclear sales to Libya and Iran 
had aroused international concern. In May 1995, the last of 
Kazakstan's nuclear weapons was destroyed, removing a major 
shadow from the Soviet past. The United States has promised 
aid in permanently sealing the Semey test site. 

In the 1990s, Kazakstan's foreign policy has continued 
Nazarbayev's early support of a federation among the former 
Soviet states, now loosely united in the CIS. Because the coun- 
try's industrial and energy bases are located close to Russia's 
southern border, experts have identified Kazakstan as the 
former Soviet republic most likely to experience Russian pres- 
sure toward reunification. Despite the strains caused by the 
uncertain status of the large Russian minority in his republic, 
Nazarbayev has maintained close relations with Russia; in early 
1996, he brought Kazakstan into a new commercial confedera- 
tion with Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan. In June 1996, Prime 
Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin reiterated Kazakstan's full sup- 



xlv 



port for additional CIS integration (while preserving member- 
state sovereignty) and for the reelection of Boris N. Yeltsin as 
president of Russia. Meanwhile, Kazakstan worked with Kyr- 
gyzstan and Uzbekistan to extend the activities of the Central 
Asian Economic Union, which was established in 1993. At the 
Bishkek summit of January 1997, a treaty of "eternal friend- 
ship" guaranteed mutual security assistance among the three 
member nations; the summit also discussed mutual convertibil- 
ity of the three currencies. 

Kyrgyzstan 

Ryrgyzstan, the second-smallest of the Central Asian repub- 
lics in both area and population, is located between two giants: 
Kazakstan to its north and China to its south and east. The 
rural population, already the largest by percentage in Central 
Asia, is growing faster than the cities. Like Kazakstan, Kyr- 
gyzstan has a minority population of Russians (22 percent in 
1994) whose accelerated emigration threatens the country's 
technological base. The country's legal and political systems 
give clear priority to the Kyrgyz majority, alienating not only 
Russians but also the large Uzbek minority concentrated in the 
Osh region of southwestern Kyrgyzstan. Friction persists over 
control of the scarce land of the Fergana Valley, which overlaps 
the territory of three republics: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. The regime of President Askar Akayev (first 
elected in 1990) has attempted to balance sorely needed 
national reform programs with the demands of ethnic groups 
and clans that still exercise strong influence on the country's 
political and social structures. 

Kyrgyzstan, ranked as the second-poorest republic in Central 
Asia, possesses a more limited range of natural resources than 
its neighbors. In the Soviet era, Kyrgyzstan contributed a spe- 
cific group of minerals — antimony, gold, and mercury — to 
Moscow's economic plan. Of the three, only gold is a valuable 
asset in the post-Soviet world; it has attracted several Western 
investor companies. Kyrgyzstan has only limited amounts of 
coal and oil. The major energy resource is water power from 
the republic's fast-moving rivers. However, despite a govern- 
ment program of increased emphasis on hydroelectric power, 
Kyrgyzstan must import a large proportion of its energy supply. 
Kyrgyzstan' s industry, which had been specialized to serve the 
Soviet military-industrial complex, suffered heavily when that 
demand disappeared; conversion has proven very difficult. 



xlvi 



After independence, Kyrgyzstan suffered one of the worst 
economic declines among the CIS states (particularly in indus- 
trial output), despite a reform program that was deployed 
more rapidly than most others. Statistically, privatization was 
very effective, but because meaningful economic change did 
not occur after privatization, inefficient state enterprises con- 
tinued to drag down the economy. Government and commer- 
cial corruption also diluted the effects of economic reform. 

In the mid-1990s, official measurements of Kyrgyzstan' s eco- 
nomic performance were very negative; they were, however, 
not completely accurate. By 1996 an estimated 30 percent of 
real GDP came from the "black economy" — independent, 
unregistered entrepreneurs selling their wares on the street or 
in private shops — while state-owned enterprises continued to 
go bankrupt or failed to pay their employees. However, even 
official GDP bottomed out in 1995; it dropped 6.2 percent 
after slumping by 26 percent in the previous year. The Econo- 
mist Intelligence Unit forecast GDP rises of 1 percent in 1996 
and 2.5 percent in 1997, the latter spurred by the opening of 
the Canadian joint-venture gold mine at Kumtor. In 1995 the 
volume of industrial production dropped 12.5 percent, and 
consumer goods production dropped 25.4 percent, but agricul- 
ture improved by 38.8 percent. 

Other indicators are more positive, however. By early 1996, 
the inflation rate, which had reached 1,400 percent in 1993, 
was about 1 percent per month. The government's goal was to 
halve the end-of-1995 rate by the end of 1996. The exchange 
rate of the som (for value of the som — see Glossary) remained 
stable in 1996 at eleven to US$1. The budget deficit remained 
high at about 12 percent of GDP, with foreign loans applied to 
make up the shortfall. 

Foreign investment remained very sparse in 1996. Many 
joint ventures with Turkey have failed, and the sale of Kyr- 
gyzstani firms to foreign investors has provided embarrassingly 
little revenue for the government. International loans con- 
tinue, but Kyrgyzstan already has fallen behind in repayments 
to Russia and Turkey. Repayment of pending international 
debts inevitably will raise the national debt. Debt and the fail- 
ure of foreign investment have forced Kyrgyzstan to rely more 
heavily on Russia. The customs union that Kyrgystan joined 
with Belarus, Kazakstan, and Russia early in 1996 will add to 
Moscow's power over Kyrgyzstan's trade policy. 



xlvii 



At the same time, Kyrgyzstan's parliament has resisted 
reform legislation that would modernize the tax code and 
privatization of large state enterprises in energy, telecommuni- 
cations, mining, and aviation. According to a government esti- 
mate, as many as 70 percent of privatized enterprises were 
bankrupt in 1996 because, under existing economic condi- 
tions, they simply lacked customers. A limited capital market 
includes the Kyrgyzstan Stock Exchange, which opened in early 
1995, and some independent brokerage houses, but because 
there is no legal framework or government regulation for capi- 
tal exchange, cash transactions were few in 1996. 

Although President Akayev began his regime with ideals of 
multiparty democracy, strong opposition stymied his reform 
programs and moved him gradually closer to the authoritarian 
positions of his four Central Asian colleagues. Power struggles 
between the legislative and executive branches of government 
promoted Akayev's expansion of executive power. In the mid- 
1990s, two elections — the first reelecting Akayev by a huge mar- 
gin in December 1995 and the second giving 95 percent 
approval in a referendum on extending his power in February 
1996 — were approved by international observers as free and 
fair, although the opposition claimed otherwise. The referen- 
dum empowers the president to conduct domestic and foreign 
policy and to name and dismiss cabinet ministers and judges 
without consulting parliament. The parliament retains 
approval rights over the presidential appointment of the prime 
minister, Supreme Court judges, and other officials, but the 
president may dissolve parliament if it fails three times to 
approve a nominee. Akayev had argued that centralizing presi- 
dential power was necessary to speed economic, political, and 
legal reform and to reduce the influence of regional political 
centers. In March 1996, he exercised his new power by secur- 
ing the resignation of the government, naming four new minis- 
ters, and redesignating the positions of five others. He also 
reorganized local government to reduce the power of provin- 
cial leaders and assign them direct responsibility for enactment 
of national reforms. 

In May 1996, a new government document described social 
conditions and listed goals for social programs in the ensuing 
years. Kyrgyzstan, which has made earnest efforts to maintain 
social support programs in the lean years of the 1990s, is 
emphasizing job creation and prevention of unemployment, 
reorganization of social insurance and pension systems, and 



xlviii 



reforms in education and health care. The official unemploy- 
ment figure in mid-1996 was 76,600; about 60 percent of the 
unemployed received unemployment benefits. The govern- 
ment goal is to keep unemployment below 100,000 while 
mounting a new, long-term job creation program. In 1996 a 
proposal was made for a government-controlled social fund to 
run a uniform state insurance and pension system that would 
remove the severe inequities of Kyrgyzstan's current system. 

Meanwhile, nearly one-third of the population (1.257 mil- 
lion) are estimated to live below the poverty line, and the 
14,000 refugees arriving annually from Tajikistan create addi- 
tional social pressures. Kyrgyzstan became a preferred refugee 
destination when Kazakstan and Uzbekistan tightened their 
migration controls in 1993. 

In the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy has been shaped by 
the small country's reliance on Russia for national security. In 
1996 President Akayev reiterated that Kyrgyzstan always would 
view Russia as a natural ally and partner. At the same time, Kyr- 
gyzstan has appealed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO — see Glossary) and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE — see Glossary) to replace the 
CIS force in Tajikistan and, in fact, to guarantee the security of 
the entire region — a position at odds with Russia's strong oppo- 
sition to NATO influence anywhere in the former Warsaw Pact 
regions. However, in early 1997 Akayev backed Russia's opposi- 
tion to NATO expansion in Europe. In 1996-97 Kyrgyzstan 
diversified its national security policy somewhat by participat- 
ing in the Central Asian peacekeeping battalion under the 
aegis of the Central Asian Economic Union. 

Difficult relations with Central Asian neighbors increase the 
need for an outside source of security. Uzbekistan, which has a 
13 percent minority population in western Kyrgyzstan, has 
flexed its muscles by shutting off fuel supplies. Kyrgyzstan 
depends heavily on the Kazakstani capital, Almaty, for air traffic 
in the absence of a first-class domestic airport. Unresolved bor- 
der issues and a continuing flow of civil war refugees have 
inflamed relations with Tajikistan. Greatly expanded trade rela- 
tions with China also have brought large numbers of Chinese 
merchants who threaten to stifle domestic commerce in some 
Kyrgyzstani cities. Kyrgyzstan has expressed the need to bal- 
ance its policy between China and Russia, and has praised 
China for its relative restraint in exerting influence over Cen- 
tral Asia. 



xlix 



Tajikistan 



Located on the western slopes of the Pamir Mountains, 
Tajikistan occupies one of the most rugged and topographi- 
cally divided regions in the world. Possessing extremely convo- 
luted frontiers, it borders Uzbekistan to the west, China to the 
east, Afghanistan to the south, and Kyrgyzstan to the north. 
Tajikistan is the smallest in area and third-largest in population 
of the Central Asian republics. Unlike the ethnically dominant 
groups of the other four republics, the Tajiks have a culture 
and a language based on Iranian rather than Turkic roots. 
Despite their differing cultural backgrounds, the Tajiks and the 
Uzbeks did not consider themselves separate until the Soviet 
Union's artificial demarcation of the republics in the 1920s. 
(Until 1929 the Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan was part of 
the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan.) 

The Soviet Union brought Tajikistan significant advance- 
ment in education, industry, and infrastructure compared with 
the primitive conditions of 1917. In the mid-1990s, however, 
the country remained the most backward of the Central Asian 
republics, partly because of specifically focused Soviet develop- 
ment policies and partly because of topographical factors that 
enormously complicate exploitation of existing resources. 

In the Soviet system, the Tajikistani economy was designed to 
produce cotton, aluminum, and a few other mineral products, 
including uranium and gold. Waged across a large portion of 
the republic, the civil war has caused great and lasting damage 
to the national economy. In 1994 damage to industry was esti- 
mated at about US$12 billion. Production levels in all indus- 
tries had dropped an estimated 60 percent in 1994 compared 
with 1990. Many Germans and Russians, a high percentage of 
the country's key technical personnel, fled the civil war. The 
rate of inflation was steep in 1992-93. 

In 1996 Tajikistan's economy still was in desperate condition. 
It remains the least attractive of the former Soviet republics for 
foreign investment. Only the export of cotton and aluminum 
has brought significant profits. A joint cotton venture with the 
United Arab Emirates was scheduled to begin in mid-1996. In 
1995 the Regar (Tursunzoda) aluminum plant produced 
230,000 tons of primary aluminum, about half its capacity but 
enough to make aluminum the second-largest export product. 
As it was earlier in the 1990s, aluminum production has been 
limited by continued reliance on imported raw materials and 



1 



energy. Tajikistani industry remains handicapped in general by 
the country's inability to pay foreign energy suppliers. 

Some movement toward economic reform was seen in 1996, 
although the unreliability of performance statistics makes eval- 
uation difficult. Prime minister Yahyo Azimov, who took office 
in February 1996, has stressed the need for quick privatization 
and assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. In early 
1996, controls were lifted on bread prices, a move that led to 
riots in some cities but that was considered a sign of commit- 
ment to market reform. The Azimov government set a 1996 
budget deficit cap of 6 percent of GDP. In mid-1996 the World 
Bank was considering a loan of US$50 million, but the IMF 
withheld aid pending improvement of foreign exchange and 
other conditions. The privatization target for the end of 1996 
was 50 percent of total enterprises, after only 8 percent of the 
country's enterprises were privatized in the first four years of 
independence. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecast addi- 
tional GDP reductions of 12.4 percent in 1996 and 10 percent 
in 1997. 

In 1996 and 1997, Tajikistan attempted to join regional orga- 
nizations that would improve its economic position. The cus- 
toms union of Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgzstan, and Russia 
considered Tajikistan for membership, but the Central Asian 
Economic Union of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 
refused Tajikistan's overtures. 

Some improvements were made in 1995-96 in Tajikistan's 
woefully shabby infrastructure. The Daewoo firm of South 
Korea modernized the telephone system, and United States, 
German, and Turkish firms were scheduled to add new fea- 
tures. The Dushanbe Airport still needs modernization, 
although in the mid-1990s regular flights were established to 
Moscow, India, and some other points. 

Especially in comparison with the stable regimes that have 
dominated the other republics since 1991, the political scene 
in Tajikistan has been unsettled from the day of independence 
onward. Throughout the 1990s, an old guard with roots in the 
Soviet era parried the efforts of various opposition groups to 
share or monopolize power. In 1992 a short-lived coalition gov- 
ernment broke down, sending the country into a civil war that 
was won nominally when the old guard forces captured 
Dushanbe and named Imomali Rahmonov chief executive. But 
conflict persisted, based partly on the geographical and clan 
divisions of the country and partly on the political question of 



reform versus reaction. Between 1993 and 1996, fighting 
flared, mostly in limited engagements, in several regions of 
Tajikistan and across the border in Afghanistan. In 1993 a mul- 
tinational CIS force, dominated by Russian units, entered the 
country with the primary mission of enforcing the southern 
border, across which opposition forces had received substantial 
support. In early 1994, the UN arranged a first round of peace 
talks, and five more rounds followed over the next two years. 
None of the talks led to an agreement on peace terms, how- 
ever. 

In 1996 Tajikistan's political situation remained as unstable 
as it had been for the previous three years. The Rahmonov 
regime was unable to defeat rebel forces or to compromise 
enough to reach a satisfactory agreement with them. As it had 
in the previous three years, Russia failed to bring the govern- 
ment and the opposition to the peace table. Meanwhile, con- 
tinued instability provided Russia the pretext for maintaining 
substantial "peacekeeping" forces in a key region of the former 
Soviet Union. The situation has led some outsiders to doubt 
the sincerity of Russia's efforts to bring peace to the area. 

In early June 1996, the civil war in Tajikistan intensified once 
again, and observers saw similarities between Russia's military 
activity there and its occupation of Chechnya. Russian air 
attacks on opposition villages in south-central Tajikistan contra- 
vened the latest three-month extension of the UN-sponsored 
cease-fire (originally signed in 1994), which had been set in 
May. In a new campaign apparently coordinated with Moscow, 
Tajikistani troops moved with Russian air support eastward into 
the country's narrow central corridor toward opposition 
strongholds. Meanwhile, in May the Rahmonov regime refused 
to reconvene UN-sponsored talks as scheduled, and the UN 
Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was refused access to 
the combat zone. In August 1996, opposition troops moved 
close to Dushanbe amid intensified fighting that ended yet 
another cease-fire agreement. 

In the fall of 1996, the government's military position was 
unfavorable as rebel forces drove from Afghanistan into central 
and eastern Tajikistan. In December Rahmonov signed a peace 
agreement with Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader of the opposition 
Islamic Rebirth Party. The agreement called for a National Rec- 
onciliation Council that would be a forum to negotiate the 
terms of a permanent peace. In the months that followed, the 
Rahmonov government negotiated with the United Tajikistan 



lii 



Opposition to reintegrate the political and military organiza- 
tions of the two sides. Scattered fighting continued into the 
spring of 1997, however. 

According to a Russian report in May 1996, the Tajikistani 
army was lacking 40 percent of its nominal officer cadre, and 
only 40 percent of those in service, many of them callups from 
the reserves, had a military education. The Tajikistani force was 
evaluated as inferior to its opposition in training and arma- 
ment. Instances of troop mutiny reinforced that opinion, paral- 
leling the situation in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In both 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, Russian troops operated in a highly 
unstable civil war atmosphere, and the opposing sides were 
deeply divided within themselves. 

As the civil war continued, the Rahmonov regime took steps 
to avoid internal sources of opposition. Although the new con- 
stitution approved in November 1994 contained substantial 
guarantees of human rights (also staples of all the Soviet-era 
constitutions), prescribed legislative and review functions for 
the legislature, and mandated an independent judiciary, in fact 
the country's governance amounted to one-man rule based on 
declarations of emergency executive powers extended from 
1993 and 1994. The result has been imprisonment, exile, and 
assassination of opposition political figures and some foreign 
observers. Rahmonov won a decisive victory in the presidential 
election of 1994, with opposition only from a second hard-line 
politician of similar background, in what was generally labeled 
a rigged outcome. The unicameral legislature offers decisive 
majority support for Rahmonov's programs, and the judiciary 
is fully under the control of the president, who has the power 
to dismiss any judge. The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Province, which accounts for nearly 45 percent of the repub- 
lic's territory, has disputed status and is a main stronghold of 
separatist opposition forces. 

Tajikistan's foreign policy increasingly has sought the eco- 
nomic and military security of close relations with Russia. In 
Tajikistan, the Russian minority enjoys a more liberal set of 
privileges than it finds in any other Central Asian republic. For 
example, Russians are allowed dual citizenship and Russian 
remains an official language. In April 1996, Rahmonov 
appointed the Russian mayor of Dushanbe, Yuriy Ponosov, as 
first deputy prime minister, continuing the policy of granting 
high government positions to ethnic Russians. Despite favor- 
able treatment of the Russian minority, Russians have fled 



liii 



Tajikistan steadily since 1992. In early 1996, only about 80,000 
of the 500,000 Russians identified in the 1989 Soviet census 
remained. Most have complained that Russian government 
authorities did not afford them adequate aid or security in 
Tajikistan, leaving them no choice but to leave. 

Turkmenistan 

Turkmenistan was known for most of its history as a loosely 
defined geographic region of independent tribes. Now it is a 
landlocked, mostly desert nation of only about 3.8 million peo- 
ple (the smallest population of the Central Asian republics in 
the second-largest land mass). The country remains quite iso- 
lated on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, largely occupied 
by the Qizilqum (Kyzyl Kum) Desert. Traditional tribal rela- 
tionships still are a fundamental base of society, and telecom- 
munications service from the outside world has only begun to 
have an impact. Like the Kazaks and the Kyrgyz, the Turkmen 
peoples were nomadic herders until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, when the arrival of Russian settlers began 
to deprive them of the vast expanses needed for livestock. 

Agriculture contributes about half of Turkmenistan's GDP, 
whereas industry accounts for only about one-fifth. However, 
irrigation is necessary for nearly all the republic's arable land. 
In the early 1990s, government subsidies protected consumers 
from the shock of leaving the insulated Soviet system. Never- 
theless, the standard of living protected by those subsidies had 
been among the lowest in the Soviet Union, and it deteriorated 
further in the 1990s. Although the Niyazov regime launched 
ambitious privatization programs in 1992 and 1993 — with 
energy, transportation, agriculture, and communications to 
remain under state control — only minor progress had been 
made toward the programs' goals by the mid-1990s. Progress 
also has been quite slow in the reform of commercial and bank- 
ing legislation. 

Turkmenistan played a vital role in the Soviet system as a nat- 
ural gas supplier. In the post-Soviet period, Russia remained 
the republic's top trade partner, with Turkey moving into sec- 
ond place in the mid-1990s. A crucial rail link with Iran also 
was an important commercial improvement. 

The single most important mineral resource is natural gas; 
Turkmenistan's reserves may be among the largest in the 
world, with estimates as high as 15 trillion cubic meters. Nearly 
all the republic has been identified as potentially productive, 



liv 



and important offshore reserves exist in the Caspian Sea. The 
second major resource is petroleum, of which Turkmenistan 
has an estimated 63 billion tons. However, the range of the 
republic's mineral resources is small: sulfur, mineral salts, and 
clays complete the list. 

In the mid-1990s, Turkmenistan's economic policy contin- 
ued to rely heavily on the West's demand for natural gas. But, 
for a nation isolated along the east coast of the Caspian Sea, gas 
sales depend strictly on pipeline movement. Existing lines, 
built to serve the Turkmenistan-Russia north-south axis, cannot 
fill this need. New lines moving from east to west have been 
planned, but all plans encounter strong geopolitical opposition 
from a regional power or from the United States. Until the 
pipeline problem is solved, Turkmenistan can sell gas only to 
the same customers it served in the Soviet era, who now are its 
impoverished fellow members of the CIS. Armenia and 
Ukraine, major CIS customers, have been chronically late in 
paying. In February 1996, Turkmenistan made a long-term 
agreement to sell as much as 15 billion cubic meters of gas per 
year to Turkey between 1998 and 2020. Turkey also received 
development rights for a field in Turkmenistan believed to con- 
tain 20 million tons of oil. 

Many recent economic indicators can only be approximated 
because Turkmenistan has not issued precise statistics. The 
national currency, the manat (for value of the manat — see 
Glossary), was devalued in late 1995 from a ratio of 500 to 
US$1 to 2,100 to US$1; it has remained non-convertible. It is 
believed that inflation in 1995 exceeded 1,000 percent; the 
1996 annual rate, 140 percent, still was the highest in Central 
Asia. Exports for 1995 were about US$1.9 billion and imports 
about US$1.5 billion in official estimates. However, Turkmeni- 
stan conducts much barter trade, and payment failures of gas 
customers further undermine the application of cash trade fig- 
ures. For 1996 the Economist Intelligence Unit forecast a 5 per- 
cent reduction of GDP following a drop of 15 percent in 1995. 
It also forecast a reduction in inflation in 1996 to 800 percent 
and a further drop in the value of the manat to a rate of 3,000 
to US$1. 

The state still strongly dominates the national economy. Lit- 
tle private enterprise occurs without some form of government 
approval or support, and about 90 percent of the work force is 
in state enterprises. In 1996 plans called for modernization of 
tax and business laws, including joint-venture conditions for 



Iv 



the oil and gas industries. Pending those developments, for- 
eign investors face a mass of state bureaucracy. 

Foreign investment has been small, and experts predict no 
short-term improvement, partly because of the republic's insuf- 
ficient legal and bureaucratic infrastructure, and partly 
because the very small and impoverished population provides 
little market opportunity. (The official average monthly wage 
was US$7 in early 1996.) The European Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development (EBRD) and other international banks 
are funding a textile complex, and Ashgabat Airport will be 
modernized with a loan of US$31 million from the British 
Export Credit Agency. However, for 1996 total direct invest- 
ment was only US$32 million, with another US$61 million in 
joint ventures and US$161 million in foreign loans. 

Turkmenistan has pursued the most independent and prag- 
matic foreign policy of the five Central Asian republics. The 
overall goal has been to form advantageous regional relation- 
ships without becoming involved in regional conflicts such as 
the Tajikistani civil war. In December 1996, Turkmenistan 
passed legislation declaring permanent neutrality and prohibit- 
ing membership in any military or political-military alliance 
entailing responsibilities for collective action by its members. 

President Niyazov has run the country's foreign policy per- 
sonally; he has faced little pressure at home to orient policy in 
a particular direction. Thus, he has been able to form ties with 
diverse foreign nations, maintaining economic advancement as 
the primary goal. Through the mid-1990s, Iran has been the 
top regional partner, although national security relations with 
Russia also have been a high priority during that period. In 
1995 Turkmenistan signed a series of bilateral agreements with 
Russia, expanding economic and political cooperation and 
proclaiming the two nations "strategic partners" through 2000. 

Turkmenistan has explicitly avoided multilateral arrange- 
ments, most of them sponsored by Uzbekistan, with the other 
Central Asian republics. It refused membership in the Central 
Asian customs union established by Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Uzbekistan in 1994, and in the Central Asian Economic Union 
that sprang from the initial agreement. Turkmenistan also con- 
tributed nothing to the CIS peacekeeping force sent to Tajiki- 
stan by those three nations and Russia in 1993. Substantial 
tension has arisen with Uzbekistan over water consumption, 
competition on the world cotton market, the Uzbek minority 
population's potential for unrest, and resentment of Uzbeki- 



lvi 



Stan's ambitions for regional leadership. By the end of 1995, 
tensions with Uzbekistan were so high that Turkmenistan boy- 
cotted all regional meetings. However, in January 1996 a meet- 
ing of the two nations' presidents produced a package of 
economic cooperation agreements, and new agreements on 
road and railroad transportation were discussed in the first half 
of 1996. 

Uzbekistan 

Uzbekistan is the third-largest of the Central Asian republics 
in area and the first in population (estimated at 23 million in 

1994 and growing at the fastest rate in Central Asia). Uzbeki- 
stan is completely landlocked between Kazakstan to the north, 
Turkmenistan to the south, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to 
the east. It shares the Aral Sea, and hence the environmental 
problems of that area, with Kazakstan. The territory of modern 
Uzbekistan was at the center of the rich cultural and commer- 
cial developments that occurred in Central Asia over a period 
of two millennia, especially along the axis defined by the Silk 
Route between Europe and China. Included in Uzbekistan are 
the three chief Silk Route outposts of Bukhoro (Bukhara), 
Khiva, and Samarqand (Samarkand). 

Besides the agricultural base that yields cotton, vegetables, 
and grain, Uzbekistan's economy is blessed with gold, several 
other valuable minerals, and substantial reserves of energy 
resources, especially natural gas. In the mid-1990s, the econ- 
omy still is based primarily on agriculture, following substantial 
increases in irrigation-dependent output in the 1970s and 
1980s. Cotton remains the most valuable crop, and Uzbekistan 
is the fourth-largest cotton producer in the world. 

Uzbekistan has suffered from high inflation, mainly because 
the state has continued Soviet-era social protection programs, 
bank credits for unprofitable enterprises, budget deficits, and 
price supports that require expanding the supply of money. As 
inflation has redistributed wealth, many Uzbekistanis have suf- 
fered substantial losses of real income. By 1994 annual infla- 
tion reached 1,300 percent, but government restrictions in 

1995 lowered the year-end figure to 77 percent. 
Throughout the post-Soviet period, a primary goal of 

Uzbekistan's economic reform policy has been to avoid the dis- 
ruptions associated with rapid transition. While proclaiming 
the eventual goal of a market economy, economic planners 
have moved very slowly in privatization and in the creation of a 



lvii 



Western-style financial sector that would offer economic incen- 
tives and encourage private entrepreneurial initiative. This 
strategy has succeeded in reducing the transition shocks expe- 
rienced by other post-Soviet societies. Since independence, 
Uzbekistan's GDP has fallen about 20 percent, compared with 
the Central Asian average of 50 percent. Part of that modera- 
tion results from Uzbekistan's initially more favorable situation 
in 1992. Because the cotton monoculture gave Uzbekistan a 
commodity with sales value worldwide (in 1995 some 75 per- 
cent of cotton exports went outside the CIS) and because 
Uzbekistan was less dependent on foreign trade and imported 
energy supplies than the other Central Asian countries, the 
end of the Soviet Union imposed fewer economic hardships. 
The 1995 cotton crop, expected to set a record, was signifi- 
cantly below forecast levels, however. Meanwhile, in 1996 the 
republics of the region continued nominal efforts to improve 
the Aral Sea environmental disaster, amid significant doubts 
that Uzbekistan would sacrifice cotton irrigation water from 
Aral tributaries to achieve that goal. 

In late 1995, the IMF lent the regime US$260 million for 
economic reform, the first money accepted by Karimov from 
the IMF. In its evaluation at that time, the IMF noted that 
Uzbekistan's structural reform had been slow, notably in the 
banking sector, but that its tight monetary policy had slowed 
the economy's previous runaway inflation and liberalization of 
foreign exchange had been effective. Inflation for 1995 was 77 
percent; the IMF year-end inflation target for 1996 was 21 to 25 
percent; the exchange rate of the Uzbekistani som (for value of 
the som — see Glossary) fell from thirty to the United States 
dollar in 1995 to thirty-five to the dollar in 1996. The Econo- 
mist Intelligence Unit forecast a 1996 drop in GDP of 1 per- 
cent, followed by growth of 1 percent in 1997. The projected 
budget deficit for 1996 was 3.5 percent of GDP, which con- 
forms with IMF loan guidelines. An IMF credit of US$124 mil- 
lion was granted in December 1995. 

Uzbekistan's economy is one of the most stable in the Cen- 
tral Asian region, and foreign investment activity there has 
been the highest in the region. In December 1995, the United 
States Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreed to pro- 
vide US$500 million to convert the Soviet-era military industry, 
and United States oil companies committed US$1.3 billion of 
long-term investments in the oil and gas industry. Uzbekistan is 
the regional distribution center for electronic and domestic 



lviii 



appliances from Dubai, based on a favorable tariff system that 
places no tax on most imports (a 15 percent tariff was levied on 
electronics in 1996). A large Daewoo (South Korean) television 
and videocassette plant in Tashkent is the most visible foreign 
electronics enterprise. The British Massey-Ferguson firm plans 
an agricultural machinery plant at some future date, and the 
British Quickstop supermarket chain opened outlets in Tash- 
kent in 1996. Although some improvement has been made in 
Uzbekistan's tax and legal system, the dominance of the state 
bureaucracy continues to complicate foreign investment. 

In 1996 the Karimov regime became noticeably less cautious 
in its approach to economic reform. Karimov criticized some 
bureaucrats for hindering execution of reform decrees, and 
the president began advocating private enterprise as the surest 
path to individual and national prosperity. 

Overall foreign trade goals still include expanded commer- 
cial agreements with East Asia and the West, but by 1996 
Uzbekistan had expressed willingness to join a customs union 
with Belarus, Kazakstan, and Russia, which already had reached 
a series of commercial accommodations early in 1996. Self-suf- 
ficiency in oil, gained for the first time in 1996, has freed 
Uzbekistan from dependence on Russia in a key area. 

Uzbekistan's position as the only Central Asian state border- 
ing all the other four has combined with other advantages (the 
largest population in the region and significant natural 
resources) to advance its claim as the leader and potential uni- 
fying force of the Central Asians. That putative role also has 
gained Uzbekistan considerable distrust among the other four 
republics, each of which has a significant Uzbek minority popu- 
lation and each of which has felt the impact of Uzbekistan's 
drive for supremacy in different ways. In 1992 Uzbekistani 
troops — the best-equipped in Central Asia — were instrumental 
in the triumph of Imomali Rahmonov's communist forces in 
Tajikistan, and since that time Uzbekistan has participated in 
the CIS force attempting to keep the peace in that country. In 
tandem with its drive for Western economic ties and privatiza- 
tion, in 1996 Uzbekistan intensified its promotion of regional 
economic and security agreements. Partly as a counterweight 
to Russia's influence in the region, Uzbekistan has encouraged 
broader activities by the Central Asian Economic Union, which 
it shares with Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. In 1996 the most nota- 
ble departure from dependency on Russia was establishment of 
the Central Asian peacekeeping battalion, which held an initial 



lix 



exercise in the United States under the auspices of the NATO 
Partnership for Peace program. In January 1997, the economic 
union's members signed a treaty of "eternal friendship" that 
included mutual security guarantees. 

The armed forces, which had inherited a substantial infra- 
structure from the Soviet period, were the best-equipped force 
in the region by 1996, after developing steadily in the interim 
years. In 1996, Uzbekistan's armed forces numbered 30,000 
persons, including 25,000 ground and 4,000 air force troops. 
At that time, the government announced that ethnic Uzbeks 
constituted 80 percent of the country's armed forces, com- 
pared with 6 percent in the former Soviet force of 1992. 

After independence, much of Uzbekistan's political struc- 
ture remained essentially unchanged. Although some impetus 
had existed toward more democratic governance prior to inde- 
pendence, Karimov set the tone for political activity by winning 
a rigged presidential election in 1991. The new constitution 
approved in December 1992 prescribed a secular, multiparty 
democracy with full observance of human rights. However, the 
trial and harassment of opposition political figures and the 
restriction of the media began immediately; international pro- 
tests in the next few years achieved scant results. Only two par- 
ties, Karimov's and a token opposition group, were permitted 
to participate in the parliamentary election of 1994. In March 
1995, a rigged referendum extended the presidency of Kari- 
mov until 2000. Shortly thereafter, Karimov sentenced seven 
leaders of the political opposition to prison terms. Although 
the stable atmosphere fostered by Karimov's regime had 
tended to soften international criticism, Uzbekistan's human 
rights record still left much to be desired. In 1995 and 1996, 
however, a general improvement in government observation of 
human rights was noted; the government apparently has 
attempted to attract Western investors by responding to criti- 
cism of its handling of human rights cases. Two new political 
parties were formed and registered officially in mid-1995. 

Uzbekistan's relations with Russia have been characterized 
by a combination of resentment and dependence, representing 
one of the few areas where the Karimov regime does not exer- 
cise full control. Although Karimov has strongly encouraged 
business activities by Western countries, especially Germany, he 
has been careful not to alienate Russia's commercial interests. 
In 1994 and 1995, Uzbekistan signed commercial treaties with 



Ix 



a variety of CIS countries, but Russia always was the primary 
partner in such deals. 

The issue of dual citizenship for the Russian minority in 
Uzbekistan, strongly pressed by Russia in the early 1990s, has 
caused serious irritation, as did Russia's unsuccessful pressure 
for Uzbekistan to remain in the ruble zone in 1993. Like the 
other Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan has suffered a rapid 
loss of its Russian technocrat population. Since independence, 
an estimated 500,000 Russians (out of the 1.65 million in 1989) 
have left, and the emigration of Germans, Jews, and Koreans 
further depleted the republic's base of technical know-how. 

Just beyond the borders of Central Asia, Uzbekistan has 
established new relationships with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, 
based chiefly on economic exchanges. Stimulated by the eco- 
nomic stability of Uzbekistan, international lenders such as the 
EBRD and the IMF have offered fairly generous loans. The 
United States, conscious of human rights violations, has 
offered less generous assistance to Uzbekistan than to other 
Central Asian countries. 

The republics of Central Asia emerged from the Soviet 
Union with a combination of assets and handicaps. Their geo- 
graphic isolation has complicated establishment of commercial 
relationships, and even name recognition, in the West. The 
complete lack of democratic tradition has kept the republics 
from complying with Western legal and commercial standards, 
and the expression of political dissent has been erratic and 
sometimes costly to dissenters. Serious deterioration of the 
Soviet-era education systems in all five countries threatens to 
diminish the capabilities of the next generation to contribute 
to the national economies at a time when those economies may 
be ready to flourish. At the same time, ample natural resources 
hold out the prospect that at least the republics most blessed in 
this way — Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — may ulti- 
mately enrich their economies and hence the standard of liv- 
ing of their people. The prospect of full regional cooperation 
remains only theoretical, in spite of numerous bilateral and tri- 
lateral agreements. And relations with Russia, traditionally the 
dominant outside force in Central Asia's geopolitical situation, 
remain close and vital, although fraught with misgivings. In 
early 1997, the future of the region remained nearly as unclear 
as it was in 1991, the year of independence. 

March 31, 1997 Glenn E. Curtis 



lxi 



Chapter 1 . Kazakstan 



Kazak belt buckle depicting snow leopard on a mountain 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Kazakstan. 

Short Form: Kazakstan. 

Term for Citizens: Kazakstani(s). 

Capital: Almaty, scheduled to move to Aqmola 1998. 

Date of Independence: December 16, 1991. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 2,717,300 square kilometers. 

Topography: Substantial variation according to region; Altay 
and Tian Shan ranges in east and northeast, about 12 percent 
of territory, reach elevation of nearly 7,000 meters; more than 
three-quarters of territory desert or semidesert, with elevations 
below sea level along Caspian Sea coast in far west. 

Climate: Continental and very dry except in eastern moun- 
tains, where snowfall heavy; wide temperature variation 
between winter and summer. 

Society 

Population: By 1994 estimate, 17,268,000; annual growth rate 
1.1 percent in 1994; population density 6.2 persons per square 
kilometer in 1994. 

Ethnic Groups: In 1994, Kazaks 45 percent, Russians 36 per- 
cent, Ukrainians 5 percent, Germans 4 percent, Tatars and 
Uzbeks 2 percent each. 

Languages: Official state language a contentious issue; 1995 
constitution stipulates Kazak and Russian as state languages. 
Russian primary language in business, science, and academia. 
Non-Kazak population exerts pressure against requirements 
for use of Kazak. 

Religion: In 1994, some 47 percent Muslim (Sunni branch), 44 



3 



Country Studies 



percent Russian Orthodox, 2 percent Protestant (mainly Bap- 
tist), with smaller numbers of Roman Catholic, Pentecostal, 
and Jewish believers. 

Education and Literacy: Literacy in 1989 was 97.5 percent. 
Education, fully supported by state funds, hampered by 
shortage of facilities and materials and low pay for teachers; 
major program to restructure Soviet system in progress mid- 
1990s; primary language of instruction Russian at all levels. 

Health: Soviet-era free health system declined drastically in 
early 1990s, mainly because of low funding. Drugs and 
materials in short supply, doctors underpaid and leaving 
medicine, child health care especially poor. Infant mortality 
and contagious diseases rising, mid-1990s. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): Estimated 1993 at US$26.5 
billion, or US$1,530 per capita. In 1994 estimated growth rate 
-25.4 percent. In early 1990s, growth hindered by Soviet-era 
specialization and centralization, slow privatization. 

Agriculture: Large-scale misallocation of land in Soviet Virgin 
Lands program, emphasizing cultivation over livestock, con- 
tinues to distort land use. Main crops wheat, cotton, and rice; 
main livestock products meat and milk. State farms continue to 
dominate, 1996; land privatization minimal. 

Industry and Mining: Outmoded heavy industry infrastructure 
inherited from Soviet era, specializing in chemicals, 
machinery, oil refining, and metallurgy; coal, iron ore, 
manganese, phosphates, and various other minerals mined. 
Some light industry. Industrial productivity hampered by lost 
markets and enterprise debt. 

Energy: Plentiful reserves of oil, coal, and natural gas make 
energy production dominant industrial sector. Offshore 
Caspian Sea fields, in early production stages, have huge 
capacity; extraction expanding with Western investment and 
new pipeline project. Natural gas fields, notably Karachaganak, 
will expand output in later 1990s. Thermoelectric power 
plants, main source of power, fueled by lignite mines. 
Kazakstan remains net importer of energy and fuel, 1995. 

Exports: Mainly raw materials: metals, oil and petroleum 



4 



Kazakstan 



products, chemicals, worth US$3.08 billion in 1994; share of 
bartered goods, substantial in early 1990s, smaller in 1995 and 
mainly with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
partners. Cash sales to CIS partners increased substantially in 
1995, partially replacing barter. Export structure shifting 
steadily to non-CIS partners, mid-1990s, as Western oil sales 
increase; non-CIS expansion needed to balance imports for 
industrial restructuring. 

Imports: In 1994, worth US$3.49 billion, mainly energy 
products, machinery, vehicles, chemicals, and food. Industrial 
machinery and technology imports will increase, energy 
products decrease, in late 1990s. Trade deficits with both CIS 
and non-CIS groups, 1994. Main trading partners Russia, 
Ukraine, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Czech Republic, 
Italy, and China. 

Balance of Payments: In 1994, deficit of US$2.5 billion. 

Exchange Rate: Tenge introduced November 1993 when 
Kazakstan left ruble zone. Exchange rate sixty-four to US$1, 
January 1996. 

Inflation: Hyperinflation, 1993 and 1994, brought under better 
control with tightened loan policy; estimated 1995 annual rate 
190 percent. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Centralized system; fundamental streamlining of 
tax code, 1995, emphasizing taxation of individuals over 
taxation of enterprises. Targeted 1995 budget shortfall 3.5 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways: In 1994, about 189,000 kilometers of roads, of which 
108,000 kilometers gravel or paved. Road transport declining 
element of economic infrastructure; maintenance and truck 
fleet inadequate to expand service. 

Railroads: Three railroad companies provide about 90 percent 
of national freight haulage, but infrastructure and equipment 
supply unreliable. In 1993, system had 14,148 kilometers of 
track, of which 3,050 kilometers electrified, concentrated in 



5 



Country Studies 



north, mainly connecting with Russian system. 

Civil Aviation: Kazakstan Airlines and six private companies use 
twenty airports, one of which (Almaty) has international con- 
nections. Regular flights to some major cities in CIS countries, 
Western Europe, Asia, and Middle East. 

Inland Waterways: Two rivers, Syrdariya and Ertis, total 4,000 
kilometers of navigable water; nineteen river transport com- 
panies, under state control. In 1992, 1.6 million passengers, 7 
million tons of freight moved. 

Ports: On Caspian Sea, Aqtau, Atyrau, and Fort Shevchenko, 
with limited commercial value. 

Pipelines: In 1992, some 3,480 kilometers for natural gas, 2,850 
kilometers for crude oil, and 1,500 kilometers for refined 
products. Systems mainly connected with Russian lines to 
north; new lines in planning stage, 1996, with Western aid, to 
connect with Europe and other international destinations. 

Telecommunications: Limited service, inadequate to planned 
economic expansion. In 1994, seventeen of 100 urban citizens 
had telephones, heavily concentrated in Almaty. Most equip- 
ment outmoded, overburdened. All international connections 
through Moscow. Radio and television broadcasting govern- 
ment controlled; satellite television broadcasts from other 
countries; sixty-one domestic radio stations, one domestic tele- 
vision network, 1996. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Strong presidential system, prescribed in 1993 
constitution and reinforced by dismissal of parliament and 
beginning of direct presidential rule by Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
1995. Presidential election delayed by referendum until 2000. 
New constitution, approved in August 1995 referendum, 
mandates bicameral parliament and increases presidential 
power. Parliamentary election for both houses held December 
1995. Nineteen provinces and city of Almaty run by executives 
appointed by national president. 

Politics: Close government control of legal political parties has 
not prevented numerous groups from forming. Participation 
in 1994 and 1995 parliamentary elections limited to approved 
parties, but 1994 parliament strongly opposed many of 



6 



Kazakstan 



Nazarbayev's programs. Election of 1994 declared invalid, and 
parliament dissolved in early 1995. Nazarbayev's People's Unity 
Party retained plurality in 1995 elections. Several Kazak and 
Russian nationalist parties with small representation in govern- 
ment. 

Foreign Policy: Post-Soviet broad search for international 
support, role as bridge between East and West, under personal 
direction of President Nazarbayev. Critical balance of Russian 
and Chinese influence, careful reserve toward Muslim world 
outside Central Asia; proposal of Euro-Asian Union to replace 
CIS, 1994. Active diplomatic role in CIS crises (Nagorno- 
Karabakh, Tajikistan). 

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of 
United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Partnership for Peace, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), Asian Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank, CIS, International Criminal Police 
Organization (Interpol). 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Planned strength 80,000 to 90,000; 1996 army 
strength about 25,000, air force about 15,000, border troops 
5,000 to 6,000, naval force in planning stage. 

Major Military Units: Army has two motorized rifle divisions, 
one tank division, one artillery regiment. National Guard 
operates 25 percent of boats in Caspian Sea Flotilla. Air force 
has one heavy bomber regiment; one division with three 
fighter-bomber regiments; and single, independent reconnais- 
sance, fighter, and helicopter regiments. 

Military Budget: In 1995, estimated at US$297 million. 

Internal Security: System largely unchanged from Soviet 
period. National Security Committee, successor to Committee 
for State Security (KGB), performs intelligence and counter- 
intelligence operations. Ministry of Justice runs police (militia) 
and prison systems. 



7 



I 



I 



MONGOLIA 



\ — 



I Caspian 

AZERBAIJAN 
Baku 





\ Taldyqorghan 

xvi >, * 



■7 ® 



CHINA 




IRA 



SourKtaty representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



International boundary 
Province boundary 
National capital 
Province capital 
Populated place 

Provinces 



1 


West Kazakstan 


XI 


North Kazakstan 


II 


Atyrau 


XII 


Qaraghandy 


III 


Manggystau 


XIII 


Pavlodar 


IV 


Aqtobe 


XIV 


Zhezqazghan 


V 


Qostanay 


XV 


Zhambyl 


VI 


Torghay 


XVI 


Almaty 


VII 


Qyzylorda 


XVII 


Semey 


VIII 


South Kazakstan 


XVIII 


East Kazakstan 


IX 


Aqmola 


XIX 


Taldyqorghan 


X 


Kokshetau 







400 Kilometers 



400 Miles 



Figure 4. Kazakstan: / 



10 



BY FAR THE LARGEST of the Central Asian republics of the 
former Soviet Union, independent Kazakstan is the world's 
ninth-largest nation in geographic area. The population den- 
sity of Kazakstan is among the lowest in the world, partly 
because the country includes large areas of inhospitable ter- 
rain. Kazakstan is located deep within the Asian continent, with 
coastline only on the landlocked Caspian Sea. The proximity of 
unstable countries such as Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Azer- 
baijan to the west and south further isolates Kazakstan (see fig. 
4). 

Within the centrally controlled structure of the Soviet sys- 
tem, Kazakstan played a vital industrial and agricultural role; 
the vast coal deposits discovered in Kazakstani territory in the 
twentieth century promised to replace the depleted fuel 
reserves in the European territories of the union. The vast dis- 
tances between the European industrial centers and coal fields 
in Kazakstan presented a formidable problem that was only 
partially solved by Soviet efforts to industrialize Central Asia. 
That endeavor left the newly independent Republic of Kazak- 
stan a mixed legacy: a population that includes nearly as many 
Russians as Kazaks; the presence of a dominating class of Rus- 
sian technocrats, who are necessary to economic progress but 
ethnically unassimilated; and a well-developed energy industry, 
based mainly on coal and oil, whose efficiency is inhibited by 
major infrastructural deficiencies. 

Kazakstan has followed the same general political pattern as 
the other four Central Asian states. After declaring indepen- 
dence from the Soviet political structure completely domi- 
nated by Moscow and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) until 1991, Kazakstan retained the basic governmental 
structure and, in fact, most of the same leadership that had 
occupied the top levels of power in 1990. Nursultan Naz- 
arbayev, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakstan 
(CPK) beginning in 1989, was elected president of the republic 
in 1991 and remained in undisputed power five years later. 
Nazarbayev took several effective steps to ensure his position. 
The constitution of 1993 made the prime minister and the 
Council of Ministers responsible solely to the president, and in 
1995 a new constitution reinforced that relationship. Further- 
more, opposition parties were severely limited by legal restric- 



11 



RUSSIA 




Country Studies 



tions on their activities. Within that rigid framework, 
Nazarbayev gained substantial popularity by limiting the eco- 
nomic shock of separation from the security of the Soviet 
Union and by maintaining ethnic harmony, despite some dis- 
content among Kazak nationalists and the huge Russian minor- 
ity. 

In the mid-1990s, Russia remained the most important spon- 
sor of Kazakstan in economic and national security matters, but 
in such matters Nazarbayev also backed the strengthening of 
the multinational structures of the Commonwealth of Indepen- 
dent States (CIS — see Glossary), the loose confederation that 
succeeded the Soviet Union. As sensitive ethnic, national secu- 
rity, and economic issues cooled relations with Russia in the 
1990s, Nazarbayev cultivated relations with China, the other 
Central Asian nations, and the West. Nevertheless, Kazakstan 
remains principally dependent on Russia. 

Kazakstan entered the 1990s with vast natural resources, an 
underdeveloped industrial infrastructure, a stable but rigid 
political structure, a small and ethnically divided population, 
and a commercially disadvantageous geographic position. In 
the mid-1990s, the balance of those qualities remained quite 
uncertain. 

Historical Setting 

Until the arrival of Russians in the eighteenth century, the 
history of Kazakstan was determined by the movements, con- 
flicts, and alliances of Turkic and Mongol tribes. The nomadic 
tribal society of what came to be the Kazak people then suf- 
fered increasingly frequent incursions by the Russian Empire, 
ultimately being included in that empire and the Soviet Union 
that followed it. 

Early Tribal Movements 

Humans have inhabited present-day Kazakstan since the ear- 
liest Stone Age, generally pursuing the nomadic pastoralism 
for which the region's climate and terrain are best suited. The 
earliest well-documented state in the region was the Turkic 
Kaganate, which came into existence in the sixth century A.D. 
The Qarluqs, a confederation of Turkic tribes, established a 
state in what is now eastern Kazakstan in 766. In the eighth and 
ninth centuries, portions of southern Kazakstan were con- 
quered by Arabs, who also introduced Islam. The Oghuz Turks 



12 



Kazakstan 



controlled western Kazakstan from the ninth through the elev- 
enth centuries; the Kimak and Kipchak peoples, also of Turkic 
origin, controlled the east at roughly the same time. The large 
central desert of Kazakstan is still called Dashti-Kipchak, or the 
Kipchak Steppe. 

In the late ninth century, the Qarluq state was destroyed by 
invaders who established the large Qarakhanid state, which 
occupied a region known as Transoxania, the area north and 
east of the Oxus River (the present-day Syrdariya), extending 
into what is now China. Beginning in the early eleventh cen- 
tury, the Qarakhanids fought constantly among themselves and 
with the Seljuk Turks to the south. In the course of these con- 
flicts, parts of present-day Kazakstan shifted back and forth 
between the combatants. The Qarakhanids, who accepted 
Islam and the authority of the Arab Abbasid caliphs of Bagh- 
dad during their dominant period, were conquered in the 
1130s by the Karakitai, a Turkic confederation from northern 
China. In the mid-twelfth century, an independent state of 
Khorazm (also seen as Khorezm or Khwarazm) along the Oxus 
River broke away from the weakening Karakitai, but the bulk of 
the Karakitai state lasted until the invasion of Chinggis (Geng- 
his) Khan in 1219-21. 

After the Mongol capture of the Karakitai state, Kazakstan 
fell under the control of a succession of rulers of the Mongo- 
lian Golden Horde, the western branch of the Mongol Empire. 
(The horde, or zhuz, is the precursor of the present-day clan, 
which is still an important element of Kazak society — see Popu- 
lation and Society, this ch.) By the early fifteenth century, the 
ruling structure had split into several large groups known as 
khanates, including the Nogai Horde and the Uzbek Khanate. 

Forming the Modern Nation 

The present-day Kazaks became a recognizable group in the 
mid-fifteenth century, when clan leaders broke away from Abul 
Khayr, leader of the Uzbeks, to seek their own territory in the 
lands of Semirech'ye, between the Chu and Talas rivers in 
present-day southeastern Kazakstan. The first Kazak leader was 
Khan Kasym (r. 1511-23), who united the Kazak tribes into one 
people. In the sixteenth century, when the Nogai Horde and 
Siberian khanates broke up, clans from each jurisdiction 
joined the Kazaks. The Kazaks subsequently separated into 
three new hordes: the Great Horde, which controlled Semi- 
rech'ye and southern Kazakstan; the Middle Horde, which 



13 



Country Studies 

occupied north-central Kazakstan; and the Lesser Horde, 
which occupied western Kazakstan. 

Russian traders and soldiers began to appear on the north- 
western edge of Kazak territory in the seventeenth century, 
when Cossacks established the forts that later became the cities 
of Oral (Ural'sk) and Atyrau (Gur'yev). Russians were able to 
seize Kazak territory because the khanates were preoccupied 
by Kalmyk invaders of Mongol origin, who in the late sixteenth 
century had begun to move into Kazak territory from the east. 
Forced westward in what they call their Great Retreat, the 
Kazaks were increasingly caught between the Kalmyks and the 
Russians. In 1730 Abul Khayr, one of the khans of the Lesser 
Horde, sought Russian assistance. Although Abul Khayr's 
intent had been to form a temporary alliance against the stron- 
ger Kalmyks, the Russians gained permanent control of the 
Lesser Horde as a result of his decision. The Russians con- 
quered the Middle Horde by 1798, but the Great Horde man- 
aged to remain independent until the 1820s, when the 
expanding Quqon (Kokand) Khanate to the south forced the 
Great Horde khans to choose Russian protection, which 
seemed to them the lesser of two evils. 

The Kazaks began to resist Russian control almost as soon as 
it became complete. The first mass uprising was led by Khan 
Kene (Kenisary Kasimov) of the Middle Horde, whose follow- 
ers fought the Russians between 1836 and 1847. Khan Kene is 
now considered a Kazak national hero. 

Russian Control 

In 1863 Russia elaborated a new imperial policy, announced 
in the Gorchakov Circular, asserting the right to annex "trou- 
blesome" areas on the empire's borders. This policy led imme- 
diately to the Russian conquest of the rest of Central Asia and 
the creation of two administrative districts, the Guberniya 
(Governorate General) of Turkestan and the Steppe District. 
Most of present-day Kazakstan was in the Steppe District, and 
parts of present-day southern Kazakstan were in the Governor- 
ate General. 

In the early nineteenth century, the construction of Russian 
forts began to have a destructive effect on the Kazak traditional 
economy by limiting the once-vast territory over which the 
nomadic tribes could drive their herds and flocks. The final dis- 
ruption of nomadism began in the 1890s, when many Russian 
settlers were introduced into the fertile lands of northern and 



14 



Kazakstan 



eastern Kazakstan. Between 1906 and 1912, more than a half- 
million Russian farms were started as part of the reforms of 
Russian minister of the interior Petr Stolypin, shattering what 
remained of the traditional Kazak way of life. 

Starving and displaced, many Kazaks joined in the general 
Central Asian resistance to conscription into the Russian impe- 
rial army, which the tsar ordered in July 1916 as part of the 
effort against Germany in World War I. In late 1916, Russian 
forces brutally suppressed the widespread armed resistance to 
the taking of land and conscription of Central Asians. Thou- 
sands of Kazaks were killed, and thousands of others fled to 
China and Mongolia. 

In the Soviet Union 

In 1917 a group of secular nationalists called the Alash Orda 
(Horde of Alash), named for a legendary founder of the Kazak 
people, attempted to set up an independent national govern- 
ment. This state lasted less than two years (1918-20) before sur- 
rendering to the Bolshevik authorities, who then sought to 
preserve Russian control under a new political system. The Kyr- 
gyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was set up in 1920 
and was renamed the Kazak Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic in 1925 when the Kazaks were differentiated officially 
from the Kyrgyz. (The Russian Empire recognized the ethnic 
difference between the two groups; it called them both "Kyr- 
gyz" to avoid confusion between the terms "Kazak" and "Cos- 
sack.") 

In 1925 the autonomous republic's original capital, Oren- 
burg, was reincorporated into Russian territory. Almaty (called 
Alma-Ata during the Soviet period), a provincial city in the far 
southeast, became the new capital. In 1936 the territory was 
made a full Soviet republic. From 1929 to 1934, during the 
period when Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin was trying to collec- 
tivize agriculture, Kazakstan endured repeated famines 
because peasants had slaughtered their livestock in protest 
against Soviet agricultural policy. In that period, at least 1.5 mil- 
lion Kazaks and 80 percent of the republic's livestock died. 
Thousands more Kazaks tried to escape to China, although 
most starved in the attempt. 

Many European Soviet citizens and much of Russia's indus- 
try were relocated to Kazakstan during World War II, when 
Nazi armies threatened to capture all the European industrial 
centers of the Soviet Union. Groups of Crimean Tatars, Ger- 



15 



Countiy Studies 



mans, and Muslims from the North Caucasus region were 
deported to Kazakstan during the war because it was feared 
that they would collaborate with the enemy. Many more non- 
Kazaks arrived in the years 1953-65, during the so-called Virgin 
Lands campaign of Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev (in 
office 1956-64). Under that program, huge tracts of Kazak 
grazing land were put to the plow for the cultivation of wheat 
and other cereal grains. Still more settlers came in the late 
1960s and 1970s, when the government paid handsome 
bonuses to workers participating in a program to relocate 
Soviet industry close to the extensive coal, gas, and oil deposits 
of Central Asia. One consequence of the decimation of the 
nomadic Kazak population and the in-migration of non-Kazaks 
was that by the 1970s Kazakstan was the only Soviet republic in 
which the eponymous nationality was a minority in its own 
republic (see Ethnic Groups, this ch.). 

Reform and Nationalist Conflict 

The 1980s brought glimmers of political independence, as 
well as conflict, as the central government's hold progressively 
weakened. In this period, Kazakstan was ruled by a succession 
of three Communist Party officials; the third of those men, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, continued as president of the Republic 
of Kazakstan when independence was proclaimed in 1991. 

In December 1986, Soviet premier Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in 
office 1985-91) forced the resignation of Dinmukhamed 
Kunayev, an ethnic Kazak who had led the republic as first sec- 
retary of the CPK from 1959 to 1962, and again starting in 
1964. During 1985, Kunayev had been under official attack for 
cronyism, mismanagement, and malfeasance; thus, his depar- 
ture was not a surprise. However, his replacement, Gennadiy 
Kolbin, an ethnic Russian with no previous ties to Kazakstan, 
was unexpected. Kolbin was a typical administrator of the early 
Gorbachev era — enthusiastic about economic and administra- 
tive reforms but hardly mindful of their consequences or viabil- 
ity. 

The announcement of Kolbin's appointment provoked 
spontaneous street demonstrations by Kazaks, to which Soviet 
authorities responded with force. Demonstrators, many of 
them students, rioted. Two days of disorder followed, and at 
least 200 people died or were summarily executed soon after. 
Some accounts estimate casualties at more than 1,000. 



16 



Kazakstan 



Kunayev had been ousted largely because the economy was 
failing. Although Kazakstan had the third-largest gross domes- 
tic product (GDP — see Glossary) in the Soviet Union, trailing 
only Russia and Ukraine, by 1987 labor productivity had 
decreased 12 percent, and per capita income had fallen by 24 
percent of the national norm. By that time, Kazakstan was 
underproducing steel at an annual rate of more than a million 
tons. Agricultural output also was dropping precipitously. 

While Kolbin was promoting a series of unrealistic, Moscow- 
directed campaigns of social reform, expressions of Kazak 
nationalism were prompting Gorbachev to address some of the 
non-Russians' complaints about cultural self-determination. 
One consequence was a new tolerance of bilingualism in the 
non-Russian regions. Kolbin made a strong commitment to 
promoting the local language and in 1987 suggested that Kazak 
become the republic's official language. However, none of his 
initiatives went beyond empty public-relations ploys. In fact, 
the campaign in favor of bilingualism was transformed into a 
campaign to improve the teaching of Russian. 

While attempting to conciliate the Kazak population with 
promises, Kolbin also conducted a wholesale purge of pro- 
Kunayev members of the CPK, replacing hundreds of republic- 
level and local officials. Although officially "nationality-blind," 
Kolbin's policies seemed to be directed mostly against Kazaks. 
The downfall of Kolbin, however, was the continued deteriora- 
tion of the republic's economy during his tenure. Agricultural 
output had fallen so low by 1989 that Kolbin proposed to fulfill 
meat quotas by slaughtering the millions of wild ducks that 
migrate through Kazakstan. The republic's industrial sector 
had begun to recover slightly in 1989, but credit for this 
progress was given largely to Nursultan Nazarbayev, an ethnic 
Kazak who had become chairman of Kazakstan's Council of 
Ministers in 1984. 

As nationalist protests became more violent across the Soviet 
Union in 1989, Gorbachev began calling for the creation of 
popularly elected legislatures and for the loosening of central 
political controls to make such elections possible. These mea- 
sures made it increasingly plain in Kazakstan that Kolbin and 
his associates soon would be replaced by a new generation of 
Kazak leaders. 

Rather than reinvigorate the Soviet people to meet national 
tasks, Gorbachev's encouragement of voluntary local organi- 
zations only stimulated the formation of informal political 



17 



Country Studies 



groups, many of which had overtly nationalist agendas. For the 
Kazaks, such agendas were presented forcefully on national 
television at the first Congress of People's Deputies, which was 
convened in Moscow in June 1989. By that time, Kolbin was 
already scheduled for rotation back to Moscow, but his depar- 
ture probably was hastened by riots in June 1989 in Novyy 
Uzen, an impoverished western Kazakstan town that produced 
natural gas. That rioting lasted nearly a week and claimed at 
least four lives. 

The Rise of Nazarbayev 

In June 1989, Kolbin was replaced by Nazarbayev, a politi- 
cian trained as a metallurgist and engineer. Nazarbayev had 
become involved in party work in 1979, when he became a pro- 
tege of reform members of the CPSU. Having taken a major 
role in the attacks on Kunayev, Nazarbayev may have expected 
to replace him in 1986. When he was passed over, Nazarbayev 
submitted to Kolbin's authority and used his party position to 
support Gorbachev's new line, attributing economic stagnation 
in the Soviet republics to past subordination of local interests 
to the mandates of Moscow. 

Soon proving himself a skilled negotiator, Nazarbayev 
bridged the gap between the republic's Kazaks and Russians at 
a time of increasing nationalism while also managing to remain 
personally loyal to the Gorbachev reform program. Naz- 
arbayev's firm support of the major Gorbachev positions in 
turn helped him gain national and, after 1990, even interna- 
tional visibility. Many reports indicate that Gorbachev was plan- 
ning to name Nazarbayev as his deputy in the new union 
planned to succeed the Soviet Union. 

Even as he supported Gorbachev during the last two years of 
the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev fought Moscow to increase his 
republic's income from the resources it had long been supply- 
ing to the center. Although his appointment as party first secre- 
tary had originated in Moscow, Nazarbayev realized that for his 
administration to succeed under the new conditions of that 
time, he had to cultivate a popular mandate within the repub- 
lic. This difficult task meant finding a way to make Kazakstan 
more Kazak without alienating the republic's large and eco- 
nomically significant Russian and European populations. Fol- 
lowing the example of other Soviet republics, Nazarbayev 
sponsored legislation that made Kazak the official language 
and permitted examination of the negative role of collectiviza- 



18 



Kazakstan 



tion and other Soviet policies on the republic's history. Naz- 
arbayev also permitted a widened role for religion, which 
encouraged a resurgence of Islam. In late 1989, although he 
did not have the legal power to do so, Nazarbayev created an 
independent religious administration for Kazakstan, severing 
relations with the Muslim Board of Central Asia, the Soviet- 
approved oversight body in Tashkent. 

In March 1990, elections were held for a new legislature in 
the republic's first multiple-candidate contests since 1925. The 
winners represented overwhelmingly the republic's existing 
elite, who were loyal to Nazarbayev and to the Communist 
Party apparatus. The legislature also was disproportionately 
ethnic Kazak: 54.2 percent to the Russians' 28.8 percent. 

Sovereignty and Independence 

In June 1990, Moscow declared formally the sovereignty of 
the central government over Kazakstan, forcing Kazakstan to 
elaborate its own statement of sovereignty. This exchange 
greatly exacerbated tensions between the republic's two largest 
ethnic groups, who at that point were numerically about equal. 
Beginning in mid-August 1990, Kazak and Russian nationalists 
began to demonstrate frequently around Kazakstan's parlia- 
ment building, attempting to influence the final statement of 
sovereignty being developed within. The statement was 
adopted in October 1990. 

In keeping with practices in other republics at that time, the 
parliament had named Nazarbayev its chairman, and then, 
soon afterward, it had converted the chairmanship to the pres- 
idency of the republic. In contrast to the presidents of the 
other republics, especially those in the independence-minded 
Baltic states, Nazarbayev remained strongly committed to the 
perpetuation of the Soviet Union throughout the spring and 
summer of 1991. He took this position largely because he con- 
sidered the republics too interdependent economically to sur- 
vive separation. At the same time, however, Nazarbayev fought 
hard to secure republic control of Kazakstan's enormous min- 
eral wealth and industrial potential. This objective became 
particularly important after 1990, when it was learned that Gor- 
bachev had negotiated an agreement with Chevron, a United 
States oil company, to develop Kazakstan's Tengiz oil fields. 
Gorbachev did not consult Nazarbayev until talks were nearly 
complete. At Nazarbayev's insistence, Moscow surrendered 
control of the republic's mineral resources in June 1991. Gor- 



19 



Country Studies 



bachev's authority crumbled rapidly throughout 1991. Naz- 
arbayev, however, continued to support him, persistently 
urging other republic leaders to sign the revised Union Treaty, 
which Gorbachev had put forward in a last attempt to hold the 
Soviet Union together. 

Because of the coup attempted by Moscow hard-liners 
against the Gorbachev government in August 1991, the Union 
Treaty never was signed. Ambivalent about the removal of Gor- 
bachev, Nazarbayev did not condemn the coup attempt until its 
second day. However, once the incompetence of the plotters 
became clear, Nazarbayev threw his weight solidly behind Gor- 
bachev and continuation of some form of union, largely 
because of his conviction that independence would be eco- 
nomic suicide. 

At the same time, however, Nazarbayev pragmatically began 
preparing his republic for much greater freedom, if not for 
actual independence. He appointed professional economists 
and managers to high posts, and he began to seek the advice of 
foreign development and business experts. The outlawing of 
the CPK, which followed the attempted coup, also permitted 
Nazarbayev to take virtually complete control of the republic's 
economy, more than 90 percent of which had been under the 
partial or complete direction of the central Soviet government 
until late 1991. Nazarbayev solidified his position by winning 
an uncontested election for president in December 1991. 

A week after the election, Nazarbayev became the president 
of an independent state when the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, 
and Belarus signed documents dissolving the Soviet Union. 
Nazarbayev quickly convened a meeting of the leaders of the 
five Central Asian states, thus effectively raising the specter of a 
"Turkic" confederation of former republics as a counterweight 
to the "Slavic" states (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) in whatever 
federation might succeed the Soviet Union. This move per- 
suaded the three Slavic presidents to include Kazakstan among 
the signatories to a recast document of dissolution. Thus, the 
capital of Kazakstan lent its name to the Alma-Ata Declaration, 
in which eleven of the fifteen Soviet republics announced the 
expansion of the thirteen-day-old CIS. On December 16, 1991, 
just five days before that declaration, Kazakstan had become 
the last of the republics to proclaim its independence. 

Physical Environment 

With an area of about 2,717,300 square kilometers, Kazak- 



20 



Kazakstan 



stan is more than twice the combined size of the other four 
Central Asian states. The country borders Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan to the south; Russia to the north; 
Russia and the Caspian Sea to the west; and China's Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region to the east. 

Topography and Drainage 

There is considerable topographical variation within Kazak- 
stan. The highest elevation, Khan Tengri Mountain, on the Kyr- 
gyz border in the Tian Shan range, is 6,995 meters; the lowest 
point, at Karagiye, in the Caspian Depression in the west, is 132 
meters below sea level (see fig. 2). Only 12.4 percent of Kazak- 
stan is mountainous, with most of the mountains located in the 
Altay and Tian Shan ranges of the east and northeast, although 
the Ural Mountains extend southward from Russia into the 
northern part of west-central Kazakstan. Many of the peaks of 
the Altay and Tian Shan ranges are snow covered year-round, 
and their run-off is the source for most of Kazakstan's rivers 
and streams. 

Except for the Tobol, Ishim, and Irtysh rivers (the Kazak 
names for which are, respectively, Tobyl, Esil, and Ertis), por- 
tions of which flow through Kazakstan, all of Kazakstan's rivers 
and streams are part of landlocked systems. They either flow 
into isolated bodies of water such as the Caspian Sea or simply 
disappear into the steppes and deserts of central and southern 
Kazakstan. Many rivers, streams, and lakes are seasonal, evapo- 
rating in summer. The three largest bodies of water are Lake 
Balkhash, a partially fresh, partially saline lake in the east, near 
Almaty, and the Caspian and Aral seas, both of which lie par- 
tially within Kazakstan. 

Some 9.4 percent of Kazakstan's land is mixed prairie and 
forest or treeless prairie, primarily in the north or in the basin 
of the Ural River in the west. More than three-quarters of the 
country, including the entire west and most of the south, is 
either semidesert (33.2 percent) or desert (44 percent). The 
terrain in these regions is bare, eroded, broken uplands, with 
sand dunes in the Qizilqum (red sand; in the Russian form, 
Kyzylkum) and Moyunqum (in the Russian form, Moin Kum) 
deserts, which occupy south-central Kazakstan. Most of the 
country lies at between 200 and 300 meters above sea level, but 
Kazakstan's Caspian shore includes some of the lowest eleva- 
tions on Earth. 



21 



Country Studies 



Climate 

Because Kazakstan is so far from the oceans, the climate is 
sharply continental and very dry. Precipitation in the moun- 
tains of the east averages as much as 600 millimeters per year, 
mostly in the form of snow, but most of the republic receives 
only 100 to 200 millimeters per year. Precipitation totals less 
than 100 millimeters in the south-central regions around Qyzy- 
lorda. A lack of precipitation makes Kazakstan a sunny repub- 
lic; the north averages 120 clear days a year, and the south 
averages 260. The lack of moderating bodies of water also 
means that temperatures can vary widely. Average winter tem- 
peratures are -3°C in the north and 18°C in the south; summer 
temperatures average 19°C in the north and 28°-30°C in the 
south. Within locations differences are extreme, and tempera- 
ture can change very suddenly. The winter air temperature can 
fall to -50°C, and in summer the ground temperature can 
reach as high as 70°C. 

Environmental Problems 

The environment of Kazakstan has been badly damaged by 
human activity. Most of the water in Kazakstan is polluted by 
industrial effluents, pesticide and fertilizer residue, and, in 
some places, radioactivity. The most visible damage has been to 
the Aral Sea, which as recently as the 1970s was larger than any 
of the Great Lakes of North America save Lake Superior. The 
sea began to shrink rapidly when sharply increased irrigation 
and other demands on the only significant tributaries, the Syr- 
dariya and the Amu Darya (the latter reaching the Aral from 
neighboring Uzbekistan), all but eliminated inflow. By 1993 
the Aral Sea had lost an estimated 60 percent of its volume, in 
the process breaking into three unconnected segments. 
Increasing salinity and reduced habitat have killed the Aral 
Sea's fish, hence destroying its once-active fishing industry, and 
the receding shoreline has left the former port of Aral'sk more 
than sixty kilometers from the water's edge. The depletion of 
this large body of water has increased temperature variations in 
the region, which in turn have had an impact on agriculture. A 
much greater agricultural impact, however, has come from the 
salt- and pesticide-laden soil that the wind is known to carry as 
far away as the Himalaya Mountains and the Pacific Ocean. 
Deposition of this heavily saline soil on nearby fields effectively 
sterilizes them. Evidence suggests that salts, pesticides, and resi- 



22 



Kazakstan 



dues of chemical fertilizers are also adversely affecting human 
life around the former Aral Sea; infant mortality in the region 
approaches 10 percent, compared with the 1991 national rate 
of 2.7 percent. 

By contrast, the water level of the Caspian Sea has been ris- 
ing steadily since 1978 for reasons that scientists have not been 
able to explain fully. At the northern end of the sea, more than 
a million hectares of land in Atyrau Province have been 
flooded. Experts estimate that if current rates of increase per- 
sist, the coastal city of Atyrau, eighty-eight other population 
centers, and many of Kazakstan's Caspian oil fields could be 
submerged by 2020. 

Wind erosion has also had an impact in the northern and 
central parts of the republic because of the introduction of 
wide-scale dryland wheat farming. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
much soil was lost when vast tracts of Kazakstan's prairies were 
plowed under as part of Khrushchev's Virgin Lands agricul- 
tural project. By the mid-1990s, an estimated 60 percent of the 
republic's pastureland was in various stages of desertification. 

Industrial pollution is a bigger concern in Kazakstan's manu- 
facturing cities, where aging factories pump huge quantities of 
unfiltered pollutants into the air and groundwater. The capital, 
Almaty, is particularly threatened, in part because of the postin- 
dependence boom in private automobile ownership. 

The gravest environmental threat to Kazakstan comes from 
radiation, especially in the Semey (Semipalatinsk) region of 
the northeast, where the Soviet Union tested almost 500 
nuclear weapons, 116 of them above ground. Often, such tests 
were conducted without evacuating or even alerting the local 
population. Although nuclear testing was halted in 1990, radia- 
tion poisoning, birth defects, severe anemia, and leukemia are 
very common in the area (see Health Conditions, this ch.). 

With some conspicuous exceptions, lip service has been the 
primary official response to Kazakstan's ecological problems. 
In February 1989, opposition to Soviet nuclear testing and its 
ill effects in Kazakstan led to the creation of one of the repub- 
lic's largest and most influential grass-roots movements, 
Nevada-Semipalatinsk, which was founded by Kazak poet and 
public figure Olzhas Suleymenov. In the first week of the move- 
ment's existence, Nevada-Semipalatinsk gathered more than 2 
million signatures from Kazakstanis of all ethnic groups on a 
petition to Gorbachev demanding the end of nuclear testing in 
Kazakstan. After a year of demonstrations and protests, the test 



23 



Country Studies 

ban took effect in 1990. It remained in force in 1996, although 
in 1995 at least one unexploded device reportedly was still in 
position near Semey. 

Once its major ecological objective was achieved, Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk made various attempts to broaden into a more 
general political movement; it has not pursued a broad ecolog- 
ical or "green" agenda. A very small green party, Tagibat, made 
common cause with the political opposition in the parliament 
of 1994. 

The government has established a Ministry of Ecology and 
Bioresources, with a separate administration for radioecology, 
but the ministry's programs are underfunded and given low 
priority. In 1994 only 23 percent of budgeted funds were actu- 
ally allotted to environmental programs. Many official meet- 
ings and conferences are held (more than 300 have been 
devoted to the problem of the Aral Sea alone), but few practi- 
cal programs have gone into operation. In 1994 the World 
Bank (see Glossary), the International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary), and the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency agreed to give Kazakstan US$62 million to help the 
country overcome ecological problems. 

Population and Society 

Total population was estimated in 1994 at 17,268,000, mak- 
ing Kazakstan the fourth most populous former Soviet repub- 
lic. As of 1990, 57 percent of the country's residents lived in 
cities. Because much of the land is too dry to be more than 
marginally habitable, overall population density is a very low 
6.2 persons per square kilometer. Large portions of the repub- 
lic, especially in the south and west, have a population density 
of less than one person per square kilometer. In 1989 some 1.4 
million Kazaks lived outside Kazakstan, nearly all in the Russian 
and Uzbek republics. At that time, an estimated 1 million 
Kazaks lived in China, and a sizeable but uncounted Kazak 
population resided in Mongolia. 

Demographic Factors 

The birth rate, which is declining slowly, was estimated at 
19.4 births per 1,000 population in 1994 (see table 2, Appen- 
dix). The death rate, which has been climbing slowly, was esti- 
mated at 7.9 per 1,000 population — leaving a rate of natural 
increase of 1.1 percent, by far the lowest among the five Cen- 



24 




Panoramic view of the capital city, Almaty 
Courtesy Lorraine Predham 
The opera house in Almaty 
Courtesy Stanley Bach 



25 



Country Studies 

tral Asian republics. In 1995 the total fertility rate — 2.4 births 
per woman, a drop from the 1990 figure of 2.8 — also was far 
below the rates for the other Central Asian republics. In the 
first six months of 1994, some 1.8 percent fewer babies were 
born than in the same period the previous year. In the same 
months, the number of deaths rose by 2.5 percent compared 
with those in the same period in 1993. In some provinces, 
death rates are much higher than the average, however. Shygys 
Qazaqstan (East Kazakstan) Province has a death rate of 12.9 
per thousand; Soltustik Qazaqstan (North Kazakstan) Province, 
eleven per 1,000; and Almaty Province, 11.3 deaths per 1,000. 
The cause of nearly half of these deaths is cardiovascular dis- 
ease. 

Because of declining life expectancy and decreases in the 
size of the Russian population, which is demographically older 
and has a low birth rate, the republic's residents are a relatively 
young group; in 1991 there were only 149 pensioners per 1,000 
population, as opposed to 212 per 1,000 in the former Soviet 
Union as a whole (see table 3, Appendix). The republic is 
experiencing a pronounced outflow of citizens, primarily non- 
Kazaks moving to other former Soviet republics. Although fig- 
ures conflict, it seems likely that as many as 750,000 non-Kazaks 
left the republic between independence and the end of 1995. 
Official figures indicate that in the first half of 1994 some 
220,400 people left, compared with 149,800 in the same period 
of 1993. In 1992 and 1993, the number of Russian emigrants 
was estimated at 100,000 to 300,000. Such out-migration is not 
uniform. Some regions, such as Qaraghandy, have lost as much 
as 10 percent of their total population, resulting in shortages of 
technicians and skilled specialists in that heavily industrial 
area. 

To some extent, the outflow has been offset by in-migration, 
which has been of two types. Kazakstan's government has 
actively encouraged the return of Kazaks from elsewhere in the 
former Soviet Union and from China and Mongolia. Unlike 
other ethnic groups, ethnic Kazaks are granted automatic citi- 
zenship. More than 60,000 Kazaks emigrated from Mongolia in 
1991-94, their settlement — or resettlement — eased by govern- 
ment assistance. Most were moved to the northern provinces, 
where the majority of Kazakstan's Russian population lives. 
Because these "Mongol Kazaks" generally do not know Russian 
and continue to pursue traditional nomadic lifestyles, the 



26 



Kazakstan 



impact of their resettlement has been disproportionate to their 
actual numbers. 

The other major source of in-migration has been non-Kazaks 
arriving from other parts of Central Asia to avoid inhospitable 
conditions; most of these people also have settled in northern 
Kazakstan. Although officially forbidden and actively discour- 
aged, this in-migration has continued. In a further attempt to 
control in-migration, President Nazarbayev decreed that no 
more than 5,000 families would be permitted to take up resi- 
dence in the republic in 1996. 

Ethnic Groups 

Kazakstan is the only former Soviet republic where the indig- 
enous ethnic group is not a majority of the population. In 1994 
eight of the country's eleven provinces had Slavic (Russian and 
Ukrainian) population majorities. Only the three southern- 
most provinces were populated principally by Kazaks and other 
Turkic groups; the capital city, Almaty, had a European (Ger- 
man and Russian) majority. Overall, in 1994 the population was 
about 44 percent Kazak, 36 percent Russian, 5 percent Ukrai- 
nian, and 4 percent German. Tatars and Uzbeks each repre- 
sented about 2 percent of the population; Azerbaijanis, Uygurs, 
and Belarusians each represented 1 percent; and the remain- 
ing 4 percent included approximately ninety other nationali- 
ties (see table 4, Appendix). 

Kazakstan's ethnic composition is the driving force behind 
much of the country's political and cultural life. In most ways, 
the republic's two major ethnic groups, the Kazaks and the 
"Russian-speakers" (Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and 
Belarusians), may as well live in different countries. To the Rus- 
sians, most of whom live in northern Kazakstan within a day's 
drive of Russia proper, Kazakstan is an extension of the Sibe- 
rian frontier and a product of Russian and Soviet development. 
To most Kazaks, these Russians are usurpers. Of Kazakstan's 
current Russian residents, 38 percent were born outside the 
republic, while most of the rest are second-generation Kazak- 
stani citizens. 

The Nazarbayev government has announced plans to move 
the capital from Almaty in the far southeast to Aqmola in the 
north-central region by 1998. That change would cause a shift 
of the Kazak population northward and accelerate the absorp- 
tion of the Russian-dominated northern provinces into the 
Kazakstani state. Over the longer term, the role of Russians in 



27 



Country Studies 

the society of Kazakstan also is determined by a demographic 
factor — the average age of the Russian population is higher, 
and its birth rate much lower. 

The Role of Women 

Like its 1993 predecessor, the constitution of 1995 defends 
women's rights implicitly, if not entirely explicitly. The docu- 
ment guarantees citizens the right to work and forbids discrim- 
ination based on geographic origin, gender, race, nationality, 
religious or political belief, and language. 

In practice, social opinion tends to associate women in the 
workplace with the abuses of the Soviet past. The early 1990s 
saw the loss of more than 100,000 day-care spaces, and public 
opinion strongly favors returning primary responsibility for the 
rearing and educating of children to mothers. In April 1995, 
President Nazarbayev said that one of the republic's goals must 
be to create an economy in which a mother can work at home, 
raising her children. This general opinion has been reflected 
in governmental appointments and private enterprise; almost 
no women occupy senior positions in the country, either in 
government or in business. 

The declining birth rate is another issue with the potential 
to become politicized because it affects the demographic 
"race" between Kazaks and Russians. With demographic statis- 
tics in mind, Kazak nationalist parties have attempted to ban 
abortions and birth control for Kazak women; they have also 
made efforts to reduce the number of Kazak women who have 
children outside marriage. In 1988, the last year for which 
there are figures, 11.24 percent of the births in the republic 
were to unmarried women. Such births were slightly more com- 
mon in cities (12.72 percent) than in rural areas (9.67 per- 
cent), suggesting that such births may be more common 
among Russians than among Kazaks. 

Women's health issues have not been addressed effectively in 
Kazakstan. Maternal mortality rates average 80 per 10,000 
births for the entire country, but they are believed to be much 
higher in rural areas. Of the 4.2 million women of childbearing 
age, an estimated 15 percent have borne seven or more chil- 
dren. Nevertheless, in 1992 the number of abortions exceeded 
the number of births, although the high percentage of early- 
stage abortions performed in private clinics complicates data 
gathering. According to one expert estimate, the average per 
woman is five abortions. Rising abortion rates are attributable, 



28 



Kazakstan 



at least in part, to the high price or unavailability of contracep- 
tive devices, which became much less accessible after 1991. In 
1992 an estimated 15 percent of women were using some form 
of contraception. 

Clans 

One aspect of Kazak traditional culture, clan membership, is 
acquiring importance in the postindependence environment. 
Historically the Kazaks identified themselves as belonging to 
one of three groups of clans and tribes, called zhuz, or hordes, 
each of which had traditional territories. Because the Lesser 
Horde controlled western Kazakstan and the Middle Horde 
migrated across what today is northern and eastern Kazakstan, 
those groups came under Russian control first, when colonial 
policies were relatively benign. The traditional nobles of these 
hordes managed to retain many of their privileges and to edu- 
cate their sons in Russian schools. These sons became the first 
Kazak nationalists, and in turn their sons were destroyed by Sta- 
lin, who tried to eradicate the Kazak intelligentsia during his 
purges of the 1930s. 

The Large, or Great, Horde was dominant in the south, and 
hence did not fall under Russian control until colonialism was 
much harsher. Substantially fewer Great Horde Kazaks became 
involved in politics before the revolution, but those who did 
became socialists rather than nationalists. For that reason, the 
Great Horde members came to dominate once the Bolsheviks 
took power, especially after Kazaks tan's capital was moved from 
the Lesser Horde town of Orenburg (now in Russia) to a Great 
Horde wintering spot, Almaty. Kunayev and Nazarbayev are 
said to have roots in clans of the Great Horde. 

With the collapse of the CPK and its patronage networks, 
and in the absence of any other functional equivalent, clan and 
zhuz membership has come to play an increasingly important 
role in the economic and political life of the republic at both 
the national and the province level. The power of clan politics 
has been visible in the dispute over moving the national capital 
to Aqmola, which would bolster the prestige of the Middle 
Horde, on whose lands Aqmola is located. In general, members 
of the Lesser and Middle hordes are more Russified and, 
hence, more inclined to cooperate with Russian industrial and 
commercial interests than are the members of the Great 
Horde. Akezhan Kazhegeldin, prime minister in 1996, was a 
Middle Horder, as was the opposition leader Olzhas Suley- 



29 



Country Studies 

menov. Although mindful of Russia's strength, the Great 
Horders have less to lose to Russian separatism than do the 
Lesser and Middle horders, whose lands would be lost should 
the Russian-dominated provinces of northern Kazakstan 
become separated from the republic. 

Religion 

By tradition the Kazaks are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi 
school, and the Russians are Russian Orthodox. In 1994, some 
47 percent of the population was Muslim, 44 percent was Rus- 
sian Orthodox, and 2 percent was Protestant, mainly Baptist. 
Some Jews, Catholics, and Pentacostalists also live in Kazakstan; 
a Roman Catholic diocese was established in 1991. As else- 
where in the newly independent Central Asian states, the sub- 
ject of Islam's role in everyday life, and especially in politics, is a 
delicate one in Kazakstan. 

Islam in the Past 

As part of the Central Asian population and the Turkic 
world, Kazaks are conscious of the role Islam plays in their 
identity, and there is strong public pressure to increase the role 
that faith plays in society. At the same time, the roots of Islam 
in many segments of Kazak society are not as deep as they are 
in neighboring countries. Many of the Kazak nomads, for 
instance, did not become Muslims until the eighteenth or even 
the nineteenth century, and urban Russified Kazaks, who by 
some counts constitute as much as 40 percent of the indige- 
nous population, profess discomfort with some aspects of the 
religion even as they recognize it as part of their national heri- 
tage. 

Soviet authorities attempted to encourage a controlled form 
of Islam as a unifying force in the Central Asian societies while 
at the same time stifling the expression of religious beliefs. 
Since independence, religious activity has increased signifi- 
cantly. Construction of mosques and religious schools has 
accelerated in the 1990s, with financial help from Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, and Egypt. Already in 1991, some 170 mosques were 
operating, more than half of them newly built; at that time, an 
estimated 230 Muslim communities were active in Kazakstan 

Islam and the State 

In 1990 Nazarbayev, then party first secretary, created a state 



30 



Kazakstan 



basis for Islam by removing Kazakstan from the authority of the 
Muslim Board of Central Asia, the Soviet-approved and politi- 
cally oriented religious administration for all of Central Asia. 
Instead, Nazarbayev created a separate muftiate, or religious 
authority, for Kazak Muslims. However, Nazarbayev's choice of 
Ratbek hadji Nysanbayev to be the first Kazak mufti proved an 
unpopular one. Accusing him of financial irregularities, reli- 
gious mispractice, and collaboration with the Soviet and Kazak- 
stani state security apparatus, a group of believers from the 
nationalist Alash political party attempted unsuccessfully to 
replace the mufti in December 1991. 

With an eye toward the Islamic governments of nearby Iran 
and Afghanistan, the writers of the 1993 constitution specifi- 
cally forbade religious political parties. The 1995 constitution 
forbids organizations that seek to stimulate racial, political, or 
religious discord, and imposes strict governmental control on 
foreign religious organizations. As did its predecessor, the 1995 
constitution stipulates that Kazakstan is a secular state; thus, 
Kazakstan is the only Central Asian state whose constitution 
does not assign a special status to Islam. This position was based 
on the Nazarbayev government's foreign policy as much as on 
domestic considerations. Aware of the potential for investment 
from the Muslim countries of the Middle East, Nazarbayev vis- 
ited Iran, Turkey, and Saudia Arabia; at the same time, how- 
ever, he preferred to cast Kazakstan as a bridge between the 
Muslim East and the Christian West. For example, he initially 
accepted only observer status in the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), all of whose member nations are pre- 
dominantly Muslim. The president's first trip to the Muslim 
holy city of Mecca, which did not occur until 1994, was part of 
an itinerary that also included a visit to Pope John Paul II in 
the Vatican. 

By the mid-1990s, Nazarbayev had begun occasionally to 
refer to Allah in his speeches, but he had not permitted any of 
the Islamic festivals to become public holidays, as they had else- 
where in Central Asia. However, certain pre-Islamic holidays 
such as the spring festival Navruz and the summer festival 
Kymyzuryndyk were reintroduced in 1995. 

National Identity 

As in the other Central Asian republics, the preservation of 
indigenous cultural traditions and the local language was a dif- 
ficult problem during the Soviet era. The years since 1991 have 



31 



Country Studies 



provided opportunities for greater cultural expression, but 
striking a balance between the Kazak and Russian languages 
has posed a political dilemma for Kazakstan's policy makers. 

Language 

The two official languages in Kazakstan are Russian and 
Kazak. Kazak is part of the Nogai-Kipchak subgroup of north- 
eastern Turkic languages, heavily influenced by both Tatar and 
Mongol. Kazak was first written only in the 1860s, using Arabic 
script. In 1929 Latin script was introduced. In 1940 Stalin 
decided to unify the written materials of the Central Asian 
republics with those of the Slavic rulers by introducing a modi- 
fied form of Cyrillic. In 1992 the return of a Latin-based alpha- 
bet came under discussion, but the enormous costs involved 
appear to have stopped further consideration of the idea. 

Kazak first became a state language in the late Soviet period, 
when few of the republic's Russians gave serious thought to the 
possibility that they might need Kazak to retain their employ- 
ment, to serve in the armed forces, or to have their children 
enter a Kazakstani university. At that point, fewer than 5 per- 
cent of Russians could speak Kazak, although the majority of 
Kazaks could speak Russian. However, with the separation 
between Russia and Kazakstan that followed independence, 
Russian nationalist sentiment and objections to alleged dis- 
crimination in official language policies have increased, espe- 
cially in the north, as Russians have felt the threat of Kazak 
becoming the sole legal state language. Meanwhile, Kazaks 
have strongly defended the preeminence of their tongue, 
although mastery of the language is far from universal even 
among Kazaks. According to some estimates, as much as 40 
percent of the Kazak population is not fluent in Kazak. The 
standard language of business, for example, is Russian. 

Even those who are fluent find Kazak a difficult language to 
work with in science, business, and some administrative settings 
because it remained largely a "kitchen" language in Soviet 
times, never developing a modern technical vocabulary. Nor 
has there been extensive translation of technical or popular lit- 
erature into Kazak. Thus, for most Kazaks Russian remains the 
primary "world language." In fact, President Nazarbayev 
defended making Kazak the sole official language on the 
grounds that decades of Russification had endangered the sur- 
vival of Kazak as a language. The practical primacy of Russian is 
reflected in the schools. Despite efforts to increase the number 



32 



Kazakstan 



of schools where Kazak is the primary language of instruction, 
Russian appeared to continue its domination in the mid-1990s. 
In 1990 about twice as many schools taught in Russian as in 
Kazak. Although institutions of higher learning now show a 
strong selection bias in favor of Kazak students, Russian 
remains the language of instruction in most subjects. 

The issue of languages is one of the most politicized and 
contentious in Kazakstan. The volatility of the language issue 
has been augmented by Russia's controversial proposals, begin- 
ning in 1993, that Kazakstan's Russians be granted dual citizen- 
ship. Although Nazarbayev rejected such a policy, the language 
controversy prompted him to postpone deadlines for imple- 
mentation of laws making Kazak the sole official language. 
Thus, it is unlikely that most adult non-Kazaks will have to learn 
Kazak. Nevertheless, demographic trends make it probable 
that the next generation will have to learn Kazak, a prospect 
that generates considerable discomfort in the non-Kazak popu- 
lation. The 1995 constitution does not provide for dual citizen- 
ship, but it does alleviate Russian concerns by declaring 
Russian an official language. That status means that Russian 
would continue as the primary language of communication for 
many ethnic Kazaks, and it will remain acceptable for use in 
schools (a major concern of Russian citizens) and official docu- 
ments. 

Culture 

Before the Russian conquest, the Kazaks had a well-articu- 
lated culture based on their nomadic pastoral economy. 
Although Islam was introduced to most of the Kazaks in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the religion was not 
fully assimilated until much later. As a result, it coexisted with 
earlier elements of shamanistic and animistic beliefs. Tradi- 
tional Kazak belief held that separate spirits inhabited and ani- 
mated the earth, sky, water, and fire, as well as domestic 
animals. To this day, particularly honored guests in rural set- 
tings are treated to a feast of freshly killed lamb. Such guests 
are sometimes asked to bless the lamb and to ask its spirit for 
permission to partake of its flesh. Besides lamb, many other tra- 
ditional foods retain symbolic value in Kazak culture. 

Because animal husbandry was central to the Kazaks' tradi- 
tional lifestyle, most of their nomadic practices and customs 
relate in some way to livestock. Traditional curses and blessings 
invoked disease or fecundity among animals, and good man- 



33 



Country Studies 

ners required that a person ask first about the health of a man's 
livestock when greeting him and only afterward inquire about 
the human aspects of his life. 

The traditional Kazak dwelling is the yurt, a tent consisting 
of a flexible framework of willow wood covered with varying 
thicknesses of felt. The open top permits smoke from the cen- 
tral hearth to escape; temperature and draft can be controlled 
by a flap that increases or decreases the size of the opening. A 
properly constructed yurt can be cooled in summer and 
warmed in winter, and it can be disassembled or set up in less 
than an hour. The interior of the yurt has ritual significance; 
the right side generally is reserved for men and the left for 
women. 

Although yurts are less used for their original purpose than 
they once were, they remain a potent symbol of "Kazakness." 
During demonstrations against Nazarbayev in the spring of 
1992, demonstrators and hunger strikers erected yurts in front 
of the government building in Almaty. Yurts are also frequently 
used as a decorative motif in restaurants and other public 
buildings. 

Because of the Kazaks' nomadic lifestyle and their lack of a 
written language until the mid-nineteenth century, their liter- 
ary tradition relies upon oral histories. These histories were 
memorized and recited by the akyn, the elder responsible for 
remembering the legends and histories, and by jyrau, lyric 
poets who traveled with the high-placed khans. Most of the leg- 
ends concern the activities of a batir, or hero-warrior. Among 
the tales that have survived are Koblandy-batir (fifteenth or six- 
teenth century), ErSain (sixteenth century), and Er Targyn (six- 
teenth century), all of which concern the struggle against the 
Kalmyks; Kozy Korpesh and Bain sulu, both epics; and the love 
lyric Kiz-Jibek. Usually these tales were recited in a song-like 
chant, frequently to the accompaniment of such traditional 
instruments as drums and the dombra, a mandolin-like string 
instrument. President Nazarbayev has appeared on television 
broadcasts in the republic, playing the dombra and singing. 

The Russian conquest wreaked havoc on Kazak traditional 
culture by making impossible the nomadic pastoralism upon 
which the culture was based. However, many individual ele- 
ments survived the loss of the lifestyle as a whole. Many prac- 
tices that lost their original meanings are assuming value as 
symbols of post-Soviet national identity. 



34 



Bust of Zhambyl Zhambayev, 
poet of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, after whom 
a city was named 
Courtesy Stanley Bach 



For the most part, preindependence cultural life in Kazak- 
stan was indistinguishable from that elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union. It featured the same plays, films, music, books, paint- 
ings, museums, and other cultural appurtenances common in 
every other corner of the Soviet empire. That Russified cul- 
tural establishment nevertheless produced many of the most 
important figures of the early stages of Kazak nationalist self- 
assertion, including novelist Anuar Alimzhanov, who became 
president of the last Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, and 
poets Mukhtar Shakhanov and Olzhas Suleymenov, who were 
copresidents of the political party Popular Congress of Kazak- 
stan (see Structure of Government; Political Organizations, 
this ch.). Shakhanov also chaired the commission that investi- 
gated the events surrounding the riots of December 1986. 

An even more powerful figure than Shakhanov, Suleymenov 
in 1975 became a pan-Central Asian hero by publishing a book, 
Az i la, examining the Lay of Igor's Campaign, a medieval tale 
vital to the Russian national culture, from the perspective of 
the Turkic Pechenegs whom Igor defeated. Soviet authorities 
subjected the book to a blistering attack. Later Suleymenov 
used his prestige to give authority to the Nevada-Semipalatinsk 
antinuclear movement, which performed the very real service 
of ending nuclear testing in Kazakstan. He and Shakhanov 
originally organized their People's Congress Party as a pro-Naz- 



35 



Country Studies 



arbayev movement, but Suleymenov eventually steered the 
party into an opposition role. In the short-lived parliament of 
1994-95, Suleymenov was leader of the Respublika opposition 
coalition, and he was frequently mentioned as a possible presi- 
dential candidate. 

The collapse of the Soviet system with which so many of the 
Kazak cultural figures were identified left most of them in awk- 
ward positions. Even more damaging has been the total col- 
lapse of public interest in most forms of higher culture. Most of 
the books that Kazakstanis buy are about business, astrology, or 
sex; the movies they see are nearly all American, Chinese, or 
Turkish adventure and action films; most concerts feature rock 
music, not infrequently accompanied by erotic dancing; and 
television provides a diet of old Soviet films and dubbed Mexi- 
can soap operas. Kazakstan's cultural elite is suffering the same 
decline affecting the elites of all the former Soviet republics. 
Thus, cultural norms are determined predominantly by Kazak- 
stan's increasing access to global mass culture. 

Education 

The constitution of 1995 specifies that education through 
secondary school is mandatory and free, and that citizens have 
the further right to compete for free education in the repub- 
lic's institutions of higher learning. Private, paid education is 
permitted but remains subject to state control and supervision. 

In 1994 Kazakstan had 8,575 elementary and secondary 
schools (grades one through twelve) attended by approxi- 
mately 3.2 million students, and 244 specialized secondary 
schools with about 222,000 students. In 1992 about 51 percent 
of eligible children were attending some 8,500 preschools in 
Kazakstan. In 1994 some 272,100 students were enrolled in the 
republic's sixty-one institutes of higher learning. Fifty-four per- 
cent of the students were Kazak, and 31 percent were Russian. 

The educational situation since independence is somewhat 
difficult to judge because of incomplete information. The 
republic has attempted to overhaul both the structure of its 
education system and much of its substance, but the questions 
of what should be taught and in what manner continue to 
loom large. A particularly sensitive and unresolved issue is what 
the language of instruction should be, given the almost equal 
distribution of the population between ethnic Kazaks and eth- 
nic Russians. In 1994 most instruction still was in Russian 
because Kazak-language textbooks and Kazak teachers were in 



36 



Kazakstan 



short supply. Enrollment was estimated to be 92 percent of the 
total age-group in both primary and secondary grades, but only 
8 percent in the postsecondary age-group. 

Serious shortages in funding and resources have hindered 
efforts to revamp the education system inherited from the 
Soviet Union. Even in 1990, more than half the republic's 
schools were operating on two and even three shifts per day; 
since then, hundreds of schools, especially preschools, have 
been converted to offices or stores. Elementary- and second- 
ary-school teachers remain badly underpaid; in 1993 more 
than 30,000 teachers (or about one-seventh of the 1990 teach- 
ing staff) left education, many of them to seek more lucrative 
employment. 

Despite the obstacles, efforts have been made to upgrade the 
education system, especially at the highest level. Kazakstani citi- 
zens still can enroll in what once were the premier Soviet uni- 
versities, all of which are now in foreign countries, in particular 
Russia and Ukraine. In the mid-1990s, however, such opportu- 
nities have become rare and much more expensive. This situa- 
tion has forced the upgrading of existing universities in 
Kazakstan, as well as the creation of at least one new private 
university, Al-Farabi University, formerly the S.M. Kirov State 
University, in Almaty. The largest institution of higher learning 
in Kazakstan, Al-Farabi had 1,530 teachers and about 14,000 
students in 1994. A second university, Qaraghandy State Uni- 
versity, had about 8,300 students in 1994. In addition, technical 
secondary schools in five cities — Aqmola, Atyrau, Pavlodar, 
Petropavl (formerly Petropavlovsk), and Taldyqorghan (for- 
merly Taldy-Kurgan) — have been reclassified as universities, 
increasing regional access to higher education. Altogether, in 
1994 Kazakstan had thirty-two specialized institutes of higher 
learning, offering programs in agriculture, business and eco- 
nomics, medicine, music, theater, foreign languages, and a 
variety of engineering and technical fields. In the area of tech- 
nical education, the republic has taken aggressive advantage of 
offers from foreign states to educate young Kazaks. In 1994 
about 3,000 young people were studying in various foreign 
countries, including the United States. 

One trend that particularly worries republic administrators 
is the pronounced "Kazakification" of higher education, as the 
republic's Russians either send their children to schools across 
the Russian border or find it impossible to enroll them in local 
institutions. Kazakstan's law forbids ethnic quotas, but there is 



37 



Country Studies 

evidence of prejudicial admittance patterns. The class that 
entered university in 1991, for example, was 73.1 percent Kazak 
and only 13.1 percent Russian. 

Health 

The early years of independence have had a disastrous effect 
on public health. In the 1980s, Kazakstan had an extensively 
developed public health system that delivered at least basic 
care without charge even to very remote communities. By 1993, 
however, Kazakstan rated below average or lower among the 
former Soviet republics in medical system, sanitation, medical 
industry, medical research and development, and pharmaceu- 
tical supply. 

Health System 

In 1994 the health system had twenty-nine doctors per 1,000 
people and 86.7 other medical personnel per 1,000. There 
were 1,805 hospitals in the republic, with seventy-six beds per 
1,000 people. There were 3,129 general health clinics and 
1,826 gynecological and pediatric clinics. Conditions and ser- 
vices at these facilities varied widely; it was not uncommon, for 
example, for rural clinics and hospitals to be without running 
water. 

The constitution of 1995 perpetuates the Soviet-era guaran- 
tee of free basic health care, but financing has been a consis- 
tent problem. In 1992 funding allotted to public health care 
was less than 1.6 percent of GDP, a level characterized by the 
World Bank as that of an underdeveloped nation. 

Because doctors and other medical personnel receive very 
low pay, many medical professionals have moved to other 
republics — a large percentage of Kazakstan's doctors are Rus- 
sian or other non-Kazak nationalities — or have gone into other 
professions. Nonpayment even of existing low wages is a com- 
mon occurrence, as are strikes by doctors and nurses. 

In the 1980s, Kazakstan had about 2,100 pharmaceutical- 
manufacturing facilities; drugs were also available from other 
Soviet republics or from East European trading partners within 
the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon). Since independence most such supply connec- 
tions have been terminated, and many domestic pharmaceuti- 
cal plants have closed, making some types of drugs virtually 
unavailable. As a result, vaccination of infants and children, 



38 



Kazakstan 



which reached between 85 and 93 percent of the relevant age- 
groups in 1990, decreased sharply in the early 1990s. Kazakstan 
ran out of measles and tuberculosis vaccine in late 1991, and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that more 
than 20 percent of children were not receiving basic vaccina- 
tions in 1992. 

To some extent, the provision of drugs has been taken over 
by a government-owned company, Farmatsiya, which purchases 
about 95 percent of the medical equipment and supplies for 
the government. There have been persistent complaints that 
Farmatsiya pays far too much for foreign equipment and medi- 
cines in return for nonmedical considerations. 

Private medical practice is permitted in general medicine 
and in some specialized fields; private surgical practice is for- 
bidden, as is private treatment of cancer, tuberculosis, venereal 
disease, pregnancy, and infectious diseases. Some types of pri- 
vate practice have been introduced directly into the state clin- 
ics, creating a confusing situation in which identical 
procedures are performed by the same personnel, some for 
state fees and others for higher private fees. A substantial unof- 
ficial market has developed in the distribution of hospital sup- 
plies; patients often are expected to pay for the bandages, 
anesthesia, and other materials and services required for the 
"free" treatment received at medical facilities. Kazakstan has no 
system of medical insurance. 

In the mid-1990s, the largest growth area in medicine was in 
services not requiring large capital outlays by the practitioner. 
This area, which includes acupuncturists, fertility consultants, 
substance-abuse therapists, physical therapists, and dentists, is 
only lightly regulated, and the incidence of charlatanism is 
high. 

Kazakstan has negotiated some international agreements to 
improve health care. In 1992 an association of scientific organi- 
zations specializing in contagious diseases established its head- 
quarters in Almaty. The group, which includes doctors and 
technicians from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan, conducts joint research with scientists in China, 
Mongolia, and Vietnam. A 1995 medical cooperation agree- 
ment between the Kazakstani and Iranian ministries of health 
called for exchanges of medical students and experts, joint 
research projects, exchanges of information on the latest medi- 
cal advances (with an emphasis on contagious diseases), and 
mutual natural-disaster assistance. 



39 



Country Studies 



Health Conditions 

The deterioration of the public health system has hit Kazakh- 
stan's population hard. Rates of infant mortality and overall 
mortality have risen in the 1990s as the fertility rate has 
decreased, contributing to the first drop in the republic's popu- 
lation since World War II. Infant mortality was twenty-seven per 

I, 000 live births in 1991, the lowest rate among the five Central 
Asian republics but higher than that for any non-Central Asian 
republic. A lack of medicines and facilities, together with a gen- 
eral deterioration in physical environment and living stan- 
dards, has promoted outbreaks of several potentially epidemic 
diseases, including diphtheria (its incidence increased from 
thirty-five cases in 1993 to 312 in the first ten months of 1994), 
poliomyelitis (two cases in 1994), viral hepatitis, and cholera 
(of which outbreaks occurred in 1992 and 1993). The inci- 
dence of tuberculosis has grown substantially, with as many as 

II, 000 new cases and 2,000 deaths reported annually (see table 
5, Appendix). According to a 1995 report of the Contagious 
Disease Association in Almaty, a bubonic plague-carrying rat 
population was moving from the Balkhash region, where the 
plague is endemic, southward toward Almaty, whose municipal 
government had taken no measures to control rats. 

The first death in Kazakstan attributed to acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) was reported in July 1993. At that 
time, nineteen carriers of the human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) reportedly were registered in Kazakstan. Of that num- 
ber, three were identified as homosexuals, two were preschool 
children, and nine were foreign citizens, who were deported. 
In mid-1995, the WHO reported that twenty-seven people had 
been diagnosed with AIDS or as HIV-positive between 1993 and 
1995. The Kazakstan AIDS Prevention and Control Dispensary 
was established in Almaty in 1991, with twenty-two branch 
offices and diagnostic laboratories elsewhere in the republic. 
However, in the early 1990s diagnosis and treatment relied on 
foreign funds and equipment because domestic health funds 
were barely sufficient to maintain clinic buildings. Fewer than 
500 requests for screening were received in 1993. In mid-1995, 
the government set up the Coordinating Council for Combat- 
ing AIDS under the direct administration of the prime minis- 
ter. 

The shortage of health care has put children at particular 
risk. Approximately 15 percent of newborns in 1994 were 
unhealthy, most often suffering from bronchiopulmonary and 



40 



Kazakstan 



cardiovascular problems. Measles, diphtheria, brucellosis, and 
other childhood diseases became more prevalent during the 
early 1990s. 

Extensive pollution and degradation of large segments of 
the natural environment have increased the strain on public 
health. Both the air and water of many of the large cities are 
badly polluted. Three regions have been identified as having 
particularly hazardous environments. Oskemen (formerly Ust- 
Kamenogorsk) in the far northeast has been rated the third 
most polluted city in the former Soviet Union, with ten times 
the maximum permitted levels of lead in the air and high con- 
centrations of beryllium, thallium, mercury, cadmium, anti- 
mony, and arsenic in the municipal water supply. Just west of 
Oskemen, in Semey, a major site of Soviet nuclear testing from 
1949 to 1991, radiation has contaminated the air and soil. 
Experts believe that the tests, which were conducted in the 
atmosphere until 1963, contaminated the environment of the 
entire country of Kazakstan. In one village, Kaynar, near the 
main proving ground, 140 of 3,400 children were found to 
have been disabled since birth; in a random sample of another 
600 of the town's children, all were found to be suffering ill 
health of one form or another. Radiation is believed the cause 
of such statistics. The third major area of environmental degra- 
dation is the Aral Sea Basin along the southwestern border, 
where agricultural runoff and untreated sewage have caused 
advanced pollution of groundwater (see Environmental Prob- 
lems, this ch.). 

Water contamination is a serious environmental health haz- 
ard in Kazakstan because of poor management of drinking 
water and insufficient sewage treatment. About 30 percent of 
rural communities obtain water from shallow wells; the water is 
vulnerable to contamination by materials leached from the sur- 
face. As late as 1985, only 37 percent of homes had sewerage 
systems and running water, and even schools and hospitals had 
primitive sanitary systems that caused frequent outbreaks of 
intestinal illness. 

The diet and lifestyle of many citizens, especially in the cit- 
ies, contribute further to poor health. The average diet is high 
in meat and salt and low in vegetables and fruits. The hyperin- 
flation of 1992-93 cut deeply into family budgets, limiting both 
the variety and quantity of food most ordinary people con- 
sume. Smoking is almost universal, especially among men, and 
alcoholism is common. Other forms of substance abuse such as 



41 



Country Studies 

the use of hemp, morphia products, and glue are common, 
especially among young people. 

Occupational hazards constitute another major health prob- 
lem. Especially during the economic hardships of the early 
1990s, public health authorities refrained from measures such 
as closing polluting factories or restricting the use of fertilizers, 
pesticides, and irrigation water out of a fear of accelerating the 
general decline in production. Because of the dangers posed 
by exposure to toxic smoke and fumes, lead and phosphate 
plants limit workers to ten years of employment. With little 
restriction on how they are operated, factories in Kazakstan 
note high rates of morbidity, absenteeism, and permanent dis- 
ability among their employees. 

Social Welfare 

The Soviet system of social welfare, which remained in place 
in Kazakstan in the early 1990s, presupposed a very high level 
of public services. The 1993 constitution maintained most of 
the assumptions of the Soviet era without providing a clear 
mechanism for paying for "guaranteed" workers' benefits such 
as free education, medical care, pensions, and vacations. The 
constitution ratified in 1995 somewhat reduces the list and 
scale of guaranteed protections, but remaining guarantees 
include a minimum wage, pensions for the retired and the dis- 
abled, social benefits for orphans and for people who are eld- 
erly or infirm, legal assistance, housing, and what is called 
"social defense against unemployment." 

In practice, social benefits have proven difficult to supply 
because of financial considerations and the lack of a firm orga- 
nizational structure for service provision. For example, in the 
Soviet period housing was supplied by the state or by employ- 
ers. In 1990 housing began to be privatized, a process almost 
completed by the mid-1990s. The result has been a healthy 
resale market for existing housing. In 1995 apartment costs in 
Almaty could exceed 15,000 tenge (for value of the tenge, see 
Glossary) per square meter, but there had been no correspond- 
ing boom in new housing construction, in part because privati- 
zation of the land on which such housing would stand 
remained a sensitive and unresolved issue. As a result, the 
republic's housing crisis, already acute in the Soviet period, has 
grown far worse. In the mid-1990s the housing shortage was 
especially serious in Almaty, where tens of thousands were on 



42 



Kazakstan 



waiting lists. In 1995 housing construction decreased by about 
25 percent. 

Perhaps the biggest problems have emerged in the areas of 
pensions, aid to large families and other social assistance, and 
unemployment compensation. An independent pension fund 
was created in 1991 on the basis of a social insurance tax on 
enterprises (37 percent of wages in 1992) and contributions by 
employees (1 percent of wages in 1992). The national budget 
nominally covers remaining deficits in the pension fund. Pen- 
sions initially were set at 60 percent of average pay, with mini- 
mal pensions available even to elderly citizens such as 
housewives who never had drawn a salary. However, the high 
inflation of 1991-93 badly eroded existing pensions; the state 
has continually adjusted pensions upward in a futile struggle to 
keep pace (see Prices, Wages, and Currency, this ch.). In addi- 
tion, the administration of pensions has been reconfigured sev- 
eral times, leading to lengthy delays in the payment even of the 
small sums pensioners are owed. Such delays have prompted 
numerous public demonstrations. Although the value of pen- 
sions has shrunk dramatically in real terms, by 1992 govern- 
ment expenditures on them were 4.7 percent of the GDP. In 
March 1995, the government had to divert 632 million tenge 
from the national budget to cover pension arrears. 

Similar problems have occurred in other categories of allow- 
ances to citizens, especially lump-sum payments to newborns; 
child allowances to large families (those with four or more chil- 
dren) and abandoned children; assistance to single mothers; 
and assistance to the children of soldiers. In 1992 payments in 
these categories reached 5 percent of Kazakstan's GDP. Slow 
payment and the lag between inflation and cost-of-living adjust- 
ments have had a particularly severe effect on Kazakstan's 
poorer families, for some of whom government subsidies pro- 
vide as much as one-quarter of total income. In 1994 about 2.1 
million citizens received retirement pensions, and about 
800,000 received other types of pension. 

Unemployment is perhaps the most difficult category of 
social problem because it is a phenomenon that officially did 
not exist until 1991 and still carries a considerable social 
stigma. As of January 1, 1995, some 85,700 people officially 
were registered as unemployed, about 55 percent of them in 
rural areas. However, this figure is commonly assumed to be 
too low because many workers still are nominally employed, 
even though their salaries have been reduced or stopped alto- 



43 



Country Studies 



gether under a variety of cutback conditions. In January 1995, 
some 230 enterprises, with a normal work force of about 51,000 
employees, were standing idle; by April 1995, the number had 
grown to 376 enterprises with more than 90,000 employees. 

The Economy 

Although Kazakstan has the potential to be a wealthy nation, 
since independence it has suffered consistent and precipitous 
economic decline. Reporting problems and incompatibility of 
data make precise measurement of the republic's economic 
shrinkage difficult, but it is generally accepted that, by the mid- 
1990s, GDP had dropped to about half of what it was in 1990 
(see table 6, Appendix). Despite the presence of rich deposits 
of natural resources, the republic's industrial sector was devel- 
oped in the Soviet period only in specific areas such as metal 
processing, chemicals, textiles, and food processing. The semi- 
arid condition of much of Kazakstan's territory does not pre- 
clude the export of wheat, meat, and some vegetables. 

Natural Resources 

Soviet geologists once boasted that Kazakstan was capable of 
exporting the entire Periodic Table of Elements. During the 
Soviet period, Kazakstan supplied about 7 percent of the 
union's gold, or about twenty-four tons per year. Since inde- 
pendence, the republic has attracted large foreign partners to 
develop existing or new mines. President Nazarbayev 
announced intentions to increase annual gold production to 
fifty or sixty tons by 1995 or 1996. 

In 1989 the mines of Kazakstan yielded 23.8 million tons of 
iron ore and 151,900 tons of manganese. The republic also pos- 
sesses deposits of uranium, chrome, titanium, nickel, wolfram, 
silver, molybdenum, bauxite, and copper. Major phosphate 
mines feed fertilizer plants in the southern city of Zhambyl. 
Three major coal fields — Torghay, Qaraghandy, and Ekibas- 
tuz — produced 140 million tons of hard coal in 1991, but by 
1994 Kazakstan's national total had dropped to 104 million 
tons. 

In the mid-1990s, all minerals in Kazakstan belonged to the 
republic. Authority for decisions concerning their develop- 
ment was delegated to the prime minister, provided that these 
decisions were consistent with laws on natural resource devel- 
opment. The fundamental law "On Natural Resources and the 



44 



Karatau Mountains, reportedly containing huge reserves of lead and 

zinc, southern Kazakstan 
Courtesy Paul Hearn 

Development of Mineral Resources" was passed in May 1992, 
but its treatment of foreign development of minerals is limited 
to two brief paragraphs stipulating that foreign development 
be conducted in accordance with international and national 
law 

Agriculture 

In the early 1990s, agriculture was the second largest sector 
of the economy, contributing about 36 percent of GDP and 
employing about 18 percent of the workforce in 1993. The cli- 
mate and soil of most of Kazakstan are best suited to the light 
grazing by which the nomadic Kazaks had traditionally sup- 
ported themselves, following herds of sheep, cattle, camels, 
and horses about the open steppe. Despite such natural advan- 
tages, Soviet policy encouraged cultivation, especially in the 
northern parts of the republic. The major transformation 
occurred under premier Khrushchev during the Virgin Lands 
program of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Its objectives were to 
reduce Soviet grain imports to Central Asia and settle the 
remaining nomadic herdsmen of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Under that program, 60 percent of Kazakstan's pastureland 



45 



Country Studies 

went under cultivation. An estimated 30 percent of that land 
was not suitable for cultivation, however, and Khrushchev was 
ousted in 1964 after a series of crop failures in Kazakstan. In 
1992 the total area under cultivation was 36.5 million hectares, 
of which 2.3 million hectares were irrigated. Much of this land 
is dedicated to large-scale wheat farming, which requires inten- 
sive capitalization and does not lend itself to privatization. Even 
with the emphasis on grain production, about 84 percent of 
the republic's agricultural land, or about 187 million hectares, 
remains devoted to pasturage, mainly of cattle and sheep. Con- 
tinuation of the Soviet system of intensive livestock manage- 
ment, dependent on fodder more than on natural grazing, has 
left much grazing land unused and has distorted cultivation in 
favor of fodder production. 

The primary agricultural regions are the north-central and 
southern parts of the republic. Grain production is especially 
important in the north-central region, and cotton and rice pre- 
dominate in the south (see table 7, Appendix). Kazakstan also 
is a major producer of meat and milk. 

In 1993 only about 1.5 percent of agricultural land was in 
private hands. Although some privatization had occurred, the 
bulk of Kazakstan's agriculture remained organized in 7,000 to 
8,000 state and collective farms that averaged 35,000 to 40,000 
hectares each. Many of those farms had moved into a transi- 
tional stage of joint-stock ownership, private collectives, or 
farming associations (see Post-Soviet Economic Developments, 
this ch.). The state also has maintained control of agricultural 
inputs and equipment, as well as some processing and market- 
ing policies and operations. In the wake of price liberalization, 
the mandated state share of agricultural sales has decreased 
annually from the 1991 level of 70 percent. 

Until the early 1990s, western Kazakstan was an important 
fishing area, but sharply increased salination has made the Aral 
Sea sterile. Fishing output dropped from 105,300 tons in 1960 
to 89,600 tons in 1989. The current figure is probably close to 
zero, judging by the decision of Soviet central planners in 1990 
to fly Arctic fish to Kazakstan for processing as a means of 
maintaining local employment in that operation. 

Industry 

Kazakstan inherited a decaying but still powerful manufac- 
turing and processing capacity from the centrally managed 
Soviet system. In that system, among Kazakstan's designated 



46 



Kazakstan 



products for the general all-union market were phosphate fer- 
tilizer, rolled metal, radio cables, aircraft wires, train bearings, 
tractors, and bulldozers. Kazakstan also had a well-developed 
network of factories producing military goods that supplied 
about 1 1 percent of the total military production of the Soviet 
Union. In some areas of military production, Kazakstan had a 
virtual monopoly. In the post-Soviet era, much of the defense 
industry has stopped or slowed production; some plants now 
produce nonmilitary electronic equipment and machines. 

Most of the republic's manufacturing, refining, and metal- 
lurgy plants are concentrated in the north and northeast, in 
Semey, Aqmola, Petropavl, and Aqtobe (see fig. 5). In south- 
central Kazakstan, the most important industrial centers are 
Shymkent (chemicals, light industry, metallurgy, and food pro- 
cessing), Almaty (light industry, machine building, and food 
processing), and Zhambyl (chemicals, machine building, and 
food processing). 

Structure of Industry 

The energy sector is the most productive component of 
Kazakstan's industrial structure, accounting for about 42 per- 
cent of total output. Metallurgy generates about one-quarter of 
industrial output, divided equally between the processing of 
ferrous and nonferrous metals (see table 8, Appendix). Engi- 
neering and metalworking account for 6.2 percent of industrial 
output, chemicals and petrochemicals for 3.6 percent, and con- 
struction materials for 2.7 percent. Kazakstan's entire light 
industry sector accounts for only 4.8 percent of industrial out- 
put. In the Soviet era, the republic had more than fifty military- 
industrial enterprises, employing as many as 75,000 workers. 
Because Baykonur, one of the world's two largest spaceports, 
was located in Kazakstan, as were 1,350 nuclear warheads, the 
prosperity of this sector was assured during the Soviet period. 
Military-related enterprises produced or processed beryllium, 
nuclear reactor fuel, uranium ore, heavy machine guns, anti- 
ship missiles, torpedoes, chemical and biological weapons, sup- 
port equipment for intercontinental ballistic missiles, tactical 
missile launcher equipment, artillery, and armored vehicles. 

Production Levels 

In general, Kazakstan's industry suffered a disastrous year in 
1994, when overall output dropped 28.5 percent. The metal- 
lurgy and energy industries were the main contributors to the 



47 



Country Studies 

1994 decline, although by percentage light industry (down 56 
percent) and engineering and metalworking (down 43 per- 
cent) suffered the sharpest reductions. However, in the last few 
months of 1994 and the first half of 1995, production 
decreased more slowly. Although monthly production contin- 
ued to decline compared with 1994, the rate of decline 
between 1994 and 1995 was about half the rate shown between 
1993 and 1994. By mid-1995, the chemical, oil-refining, natural 
gas, timber, ferrous metallurgy, and oil extraction industries 
were showing higher outputs than they had for the same peri- 
ods of 1994. Reduced consumer purchasing power exacerbated 
declines in most processing and consumer goods industries, 
however; overall light industry output was 61.2 percent lower in 
the first five months of 1995 than in the same period of 1994. 
In the first five months of 1995, the republic's industries pro- 
duced goods valued at 253.1 billion tenge, or about US$4 bil- 
lion — a drop of 16.5 percent from the five-month output value 
for 1994. 

Kazakstan has remained highly dependent on Russia as a 
customer for its manufactured products; this dependence has 
been the main cause of the shrinkage in the industrial base, as 
Russia has reduced its demand for most of Kazakstan's export 
products in the early and mid-1990s (see International Finan- 
cial Relations, this ch.). Although more than 80 percent of 
Kazakstan's industrial production is still intended for sale in 
Russia, trade with Russia in 1995 was only about 20 percent of 
what it was in 1991. In January 1995, some 230 enterprises, with 
about 51,000 employees, were idle; by April the figures had 
grown to 376 enterprises and more than 90,000 employees. 
Also alarming is the growing debt load of the enterprises, 
which continue to support their unprofitable operations by 
unregulated borrowing among themselves. By March 1994, 
total agricultural and industrial indebtedness had reached 
230.6 billion tenge. One consequence of falling production 
and growing indebtedness is that the republic's enterprises are 
increasingly unprofitable. As of March 1995, the government 
categorized 2,483 enterprises, or about one-third of the repub- 
lic's total, as unprofitable. As of early 1996, however, very few 
had been forced into formal bankruptcy. 

Energy 

Kazakstan is well endowed with energy resources, including 
abundant reserves of coal, oil, and natural gas, which made the 



48 




Turkmenbashy 



Chekelen 



gkal boundary 
/Vebfepital 
place 
fequipment 
■ I* 

4s/i n materials 
ining 

'try 

processing 

[ 

essing 
ning 

>g 

tiles 
rtilizer 

al machinery 
jlometers 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 5. Kazakstan, Ky 



50 



Kazakstan 



republic one of the top energy-producing regions of the Soviet 
Union. In 1993 Kazakstan was the second largest oil producer, 
third largest coal producer, and sixth largest natural gas pro- 
ducer among the former Soviet republics. Industry in Kazak- 
stan is dominated by the energy sector; in 1994 electric power 
generation accounted for 19 percent of GDP, and fuel extrac- 
tion and processing accounted for nearly 23 percent. Thus, the 
national economy is strongly affected by changes in levels of 
fuel extraction and energy production (see fig. 6). 

Oil 

Kazakstan's oil reserves have been estimated at as much as 
2,100 million tons, most of which is in relatively new fields that 
have not yet been exploited. In addition, new offshore discov- 
eries in the north Caspian more than replaced the annual 
drawdown of known reserves in the early 1990s. In 1993 Chev- 
ron Oil made an initial investment in a joint venture, Ten- 
gizchevroil, to exploit the Tengiz oil fields at the northern end 
of the Caspian Sea in what was envisioned as the leading 
project among foreign oil investments. Recoverable reserves at 
Tengiz are estimated at 25 billion barrels, or about twice the 
amount in the Alaskan North Slope, although Tengiz oil is 
extremely high in sulfur. The French firm Elf-Aquitaine has 
leased about 19,000 square kilometers of land in the Emba 
region northeast of the Caspian, where there are known to be 
large quantities of sulfur-free oil and natural gas. Other oil 
deposits, with paraffin, asphalt, or tar (all harder to process), 
have been found in the Caspian Sea near Novyy Uzen and 
Buzachiy. 

Oil production, which increased by an average of 3 percent 
per year through 1991, reached a peak production of 26.6 mil- 
lion tons that year before output began to decline in 1992. The 
most productive region in the early 1990s was the Mangyshlak 
Peninsula on the east shore of the Caspian Sea. In the early 
1990s, Mangyshlak yielded more than 50 percent of the repub- 
lic's oil output before experiencing a decline of 11 percent in 
1992. Kazakstan also is known to be rich in deposits of heavy 
oil, which currently are not commercially viable but which are 
potentially valuable. 

The republic planned to increase its oil exports from the 7.8 
million tons of 1992 (15 percent of total exports) to as much as 
37 million tons in 1996 (50 percent of total exports), for which 
anticipated revenue was about US$2.9 billion. By 1993, how- 



51 




iO 



Country Studies 



ever, domestic and CIS industry conditions made such goals 
unrealistic. The most important obstacles to increased oil pro- 
duction and export involve Russia. In 1994 Russian refineries 
in western Siberia, upon which Kazakstan's oil industry contin- 
ues to rely heavily for processing, cut their operations drasti- 
cally because paying customers could not be found; this cut 
resulted in the plants' lower demand for crude oil from Kazak- 
stani suppliers. Thus, in the first nine months of 1994, Kazak- 
stan's oil sales fell to 4.5 million tons from 8 million tons in the 
same period of 1993, and production for the year fell 11.7 per- 
cent. Because of the oil-exchange agreement with Russia, the 
cutback in Russian refinery production also reduced domestic 
refinery production nearly 25 percent in 1994. 

The second obstacle to greater production and export of oil 
is pipeline access through Russia to Western customers, which 
Russia has curtailed because of capacity limits and political 
maneuvering. The lack of pipeline facilities caused Chevron to 
announce substantial capital investment cutbacks in the Tengiz 
oil fields for 1995. In the mid-1990s, the pipeline that connects 
Kazakstani oil fields with the Russian Black Sea port 
Novorossiysk provided the sole access to the oil of the Tengiz 
fields for Chevron and its Western customers (see Transporta- 
tion and Telecommunications, this ch.). The uncertainties of 
relying on the existing Russian line or on a second line passing 
through the war-torn Caucasus region led to discussions of new 
pipeline projects passing through Iran or even eastward across 
China to the Pacific Ocean. In September 1995, a new agree- 
ment with Turkey laid plans for pipelines crossing Georgia to 
ports in Georgia and Turkey, providing a new outlet possibility 
for Kazakstan's Tengiz oil. Also, in October 1995 Kazakstan 
joined in a new consortium with Russian and United States 
companies to build a pipeline to the Black Sea. Chevron and 
Mobil Oil of the United States, British Gas, Agip of Italy, and 
Russia's LUKoil enterprise were to fund the entire pipeline 
project in return for a 50 percent share in the pipeline. The 
governments of Kazakstan and Russia were to receive the other 
50 percent. However, pipeline construction was delayed amid 
further international negotiation over alternative routes. 

In the first quarter of 1995, major accidents and power 
shortages at drilling sites reduced production by about 10 per- 
cent compared with output in the first quarter of 1994. Refin- 
ery output in that period was even lower; only about half the 



52 



N 

A 



I boundary 
lace 

basin 

trie power plant 
c power plant 



tjONGOLIA 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



NEPAL 



Figure 6. Kazakstan, ^, 1996 



54 



Kazakstan 



first quarter's oil was refined, and the Pavlodar refinery closed 
entirely because it received no crude oil from Russia. 

Natural Gas 

Kazakstan has enormous reserves of natural gas, most nota- 
bly the giant Karachaganak field in the northwest near the Rus- 
sian border, under codevelopment by a consortium of Agip of 
Italy, British Gas, and the Russian Natural Gas Company (Gaz- 
prom). In 1992 natural gas production was 8.5 million cubic 
meters, half of which came from Karachaganak. By 1994, how- 
ever, production was only 4.1 million cubic meters because Rus- 
sian consumption had dropped drastically in the early 1990s. A 
1995 deal with Gazprom gave that organization part ownership 
of Karachaganak in exchange for a guaranteed purchase of 
natural gas from Kazakstan. Foreign investment projects at 
Tengiz and Karachaganak were expected to triple domestic gas 
output and enhance gas processing capabilities in the later 
1990s. The usefulness of increased output depends on new 
pipeline agreements — still in the formative stage in 1996 — with 
Russia and other countries in the region. 

Coal 

In 1994 coal production decreased 6.7 percent to 104.4 mil- 
lion tons, after a production peak of 140 million tons was 
reached in 1991. About thirty major coalfields exist, most of 
them within 400 kilometers of Qaraghandy in north-central 
Kazakstan. This region offers some of the most accessible and 
cheaply extracted coal in the CIS; however, most of Kazakstan's 
coal is high in ash. The largest open-pit mines are located in 
the Ekibastuz Basin northeast of Qaraghandy. According to 
estimates, presently exploited mines contain 100 years of coal 
reserves at today's rate of consumption. Coal is a key input for 
industry; in the early 1990s, more than 75 percent of coal con- 
sumption in Kazakstan went to thermoelectric stations for 
power generation, and another 14 percent went to the steel 
industry. In the early 1990s, Kazakstan exported about 40 per- 
cent of its coal to CIS customers, mainly Russia. 

The coal industry has been plagued by poor management 
and strikes that shut down major underground operations at 
Qaraghandy and surface operations at Ekibastuz in 1994 and 
1995. The large metallurgical works of Qaraghandy, built 
under the Soviet concept of the territorial-industrial complex 



55 




Figure 6. Ktuakstan, Kyrgyutan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Fuel and Energy Centers, 1996 



Country Studies 



combining heavy industry with on-site fuel reserves, has been 
forced to curtail production when strikes are called. 

Current Fuel Supply and Consumption 

Despite its fuel endowments, Kazakstan remains a net 
importer of energy, partly because of falling production in the 
early 1990s and partly because of remaining barter agreements 
from the Soviet era. Undeveloped east-to-west transportation 
infrastructure has prevented efficient supply of domestic fuels 
to industries, which are energy intensive. As a consequence, 
Kazakstan still must import oil, natural gas, lubricating oil, gas- 
oline, and diesel fuel from Russia, which in the postindepen- 
dence years has taken advantage of its neighbor's vulnerability 
to economic pressure. In the mid-1990s, the oil exchange sys- 
tem between Kazakstan and Russia meant that declining 
demand in Russia reduced availability of those Russian prod- 
ucts to Kazakstan. In 1994 Russia sent only 40 percent of the 
crude oil and 48 percent of the refined products prescribed in 
the bilateral agreement for that year. Gas imports showed a 
similar drop. 

The national electric power system is divided into three 
grids. The northern grid, which serves a large part of heavy 
industry, is connected to the adjacent Siberian grid in Russia, 
and the southern grid is connected to the Central Asian Sys- 
tem. Kazakstan depends on Russia for electricity and fuel. 
Although the Siberian generating stations that supply the 
northern grid are located in Russia, they are fired largely by 
coal exported from Kazakstan. Some electric power also is 
received from Kyrgyzstan's hydroelectric stations to the south 
in exchange for coal (see Energy, ch. 2). 

In 1991 Kazakstan consumed 101.6 billion kilowatt-hours of 
electricity (84.7 percent of which was produced domestically), 
making it a relatively heavy energy consumer among nations of 
its economic stature. About 85 percent of domestic generation 
occurs in coal-fired thermoelectric plants. A few thermoelectric 
plants use natural gas or oil; the remaining 15 percent of 
energy comes from those plants and from hydroelectric sta- 
tions. The main sources of coal-generated electricity are the 
fields of Ekibastuz, Maykubin, Torghay, and Borlin. There are 
three large hydroelectric stations, at Bukhtarmin, Oskemen, 
and Kapchagay. The republic's one nuclear power station is 
located near the city of Aqtau. 



56 



Kazakstan 



Work Force 

In 1992 some 16 percent of Kazakstan's work force was 
employed in manufacturing 24 percent in agriculture and for- 
estry, 9 percent in construction, 9 percent in transportation 
and communications, and 32 percent in trade and services (see 
table 9, Appendix). An estimated 28.3 percent of the work 
force had at least a secondary education at the time of inde- 
pendence. Russians generally were employed in higher-paying 
sectors such as industry, transportation, and science, and 
Kazaks predominated in lower-paying areas such as health care, 
culture, art, and education. Overall, about two-thirds of work- 
ers and about 80 percent of industrial workers were non- 
Kazaks. In state enterprises, which provided 95 percent of 
employment before independence, one-half of the work force 
was female in 1990. The high participation rate of women con- 
tributed to an overall participation rate of 79 percent of work- 
ing-age citizens in some form of employment. 

In 1990 the working population of the republic peaked at 
around 6.7 million people, in a command economy where the 
legal requirement of full employment of both men and women 
meant substantial underemployment not revealed by official 
statistics. By the end of 1994, the number of employed people 
had declined about 8.9 percent, to about 6.1 million. This drop 
was caused in part by the privatization of Kazakstan's economy 
(by 1993 about 7 percent of Kazakstanis were working outside 
the state sector), but it also reflected growing unemployment 
and underemployment. In January 1995, there were 85,700 
officially registered unemployed people in the republic, up 
from 4,000 in 1992. That figure does not include an unknown 
but significant number of workers whose names remained on 
official payroll lists while they were on forced leave, reduced 
hours, and delayed wage-payment schedules. 

Post-Soviet Economic Developments 

Until 1990, when the whole central planning system col- 
lapsed, Kazakstan was part of the Soviet command economy. 
Even at the time of the 1991 coup that led to independence, 43 
percent of the republic's industrial capacity was under Mos- 
cow's direct control, 48 percent was under joint republic and 
union control, and only 8 percent was strictly under republic 
control. 



57 



Country Studies 



Although economic production declined dramatically in the 
early 1990s, some indicators showed a slower rate of decline by 
early 1995. In 1994 GDP declined 25.4 percent compared with 

1993, including drops of 28.5 percent in industry and 21.2 per- 
cent in agriculture. In January and February 1995, additional 
GDP declines of 18.8 percent and 15.8 percent occurred 
(against the same months in 1994); however, March 1995 
showed an increase of 4 percent (against 1994), fueled mainly 
by an increase in industrial production. Agricultural produc- 
tion, however, continued to drop in early 1995; 1994 first-quar- 
ter production was 79 percent of the same period in 1993, and 
the first quarter of 1995 almost duplicated that decline. 

Much of Kazakstan's economic future depends upon its 
ambitious three-stage privatization program, which began in 
1992 and reached the end of its second stage in 1995. The 
Kazakstan State Property Committee has responsibility for all 
three phases. In the first stage, housing and small enterprises 
employing fewer than 200 people were privatized. Most conver- 
sions of small enterprises were accomplished by auction to 
groups of employees, often under the leadership of the incum- 
bent manager. Housing, which by 1995 was nearly all in private 
ownership, was privatized either by giving the residence out- 
right to its current occupant or by payment of government- 
issued vouchers. The second stage entailed the privatization of 
almost everything except the republic's mineral wealth and 
industrial plants employing more than 5,000 people (such 
plants accounted for most of Kazakstan's military-related indus- 
try). 

Privatization of the largest state enterprises is the principal 
goal of stage three, which did not begin as scheduled in late 
1995. Until that time, these enterprises were run as self-manag- 
ing joint-stock companies in which the government of Kazak- 
stan was the largest stockholder. This interim stage, which was 
considered beneficial, required preparation of profit-and-loss 
statements in anticipation of full commercial operation some- 
time in the future. Meanwhile, 3,500 medium-sized firms, 
including 70 percent of state-owned industries, were offered 
for sale in a mass privatization program beginning in April 

1994. These firms could be purchased with government- 
licensed investment funds. 

Under Kazakstan's privatization system, vouchers are issued 
to individual citizens. Vouchers then can be deposited in priva- 
tization investment funds, which in turn can buy up to 20 per- 



58 



Typical apartment building, Indoor marketplace, Almaty 

Almaty Courtesy Lisa Batey 

Courtesy Stanley Bach 



cent of large companies being privatized. The initial voucher 
issue reached an estimated 95 percent of citizens. After four 
auctions, in mid-1994 about 85 percent of forty-five small-to- 
medium-sized enterprises, mainly in light industry, machinery 
manufacturing, and fuel distribution, had been sold. 

By the end of 1994, about 60 percent of enterprises were 
owned by individuals or cooperatives. (In 1990 the figure 
already had reached 40 percent, however.) The success of the 
privatization of small enterprises, together with the formation 
of new private enterprises, meant that in 1994 some 61 percent 
of retail trade occurred in the private sector, an increase of 17 
percent over the 1993 figure. Large-enterprise privatization has 
been less successful, however. Nominally privatized enterprises 
often maintain close contact with government officials who 
permit firms to maintain outdated production practices and 
supply relationships, and even to keep unpaid workers on their 
rolls. 

Distribution of vouchers among the 170 government- 
licensed investment funds also has been problematic. In 1994 



59 



Country Studies 

and early 1995, twenty companies collected nearly 60 percent 
of the vouchers, while another nineteen funds accumulated 
more than 20 percent; half the funds received a total of only 4 
percent of the vouchers. One fund, Butia-Kapital, received 
nearly 10 percent of the vouchers, the largest single holding. 
This fund was widely rumored to be controlled by a nephew of 
President Nazarbayev. Although proceeds from privatization 
amounted to an income of 242 million tenge for the state trea- 
sury in the first quarter of 1995, complaints persisted that 
objects of privatization were priced too low and that favored 
funds received "sweetheart" deals. 

Privatization of land has been handled differently than that 
of industry because the concept of individual land ownership 
does not exist in Kazakstan. Individuals and corporations can 
purchase only the right to use the land, and that right can be 
resold. Initial sale prices of state land are determined by the 
State Committee on Land Relations and Tenure. Government 
efforts to legalize a private land market have been stymied by 
both Russian and Kazak groups, each fearing that the other 
might gain control of the country's agriculture. By June 1995, 
some rorm of ownership or management change had occurred 
in 1,490 state farms, about three-quarters of the total remain- 
ing in operation. Many state farms, or portions of them, were 
converted into joint-stock companies that retained the same 
group of occupants and state-dominated arrangements for sup- 
ply and marketing as under the previous nomenclature. The 
creation of small, individually managed farms was uncommon 
because capital, inputs, equipment, and credit were in very 
short supply for individuals attempting to start agricultural 
enterprises. 

Banking and Finance 

Restructuring of the state-controlled banking and financial 
systems that Kazakstan inherited in 1991 has been a long, slow 
process. As in the Soviet era, the national bank continues to 
dominate the financial system, including currency manage- 
ment. Other commercial institutions have been established, 
but they play small roles in the country's financial life. 

Banks 

Kazakstan's banking industry was created on the basis of a 
subsequently modified law enacted in April 1993. That law cre- 
ated a central institution, the National Bank of Kazakstan 



60 



Kazakstan 



(NBK), which has regulatory authority over a system of state, 
private, joint-stock, and joint banks. Licensed banks are autho- 
rized to perform all of the traditional banking functions. 

The introduction of a modern banking system has not pro- 
gressed smoothly. Scandals have involved swindles by bank 
employees, questionable loans, and the maintenance of heavy 
portfolios of nonproductive loans. Several bank failure scares 
also have occurred. Major modifications of banking regula- 
tions have been introduced several times. In June 1994, Kazak- 
stan instituted a fifteen-month program of financial and 
economic reform, tightening banking and credit laws, liberaliz- 
ing price policies, and ending the granting of credits to state- 
owned institutions. Another short-term reform was introduced 
in March 1995, in part to tighten regulation of capital require- 
ments and to increase the professionalism of the existing 
bank's operations. To that end, a system of partnership with 
foreign banks was introduced, pairing domestic banks with 
experienced foreign partners. Guidance for this bank reform is 
being provided by the IMF, as well as by international auditing 
firms such as Ernst and Young and Price Waterhouse. 

In 1994 the national bank system included a State Export 
and Import Bank and a State Bank for Development, both of 
which functioned under full government control rather than 
as market institutions. Four large, state-owned banks controlled 
80 percent of financial assets. Of the 200 small commercial 
banks in operation in 1994, the majority were attached to 
enterprises. About thirty private banks were licensed to deal in 
foreign exchange. 

The aim of the 1995 reform was to create a republic-wide 
banking system, including ten to fifteen large banks with total 
capital of at least US$10 million, headquartered in Almaty and 
with branches throughout Kazakstan; foreign branch banks, 
most of which would have single representative offices in 
Almaty; several dozen smaller banks, both in Almaty and in the 
provinces, with capital in the range of US$2-US$3 million; and 
savings banks, some with specialized purposes such as the Agri- 
cultural and Industrial Bank (Agroprombank). 

In 1995 the NBK planned to release 80 percent of the credit 
funds it granted to an auction market, departing from the pre- 
vious policy of rationing credit by directing it to designated 
enterprises. No stock exchange or capital markets existed as of 
1995, although a law on securities and stock exchange had 
been adopted in 1991. 



61 



Country Studies 

Fiscal Management 

State revenue is derived primarily from various taxes, the 
introduction of which has been somewhat problematic. A fun- 
damental revision of the national tax code in 1995 reduced the 
number of taxes from forty-five to eleven and the volume of 
prospective revenue by 17 percent. Five national corporate 
taxes remained after the reform, which reduced the corporate 
tax rate to 30 percent. Prior to that revision, the largest contri- 
butions to state income were business-profit taxes (15 percent); 
a uniform, 20 percent value-added tax (see Glossary), a per- 
sonal income tax (ranging from 12 to 40 percent and account- 
ing for 16 percent of tax income); and special-purpose revenue 
funds (17 percent). However, the system has suffered from 
chronic undercollection. The primary long-term goal of the 
1995 tax reform was to encourage fuller compliance with tax 
laws. The 1996 budget called for reducing the deficit to 3.3 per- 
cent of GDP. 

Prices, Wages, and Currency 

The freeing of government price controls, followed by intro- 
duction of the tenge as Kazakstan's independent currency unit, 
set off hyperinflation, which badly eroded real wages, pensions, 
and savings (see table 10, Appendix). Introduced in November 
1993 at approximately five to the United States dollar, the 
tenge fell to about fifty-six per dollar by late November 1994. 
Subsequently, the currency remained relatively stable, falling 
only to sixty-four per US$1 at the beginning of 1996. The 
tenge's stabilization was due in part to the government's deter- 
mination to control the state budget, in part to the availability 
of an IMF stabilization fund, and in part to the backing of gov- 
ernment reserves of US$1.02 billion in hard currency and 
gold. By 1995 inflation had decreased substantially from the 
levels of 1993 and 1994, when the rate was 1,880 percent, 
although the annualized rate for 1995 was estimated at midyear 
at 190 percent, well above the prime minister's target figure of 
40 percent. 

Inflation has strongly affected wages and family budgets. In 
July 1994, for example, nominal wages in the republic 
increased by an average of twenty times, but the costs of food, 
services, and goods increased by more than thirty-two times in 
the same month. As a result of such conditions, real wages in 
the republic declined by about one-third in the first half of 
1994. The overall average monthly wage in the republic in Feb- 



62 



Kazakstan 



ruary 1995 was 3,650 tenge, or about US$61 at the exchange 
rate of the time. In mid-1995, the overall average wage was 
4,613 tenge, but the disparity between industrial and agricul- 
tural wages was growing steadily: the industrial average was 
7,452 tenge, the agricultural average 2,309 tenge. Wages in ser- 
vice occupations such as education and health are quite low, 
and government employees in those occupations often are not 
paid on time. Chronic nonpayment of wages has caused strikes 
in industrial enterprises and coal mines. 

Many enterprises have made wage payments in merchandise 
rather than money; this practice has led to a large volume of 
merchandise resale at bazaars, either by workers or by private 
wholesalers. The actual level of consumer welfare is unknown 
because prices and the availability of goods change rapidly. 
Because Kazakstan lacks a strong consumer-goods industry, 
imports have begun to replace CIS products, notably clothing, 
housewares, and electronics. In 1995 wage increases continued 
to lag behind the rising cost of living, causing spending power 
to decline by 2 to 3 percent per month. The greatest losses in 
real wages have been suffered in industrial (and mostly Rus- 
sian) northern Kazakstan. One consequence of declining pur- 
chasing power is that families now devote as much as 10 
percent of their budgets to the purchase of foreign currency, 
presumably as a hedge against inflation. In 1995 the purchase 
of food became the largest family expenditure, exceeding 50 
percent of average budgets. Even so, purchases of all categories 
of foodstuffs have declined in the republic, while purchases of 
nonfoodstuffs have dropped 40 percent or more. 

International Financial Relations 

Shortly after independence, Kazakstan began seeking diver- 
sification of its commercial activities, which had focused com- 
pletely on the Soviet Union until 1992. Because the regime has 
been stable and abundant natural resources make investment 
potentially profitable, the search for new foreign partners has 
been successful in many cases, although substantial limitations 
remained in the mid-1990s. 

Foreign Investment 

World Bank figures showed foreign direct investment in 
Kazakstan of US$400 million in 1993, projected to rise to an 
annual average of about US$775 million by 1997. By mid-1994, 
fourteen British firms, fifty American firms, and twenty-four 



63 



Country Studies 



French firms were registered as investors. A March 1994 survey 
showed one foreign acquisition in the republic, twenty-five new 
economic projects, and seventy working joint ventures, with 
total foreign investment of $US10.44 billion. Average invest- 
ment was computed at US$108.7 million, but that figure was 
distorted by Chevron's huge single investment in the Tengiz oil 
development project. 

In the mid-1990s, Kazakstan's investment climate was consid- 
ered liberal compared with that of the other non-Baltic former 
Soviet republics. In December 1994, existing trade legislation 
was consolidated into the Law on Foreign Investments, which, 
among other things, offered foreign investors 100 percent own- 
ership of enterprises and full conversion of profits into hard 
currency. Liberal tax incentives, including a five-year initial for- 
giveness of all corporate taxes, also have been implemented. 
Regulations have been loosened on the export of precious met- 
als and on terms for foreign participation in oil field develop- 
ment. For these reasons, international investor ratings place 
Kazakstan high among the former Soviet republics. 

The international lending community also has been 
attracted to Kazakstan. In 1994 the Paris Club of Western credi- 
tor countries committed US$1.33 billion for use in reconstruct- 
ing Kazakstan's industry and agriculture. The sum was the first 
large-scale foreign assistance received by the republic. Kazak- 
stan also received US$296.9 million in trade credits in 1994, 
US$220 million of which came from Japan. Projections called 
for Kazakstan's external debt to peak at US$5.1 billion in 1996, 
then begin to decline. However, that figure was based on 
expectations of drastic increases in foreign oil sales by 1996, an 
eventuality made impossible by the intervening decline in out- 
put. 

Foreign Trade 

Traditionally, most of the goods that Kazakstan produced for 
export went to markets in Russia and elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union. In 1990 some 88.7 percent of Kazakstan's exports fol- 
lowed this route, including more than 70 percent of its indus- 
trial production and mined products and 27 percent of its 
agricultural production. By 1992 the trade situation among the 
CIS countries was characterized by the World Bank as "verging 
on the chaotic," with the old Soviet payments system deteriorat- 
ing and a common currency, the ruble (see Glossary), showing 
uncertain value. That situation prompted Kazakstan to under- 



64 



Kazakstan 



take a vigorous search for diversified trade markets, and in fact 
its exports to the CIS declined by nearly 80 percent between 
1990 and 1994. By 1994 Russia still accounted for 40 percent of 
Kazakstan's total trade and for 74 and 80 percent of the repub- 
lic's total CIS exports and imports, respectively. Kazakstan's 
largest volume of non-Russian CIS trade is with Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Ukraine, all of which are net import- 
ers of Kazak goods. The most important West European trad- 
ing partners are Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
Czech Republic, and Italy (see table 11, Appendix). Non-CIS 
Asian countries account for 11 percent of trade, with China the 
major partner in this category. 

The predominant pattern of trade has continued from the 
Soviet era: exports are mostly raw materials, and imports are 
mostly manufactured goods. Ferrous and nonferrous metals — 
mainly rolled steel, copper, ferroalloys, zinc, titanium, and alu- 
minum — account for 40 percent of export earnings, followed 
by oil and petroleum products (33 percent) and chemicals (10 
percent). Energy products are also the largest import category, 
mainly because of the ongoing geographically determined 
exchange agreement that sends Russian oil from western Sibe- 
ria to refineries in eastern Kazakstan and oil from Kazakstan's 
western oil fields to refineries across the border in Russia. 
Thus, in 1994 some 31 percent of imports were energy prod- 
ucts, followed by machinery, equipment, and vehicles (29 per- 
cent); chemicals; and food. By 1994 private traders also 
imported large amounts of consumer products that did not 
appear in official statistics. 

In 1994 Kazakstan's total exports were worth US$3,076 bil- 
lion, and its imports were worth US$3,488 billion. Comparison 
with 1993 is not meaningful because in that year unstable ruble 
values and heavy barter transactions skewed statistics. In fact, 
an estimated 70 percent of 1994 trade also was in the form of 
barter. Of the 1994 totals, US$1,266 billion, or 41 percent, of 
exports went to the "far abroad," beyond the CIS, and 
US$1,286 billion, or 37 percent, of imports came from the "far 
abroad." Experts forecast slightly lower overall export figures in 
1995 because of restricted access to Russian pipelines. The 
trade deficit with non-CIS partners is financed by borrowing 
from international financial institutions. The deficit with CIS 
partners is financed simply by delaying payments to Russia. 



65 



Country Studies 



Transportation and Telecommunications 

Kazakstan's transportation and telecommunications net- 
works are poorly developed because of the distance between 
population centers (see fig. 7) and because of the inhospitable 
terrain that separates them. Only the largest cities are linked by 
roads and railroad. Railroad lines carry the overwhelming bulk 
of freight traffic, and more than half of the passenger traffic 
moves by road. In 1996, two ministries were responsible for 
transportation: the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
for transport operation of railways, roads, and airlines; and the 
Ministry of Construction and Housing, for construction of 
highways and airport and port facilities. 

Transportation 

Overall transportation volume probably peaked in the late 
Soviet period, when enormous inefficiencies added time and 
distance to all types of movement. The postindependence cor- 
relation of prices to cost has meant abandonment of uneco- 
nomical transportation practices. The pipeline system, 
although crucial to the economic welfare of oil-rich Kazakstan, 
remains without direct connection to potential customers in 
the West and elsewhere. The national telephone system serves 
only a small percentage of the population; domestic radio and 
television remain limited and state owned. 

Roads 

In 1994 and 1995, annual freight movement by road, which 
already accounted for less than 10 percent of Kazakstan's 
freight haulage, declined more than 50 percent per year 
because of the shift to more efficient means of transport and 
the country's overall economic decline. In 1993 Kazakstan 
counted about 400,000 road vehicles for freight transport, 
many of which were pieces of farm equipment. Available trac- 
tors and trailers are mostly small and in poor condition; the 
shortage of spare parts and the lack of a domestic truck-manu- 
facturing industry hinder long-distance haulage. 

The passenger bus fleet, which numbered 25,500 vehicles in 
1991, has declined in numbers and quality since the last new 
buses were added in 1988. Spare parts are also a problem in 
bus maintenance, and local bus service is impeded by govern- 
ment caps on fares. 



66 



MONGOLIA ^ 




IRAl 



not necessarily authoritative 



AN 



International boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 
Railroad 
Road 
Airport 
Port 



400 Kilometers 



400 Miles 



Figure 7. Kazakstan: Ti 



68 



Kazakstan 



The basic road infrastructure (about 88,000 kilometers, of 
which about 83,000 kilometers are paved or gravel) serves the 
widely dispersed population and economic centers adequately. 
However, there is a shortage of road maintenance equipment, 
and construction and repair contracts are allocated to as many 
as seventy different companies and plants owned by the Minis- 
try of Construction and Housing and the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications. As a result, construction and repair 
operations are disorganized and uneconomical. 

Railroads 

Kazakstan Railways is the third largest rail system in the 
former Soviet Union, smaller only than the systems of Russia 
and Ukraine. In 1991 railroads carried 90 percent of Kazak- 
stan's freight and 30 percent of its passenger traffic. In 1993 the 
rail system included 14,148 kilometers of track, of which 3,050 
kilometers were electrified. All track was 1,520-millimeter 
gauge. In 1993 the system carried about 39.7 million passen- 
gers and hauled about 517 million tons of freight, but haulage 
declined 42 percent in 1994, most notably in chemicals, 
cement, iron ore, and ferrous metals. Like the road system, 
Kazakstan Railways suffers from a shortage of spare parts; as 
much as 95 percent of spare parts, equipment, and rolling 
stock must be purchased from Russia, Ukraine, and other 
countries. Repair plants for rolling stock are in poor condition 
and use outmoded equipment. 

Pipelines 

In 1992 Kazakstan had 2,850 kilometers of pipeline for 
crude oil, 3,480 kilometers for natural gas, and 1,500 kilome- 
ters for refined products. The oil pipeline system was designed 
to ship domestic oil, most of which is in the western part of the 
republic, and to bring Russia's Siberian oil to Kazak refineries. 
Construction of a pipeline that would bring Kazakstan's oil to 
world markets has proven a major obstacle in the development 
of the Tengiz field because of disagreements over routing, 
financing, and ownership. Russian control of Kazakstan's only 
pipelines to the outside world has restricted oil exports to the 
West and discouraged foreign investment in the oil and gas 
industries. In 1995 Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, 
all of which have suffered export shutdowns in their cross-Rus- 
sia pipelines, began discussing a massive pipeline project that 



69 



RUSSIA 




Country Studies 



would bring their products across China to the Pacific Ocean 
and into Japan (see Energy, this ch.). 

Air Transport 

Kazakstan Airlines was founded in 1993 as a joint-stock com- 
pany initially based on 100 aircraft that the republic received as 
its share when the Soviet Aeroflot fleet was divided among the 
former republics. Six private airline companies also operate 
within the republic. The republic airlines of Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan began service to Kazakstan's regional airports in 
1992, and Lufthansa of Germany and Turkish Airlines have 
begun international flights into Almaty. Air traffic between 
Kazakstan and other CIS republics is handled mainly by Aerof- 
lot. The airport at Almaty, Kazakstan's only international facil- 
ity, underwent a gradual modernization of instrumentation, air 
control, and communications facilities in the early 1990s; 
beginning in 1993, international traffic to and from Kyrgyzstan 
also moved through Almaty. In 1994, besides connections with 
CIS destinations, regular flights went to Frankfurt, Hannover, 
Vienna, Zurich, Istanbul, Delhi, Karachi, Tel Aviv, and Sharjah. 
In 1991 some 7.9 million passengers and about 36.4 million 
tons of freight passed through Kazak airports. In 1994 the 
republic had twenty commercial airports and another 132 clas- 
sified as usable, of which forty-nine had permanent-surface 
runways and eight had runways longer than 3,600 meters. 

Water Transport 

The republic's two inland waterways, the Syr dariya in south- 
central Kazakstan and the Ertis River in the northeast, have a 
total of 4,000 kilometers of waterway navigable by commercial 
craft. A state agency, the Kazakstan River Fleet Industrial Asso- 
ciation (Kazrechmorflot), administers river traffic. In 1992 the 
association's eleven water transport companies carried about 
1.6 million passengers and about 7 million tons of freight. 

Telecommunications 

Experts consider Kazakstan's telecommunications facilities 
inadequate to support the type of economic expansion sought 
in the mid-1990s. The Ministry of Transport and Communica- 
tions is the only provider of telecommunications services; its 
responsibilities include management and regulation of all 
aspects of the republic's telephone, telex, telegraph, data com- 
munications, radio, television, and postal services. 



70 



Kazakstan 



In 1994 only seventeen of every 100 people in urban areas 
and 7.6 of every 100 people in rural areas had telephones. 
These figures were above average for Central Asia but lower 
than those for other CIS countries. Of the republic's total of 
about 2.2 million telephones, 184,000 were located in Almaty. 
Current equipment is utilized at a rate of 98 percent, leaving 
no room for expansion or new subscribers, although in 1992 
the waiting list had about 1 million names. 

Sixty breakdowns per 100 telephone lines occur annually, a 
very high rate. Because much of Kazakstan's telephone equip- 
ment, most of which came from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, is obsolete, spare parts are scarce. In 1992 only 8 per- 
cent of exchanges used fiber-optic and digital equipment. 
International connections go through Moscow and via satellite 
links to Australia and Israel. In 1992 a total of 100 channels 
connected with countries outside the CIS, and 3,000 channels 
connected with CIS countries. 

In 1994 there were about 4.75 million televisions and 10.17 
million radios in Kazakstan. Landlines and microwave carry 
radio broadcasts from other CIS republics and China; the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(Intelsat) and the Russian Orbita satellite system provide satel- 
lite transmission of television broadcasts from other countries, 
and the Moscow gateway switch sends international radio 
broadcasts through eight telecommunications circuits. With 
Turkish aid, a new satellite ground station went into operation 
at Almaty in 1992. 

Radio and television broadcasting is the exclusive domain of 
the Kazakstan State Radio and Television Company. In 1995 
the broadcasting system included three national and thirteen 
regional radio programs broadcast over fifty-eight stations, an 
irregular Moscow relay of the Voice of Russia and Radio Neth- 
erlands, Radio Almaty (a foreign broadcast service offering 
English, German, Kazak, and Russian programming), one 
domestic television channel available through eight regional 
stations, and relays of two Russian channels and Kyrgyz and 
Turkish programming in Almaty. 

Government and Politics 

In 1995 Kazakstan passed through a period of political tur- 
moil that fundamentally changed the shape of the republic's 
government and political forces. The republic came under 
direct presidential rule in March 1995, and a new constitution 



71 



Country Studies 



adopted shortly thereafter strengthened the power of the exec- 
utive. Presidential elections, originally scheduled for sometime 
in 1996, were postponed until December 2000 after a 1995 ref- 
erendum provided the basis for such an extension. 

Constitution 

In May 1995, Nazarbayev convened a council of experts to 
draw up a new constitution under his guidance. The resulting 
constitution was adopted in August 1995 by a popular referen- 
dum. The official participation figure, 90 percent, and the fair- 
ness of this vote were contested by opposition groups. The 
constitution guarantees equal rights to all nationalities and pre- 
scribes both Kazak and Russian as "official" state languages, 
suitable for use in government documents and education. The 
president and the legislature, the Supreme Kenges (Supreme 
Soviet), are to be elected by universal adult suffrage for five- 
year terms. The president is head of state. The second compo- 
nent of the executive branch is the Council of Ministers, key 
members of which are presidential appointees. The prime min- 
ister, as head of the Council of Ministers, appoints the other 
ministers. 

Structure of Government 

The postindependence government was structured by the 
1993 constitution with a strong executive branch, a parliament, 
and a judicial branch. In practice, the administration of Nur- 
sultan Nazarbayev dominated governance sufficiently to impel 
the writing of a new constitution providing justification for the 
one-man rule that developed in the early 1990s. 

Executive Branch 

The constitution formalizes the increased power that Presi- 
dent Nazarbayev assumed upon the invalidation of parliament 
in early 1995. It continues the previous constitutional defini- 
tion of Kazakstan as a unitary state with a presidential form of 
government. The president is the highest state officer, respon- 
sible for naming the government — subject to parliamentary 
approval — and all other republic officials. The 1995 constitu- 
tion expands the president's power in introducing and vetoing 
legislation. The government that the president appoints con- 
sists of the Council of Ministers, headed by a prime minister, 
and several state committees. In early 1996, after Nazarbayev 



72 



Kazakstan 



had reshuffled the government in October 1995, the Council 
of Ministers included the heads of twenty-one ministries and 
nine state committees; the prime minister was Akezhan Kazhe- 
geldin. In the October 1995 shift, Nazarbayev himself assumed 
the portfolio of the Ministry of National Security. 

The new constitution does not provide for the position of 
vice president, although it permitted the incumbent vice presi- 
dent, Yerik Asanbayev, to remain in office until 1996. The pres- 
ident has the power to declare states of emergency during 
which the constitution can be suspended. The president is the 
sponsor of legislation and the guarantor of the constitution 
and of the proper functioning of government, with the power 
to override the decisions and actions of local authorities and 
councils. The only grounds on which a president can be 
removed are infirmity and treason, either of which must be 
confirmed by a majority of the joint upper and lower houses of 
the new parliament. In the event of such a removal from power, 
the prime minister would become the temporary president. 

Legislative Branch 

The 1993 constitution created a unicameral parliament, 
which was to replace the 350-seat Supreme Soviet when the 
mandates of that body's deputies expired in 1995. Composed 
overwhelmingly of career communists, the 1990 parliament 
had been a balky and turgid partner for the task of economic 
and political reform. Although he probably lacked the legal 
authority to do so, Nazarbayev pressured this parliament into a 
"voluntary" early dissolution in December 1993 in order to 
allow the seating of a smaller and presumably more pliant "pro- 
fessional parliament." Under the 1995 constitution, the parlia- 
ment consists of two houses, the Senate and the Majlis, both 
operating in continuous session. Each of Kazakstan's nineteen 
provinces and the city of Almaty, which has province status, 
have two senators. These are chosen for four-year terms by 
joint sessions of the provinces' legislative bodies. An additional 
seven senators are appointed directly by the president. In addi- 
tion, ex-presidents automatically receive the status of senators- 
for-life. The Majlis has sixty-seven representatives, including 
one from each of fifty-five districts drawn to have roughly equal 
populations, and the Senate has forty seats. Direct elections for 
half the seats are held every two years. In the first election 
under the new parliamentary structure, all seats in both houses 
of parliament were contested in December 1995; runoff elec- 



73 



Country Studies 

tions filled twenty-three seats in the Majlis for which the initial 
vote was inconclusive. International observers reported proce- 
dural violations in the Majlis voting. The new parliament, 
which was seated in January 1996, included sixty-eight Kazak 
and thirty-one Russian deputies; only ten deputies were 
women. 

The initiative for most legislative actions originates with the 
president. If parliament passes a law that the president vetoes, a 
two-thirds vote of both houses is required to override the veto. 
A similar margin is needed to express no confidence in a prime 
minister, an action that requires the president to name a new 
prime minister and Council of Ministers. 

Judicial System 

The judicial system is the least developed of Kazakstan's 
three branches of government. Although Minister of Justice 
Nagashibay Shaykenov objected strenuously, the constitution 
retains the practice of presidential appointment of all judges in 
the republic. The 1993 constitution specified terms of service 
forjudges, but the 1995 document makes no mention of 
length of service, suggesting that judges will serve at the presi- 
dent's pleasure. 

Under the 1993 constitution, lines of judicial authority were 
poorly defined, in part because the republic had three "highest 
courts" — the Supreme Court, the State Arbitrage Court, and 
the Constitutional Court — which among them employed a 
total of sixty-six senior judges. Many of these senior judges, as 
well as numerous judges in lower courts, had been retained 
from the Soviet era, when the judicial branch was entirely 
under the control of the central government. The 1995 consti- 
tution makes no provision for the State Abritrage Court, which 
had heard economic disputes among enterprises and between 
enterprises and government agencies. Provisions for the new 
judiciary clearly subordinate all other courts to the Supreme 
Court, which also has a consultative role in appointing senior 
judges. 

Local Government 

Kazakstan is divided into nineteen provinces, and the city of 
Almaty has administrative status equal to that of a province. In 
turn, the provinces are divided into regions that consist of a 
number of settlement points. Each province and region and 
most settlements have their own elective councils, charged with 



74 



Headquarters building of parliament, Almaty 
Courtesy Stanley Bach 

drawing up a budget and supervising local taxation. Cities have 
their own local councils as well, and large cities are divided into 
regions, each of which has its own council. 

The local legislatures lack the authority to choose the local 
executive, who is appointed directly by the president. The local 
executive has the job of ensuring that decisions of the national 
government are enforced and that the constitution is observed. 
Province and regional "heads of administration," known by the 
Russian term glav or the Kazak term hakim, are presidential 
appointees. The hakim, in turn, appoints the members of his 
staff, who are the department heads of the jurisdiction. The 
hakim also can reverse budgetary decisions of the local coun- 
cils. 

There has been considerable pressure, especially in the pre- 
dominantly Russian north, to make the hakim posts elective 
rather than appointive. In 1994 Nazarbayev indicated that he 
would consider doing so, but the 1995 constitution provides 
only that the local councils can express no confidence in their 
hakim by a two-thirds vote. The president also has the power to 
override or revoke decisions taken by local councils; a hakim 
has the power to control budgetary decisions taken by the local 
council. 



75 



Country Studies 



The Election of 1 994 and Its Aftermath 

After the early dissolution in 1993 of Kazakhstan's first parlia- 
ment, an election for the 177 seats of the new, "professional" 
parliament was held in March 1994. The election was so closely 
managed and restricted by the government that observers from 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE; before 1995, the Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe — CSCE — see Glossary) initially were reluctant 
to certify the election as fair. 

Despite his careful electoral management, Nazarbayev net- 
ted a reliable bloc of only about sixty of the 177 seats. The 
remaining deputies quickly organized themselves into a "con- 
structive" opposition bloc, a center-left configuration calling 
itself Respublika. It included a number of disparate political 
groups. A subgroup of Respublika organized a shadow cabinet 
to provide alternative viewpoints and programs to those of the 
government. 

At the end of May 1994, the parliament passed a vote of no 
confidence in the government of Prime Minister Sergey Ter- 
eshchenko, who had been in office since 1991. Nazarbayev put 
off dismissing Tereshchenko, citing the provision of the 1993 
constitution giving the president the right to name the prime 
minister, subject only to parliamentary confirmation. By mid- 
year, however, parliament was in rebellion against the presi- 
dent, and a new faction of Respublika, including a broad range 
of communist, nationalist, and special-issue parties, demanded 
the resignations of Nazarbayev and Tereshchenko. 

In mid-October, following a month-long scandal over the 
private dealings of Tereshchenko's ministers of internal affairs 
and the economy (the second of whom was indicted), Naz- 
arbayev was finally forced to dismiss the Tereshchenko govern- 
ment. Nazarbayev named industrialist Akezhan Kazhegeldin to 
replace Tereshchenko. As chief of a northern industrial con- 
glomerate, Kazhegeldin, a Kazak, was closely associated with 
the Russian-controlled sector of Kazakstan prior to 1991. 

Thus, by late 1994 parliament was emerging as a particular 
focus for anti-Nazarbayev sentiment. Although extremely 
unproductive itself, passing only seven laws during its year of 
existence, parliament severely impeded Nazarbayev's privatiza- 
tion programs, causing the complete cessation of privatization 
voucher distribution. At the end of 1994, the parliament issued 
its own alternative New Economic Policy, in competition with 
Nazarbayev's, and parliament also attempted to take over 



76 



Kazakstan 



actual disbursement of funds for the state budget. At the same 
time, parliament was providing a forum for several skilled and 
well-financed men to position themselves for a challenge to 
Nazarbayev in the presidential election scheduled for 1996. 

In March 1995, Kazakstan's Constitutional Court ruled the 
1994 parliamentary election invalid because of procedural 
irregularities that, among other things, waived certain require- 
ments for pro-Nazarbayev candidates. After filing a token 
objection, Nazarbayev announced the dissolution of parlia- 
ment and new elections to be held in two or three months. The 
Council of Ministers that had been approved by that parlia- 
ment then resigned en masse. Using emergency powers 
granted him upon the dissolution of the 1990-93 parliament, 
Nazarbayev reappointed Prime Minister Kazhegeldin, who 
installed a new Council of Ministers. Unlike its virtually all- 
Kazak predecessor, the new body put the key Ministry of 
Finance under a Russian, Aleksandr Pavlov, and gave the Minis- 
try of the Economy portfolio to a Middle Horde Kazak from 
the Russified north. One of Kazhegeldin's two new first deputy 
prime ministers was Kazak; the other was Russian. The new 
head of the Privatization Commission, Sarybay Kalmurzayev, 
also apparently was a Middle Horder. He not only began to per- 
mit privatization auctioneers to accept cash in addition to 
vouchers, but also began to give Russian companies rights of 
first refusal in privatization of large industrial plants, especially 
military ones. In April 1995, Nazarbayev staged a referendum 
that ratified extension of his presidency until December 2000 
by a 95 percent majority. In December 1995, Nazarbayev issued 
a decree enabling him to annul any existing law, demand the 
government's resignation, or order new parliamentary elec- 
tions. This step furthered the authoritarian direction of Kazak- 
stan's government. 

Political Organizations 

Economic and ethnic differentiation in Kazakstan has led to 
the appearance of more than 2,000 social organizations, move- 
ments, political parties, and social action funds across a broad 
political spectrum. Although Nazarbayev prevented electoral 
participation by many opposition parties, the formation and 
reformation of parties and coalitions have occurred at a rapid 
pace in the postindependence years. In the parliamentary elec- 
tion of December 1995, thirty parties and other organizations 
registered candidates. 



77 



Country Studies 



The President's Party 

Significantly, the one type of party that has failed to thrive in 
Kazakstan is a "presidential party" that would serve as a training 
ground for future officials, as well as a conduit for their 
advancement. Nazarbayev lost control of his first two attempts 
at forming parties, the Socialists and the People's Congress 
Party (NKK). The latter particularly, under the leadership of 
former Nazarbayev ally Olzhas Suleymenov, became a center of 
parliamentary opposition. Nazarbayev's third party, the Peo- 
ple's Unity Party (SNEK), remained loyal to the president, 
although it was unable, even with considerable government 
help, to elect enough deputies to give Nazarbayev control of 
the 1994-95 parliament. SNEK formally incorporated itself as a 
political party in February 1995. 

Other Parties 

With the exception of SNEK and some smaller entities, such 
as the Republican Party and an entrepreneurial association 
known as For Kazakstan's Future, most of Kazakstan's parties 
and organizations have little or no influence on presidential 
decision making. Because privatization and the deteriorating 
economy have left most citizens much worse off than they were 
in the early 1990s, most of the republic's organizations and par- 
ties have an oppositional or antipresidential character. 

The Communist Party of Kazakstan, declared illegal in 1991, 
was allowed to re-register in 1993. Kazakstan also has a small 
Socialist Democratic Party. Both parties made poor showings in 
the 1994 election, but two former communist organizations, 
the State Labor Union (Profsoyuz) and the Peasants' Union, 
managed to take eleven and four seats, respectively. 

Nationalist Groups 

At least four large Kazak nationalist movements were active 
in the mid-1990s. Three of them — Azat (Freedom), the Repub- 
lican Party, and Zheltoksan (December) — attempted to form a 
single party under the name Azat, with the aim of removing 
"colonialist" foreign influences from Kazakstan. The fourth 
movement, Alash (named for the legendary founder of the 
Kazak nation, as well as for the pre-Soviet nationalist party of 
the same name), refused to join such a coalition because it 
advocated a more actively nationalist and pro-Muslim line than 
did the other three parties. In the March 1994 election, Azat 



78 



Kazakstan 



and the Republicans were the only nationalist parties to run 
candidates. They elected just one deputy between them. 

Four exclusively Russian political organizations in Kazakstan 
have nationalist or federative agendas. These are Yedinstvo 
(Unity), Civic Contract, Democratic Progress, and Lad (Har- 
mony). Party registration procedures for the 1994 election 
made places on the ballot very difficult to obtain for the Rus- 
sian nationalist groups. Although Lad was forced to run its can- 
didates without party identification, four deputies were elected 
with ties to that party. 

The Russian group most unsettling to the Nazarbayev gov- 
ernment was the Cossacks, who were denied official registra- 
tion, as well as recognition of their claimed status as a distinct 
ethnic group in the northeast and northwest. Not permitted to 
drill, carry weapons, or engage in their traditional military 
activities, Kazakstan's Cossacks have, in increasing numbers, 
crossed the border into Russia, where restrictions are not as 
tight. 

Opposition Coalitions 

In 1994 parliament's success at countering presidential 
power encouraged the legislators, many of whom were con- 
nected with the former Soviet ruling elite, to use their training 
in the political infighting of Soviet bureaucracy to form effec- 
tive antipresidential coalitions. Ironically, these coalitions were 
the only political groupings in the republic that transcended 
ethnic differences. The Respublika group was elastic enough to 
contain both Kazak and Russian nationalists, and the Otan- 
Otechestvo organization forged a coalition of Kazaks, Russians, 
and even Cossacks who desired a return to Soviet-style political 
and social structures. 

Nazarbayev and Political Prospects 

Public opinion in Kazakstan appears to have accepted the 
imposition of presidential rule, at least partly because the par- 
liament Nazarbayev dissolved had focused on its own wages and 
benefits rather than on solving the nation's problems. In the 
short run, the imposition of direct presidential rule seemed 
likely to reduce ethnic tensions within the republic. Indeed, 
one of Nazarbayev' s primary justifications for assuming greater 
power was the possibility that bolstered presidential authority 
could stem the growing ethnic hostility in the republic, includ- 
ing a general rise in anti-Semitism. 



79 



Country Studies 

The ethnic constituency whose appeasement is most impor- 
tant is, however, the Russians, both within the republic and in 
Russia proper. Stability in Kazakstan is overwhelmingly shaped 
by developments in Russia, especially as that country returns its 
attention to some measure of reintegration of the former 
Soviet empire. Because of Kazakstan's great vulnerability to 
Russian political, economic, and military intervention, experts 
assume that Russian national and ethnic interests play a consid- 
erable part in Nazarbayev's political calculations (see Foreign 
Policy; National Security Prospects, this ch.). 

It also seems likely that Nazarbayev would use presidential 
rule to increase the linguistic and cultural rights of the repub- 
lic's Russians. Although Nazarbayev had taken a firm stand on 
the issue of formal dual citizenship, a treaty he and Russia's 
president, Boris N. Yeltsin, signed in January 1995 all but obvi- 
ated the language question by permitting citizens of the respec- 
tive countries to own property in either republic, to move 
freely between them, to sign contracts (including contracts for 
military service) in either country, and to exchange one coun- 
try's citizenship for the other's. When the Kazak parliament rat- 
ified that agreement, that body also voted to extend to the end 
of 1995 the deadline by which residents must declare either 
Kazakstani or Russian citizenship. After the dissolution of that 
parliament, Kazakstan considered extending the deadline until 
2000, as Russia already had done. 

In the mid-1990s, Nazarbayev seemed likely to face eventual 
opposition from Kazak nationalists if he continued making 
concessions to the republic's Russians. Such opposition would 
be conditioned, however, by the deep divisions of ethnic 
Kazaks along clan and family lines, which give some of them 
more interests in common with the Russians than with their 
ethnic fellows. The Kazaks also have no institutions that might 
serve as alternative focuses of political will. Despite a wave of 
mosque building since independence, Islam is not well estab- 
lished in much of the republic, and there is no national reli- 
gious-political network through which disaffected Kazaks 
might be mobilized. 

The lack of an obvious venue for expression of popular dis- 
satisfaction does not mean, however, that none will materialize. 
Nazarbayev gambled that imposition of presidential rule would 
permit him to transform the republic's economy and thus pla- 
cate the opposition through an indisputable and widespread 
improvement of living standards. Experts agree that the repub- 



80 



Kazakstan 



lie has the natural resources and industrial potential to make 
this a credible wager. But a number of conditions outside Naz- 
arbayev's control, such as the political climate in Russia and the 
other Central Asian states, would influence that outcome. By 
dismissing parliament and taking upon himself the entire bur- 
den of government, Nazarbayev made himself the obvious tar- 
get for the public discontent that radical transformations 
inevitably produce. 

The Media 

Kazakstan has enjoyed the same flourishing of media as have 
most of the other former Soviet republics. To some extent, the 
republic also continues to be influenced by the Moscow media, 
although changes in currency and the simple passage of time 
are steadily reducing that influence. Also similar to the pro- 
cesses in other republics is a certain erosion of the freedom 
that the media enjoyed in the earlier days of independence. 
Although the government always has retained some control, 
there was a certain tendency to view the proper relationship 
between the media and government as adversarial. However, 
Nazarbayev steadily chipped away at Kazakstan's central press, 
which as a result became more noticeably pro-government in 
1994 and 1995. The 1995 constitution guarantees freedom of 
ideas and expression and explicitly bans censorship. In prac- 
tice, however, the government influences the press in several 
ways. Government presses (the only ones available) have 
refused to publish private newspapers for various "technical" 
reasons; financial pressure has been brought through court 
cases or investigations of a given newspaper's sponsors; and, in 
some cases, outright censorship has been exercised for "secu- 
rity reasons." Strictly enforced laws forbid personal criticism of 
the president or members of the president's family. 

The major official newspapers are the Russian-language 
Kazakstanskaya pravda and Sovety Kazakstana, which are sup- 
ported by the government. Nominally, the former is the organ 
of the Council of Ministers and the latter that of the parlia- 
ment. The newspaper Ekspress J^has taken some independent 
positions, although in the mid-1990s the editor in chief was a 
senior official in SNEK, the presidential political party. The 
small-edition papers Respublika and NKKare somewhat more 
oppositional. The first was the organ of the Socialist Party until 
it was sold to commercial interests, and the second is the organ 
of the People's Congress Party. Respublika is said to be underfi- 



81 



Country Studies 



nanced, but NKK enjoys the resources of Olzhas Suleymenov's 
large Nevada-Semipalatinsk commercial organization. Pano- 
rama, perhaps the largest independent newspaper in the 
republic, is owned by some of the largest business interests in 
the republic and is oriented toward political and economic 
issues (on which it generally takes an objective view) . The Kara- 
van commercial organization publishes two newspapers, Kara- 
van and ABV (short for Almaty Business News). The former 
inclines toward tabloid-style muckraking, while the latter is 
entirely commercial in character. 

The electronic media remain under state control. Many pri- 
vate production companies exist, but access to television and 
radio is still controlled by the State Television and Radio Broad- 
casting Corporation (see Transportation and Telecommunica- 
tions, this ch.). 

As it does most activities, ethnicity complicates media opera- 
tions. Inevitably the nationality of the owners of a newspaper or 
television production company affects how its product is 
received. The most obvious example is that of the newspaper 
Karavan. Although its muckraking approach is similar to that 
taken by newspapers in Moscow and Bishkek, the fact that the 
paper is Russian-owned makes it seem, in the context of Kazak- 
stan, to be more vividly partisan. In early 1995, a fire in the 
Karavan warehouse prompted rumors of sabotage, which never 
were substantiated. 

Human Rights 

Considering the power available to the Nazarbayev regime, 
Kazakstan's observation of international human-rights stan- 
dards in the mid-1990s was given a relatively high rating. In one 
celebrated case of attempted censorship, historian Karishal 
Asanov was tried three times before being acquitted on a 
charge of defaming the president for an article he published in 
a Moscow newspaper. 

Although antigovernment activities of the nationalist-reli- 
gious group Alash have been actively discouraged, there have 
been no recorded instances of extrajudicial killings or disap- 
pearances, or of unsubstantiated grounds for arrest. Prisons 
are generally overcrowded because of the eruption of crime in 
the republic, but international organizations record no 
instances of torture or of deliberately degrading treatment. 

The state security organs continue some of their Soviet-era 
ways; there have been complaints that proper procedures for 



82 



Kazakstan 



search warrants are not always followed, and some credible 
accusations have been made about tampering with or planting 
evidence in criminal proceedings. In general, however, the 
republic's investigative and security organs seem to be making 
an effort to follow the constitution's guidance on the inviolabil- 
ity of person, property, and dwelling. 

Free movement about the country is permitted, although 
residence is still controlled by the Soviet-era registration sys- 
tem, which requires citizens to have official permission to live 
in a particular city. In practice, this system has made it almost 
impossible for outsiders to move into Almaty. 

The exercise of political rights in Kazakstan is closely con- 
trolled, and the number of parties is limited by registration 
restrictions. Imposition of presidential rule and the general 
strengthening of the president's role have limited popular 
political participation. The Russian population has attempted 
to depict the imposition of language laws and the refusal to 
grant dual citizenship as violations of human rights, but these 
claims generally have not been accepted by the international 
community. Several Russian political groups and human rights 
alleged that irregularities in the August 1995 constitutional ref- 
erendum invalidated the document's ratification on human 
rights grounds. The nine official foreign observers reported no 
major irregularities, however. 

Foreign Policy 

From the onset of independence, President Nazarbayev 
sought international support to secure a place for Kazakstan in 
the world community, playing the role of bridge between East 
and West, between Europe and Asia. 

Almost immediately upon its declaration of independence, 
the republic gained a seat in the United Nations, membership 
in the CSCE, and a seat on the coordinating council of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary). 
The United States and other nations also gave Kazakstan quick 
recognition, opening embassies in Almaty and receiving Kazak- 
stani ambassadors in return. Its status as an apparent nuclear 
power got Kazakstan off to a fast start in international diplo- 
macy. President Nazarbayev became a signatory to the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and its so-called Lisbon Pro- 
tocol by which Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine pledged to 
eliminate nuclear weapons in the 1990s. In addition, Naz- 
arbayev was able to negotiate US$1.2 billion in prepayment by 



83 



Country Studies 

the United States against sale of the enriched uranium con- 
tained in Kazakstan's warheads, as well as another US$311 mil- 
lion for maintenance and conversion of existing missile silos. 
Equally important was that the nuclear warheads prompted the 
United States to become a party to negotiations concerning the 
warheads between Kazakstan and Russia. The United States 
eventually became a guarantor of the agreement reached by 
the two countries. In May 1995, the last nuclear warhead in 
Kazakstan was destroyed at Semey, completing the program of 
removal and destruction of the entire former Soviet arsenal 
and achieving the republic's goal of being "nuclear free." 

Under the leadership of Nazarbayev, who maintained per- 
sonal control of foreign policy, Kazakstan eagerly courted West- 
ern investment. Although foreign aid, most of it from Western 
nations, began as a trickle, significant amounts were received 
by 1994. In practice, however, Nazarbayev was ambivalent about 
moving too fully into a Western orbit. 

Turkey 

In the period shortly after independence, policy makers 
often discussed following the "Turkish model," emulating Tur- 
key in incorporating a Muslim cultural heritage into a secular, 
Europeanized state. Turkey's president Turgut Ozal made a 
state visit to Kazakstan in March 1991 and hosted a return visit 
by Nazarbayev later the same year. Soon afterward Nazarbayev 
began to echo Turkish talk of turning Kazakstan into a bridge 
between Muslim East and Christian West. In practice, however, 
the Turks proved to be more culturally dissimilar than the 
Kazakstanis had imagined; more important, Turkey's own eco- 
nomic problems meant that most promises of aid and invest- 
ment remained mostly just statements of intentions. 

China 

As Turkey proved itself a disappointment, President Naz- 
arbayev began to speak with increasing enthusiasm about the 
Asian economic "tigers" such as Singapore, the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea), and Taiwan. Among the republic's first 
foreign economic advisers were Chan Young Bang, a Korean 
American with close ties to South Korea's major industrial fam- 
ilies, and Singapore's former prime minister, Li Kwan Yew. 

The most compelling model, however, was provided by 
China, which quickly had become Kazakstan's largest non-CIS 
trading partner. The Kazakstani leadership found the Chinese 



84 



President Nursultan Nazarbayev with French President Francois 

Mitterrand during the former's official 
visit to France, September 1992 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 

combination of rigid social control and private-sector prosper- 
ity an attractive one. China also represented a vast market and 
appeared quite able to supply the food, medicine, and con- 
sumer goods most desired by the Kazakstani market. 

However, the relationship with China has been a prickly one. 
Kazakstan's fears of Chinese domination remain from the 
Soviet era and from the Kazaks' earlier nomadic history. A 
large number of Kazaks and other Muslims live in the Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region of China, just over the border. 
Direct rail and road links have been opened to Ummqi in Xin- 
jiang, and Chinese traders in Kazakstan are prominent in the 
thriving barter between the two nations. However, China is 
plainly nervous about any contact that would encourage sepa- 
ratist or nationalist sentiments among its own "captive peo- 
ples." For its part, Kazakstan has expressed unease about the 
large numbers of Chinese who began buying property and set- 
tling in the republic after the end of Soviet rule. Kazakstan also 
has reacted angrily but without effect to Chinese nuclear tests 
at Lob Nor, China's main testing site, located within 300 kilo- 
meters of the common border. 



85 



Country Studies 

The Middle East 

Nazarbayev was hesitant to court investment from the Mid- 
dle East, despite high levels of Turkish and Iranian commercial 
activity in Central Asia. Unlike the other Central Asian repub- 
lics, Kazakstan initially accepted only observer status in the 
Muslim-dominated ECO, largely out of concern not to appear 
too "Muslim" itself. Over time, however, the president moved 
from being a professed atheist to proudly proclaiming his Mus- 
lim heritage. He has encouraged assistance from Iran in devel- 
oping transportation links, from Oman in building oil 
pipelines, from Egypt in building mosques, and from Saudi 
Arabia in developing a national banking system. 

Russia and the CIS 

Most of Kazakstan's foreign policy has, not unnaturally, 
focused on the other former Soviet republics and, particularly, 
on the potential territorial ambitions of Russia. Since Gor- 
bachev's proposal for a modified continuation of the Soviet 
Union in late 1991, Kazakstan has supported arrangements 
with Russia that guarantee the republic's sovereignty and inde- 
pendence, including a stronger and institutionally complex 
CIS. 

As the CIS failed to develop a strong institutional framework, 
Nazarbayev attempted to achieve the same end in another way, 
proposing the creation of a Euro-Asian Union that would sub- 
ordinate the economic, defense, and foreign policies of indi- 
vidual member states to decisions made by a council of 
presidents, an elective joint parliament, and joint councils of 
defense and other ministries. Citizens of member nations 
would hold union citizenship, essentially reducing the inde- 
pendence of the individual member republics to something 
like their Soviet-era status. The proposal, however, met with lit- 
tle enthusiasm, especially from Russia, whose support was cru- 
cial to the plan's success. 

Nazarbayev pursued bilateral trade and security agreements 
with each of the former republics and in September 1992 
unsuccessfully attempted to have Kazakstan broker a cease-fire 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan that also would set a prece- 
dent for settling interrepublic and interregional strife in the 
former republics. Nazarbayev also participated in the fitful 
efforts of the five Central Asian leaders to create some sort of 
regional entity; the most promising of these was a free-trade 



86 



Kazakstan 



zone established in 1994 among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Kazakstan (see Foreign Trade, ch. 2). 

Kazakstan also has contributed to efforts by Russia and 
Uzbekistan to end the civil war in Tajikistan. Kazakstani troops 
were part of a joint CIS force dispatched to protect military 
objectives in and around the Tajikistan's capital, Dushanbe. 
Although Nazarbayev and Uzbekistan's President Islam Kari- 
mov warned in 1995 that their countries soon would consider 
withdrawal if peace talks made no progress, the multinational 
CIS force remained in place in early 1996. 

National Security 

Kazakstan's national security policy remains closely associ- 
ated with that of Russia, partly because the military forces of 
Kazakstan have developed more slowly than planned and partly 
because of long-standing habits of interdependence. The inter- 
nal security organization of police, prisons, intelligence gather- 
ing, and criminal justice remains substantially as it was in the 
Soviet era. 

Military Establishment 

At independence Kazakstan had no army because defense 
and security needs always had been met by the Soviet army. Ini- 
tially Nazarbayev, unlike many of his fellow new presidents, 
argued that his country should function without an indepen- 
dent army, assuming that collective security needs would con- 
tinue to be met by armies under CIS command. Even when the 
Russian military establishment changed its oath of service to 
refer solely to Russia rather than to the CIS, Nazarbayev contin- 
ued the policy of drafting youth into the CIS forces rather than 
those of the republic. Even though the republic's strategic 
thinkers saw Kazakstan as the intersection of three potential 
military theaters — Europe, the Near East, and the Far East — in 
the first years of independence, the republic was thought to 
require only a national guard of no more than 2,500 men, 
whose duties were envisioned as primarily ceremonial. 

When Russia transformed the troops on its soil into a Rus- 
sian army in the spring of 1992, Kazakstan followed suit by 
nationalizing the former Soviet Fortieth Army, which remained 
in Kazakstan, creating the formal basis for a Kazakstani 
national defense force (see table 12, Appendix). 



87 



Country Studies 



Command Structure 

The armed forces established in 1992 are subordinate to the 
Ministry of Defense and to the president in his capacities as 
commander in chief and chairman of the National Security 
Council. The second-ranking military office is chief of the 
General Staff. The General Staff consists of deputy defense 
ministers for personnel, ground forces, air defense, and air- 
borne forces. The president's main advisory body for national 
defense is the National Security Council, which includes the 
prime minister, the first deputy prime minister, the minister of 
foreign affairs, the chairman of the Committee for Defense of 
the Constitution, the chairman of the State Committee for 
Emergency Situations, the minister of defense, the commander 
of the Border Troops, the commander of the ground forces, 
and the minister of internal affairs. When it is active, parlia- 
ment has a four-member Committee for National Security and 
Defense for coordination of defense policy with the executive 
branch. 

Force Structure 

In the mid-1990s, plans called for developing a military force 
of 80,000 to 90,000 personnel, including ground forces, air 
forces, and a navy (for deployment in the Caspian Sea). In 
1996 the army included about 25,000 troops, organized into 
two motorized rifle divisions, one tank division, and one artil- 
lery brigade. Attached to that force were one multiple rocket 
launcher brigade, one motorized rifle regiment, and one air 
assault brigade. Overall army headquarters are at Semey, with 
division headquarters at Ayagoz, Sary Ozyk, Alrhaty, and Semey. 

According to national defense doctrine, Kazakstan has a 
minimal requirement for naval forces. In late 1993, Kazakstan 
received about 25 percent of the patrol boats and cutters in 
Russia's Caspian Sea Flotilla, which subsequently constituted 
the entire naval force. In 1993 naval bases were planned for 
Fort Shevchenko on the Caspian Sea and at Aral, north of the 
Aral Sea, but a scarcity of funds delayed completion. Likewise, 
naval air bases were planned for Aqtau and the Buzachiy Penin- 
sula on the Caspian Sea and at Saryshaghan on Lake Balkhash. 

In 1995 the air force included an estimated 15,000 troops. 
After the withdrawal in 1994 of forty Tu-95MS nuclear-capable 
bombers, the Kazakstan Air Force was left with 133 combat air- 
craft, whose offensive capability relied on MiG-23, MiG-27, 
MiG-29, and Su-24 fighters with support from An-24 and An- 



88 



Kazakstan 



26 transport and MiG-25 surveillance aircraft. Thirty air bases 
are scattered throughout the republic. Since 1992 Kazak pilots 
have received little air training because units have been staffed 
at only 30 to 50 percent of operational levels. 

Officer Cadre 

Creating the projected national armed forces has proved 
more difficult than expected. Since independence, the officer 
corps, which was overwhelmingly Slavic in the early 1990s, has 
suffered a severe loss of manpower. In 1992 nearly two-thirds of 
the company and battalion commanders in Kazakstan had to 
be replaced as Russian-speaking officers took advantage of CIS 
agreements permitting transfer to other republics. When these 
transfers occurred, almost no Kazak officers were available as 
replacements. In the entire Soviet period, only three Kazaks 
had graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff, 
and only two had earned advanced degrees in military science. 

Kazaks have dominated the top administrative positions in 
the post-Soviet military establishment. In addition to Minister 
of Defense Sagadat Nurmagambetov, President Nazarbayev 
appointed two Kazak colonels as deputy ministers of defense 
and a Kazak general to head the Republic National Guard (the 
guard unit responsible for protecting the president and other 
dignitaries as well as antiterrorist operations). Kazakstan's first 
National Security Council consisted of seven Kazaks, one Rus- 
sian, and one Ukrainian. In October 1994, both Slavs left office 
and were replaced by ethnic Kazaks. Despite a secret call-up of 
officers in reserve, by the fall of 1993 Kazakstan was short at 
least 650 officers, while the Border Troops Command, 80 per- 
cent of whose officers were non-Kazak, was understaffed by 45 
percent. 

Border Troops 

Kazakstan's extensive land borders are highly vulnerable to 
penetration by international smugglers, illegal immigrants, 
and terrorists. In 1992 the Eastern Border Troops District of 
the former Soviet Union was dissolved; this action resulted in 
the formation of the Kazakstan Border Troops Command 
under a Kazak general. After this transition, overall control of 
border security remained with the National Security Commit- 
tee, formerly the Kazakstan Committee for State Security 
(KGB). The border troops commander is a member of the 
National Security Committee and a member of the Council of 



89 



Country Studies 



CIS Border Troops Commanders, which was established in 
1993 to foster regional cooperation. Cooperation with Russia, 
with which Kazakstan shares roughly half its borders, is the pri- 
mary goal of border policy, and several agreements provide for 
Russian aid. Cooperative agreements also are in effect with the 
other four Central Asian republics. 

Kazakhstan's border troops force is estimated at 5,000 to 6,000 
personnel. Troops are trained at the Almaty Border Troops 
School (formerly run by the KGB) or under a cooperative 
agreement at four Russian facilities. Headquarters are at 
Almaty, with several subordinate commands, including a 
coastal patrol squadron headquartered at Atyrau on the north 
Caspian Sea coast. 

Training and Recruitment 

Exacerbating the severe shortage of trained military person- 
nel is the virtual absence of higher-level military training facili- 
ties. The only two such schools in existence, the general All 
Arms Command School and the Border Troops Academy, both 
in Almaty, are capable of graduating only about 200 junior offi- 
cers a year, and in 1993 three-quarters of those left the repub- 
lic. There were also three military secondary boarding 
schools — in Almaty, Shymkent, and Qaraghandy — and a civil 
aviation school in Aqtobe, which is to be converted to a military 
flight school sometime after 2000. 

There are indications of severe problems in filling the ranks 
of the armed services. Some accounts indicate that as many as 
20,000 soldiers were absent without leave from the army in 
1993, and desertion and low morale among conscripts contin- 
ued to be a major problem in the mid-1990s. Another concern 
is the deteriorating physical condition of inductees, one-third 
of whom are said to be unfit for conscription. Discipline 
appears to be problematic as well. In 1993 more than 500 
crimes by soldiers were reported in Almaty Province alone; 
members of the Kazakstani peacekeeping force in Tajikistan 
reportedly have robbed and raped villagers they were sent to 
protect. At the command level, in 1993 one general was dis- 
missed for selling weapons and other military goods. 

Military Infrastructure 

The quality of military support installations declined in the 
first years of the post-Soviet period. For instance, the chief 
planner of Kazakstan's Institute for Strategic Studies has esti- 



90 



Kazakstan 



mated that only in the next century will the republic have the 
capability to use air-to-surface missiles for defensive purposes. 
In addition, sensitive facilities inherited by military authorities 
from the Soviet army all are said to be on the point of collapse. 
Facilities in bad repair include nuclear test and storage facili- 
ties at Kokshetau, the BN-350 breeder-reactor at Aqtau, and a 
tracking and monitoring station at Priozersk. Even the first 
Kazak cosmonaut, who was sent into space with great pomp in 
June 1994, was in fact a Russian citizen and career officer in the 
Russian air force, as were his two "Ukrainian" shipmates. 

Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakstan was 
the most significant site of military-industrial activity in Central 
Asia. The republic was home to roughly 3 percent of Soviet 
defense facilities, including more than fifty enterprises and 
75,000 workers, located mostly in the predominantly Russian 
northern parts of the country. 

A plant in Oskemen fabricated beryllium and nuclear reac- 
tor fuel, and another at Aqtau produced uranium ore. Plants in 
Oral manufactured heavy machine guns for tanks and antiship 
missiles. In Petropavl, one plant produced SS-21 short-range 
ballistic missiles, and other plants manufactured torpedoes and 
naval communications equipment, support equipment for 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical missile 
launcher equipment, artillery, and armored vehicles. There 
was a torpedo-producing facility in Almaty as well. Chemical 
and biological weapons were produced in Aksu, and chemical 
weapons were manufactured in Pavlodar. 

By 1994 most of Kazakstan's defense plants had ceased mili- 
tary production. All of them required component parts from 
inaccessible sources outside Kazakstan, principally in Russia. 
Even more important, the Russian military-industrial complex 
was itself in collapse, so that Kazakstan's military enterprises no 
longer could rely on Russian customers. In addition, the great 
majority of key workers at all these facilities were ethnic Slavs, 
the most employable of whom moved to Russia or other former 
Soviet republics. 

Substantial elements of Kazakstan's military-production 
infrastructure nevertheless remain in the republic. In addition, 
in early 1992 the army nationalized all of the standard-issue 
Soviet military equipment remaining on the republic's soil. An 
unknown percentage of this equipment is still in use in Kazak- 
stan, and another portion of it likely has been sold to other 



91 



Country Studies 



countries. Since independence, at least one new ship, a cruiser 
named in honor of Nazarbayev, has been commissioned. 

The weapons of greatest concern to the world, however, have 
been the 1,350 nuclear warheads that remained in Kazakstan 
when the Soviet Union disbanded. Although two other new 
states — Ukraine and Belarus — also possessed "stranded" 
nuclear weapons, the Kazakstani weapons attracted particular 
international suspicion, and unsubstantiated rumors reported 
the sale of warheads to Iran. Subsequent negotiations demon- 
strated convincingly, however, that operational control of these 
weapons always had remained with Russian strategic rocket 
forces (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). All of the warheads were 
out of Kazakstan by May 1995. 

Kazakstan's other military significance was as a test range 
and missile launch site. The republic was the location of only 
about 1 percent of all Soviet test ranges, but these included 
some all Soviet Union's largest and most important, especially 
in the aerospace and nuclear programs. Test sites included a 
range at Vladimirovka used to integrate aircraft with their 
weapons systems; a range at Saryshaghan for flight testing of 
ballistic missiles and air defense systems; a similar facility at 
Emba; and the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Proving 
Grounds, which was the more important of the two major 
nuclear testing facilities in the Soviet Union. In the four 
decades of its existence, there were at least 466 nuclear explo- 
sions at Semipalatinsk. 

The other major Soviet military facility on Kazakstani soil 
was the Baykonur space launch facility, the home of the Soviet 
space exploration program and, until 1994, Russia's premier 
launch site for military and intelligence satellites. Kazakstan 
and Russia debated ownership of the facility, while the facility 
itself suffered acute deterioration from the region's harsh cli- 
mate and from uncontrolled pilfering. In 1994 Russia formally 
recognized Kazakstan's ownership of the facility, although a 
twenty-year lease ratified in 1995 guaranteed Russia continued 
use of Baykonur. 

Military Doctrine 

In 1992 Kazakstan adopted a three-stage defense doctrine, 
calling for creation of administrative, command, and support 
organizations in 1992, restructuring of field forces between 
1993 and 1996, and a modernization process leading to estab- 
lishment of a fully professional military force by 2000. In 1992 



92 



Kazakstan 



Minister of Defense Sagadat Nurmagambetov abandoned the 
last goal as impractical, calling rather for a combination of con- 
scripts and contract service personnel. In the summer of 1994, 
Kazakstan's Institute for Strategic Studies called for the com- 
plete abandonment of the official defense doctrine. The exist- 
ing doctrine was criticized for being based on outmoded Soviet 
precepts that combined fear of hostile military encirclement 
with a commitment to peace that approached pacificism. 

The institute argued that Kazakstan should instead base its 
defense policies on the assumption that the republic likely 
would find itself amid border confrontations involving CIS 
nations, an expansionist China, and Islamic neighbors with 
enhanced power and ambition. To prepare for such events, the 
institute recommended de-emphasizing military development 
and instead pursuing multinational defense agreements along 
the lines of Nazarbayev's proposed Euro-Asian Union or, absent 
that, a military alliance with Russia and active pursuit of NATO 
membership. Kazakstan became a member of NATO's Partner- 
ship for Peace in 1994. 

Following the appearance of the institute's evaluation, the 
Ministry of Defense has acknowledged that the second of its 
original goals — restructuring of field forces by 1996 — likely 
could not be achieved. This admission meant that Kazakstan's 
dependence upon Russia likely would become even greater. In 
January 1995, the two countries signed agreements committing 
them to creadon of "unified armed forces." To deflect criticism 
that such an agreement was inimical to national sovereignty, 
Nazarbayev likened the new arrangement to the Warsaw Pact 
and NATO, as distinct from the formation of a single armed 
force. At the same time, Russia formally took up shared respon- 
sibility for patrol of Kazakstan's international borders (under a 
nominally joint command), which in practice meant the bor- 
der with China. 

Law Enforcement Systems 

Kazakstan's police, court, and prison systems are based, 
largely unchanged, on Soviet-era pracdces, as is the bulk of the 
republic's criminal code. Major legislative changes have con- 
centrated on commercial law, with a view to improving the 
atmosphere for foreign investment. Formal responsibility for 
observation of the republic's laws and for protection of the 
state's interests is divided among the National Security Com- 
mittee (successor to the Kazak branch of the KGB), the Minis- 



93 



Country Studies 



try of Internal Affairs, and the Office of the Procurator 
General. Intelligence and counterintelligence are the responsi- 
bility of the National Security Committee. The police (still 
called the militia) and prisons are the responsibility of the Min- 
istry of Internal Affairs. The Office of the Procurator General, 
formerly charged with investigation and prosecution of unlaw- 
ful acts, was removed from its investigative capacity by the 1995 
constitution. Investigation of crimes shifted to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, which also is responsible for fire protection, 
automotive inspection, and routine preservation of order. As of 
1992, Kazakstan became a member of the International Crimi- 
nal Police Organization (Interpol), and Kazakstani authorities 
have worked particularly closely with the law enforcement 
agencies of Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Kyr- 
gyzstan. 

Courts 

The present court system functions at three levels: local 
courts, which handle petty crimes such as pickpocketing and 
vandalism; province-level courts, which handle offenses such as 
murder, grand larceny, and organized crime; and the Supreme 
Court, to which decisions of the lower courts are appealed. 
Until mid-1995, the Constitutional Court ruled as final arbiter 
on the constitutionality of government laws and actions in 
cases of conflict. 

The present constitution provides guarantees of legal repre- 
sentation for persons accused of a crime, including free repre- 
sentation if necessary, but this right appears to be little 
recognized by authorities or realized by the public. Pretrial 
detention is permissible, and a suspect may be held for three 
days before being charged. After being charged, an accused 
individual may be held for up to a year before being brought to 
trial. There is no system of bail; accused individuals remain 
incarcerated until tried. 

Both the police and the National Security Committee have 
the right to violate guarantees of privacy (of the home, tele- 
phone, mail, and banks) with the sanction of the procurator 
general. The theoretical requirement for search warrants and 
judicial orders for wiretaps and other violations of privacy often 
is ignored in practice. When the 1995 constitution was 
approved, a United States official criticized its lack of protec- 
tion of civil and human rights. Before the approval referen- 
dum, Nazarbayev had announced the dissolution of the 



94 



Kazakstan 



Constitutional Court, which he replaced in October with a 
Constitutional Council whose decisions the president could 
veto. 

Prisons 

The Kazakstani prison system came under attack from 
human rights organizations in the mid-1990s. In the late Soviet 
period, eighty-nine labor camps, ten prisons, and three psychi- 
atric hospitals (under the administration of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs) were known to be operating in the republic. 
At least two of the prisons, at Oskemen and Semey, date from 
tsarist days. There also were at least four special prisons for 
women and children, at Pavlodar, Zhambyl, and Chamalghan. 
The facilities remaining from the Soviet period are badly over- 
crowded and understaffed. According to a 1996 report from 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, government funding of prisons 
is less than half the amount required, and corruption and theft 
are common throughout the prison system. The total prison 
population in 1996 was 76,000, and about 1,300 died of tuber- 
culosis in 1995. Health conditions are extremely poor. Over- 
crowding has been exacerbated by an explosion of crime 
among the country's youth and by President Nazarbayev's 
ongoing policy of harsh sentences for convicted criminals. 

Crime 

In the early and mid-1990s, crime was increasing at an alarm- 
ing rate. The police were badly understaffed, overworked, and 
underfinanced. In 1995 police in Almaty received no pay for 
three months. A significant drain of personnel has occurred 
since independence, as investigators and police officers either 
move to other republics or enter other lines of work offering 
higher pay. Even before independence, militia authorities com- 
plained that staffing was more than 2,000 below full force. In 
numerous instances, police officers themselves have been 
involved in crime, especially in such potentially lucrative 
branches of law enforcement as highway patrol and customs 
inspection. Under these circumstances, public respect for the 
police declined seriously. 

Since independence Kazakstan has suffered an enormous 
increase in crime of almost all types. One indication of this 
explosion has been a series of measures ordered by President 
Nazarbayev in September 1995, aimed primarily at ending cor- 
ruption in the police force. The incidence of reported crimes 



95 



Country Studies 



has grown by about 25 percent in every year since indepen- 
dence, although in the first months of 1995 the growth rate 
slowed to about 16 percent. The average crime rate for the 
republic is about 50 crimes per 10,000 population, but the rate 
is significantly higher in Qaraghandy, North Kazakstan, East 
Kazakstan, Aqmola, Pavlodar, and Almaty. Crime-solving rates 
have fallen to under 60 percent across the republic and to as 
low as 30 percent in cities such as Qaraghandy and Temirtau. 

Particular increases have been noted in violent crimes and in 
crimes committed by teenagers and young men. Contract mur- 
ders and armed clashes between criminal groups increased 
noticeably in 1995 and were cited by Nazarbayev as a reason for 
tightening police procedures. Although Soviet crime statistics 
were not especially reliable, it is still revealing that in 1988 only 
5 percent of the republic's convicts were under thirty years of 
age, but by 1992 that figure had risen to 58 percent. In addi- 
tion, there has been an enormous increase in official malfea- 
sance and corruption, with bribe taking reported to be nearly 
ubiquitous. 

Narcotics 

Kazakstan offers natural conditions favorable to accelerated 
narcotics use and trade. Many parts of the country offer excel- 
lent growing conditions for cannabis and opium poppies, and 
the country is located on the route to lucrative markets in the 
West. Until it ceased production in 1991, Kazakstan's Shymkent 
plant was the Soviet Union's only supplier of medicinal opiates. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated narcotics production 
and traffic to be 30 percent higher in 1993 than in the previous 
year. The focus of attention for that ministry, which coordi- 
nates the republic's antinarcotics program, is the Chu Valley in 
south central Kazakstan, where an estimated 138,000 hectares 
of cannabis and an unknown area of opium poppy fields are 
under cultivation, providing exports for international smug- 
glers. Because of low funding, efforts to eradicate cannabis and 
poppy cultivation virtually ceased in 1995. 

Almaty has become a crossroads for opiates and hashish 
from southwest Asia. This role has resulted in large part from 
lax customs controls and the city's position as a transportation 
hub. In 1994 an estimated 1.4 tons of morphine base from 
/Afghanistan were stored in Almaty. 

An active government narcotics control program began in 
1993, although limited personnel and funding have handi- 



96 



Kazakstan 



capped its efforts. In 1994 only 400 police, 100 sniffer dogs, 
and twelve special investigators were active. Most Ministry of 
Internal Affairs interdiction occurs along the Chinese border. 
Cooperation has been sought with the narcotics programs of 
other Central Asian states and Russia. In 1993 and 1994, Rus- 
sian forces made eradication sweeps through the Chu Valley, 
but Russian helicopter support ceased in 1994. Antinarcotics 
agreements have been signed with Turkey, Pakistan, China, 
and Iran. Kazakstan also has requested United States aid in 
drafting narcotics provisions in a new penal code. 

Domestic use of narcotics has been confined largely to areas 
of production, notably around Shymkent. Although only 
10,700 addicts were registered in 1991, experts believe the 
actual number to be much higher. The use of homemade opi- 
ates increased significantly in the early 1990s. The Ministry of 
Health runs a center offering treatment and prevention pro- 
grams. However, by 1994 lack of resources had made treatment 
on demand impossible and stimulated reorganization of the 
program. 

National Security Prospects 

Like the other four Central Asian republics (with the possi- 
ble exception of Uzbekistan), Kazakstan lacks the resources to 
create an independent military establishment or an effective 
internal security force. By 1995 policy makers, headed by Presi- 
dent Nazarbayev, had recognized the need to remain under the 
umbrella of Russian military protection, a status reinforced by 
a number of bilateral treaties and expected to become further 
institutionalized in future years. The poor state of internal 
security was a crisis that eluded control in the mid-1990s, 
despite authoritarian measures by Nazarbayev. But Kazakstan 
has committed itself to encouraging foreign investment in the 
effort to salvage the national economy. To provide an appropri- 
ate atmosphere for such commercial activity, improved internal 
security, perhaps with substantial Western assistance, is a neces- 
sary step. 

* * * 

Relatively few monographs have been written on Kazakstan. 
For historical background in the modern era, Central Asia: 120 
Years of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth, offers a com- 
prehensive treatment. Useful economic information on the 



97 



Country Studies 



post-Soviet period is available from the World Bank's Kazakstan: 
The Transition to a Market Economy, the PlanEcon Review and Out- 
look for the Former Soviet Republics, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency's Kazakstan: An Economic Profile. A more concise sum- 
mary of Kazakstan 's geopolitical position in the 1990s is found 
in Charles Undeland and Nicholas Piatt's The Central Asian 
Republics. 

Among the most complete historical and social analyses of 
the country is Martha Brill Olcott's The Kazakhs, the second edi- 
tion of which was published in 1995. Central Asia, edited by 
Hafeez Malik, offers a collection of articles on the history and 
geopolitics of the region. Current information on political and 
economic events is found in the Foreign Broadcast Informa- 
tion Service's Daily Report: Central Eurasia, and current informa- 
tion on environmental issues is contained in that service's FBIS 
Report: Environment and World Health, which before August 1995 
was titled FBIS Report: Environment. For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



98 



Chapter 2. Kyrgyzstan 



Kyrgyz kookor, a jug for mare's milk 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Kyrgyz Republic. 
Short Form: Kyrgyzstan. 
Term for Citizens: Kyrgyzstani(s). 
Capital: Bishkek. 

Date of Independence: August 31, 1991. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 198,500 square kilometers. 

Topography: Dominated by Tian Shan, Pamir, and Alay 
mountain ranges; average elevation 2,750 meters. Mountains 
separated by deep valleys and glaciers. Flat expanses only in 
northern and eastern valleys. Many lakes and fast-flowing rivers 
draining from mountains. 

Climate: Chiefly determined by mountains, continental with 
sharp local variations between mountain valleys and flatlands. 
Precipitation also varies greatly from western mountains (high) 
to north-central region (low). 

Society 

Population: In 1994, estimated at 4.46 million; annual growth 
rate 1.9 percent; 1994 population density 22.6 people per 
square kilometer. 

Ethnic Groups: In 1994, 52 percent Kyrgyz, 22 percent Russian, 
13 percent Uzbek, 3 percent Ukrainian, 2 percent German. 

Languages: Aggressive post-Soviet campaign to make Kyrgyz 
official national language in all commercial and government 
uses by 1997; Russian still used extensively, and non-Kyrgyz 
population, most not Kyrgyz speakers, hostile to forcible 



101 



Country Studies 



Kyrgyzification. 

Religion: Dominant religion Sunni Muslim (70 percent), with 
heavy influence of tribal religions. Russian population largely 
Russian Orthodox. 

Education and Literacy: Literacy 97 percent in 1994. Strong 
tradition of educating all citizens; ambitious program to 
restructure Soviet system hampered by low funding and loss of 
teachers. School attendance mandatory through grade nine. 
Kyrgyz increasingly used for instruction; transition from 
Russian hampered by lack of textbooks. Twenty-six institutions 
of higher learning. 

Health: Transition from Soviet national health system to public 
health insurance system slowed by low funding. In 1990s, 
health professionals not well-trained; supplies, facilities, and 
equipment insufficient, unsanitary. Contaminated water a 
major health hazard. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): In 1993, estimated at US$2.77 
billion, US$590 per capita, declining steadily in early and mid- 
1990s. In 1994 growth rate -26.2 percent. Economic growth 
stopped by insufficient privatization and restructuring, Soviet- 
era banking system, and rampant corruption. 

Agriculture: Heavily state controlled, reducing profitability and 
encouraging subsistence farming; irrigation necessary for 
more than 70 percent of land. Main use of land livestock 
raising; main crops corn, wheat, barley, vegetables, potatoes, 
and sugar beets. Bank credits and input materials scarce for 
farmers; severe output decline 1991-95. 

Industry and Mining: Production decline 58 percent, 1992-94, 
caused by energy shortage and loss of Russian skilled workers. 
Political pressure maintains unprofitable Soviet-era state 
enterprises. Main industries machine building, textiles, food 
processing, electronics, and metallurgy. Iron ore, copper, gold, 
lead, zinc, molybdenum, mercury, and antimony are mined. 

Energy: Insignificant oil and natural gas deposits, and coal 
deposits not fully exploited. In 1994, some 39 percent of 
imports were fuels. Coal-powered thermoelectric power pro- 



102 



Kyrgyzstan 



duction replaced by hydroelectric power, early 1990s; emphasis 
on electric power based on abundant water power, providing 
exportable power bartered for coal from Kazakstan. 

Exports: In 1994, value US$339 million. Main commodities 
wool, hides, cotton, electric power, electronics, metals, food 
products, and shoes. Main partners Russia, Ukraine, Uzbeki- 
stan, Kazakstan, and China. Export taxes and licensing sub- 
stantially relaxed by 1995. 

Imports: In 1994, mainly fuels, construction materials, ferrous 
metals, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and machinery. Main 
suppliers Russia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and China. Import 
licenses and tariffs liberalized, 1994. Value US$347 million, 
1994. 

Balance of Payments: In 1992, deficit US$147.5 million. 

Exchange Rate: Som introduced as national currency, May 
1993, with floating exchange rate. Early 1996, eleven som per 
US$1. 

Inflation: Hyperinflation (1,400 percent per year), 1992 and 
1993; rate about 180 percent 1994; 1995 government target 55 
percent; value of som supported by international banks 
beginning in 1993, and price controls reintroduced 1993. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Drastic tax revenue shrinkage caused revenue 
crisis and reduced government spending, 1994; widespread tax 
reform program in place 1995, focusing on enforcement and 
new land and excise taxes. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways: In 1990, 28,400 kilometers of roads, of which 22,400 
hard-surfaced. Nearly all freight moves by road; plans to 
supplement connection with China-Pakistan highway, mid- 
1990s. Fuel shortage restricts vehicle use, mid-1990s. 

Railroads: Little developed; 370 kilometers of track, one main 
line in north, 1994. Plans for north-south line begun 1995. 

Civil Aviation: Two international airports, at Bishkek and Osh; 
about twenty-five smaller facilities. Beginning in 1991, fuel 



103 



Country Studies 

shortage diverts international traffic to Almaty in Kazakstan, 
with reduction in overall transport; regular service to Tashkent 
and Moscow. 

Inland Waterways: None. 

Ports: None. 

Pipelines: In 1994, 220 kilometers for natural gas. 

Telecommunications: Little developed; in 1994, about 7 per- 
cent of population with telephones. Equipment outmoded, 
operating at capacity, and difficult to replace. Three national 
radio stations, very limited domestic television. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Constitution of 1993 prescribes three branches; 
executive strongest and reinforced with special powers 
assumed by President Askar Akayev, early 1990s. In election 
held December 1995, Akayev reelected by 71.6 percent of vote. 
Council of Ministers, nominally administering executive 
branch, subservient to president. Bicameral parliament of 105 
(upper house 35, convened full-time; lower house 70 members, 
convening twice yearly) established 1994 at Akayev's request, 
elected to five-year terms; parliament has opposed Akayev on 
some issues. Judges appointed by president with parliamentary 
approval. Some local governments with strong power bases. 

Politics: Numerous groups appeared early 1990s but no 
organized party system; government has denied registration to 
some parties; some neocommunist parties active. 

Foreign Relations: Post-Soviet attempts at relations with wide 
variety of Western and Asian countries, based on neutrality, 
using Akayev's personal diplomacy. Careful cultivation of 
powerful neighbors Russia, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan; border 
tensions with Tajikistan. Fast increasing Chinese economic role 
watched carefully by government; Western sources of aid 
endangered by antidemocratic tendencies. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of 
United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (OSCE), Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO), Islamic Bank, Asian Development Bank, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace, World 



104 



Kyrgyzstan 



Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Ground forces had 12,000 troops, 1996; air and 
air defense forces 4,000 troops, border guards about 2,000 
troops. Manpower and weapon levels in development stage, 
1995. Heavy reliance on Russian command and equipment 
expected to continue indefinitely. 

Major Military Units: Ground forces with one motorized rifle 
division with armor and artillery, attached sapper, signals, and 
mountain infantry units. Air force with one fighter, one 
training, one helicopter regiment. 

Military Budget: Estimated at US$13 million, 1995. 

Internal Security: State Committee for National Security, 
replacing Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), respon- 
sible for intelligence and runs National Guard (about 1,000 
troops assigned as "palace guard") and border guards. Police 
(militia) system, unchanged from Soviet era, includes 25,000 
personnel under centralized command. 




f ^ -('Suluktu v -sll 

p* J 



® 

Dushanbe 



AFGHANISTA; 



rternational boundary 

XAJI r0V ' nce tDOunc ' ar ^ 

ational capital 
.Province capnai 
opulated place 
;ailroad 

) 

/ oad 
irport 

150 Kilometers 



150 Miles 



Figure 8. Kyrgyzstan: A\ 



108 



ELEVATED TO THE STATUS of a union republic by Joseph V. 
Stalin in 1936, the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic was until 
1990 one of the poorest, quietest, and most conservative of all 
the Soviet republics. It was the Kyrgyz Republic that celebrated 
the election of a sheepherder as president of its parliamentary 
executive committee, the Presidium, in 1987. Three years later, 
however, that quiescence ended, and Kyrgyzstan's history as a 
separate nation began. 

Kyrgyzstan began the new phase of its existence by declaring 
independence in August 1991. At that point, it possessed a 
combination of useful resources and threatening deficiencies. 
Geographic location fits in both categories; landlocked deep 
inside the Asian continent, Kyrgyzstan has minimal natural 
transportation routes available to serve its economic develop- 
ment, and its isolation has been an obstacle in the campaign to 
gain international attention. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan 
also is isolated from most of the Asian trouble spots (excepting 
Tajikistan), making national security a relatively low priority. 
The natural resources that Kyrgyzstan possesses — primarily 
gold, other minerals, and abundant hydroelectric power — have 
not been managed well enough to make them an asset in pull- 
ing the republic up from the severe economic shock of leaving 
the secure, if limiting, domain of the Soviet Union. 

In the mid-1990s, the most ambitious economic and political 
reform program in Central Asia caused more frustration than 
satisfaction among Kyrgyzstan's citizens, largely because the 
republic inherited neither an economic infrastructure nor a 
political tradition upon which to base the rapid transitions 
envisioned by President Askar Akayev's first idealistic blue- 
prints. Although some elements of reform (privatization, for 
example) went into place quickly, the absence of others (credit 
from a commercial banking system, for example) brought the 
overall system to a halt, causing high unemployment and frus- 
tration. By 1995, democratic reform seemed a victim of that 
frustration, as Akayev increasingly sought to use personal exec- 
utive power in promoting his policies for economic growth, a 
pattern that became typical in the Central Asian countries' first 
years of independence. 

Since independence Kyrgyzstan has made impressive strides 
in some regards such as creating genuinely free news media 



109 



Provinces 

I Osh 

II Jalal-Abad 

III Talas 

IV Chu 

V Naryn 

VI Ysyk-Kdl 



KAZAKSTAN 



®Almaty 



S ^ N Ta,as »l 




-® _ ^'=^~' Cholgon 

f Bishkek 4- JL_ 

4^; / iv , CrcT' 



UZBEKISTAN 



, — ag Jalal-Abad 




CHINA 



® 

Dushanbe 



TAJIKISTAN 



AFGHANISTAN \ 



> ^fVs, 

PAKISTAN ' 



International boundary 

Province boundary 

® National capital 

® Province capital 

• Populated place 

— — Railroad 

Road 

■4" Airport 

75 150 Kilometers 



/•>£«»>• N. K\r\>y;,iiim: Administrative Divisions and Transportation System, 1996 



1 08 



Country Studies 

and fostering an active political opposition. At the same time, 
the grim realities of the country's economic position, which 
exacerbate the clan- and family-based political tensions that 
have always remained beneath the surface of national life, 
leave long-term political and economic prospects clouded at 
best. Kyrgyzstan has no desire to return to Russian control, yet 
economic necessity has forced the government to look to Mos- 
cow for needed financial support and trade. 

Historical Background 

The modern nation of Kyrgyzstan is based on a civilization of 
nomadic tribes who moved across the eastern and northern 
sections of present-day Central Asia. In this process, they were 
dominated by, and intermixed with, a number of other tribes 
and peoples that have influenced the ultimate character of the 
Kyrgyz people. 

Early History 

Stone implements found in the Tian Shan mountains indi- 
cate the presence of human society in what is now Kyrgyzstan as 
many as 200,000 to 300,000 years ago. The first written records 
of a Kyrgyz civilization appear in Chinese chronicles beginning 
about 2000 B.C. The Kyrgyz, a nomadic people, originally 
inhabited an area of present-day northwestern Mongolia. In 
the fourth and third centuries B.C., Kyrgyz bands were among 
the raiders who persistently invaded Chinese territory and 
stimulated the building of the original Great Wall of China in 
the third century B.C. The Kyrgyz achieved a reputation as 
great fighters and traders. In the centuries that followed, some 
Kyrgyz tribes freed themselves from domination by the Huns by 
moving northward into the Yenisey and Baikal regions of 
present-day south-central Siberia. 

The first Kyrgyz state, the Kyrgyz Khanate, existed from the 
sixth until the thirteenth century A.D., expanding by the tenth 
century southwestward to the eastern and northern regions of 
present-day Kyrgyzstan and westward to the headwaters of the 
Ertis (Irtysh) River in present-day eastern Kazakstan. In this 
period, the khanate established intensive commercial contacts 
in China, Tibet, Central Asia, and Persia. 

In the meantime, beginning about 1000 B.C., large tribes 
collectively known as the Scythians also lived in the area of 
present-day Kyrgyzstan. Excellent warriors, the Scythian tribes 



110 



Kyrgyzstan 



farther west had resisted an invasion by the troops of Alex- 
ander the Great in 328-27 B.C. The Kyrgyz tribes who entered 
the region around the sixth century played a major role in the 
development of feudalism. 

The Kyrgyz reached their greatest expansion by conquering 
the Uygur Khanate and forcing it out of Mongolia in A.D. 840, 
then moving as far south as the Tian Shan range — a position 
the Kyrgyz maintained for about 200 years. By the twelfth cen- 
tury, however, Kyrgyz domination had shrunk to the region of 
the Sayan Mountains, northwest of present-day Mongolia, and 
the Altay Range on the present-day border of China and Mon- 
golia. In the same period, other Kyrgyz tribes were moving 
across a wide area of Central Asia and mingling with other eth- 
nic groups (see Ethnic Traditions, this ch.). 

Mongol Domination 

The Mongols' invasion of Central Asia in the fourteenth cen- 
tury devastated the territory of Kyrgyzstan, costing its people 
their independence and their written language. The son of 
Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, Dzhuchi, conquered the Kyrgyz 
tribes of the Yenisey region, who by this time had become dis- 
united. For the next 200 years, the Kyrgyz remained under the 
Golden Horde and the Oriot and Jumgar khanates that suc- 
ceeded that regime. Freedom was regained in 1510, but Kyrgyz 
tribes were overrun in the seventeenth century by the Kalmyks, 
in the mid-eighteenth century by the Manchus, and in the early 
nineteenth century by the Uzbeks. 

The Kyrgyz began efforts to gain protection from more pow- 
erful neighboring states in 1758, when some tribes sent emis- 
saries to China. A similar mission went to the Russian Empire 
in 1785. Between 1710 and 1876, the Kyrgyz were ruled by the 
Uzbek Quqon (Kokand) Khanate, one of the three major prin- 
cipalities of Central Asia during that period (see fig. 3). Kyrgyz 
tribes fought and lost four wars against the Uzbeks of Quqon 
between 1845 and 1873. The defeats strengthened the Kyrgyz 
willingness to seek Russian protection. Even during this period, 
however, the Kyrgyz occupied important positions in the social 
and administrative structures of the khanate, and they main- 
tained special military units that continued their earlier tradi- 
tion of military organization; some Kyrgyz advanced to the 
position of khan. 



Ill 



Country Studies 



Russian Control 

In 1876 Russian troops defeated the Quqon Khanate and 
occupied northern Kyrgyzstan. Within five years, all Kyrgyzstan 
had become part of the Russian Empire, and the Kyrgyz slowly 
began to integrate themselves into the economic and political 
life of Russia. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
increasing numbers of Russian and Ukrainian settlers moved 
into the northern part of present-day Kyrgyzstan. Russian spe- 
cialists began large-scale housing, mining, and road construc- 
tion projects and the construction of schools. In the first years 
of the twentieth century, the presence of the Russians made 
possible the publication of the first books in the Kyrgyz lan- 
guage; the first Kyrgyz reader was published in Russia in 1911. 
Nevertheless, Russian policy did not aim at educating the pop- 
ulation; most Kyrgyz remained illiterate, and in most regions 
traditional life continued largely as it had before 1870. 

By 1915, however, even many Central Asians outside the 
intelligentsia had recognized the negative effects of the Rus- 
sian Empire's repressive policies. The Kyrgyz nomads suffered 
especially from confiscation of their land for Russian and 
Ukrainian settlements. Russian taxation, forced labor, and 
price policies all targeted the indigenous population and 
raised discontent and regional tension. The Kyrgyz in Semi- 
rech'ye Province suffered especially from land appropriation. 
The bloody rebellion of the summer of 1916 began in Uzbeki- 
stan, then spread into Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere. Kazaks, Turk- 
men, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz participated. An estimated 2,000 
Slavic settlers and even more local people were killed, and the 
harsh Russian reprisals drove one-third of the Kyrgyz popula- 
tion into China. 

Into the Soviet Union 

Following a brief period of independence after the 1917 Bol- 
shevik Revolution (see Glossary) toppled the empire, the terri- 
tory of present-day Kyrgyzstan was designated the Kara-Kyrghyz 
Autonomous Region and a constituent part of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) in 1924. In 1926 the 
official name changed to the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic 
before the region achieved the status of a full republic of the 
Soviet Union in 1936. 



112 



Kyrgyzstan 



Recent History 

In the late 1980s, the Kyrgyz were jolted into a state of 
national consciousness by the reforms of Soviet leader Mikhail 
S. Gorbachev and by ethnic conflict much closer to home. As 
democratic activism stirred in Kyrgyzstan's cities, events in Mos- 
cow pushed the republic toward unavoidable independence. 

Ethnic Conflict 

The most important single event leading to independence 
grew from an outburst of ethnic friction. From the perspective 
of the Kyrgyz, the most acute nationality problem long had 
been posed by the Uzbeks living in and around the city of Osh, 
in the republic's southwest. Although Kyrgyzstan was only 
about 13 percent Uzbek according to the 1989 census, almost 
the entire Uzbek population was concentrated in Osh Prov- 
ince. Tensions very likely had existed between the Kyrgyz and 
the Uzbeks throughout the Soviet period, but Moscow was able 
to preserve the image of Soviet ethnic harmony until the 
reforms of Gorbachev in the mid-1980s. In the general atmo- 
sphere of glasnost (see Glossary), an Uzbek-rights group called 
Adalat began airing old grievances in 1989, demanding that 
Moscow grant local Uzbek autonomy in Osh and consider its 
annexation by nearby Uzbekistan. 

The real issue behind Adalat's demand was land, which is in 
extremely short supply in the southernmost province of Osh. 
To protect their claims, some Osh Kyrgyz also had formed an 
opposing ethnic association, called Osh-aimagy (Osh-land). In 
early June 1990, the Kyrgyz-dominated Osh City Council 
announced plans to build a cotton processing plant on a parcel 
of land under the control of an Uzbek-dominated collective 
farm in Osh Province. 

The confrontation that erupted over control of that land 
brought several days of bloody riots between crowds led by the 
respective associations, killing at least 320 Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 
Osh. The precise cause and sequence of events in early June 
1990 is disputed between Uzbek and Kyrgyz accounts. Scores of 
families were left homeless when their houses were burned out. 
The government finally stopped the rioting by imposing a mili- 
tary curfew. 

Because the telephone lines remained open in the otherwise 
blockaded city, news of the violence spread immediately to 
Frunze. In the capital, a large group of students marched on 
the headquarters of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzia (CPK), 



113 



Country Studies 



which also served as the seat of government, in the center of 
the city. In the violent confrontation that ensued, personal 
injuries were minimized by effective crowd control, and the 
riotous crowd eventually was transformed into a mass meeting. 

Democratic Activism 

The Osh riots and the subsequent events in Frunze quickly 
brought to the surface an undercurrent of political discontent 
that had been forming among both the intelligentsia and mid- 
dle-level party officials. A loose affiliation of activists calling 
themselves the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK) 
began to organize public opinion, calling among other things 
for the resignation of Absamat Masaliyev, who was president of 
the republic's parliament, the Supreme Soviet, as well as a 
member of the Soviet Union's Politburo and the head of the 
CPK. The DDK called for Masaliyev's resignation because he 
was widely viewed as having mishandled the Osh riots. 

Democratic activists erected tents in front of the party head- 
quarters, maintaining pressure with a series of hunger strikes 
and highly visible public demonstrations. The continuing 
atmosphere of crisis emboldened CPK members, who also 
wished to get rid of the reactionary Masaliyev. Four months 
later, in a presidential election prescribed by Gorbachev's 
reform policies, Masaliyev failed to win the majority of 
Supreme Soviet votes required to remain in power. 

The Rise ofAkayev 

With none of the three presidential candidates able to gain 
the necessary majority in the 1990 election, the Supreme Soviet 
unexpectedly selected Askar Akayev, a forty-six-year-old physi- 
cist, who had been serving as head of the republic's Academy 
of Sciences. Although he had served for a year in a science- 
related post on the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and was a party member, Akayev 
was the first president of a Soviet republic who had not held a 
high party position. 

At the same meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the deputies 
changed the name of the republic to Kyrgyzstan. They also 
began to speak seriously of seeking greater national sovereignty 
(which was formally declared on November 20, 1990) and of 
attaining political domination of the republic by the Kyrgyz, 
including the establishment of Kyrgyz as the official language. 



114 



Kyrgyzstan 



By mid-summer 1991, the Kyrgyz were beginning to make 
serious moves to uncouple the government from the CPSU and 
its Kyrgyzstan branch. In early August, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, which governs the police and the internal 
security forces, announced a ban of all CPSU affiliation or 
activity within the ministry. Events elsewhere precluded a seem- 
ingly inevitable conflict with Moscow over that decision; in 
August 1991, the attention of the entire union moved to Mos- 
cow when reactionaries in Gorbachev's government attempted 
to remove him from power. 

Unlike the leaders of the other four Central Asian republics, 
who temporized for a day about their course following the 
coup, Akayev condemned the plot almost immediately and 
began preparations to repel the airborne forces rumored to be 
on the way to Kyrgyzstan from Moscow. The quick collapse of 
the coup made the preparations unnecessary, but Akayev' s dec- 
laration of support for Gorbachev and for the maintenance of 
legitimate authority gained the Kyrgyz leader enormous 
respect among the Kyrgyz people and among world leaders. 
On August 30, 1991, days after the coup began, Akayev and the 
republic's Supreme Soviet declared Kyrgyzstan an independent 
nation, and the president threw the CPSU and its Kyrgyzstan 
branch out of the government. However, he did not go as far as 
officials in most of the other former Soviet republics, where the 
party was banned totally. 

At the same time independence was declared, the republic's 
Supreme Soviet scheduled direct presidential elections for 
October 1991. Running unopposed, Akayev received 95 per- 
cent of the popular vote, thus becoming the country's first pop- 
ularly elected president. The so-called Silk Revolution drew 
much international sympathy and attention. In December 
1991, when the Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian republics 
signed the Tashkent Agreement, forming a commonwealth 
that heralded the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Akayev 
demanded that another meeting be held so that Kyrgyzstan 
might become a founding member of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS — see Glossary), as the new union was 
to be called. 

The sympathy that Akayev had Won for Kyrgyzstan earlier in 
his presidency served the country well once the world generally 
acknowledged the passing of the Gorbachev regime and the 
Soviet Union. Kyrgyzstan was recognized almost immediately 
by most nations, including the United States, whose secretary 



115 



Country Studies 



of state, James Baker, made an official visit in January 1992. A 
United States embassy was opened in the capital (which had 
reassumed its pre-Soviet name of Bishkek in December 1990) 
in February 1992. By early 1993, the new country had been rec- 
ognized by 120 nations and had diplomatic relations with sixty- 
one of them. 

Akayev's Early Years 

Despite initial euphoria over the possibilities of indepen- 
dence and membership in the CIS, Akayev recognized that his 
country's economic position was extremely vulnerable and that 
the ethnic situation exacerbated that vulnerability. Thus, the 
Akayev administration devoted much attention to creating a 
legal basis of governance while struggling to keep the economy 
afloat. 

In the first two years of his presidency, Akayev seemed to 
work effectively with the Supreme Soviet that had put him in 
office. By 1992, however, Akayev's good relations with the legis- 
lature had fallen victim to the rapidly declining economy, the 
failure of the CIS to become a functioning body, and the coun- 
try's inability to attract substantial assistance or investment 
from any of the potential foreign partners whom he had 
courted so assiduously. 

In advancing his reform programs, Akayev experienced par- 
ticular difficulties in gaining the cooperation of entrenched 
local politicians remaining from the communist government 
apparatus. To gain control of local administration, Akayev imi- 
tated the 1992 strategy of Russia's president Boris N. Yeltsin by 
appointing individuals to leadership positions at the province, 
district, and city levels (see Structure of Government, this ch.). 
Akayev filled about seventy such positions, the occupants of 
which were supposed to combine direct loyalty and responsibil- 
ity to the president with a zeal to improve conditions for their 
immediate locales. The system became a source of constant 
scandal and embarrassment for Akayev, however. The most fla- 
grant abuses came in Jalal-Abad Province (which had been split 
from neighboring Osh in spring 1991 to dilute political power 
in the south), where the new akim, the provincial governor, 
appointed members of his own family to the majority of the 
positions under his control and used state funds to acquire per- 
sonal property. The situation in Jalal-Abad aroused strong 
resentment and demonstrations that continued even after the 
governor had been forced to resign. 



116 



Kyrgyzstan 



In 1992 and 1993, the public perception grew that Akayev 
himself had provided a model for the tendency of local leaders 
to put family and clan interests above those of the nation. 
Indeed, several prominent national government officials, 
including the head of the internal security agency, the heads of 
the national bank and the national radio administration, the 
minister of foreign affairs, and the ambassador to Russia, came 
from Akayev's home area and from Talas, the home district of 
his wife. 

Akayev's loss of momentum was reflected in the debate over 
the national constitution, a first draft of which was passed by 
the Supreme Soviet in December 1992. Although draft versions 
had begun to circulate as early as the summer of 1992, the com- 
mission itself agreed on a definitive version only after pro- 
longed debate. An umbrella group of opposition figures from 
the DDK also began drawing up constitutional proposals in 
1992, two variations of which they put forward for public con- 
sideration. 

Although broad agreement existed on the outlines of the 
constitution, several specific points were difficult to resolve. 
One concerned the status of religion. Although it was agreed 
that the state would be secular, there was strong pressure for 
some constitutional recognition of the primacy of Islam. 
Another much-debated issue was the role of the Russian lan- 
guage. Kyrgyz had been declared the official state language, 
but non-Kyrgyz citizens exerted pressure to have Russian 
assigned near-equal status, as was the case in neighboring 
Kazakstan, where Russian had been declared the "official lan- 
guage of interethnic communication." The issue of property 
ownership was warmly debated, with strong sentiment 
expressed against permitting land to be owned or sold. 
Another important question was the role of the president 
within the new state structure. 

The proposed constitution was supposed to be debated by 
the full Supreme Soviet (as the new nation's parliament contin- 
ued to call itself after independence) and by a specially con- 
vened body of prominent citizens before its acceptance as law. 
However, some members of the democratic opposition argued 
that a special assembly of Kyrgyz elders, called a kuraltai, should 
be convened to consider the document. A final draft of the 
constitution was passed by the Supreme Soviet in May 1993, 
apparently without involvement of a kuraltai. 



117 



Country Studies 

In drafting a final document, the Supreme Soviet addressed 
some of the most controversial issues that had arisen in pre- 
draft discussions. Specific passages dealt with transfer and own- 
ership of property, the role of religion in the government, the 
powers of the president, and the official language of the coun- 
try (see Constitution, this ch.). 

Akayev had spoken of the need to have a presidential system 
of government — and, indeed, the constitution sets the presi- 
dency outside the three branches of government, to act as a 
sort of overseer ensuring the smooth functioning of all three. 
However, by the mid-1990s dissatisfaction with the strong presi- 
dential model of government and with the president himself 
was growing. With economic resources diminished, political 
infighting became commonplace. Although the prime minister 
and others received blame for controversial or unsuccessful 
policy initiatives, President Akayev nonetheless found himself 
increasingly isolated politically amid growing opposition 
forces. 

Although the "democratic" opposition that had helped 
bring Akayev to power had grown disenchanted, its constituent 
factions were unable to exert serious pressure on the president 
because they could not agree on ideology or strategy. In Octo- 
ber 1992, the main democratic opposition party Erk (Free- 
dom) fractured into two new parties, Erkin and Ata-Meken 
(Fatherland). More serious opposition originated within the 
ranks of the former communist elite. Some of this opposition 
came directly from the ranks of the reconstituted and still legal 
CPK (see Political Parties, this ch.). 

In January 1993, Akayev made an unusually harsh statement 
to the effect that he had been misled by his economic advisers 
and that Kyrgyzstan's overtures to the outside world had only 
raised false hopes. The continuing outflow of ethnic Russians 
(who constitute the greater part of Kyrgyzstan's technicians), 
the war in Tajikistan (which has driven refugees and "freedom 
fighters" into Kyrgyzstan), the growing evidence of wide-scale 
official corruption and incompetence, rising crime, and — 
more than anything else — the spectacular collapse of the econ- 
omy increasingly charged the country's political atmosphere in 
the first half of the 1990s. 

Physical Environment 

The smallest of the newly independent Central Asian states, 
Kyrgyzstan is about the same size as the state of Nebraska, with 



118 



Kyrgyzstan 



a total area of about 198,500 square kilometers. The national 
territory extends about 900 kilometers from east to west and 
410 kilometers from north to south. Kyrgyzstan is bordered on 
the southeast by China, on the north and west by Kazakstan, 
and on the south and west by Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. One 
consequence of the Stalinist division of Central Asia into five 
republics is that many ethnic Kyrgyz do not live in Kyrgyzstan. 
Three enclaves, legally part of the territory of Kyrgyzstan but 
geographically removed by several kilometers, have been estab- 
lished, two in Uzbekistan and one in Tajikistan (see fig. 8). The 
terrain of Kyrgyzstan is dominated by the Tian Shan and Pamir 
mountain systems, which together occupy about 65 percent of 
the national territory. The Alay range portion of the Tian Shan 
system dominates the southwestern crescent of the country, 
and, to the east, the main Tian Shan range runs along the 
boundary between southern Kyrgyzstan and China before 
extending farther east into China's Xinjiang Uygur Autono- 
mous Region. Kyrgyzstan's average elevation is 2,750 meters, 
ranging from 7,439 meters at Pik Pobedy (Mount Victory) to 
394 meters in the Fergana Valley near Osh. Almost 90 percent 
of the country lies more than 1,500 meters above sea level. 

Topography and Drainage 

The mountains of Kyrgyzstan are geologically young, so that 
the physical terrain is marked by sharply uplifted peaks sepa- 
rated by deep valleys (see fig. 9). There is also considerable gla- 
ciation. Kyrgyzstan's 6,500 distinct glaciers are estimated to 
hold about 650 billion cubic meters of water. Only around the 
Chu, Talas, and Fergana valleys is there relatively flat land suit- 
able for large-scale agriculture. 

Because the high peaks function as moisture catchers, Kyr- 
gyzstan is relatively well watered by the streams that descend 
from them. None of the rivers of Kyrgyzstan are navigable, 
however. The majority are small, rapid, runoff streams. Most of 
Kyrgyzstan's rivers are tributaries of the Syrdariya, which has its 
headwaters in the western Tian Shan along the Chinese border. 
Another large runoff system forms the Chu River, which arises 
in northern Kyrgyzstan, then flows northwest and disappears 
into the deserts of southern Kazakstan. Ysyk-K61 is the second 
largest body of water in Central Asia, after the Aral Sea, but the 
saline lake has been shrinking steadily, and its mineral content 
has been rising gradually. Kyrgyzstan has a total of about 2,000 
lakes with a total surface area of 7,000 square kilometers, 



119 



Countrs Studies 



mostly located at altitudes of 3,000 to 4.000 meters. Onlv the 
largest three, however, occupy more than 500 square kilome- 
ters. The second- and third-largest lakes, Songkol and Chatvr- 
K61 ( the latter of which also is saline), are located in the Xarvn 

Basin. 

Natural disasters have been frequent and varied. Overgraz- 
ing and deforestation of steep mountain slopes have increased 
the occurrence of mudslides and avalanches, which occasion- 
ally have swallowed entire villages. In August 1992, a severe 
earthquake left several thousand people homeless in the south- 
western city of Jalal-Abad. 

Climate 

The country's climate is influenced chiefly by the moun- 
tains, Kyrgyzstan's position near the middle of the Eurasian 
landmass. and the absence of anv bodv of water large enough 
to influence weather patterns. Those factors create a distinctly 
continental climate that has significant local variations. 
Although the mountains tend to collect clouds and block sun- 
light (reducing some narrow valleys at certain times of year to 
no more than three or four hours of sunlight per day), the 
country is generally sunny receiving as much as 2.900 hours of 
sunlight per vear in some areas. The same conditions also 
affect temperatures, which can vary significantly from place to 
place. In January the warmest average temperature (— 4°C) 
occurs around the southern citv of Osh, and around Ysyk-K61. 
The latter, which has a volume of 1,738 cubic kilometers, does 
not freeze in winter. Indeed, its name means "hot lake" in Kyr- 
gvz. The coldest temperatures are in mountain vallevs. There, 
readings can fall to -30"C or lower; the record is -53.6°C. The 
average temperature for July similarly varies from 27°C in the 
Fergana Yallev. where the record high is 44'C. to a low of -10°C 
on the highest mountain peaks. Precipitation varies from 2,000 
millimeters per vear in the mountains above the Fergana Valley 
to less than 100 millimeters per vear on the west bank of Ysvk- 
K61. 

Environmental Problems 

Kyrgyzstan has been spared many of the enormous environ- 
mental problems faced by its Central .Asian neighbors, prima- 
rily because its designated roles in the Soviet svstem involved 
neither heavy industry nor large-scale cotton production. Also, 
the economic downturn of the earlv 1990s reduced some of the 



120 



Boundary representation r 
necessarily authoritative I 



A 




fzgwe 9. Kyrgyzstan: Topog 



122 



Kyrgyzstan 



more serious effects of industrial and agricultural policy. Nev- 
ertheless, Kyrgyzstan has serious problems because of ineffi- 
cient use and pollution of water resources, land degradation, 
and improper agricultural practices. 

Water Resources 

Although Kyrgyzstan has abundant water running through 
it, its water supply is determined by a post-Soviet sharing agree- 
ment among the five Central Asian republics. As in the Soviet 
era, Kyrgyzstan has the right to 25 percent of the water that 
originates in its territory, but the new agreement allows Turk- 
menistan and Uzbekistan unlimited use of the water that flows 
into them from Kyrgyzstan, with no compensation for the 
nation at the source. Kyrgyzstan uses the entire amount to 
which the agreement entitles it, but utilization is skewed 
heavily in favor of agricultural irrigation. In 1994 agriculture 
accounted for about 88 percent of total water consumption, 
compared with 8 percent by industry and 4 percent by munici- 
pal water distribution systems. According to World Bank (see 
Glossary) experts, Kyrgyzstan has an adequate supply of high- 
quality water for future use, provided the resource is prudently 
managed. 

Irrigation is extremely wasteful of water because the distribu- 
tion infrastructure is old and poorly maintained. In 1993 only 
an estimated 5 percent of required maintenance expenditures 
was allocated. Overall, an estimated 70 percent of the nation's 
water supply network is in need of repair or replacement. The 
quality of drinking water from this aging system is poorly moni- 
tored — the water management staff has been cut drastically 
because of inadequate funds. Further, there is no money to buy 
new water disinfection equipment when it is needed. Some 
aquifers near industrial and mining centers have been contam- 
inated by heavy metals, oils, and sanitary wastes. In addition, 
many localities rely on surface sources, making users vulnera- 
ble to agricultural runoff and livestock waste, which seep grad- 
ually downward from the surface. The areas of lowest water 
quality are the heavily populated regions of the Chu Valley and 
Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces, and areas along the rivers flow- 
ing into Ysyk-K61. 

In towns, wastewater collection provides about 70 percent of 
the water supply. Although towns have biological treatment 
equipment, as much as 50 percent of such equipment is rated 
as ineffective. The major sources of toxic waste in the water 



123 



Country Studies 

supply are the mercury mining combine at Haidarkan; the 
antimony mine at Kadamzai; the Kadzyi Sai uranium mine, 
which ceased extraction in 1967 but which continues to leach 
toxic materials into nearby Ysyk K61; the Kara-Balta Uranium 
Recovery Plant; the Min Kush deposit of mine tailings; and the 
Kyrgyz Mining and Metallurgy Plant at Orlovka. 

Land Management 

The most important problems in land use are soil erosion 
and salinization in improperly irrigated farmland. An esti- 
mated 60 percent of Kyrgyzstan's land is affected by topsoil loss, 
and 6 percent by salinization, both problems with more serious 
long-term than short-term effects. In 1994 the size of livestock 
herds averaged twice the carrying capacity of pasturage land, 
continuing the serious overgrazing problem and consequent 
soil erosion that began when the herds were at their peak in 
the late 1980s (see Agriculture, this ch.). Uncertain land ten- 
ure and overall financial insecurity have caused many private 
farmers to concentrate their capital in the traditional form — 
livestock — thus subjecting new land to the overgrazing prob- 
lem. 

The inherent land shortage in Kyrgyzstan is exacerbated by 
the flooding of agricultural areas for hydroelectric projects. 
The creation of Toktogol Reservoir on the Naryn River, for 
example, involved the flooding of 13,000 hectares of fertile 
land. Such projects have the additional effect of constricting 
downstream water supply; Toktogol deprives the lower reaches 
of the Syrdariya in Uzbekistan and the Aral Sea Basin of sub- 
stantial amounts of water. Because the Naryn Basin, where 
many hydroelectric projects are located, is very active seismi- 
cally, flooding is also a danger should a dam be broken by an 
earthquake. Several plants are now in operation in zones where 
Richter Scale readings may reach eleven. 

The Aral Sea 

In response to the internationally recognized environmental 
crisis of the rapid desiccation of the Aral Sea, the five states 
sharing the Aral Sea Basin (Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are developing a strategy to 
end the crisis. The World Bank and agencies of the United 
Nations (UN) have developed an Aral Sea Program, the first 
stage of which is funded by the five countries and external 
donors. That stage has seven areas of focus, one of which — 



124 



Kyrgyzstan 



land and water management in the upper watersheds — is of 
primary concern to Kyrgyzstan. Among the conditions detri- 
mental to the Aral Sea's environment are erosion from defores- 
tation and overgrazing, contamination from poorly managed 
irrigation systems, and uncontrolled waste from mining and 
municipal effluents. Kyrgyzstan's National Environmental 
Action Plan (NEAP) has addressed these problems as part of its 
first-phase priorities in cooperation with the Aral Sea Program. 

Environmental Policy Making 

The NEAP, adopted in 1994, is the basic blueprint for envi- 
ronmental protection. The plan focuses on solving a small 
number of critical problems, collecting reliable information to 
aid in that process, and integrating environmental measures 
with economic and social development strategy. The initial 
planning period is to end in 1997. The main targets of that 
phase are inefficient water resource management, land degra- 
dation, overexploitation of forest reserves, loss of biodiversity, 
and pollution from inefficient mining and refining practices. 

Because of severe budget constraints, most of the funds for 
NEAP operations come from international sources, including 
official institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank and numerous international nongovern- 
mental organizations. Implementation is guided by a commit- 
tee of state ministers and by a NEAP Expert Working Group, 
both established in 1994 by executive order. A NEAP office in 
Bishkek was set up with funds from Switzerland. 

The main environmental protection agency of the Kyr- 
gyzstani government is the State Committee on Environmental 
Protection, still known by its Soviet-era acronym, Goskompri- 
roda. Established by the old regime in 1988, the agency's post- 
Soviet responsibilities have been described in a series of 
decrees beginning in 1991. In 1994 the state committee had a 
central office in Bishkek, one branch in each of the seven prov- 
inces, and a total staff of about 150 persons. Because of poorly 
defined lines of responsibility, administrative conflicts often 
occur between local and national authorities of Goskompri- 
roda and between Goskompriroda and a second national 
agency, the Hydrometeorological Administration (Gidromet), 
which is the main monitoring agency for air, water, and soil 
quality. In general, the vertical hierarchy structure, a relic of 
Soviet times, has led to poor coordination and duplication of 
effort among environmental protection agencies. 



125 



Country Studies 



Population 

The population of Kyrgyzstan is divided among three main 
groups: the indigenous Kyrgyz, the Russians who remained 
after the end of the Soviet Union, and a large and concen- 
trated Uzbek population. Topography divides the population 
into two main segments, the north and the south. Each has dif- 
fering cultural and economic patterns and different predomi- 
nant ethnic groups. 

Demographic Characteristics 

The censuses of 1979 and 1989 indicated annual population 
growth of a little over 2 percent, with a birth rate of 30.4 per 
1,000 in 1989. The estimated birth rate in 1994 was twenty-six 
per 1,000, the death rate seven per 1,000, with a rate of natural 
increase of 1.9 percent (see table 2, Appendix). In 1993 aver- 
age life expectancy was estimated at sixty-two years for males, 
seventy years for females — the second lowest rate among the 
former Soviet republics. In 1993 the infant mortality rate was 
estimated at 47.8 deaths per 1,000 live births. Early marriage 
and large family size have combined to make Kyrgyzstan's pop- 
ulation a relatively young one. In 1989, some 39.5 percent of 
the population was below working age, and only 10.1 percent 
was of pension age. The 1989 census indicated that only about 
38 percent of the country's population was urbanized (see 
table 3, Appendix). 

Ethnic Groups 

In 1993 the population of Kyrgyzstan was estimated at 4.46 
million, of whom 56.5 percent were ethnic Kyrgyz, 18.8 percent 
were Russians, 12.9 percent were Uzbeks, 2.1 percent were 
Ukrainians, and 1.0 percent were Germans (see table 4, Appen- 
dix). The rest of the population was composed of about eighty 
other nationalities. Of some potential political significance are 
the Uygurs. That group numbers only about 36,000 in Kyr- 
gyzstan, but about 185,000 live in neighboring Kazakstan. The 
Uygurs are also the majority population in the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region of China, whose population is about 15 
million, located to the northeast of Kyrgyzstan. In November 
1992, the Uygurs in Kyrgyzstan attempted to form a party call- 
ing for establishment of an independent Uygurstan that also 
would include the Chinese-controlled Uygur territory. The 
Ministry of Justice denied the group legal registration. 



126 



Kyrgyzstan 



Between 1989 and 1993, a significant number of non-Kyrgyz 
citizens left the republic, although no census was taken in the 
early 1990s to quantify the resulting balances among ethnic 
groups. A considerable portion of this exodus consisted of Ger- 
mans repatriating to Germany, more than 8,000 of whom left 
in 1992 alone. According to reports, more than 30,000 Rus- 
sians left the Bishkek area in the early 1990s, presumably for 
destinations outside Kyrgyzstan. In 1992 and 1993, refugees 
from the civil war in Tajikistan moved into southern Kyr- 
gyzstan. In 1989 about 64,000 Kyrgyz were living in Tajikistan, 
and about 175,000 were living in Uzbekistan. Reliable estimates 
of how many of these people subsequently returned to Kyr- 
gyzstan have not been available. 

The Fergana Valley, which eastern Kyrgyzstan shares with 
Central Asian neighbors Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, is one of 
the most densely populated and agriculturally most heavily 
exploited regions in Central Asia. As such, it has been the point 
of bitter contention among the three adjoining states, both 
before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Members of 
the various ethnic groups who have inhabited the valley for 
centuries have managed to get along largely because they 
occupy slightly different economic niches. The sedentary 
Uzbeks and Tajiks traditionally have farmed lower-lying irri- 
gated land while the nomadic Kyrgyz have herded in the moun- 
tains. However, the potential for ethnic conflict is ever present. 
Because the borders of the three countries zigzag without evi- 
dent regard for the nationality of the people living in the valley, 
many residents harbor strong irredentist feelings, believing 
that they should more properly be citizens of a different coun- 
try. Few Europeans live in the Fergana Valley, but about 
552,000 Uzbeks, almost the entire population of that people in 
Kyrgyzstan, reside there in crowded proximity with about 1.2 
million Kyrgyz. 

Geographic Factors 

Population statistics depict only part of the demographic sit- 
uation in Kyrgyzstan. Because of the country's mountainous 
terrain, population tends to be concentrated in relatively small 
areas in the north and south, each of which contains about two 
million people. About two-thirds of the total population live in 
the Fergana, Talas, and Chu valleys. As might be expected, 
imbalances in population distribution lead to extreme con- 
trasts in how people live and work. In the north, the Chu Valley, 



127 



Country Studies 



site of Bishkek, the capital, is the major economic center, pro- 
ducing about 45 percent of the nation's gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary). The Chu Valley also is where most of the 
country's Europeans live, mainly because of economic oppor- 
tunities. The ancestors of today's Russian and German popula- 
tion began to move into the fertile valley to farm at the end of 
the nineteenth century. There was a subsequent influx of Rus- 
sians during World War II, when industrial resources and per- 
sonnel were moved en masse out of European Russia to 
prevent their capture by the invading Germans. In the era of 
Soviet First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, a deliberate develop- 
ment policy brought another in-migration. Bishkek is slightly 
more than 50 percent Kyrgyz, and the rest of the valley retains 
approximately that ethnic ratio. In the mid-1990s, observers 
expected that balance to change quickly, however, as Europe- 
ans continued to move out while rural Kyrgyz moved in, set- 
tling in the numerous shantytowns springing up around 
Bishkek. The direct distance from Bishkek in the far north to 
Osh in the southwest is slightly more than 300 kilometers, but 
the mountain road connecting those cities requires a drive of 
more than ten hours in summer conditions; in winter the high 
mountain passes are often closed. In the Soviet period, most 
travel between north and south was by airplane, but fuel short- 
ages that began after independence have greatly limited the 
number of flights, increasing a tendency toward separation of 
north and south (see Topography and Drainage; Transporta- 
tion and Telecommunications, this ch.). 

The separation of the north and the south is clearly visible in 
the cultural mores of the two regions, although both are domi- 
nated by ethnic Kyrgyz. Society in the Fergana Valley is much 
more traditional than in the Chu Valley, and the practice of 
Islam is more pervasive. The people of the Chu Valley are 
closely integrated with Kazakstan (Bishkek is but four hours by 
car from Almaty, the capital of Kazakstan). The people of the 
south are more oriented, by location and by culture, to Uzbeki- 
stan, Iran, Afghanistan, and the other Muslim countries to the 
south. 

Geographical isolation also has meant that the northern and 
southern Kyrgyz have developed fairly distinct lifestyles. Those 
in the north tend to be nomadic herders; those in the south 
have acquired more of the sedentary agricultural ways of their 
Uygur, Uzbek, and Tajik neighbors. Both groups came to 
accept Islam late, but practice in the north tends to be much 



128 



Kyrgyzstan 



less influenced by Islamic doctrine and reflects considerable 
influence from pre-Islamic animist beliefs. The southerners 
have a more solid basis of religious knowledge and practice. It 
is they who pushed for a greater religious element in the 1993 
constitution (see Religion, this ch.). 

Society and Culture 

The ethnic identity of the Kyrgyz has been strongly linked to 
their language and to ethnic traditions, both of which have 
been guarded with particular zeal once independence pro- 
vided an opportunity to make national policy on these matters. 
Less formally, the Kyrgyz people have maintained with unusual 
single-mindedness many elements of social structure and a 
sense of their common past. The name Kyrgyz derives from the 
Turkic kyrk plus yz, a combination meaning "forty clans." 

Language 

In the period after A.D. 840, the Kyrgyz joined other Turkic 
groups in an overall Turkification pattern extending across the 
Tian Shan into the Tarim River basin, east of present-day Kyr- 
gyzstan's border with China. In this process, which lasted for 
more than two centuries, the Kyrgyz tribes became mixed with 
other tribes, thoroughly absorbing Turkic cultural and linguis- 
tic characteristics. 

The forebears of the present-day Kyrgyz are believed to have 
been either southern Samoyed or Yeniseyan tribes. Those 
tribes came into contact with Turkic culture after they con- 
quered the Uygurs and settled the Orkhon area, site of the old- 
est recorded Turkic language, in the ninth century (see Early 
History, this ch.). If descended from the Samoyed tribes of 
Siberia, the Kyrgyz would have spoken a language in the Uralic 
linguistic subfamily when they arrived in Orkhon; if descended 
from Yeniseyan tribes, they would have descended from a peo- 
ple of the same name who began to move into the area of 
present-day Kyrgyzstan from the Yenisey River region of central 
Siberia in the tenth century, after the Kyrgyz conquest of the 
Uygurs to the east in the preceding century. Ethnographers 
dispute the Yeniseyan origin, however, because of the very close 
cultural and linguistic connections between the Kyrgyz and the 
Kazaks (see Early Tribal Movement; Ethnic Groups, ch. 1). 

In the period of tsarist administration (1876-1917), the 
Kazaks and the Kyrgyz both were called Kyrgyz, with what are 



129 



Country Studies 

now the Kyrgyz subdenominated when necessary as Kara-Kyr- 
gyz (black Kyrgyz). Although the Kyrgyz language has more 
Mongolian and Altaic elements than does Kazak, the modern 
forms of the two languages are very similar. As they exist today, 
both are part of the Nogai group of the Kipchak division of the 
Turkic languages, which belong to the Uralic-Altaic language 
family. The modern Kyrgyz language did not have a written 
form until 1923, at which time an Arabic-based alphabet was 
used. That was changed to a Latin-based alphabet in 1928 and 
to a Cyrillic-based one in 1940. In the years immediately follow- 
ing independence, another change of alphabet was discussed, 
but the issue does not seem to generate the same passions in 
Kyrgyzstan that it does in other former Soviet republics (see 
National Identity, ch. 1; Culture and the Arts, ch. 3; The Spo- 
ken Language, ch. 4; The Written Language, ch. 4; Language 
and Literature, ch. 5). 

One important difference between Kyrgyzstan and Kazak- 
stan is that the Kyrgyz people's mastery of their own language is 
almost universal, whereas the linguistic phase of national iden- 
tity is not as clear in the much larger area and population of 
Kazakstan (see Language, ch. 1). As in Kazakstan, mastery of 
the "titular" language among the resident Europeans of Kyr- 
gyzstan is very rare. In the early 1990s, the Akayev government 
pursued an aggressive policy of introducing Kyrgyz as the offi- 
cial language, forcing the remaining European population to 
use Kyrgyz in most public situations. Public pressure to enforce 
this change was sufficiently strong that a Russian member of 
President Akayev's staff created a public scandal in 1992 by 
threatening to resign to dramatize the pressure for "Kyrgyzifi- 
cation" of the non-native population. A 1992 law called for the 
conduct of all public business to be converted fully to Kyrgyz by 
1997. But in March 1996, Kyrgyzstan's parliament adopted a 
resolution making Russian an official state language alongside 
Kyrgyz and marking a reversal of earlier sentiment. Substantial 
pressure from Russia was a strong factor in this change, which 
was part of a general rapprochement with Russia urged by 
Akayev. 

Ethnic Traditions 

The Kyrgyz also have retained a strong sense of cultural tra- 
dition. Figures from the 1989 Soviet census show that Kyrgyz 
males were the least likely of the men of any Soviet nationality 
to marry outside their people (only 6.1 percent of their mar- 



130 



Falconer wearing traditional kalpak (hat) and coat 
woman baking little breads in traditional adobe oven 

Courtesy Hermine Dreyfus s 



131 



Country Studies 

riages were "international") and that Kyrgyz women did so in 
only 5.8 percent of marriages. Moreover, although the degree 
of such changes is difficult to measure, Kyrgyz "mixed" mar- 
riages seem uncommonly likely to assimilate in the direction of 
a Kyrgyz identity, with the non-Kyrgyz spouse learning the Kyr- 
gyz language and the children assuming the Kyrgyz nationality. 
Even ordinary citizens are thoroughly familiar with the Kyrgyz 
oral epic, Manas, a poem of several hundred thousand lines 
(many versions are recited) telling of the eponymous Kyrgyz 
hero's struggles against invaders from the east. Many places 
and things in Kyrgyzstan, including the main airport, bear the 
name of this ancient hero, the one-thousandth anniversary of 
whose mythical adventures were cause for great national cele- 
bration in 1995. 

Social Structure 

The age-old geographic separation of pockets of the Kyrgyz 
population has tended to reinforce conservatism in all of the 
country's society. The modern Kyrgyz still apply great signifi- 
cance to family and clan origins. The majority of Kyrgyz contin- 
ued a nomadic lifestyle until the Soviet campaigns of forcible 
collectivization forced them first into transitional settlements 
and then into cities and towns or state and collective farms in 
the 1930s. Within the centralized farm systems, however, many 
Kyrgyz continued to move seasonally with their herds. There 
has been strong resistance to industrial employment. 

Clans 

Kyrgyz identity in public and private life is said to be deter- 
mined primarily by membership in one of three clan groupings 
known as "wings" (right, or ong; left, or sol; and ichkilik, which is 
neither) and secondarily by membership in a particular clan 
within a wing. The history of this grouping is unknown, 
although several legends explain the phenomenon. The left 
wing now includes seven clans in the north and west. Each of 
the seven has a dominant characteristic, and all have fought 
each other for influence. The Buguu warrior clan provided the 
first administrators of the Kyrgyz Republic under the Soviet 
Union; when the purges of Stalin eradicated their leaders in 
the 1930s, their place was taken by a second northern warrior 
clan, the Sarybagysh, who have provided most Kyrgyz leaders 
since that time, including Akayev. The right wing contains only 
one clan, the Adygine. Located in the south, the Adygine are 



132 



Kyrgyzstan 



considered the most genuinely Kyrgyz clan because of their leg- 
endary heritage. The southern Ichkilik is a group of many 
clans, some of which are not of Kyrgyz origin, but all of which 
claim Kyrgyz identity in the present. 

Acutely aware of the roles each of the clans traditionally has 
played, the Kyrgyz are still very conscious of clan membership 
in competing for social and economic advantage. Support for 
fellow clan members is especially strong in the northern prov- 
inces. Kyrgyz men frequently wear traditional black-on-white 
felt headgear, which informs others of their clan status and the 
degree of respect to be accorded them. Larger clans are subdi- 
vided by origin and by the nobility of their ancestors; although 
there is no prohibition of advancement for those of non-noble 
descent, descent from a high-born extended family still is con- 
sidered a social advantage. 

Like other Central Asian groups, the Kyrgyz venerate history 
and see themselves as part of a long flow of events. A traditional 
requirement is the ability to name all the people in the previ- 
ous seven generations of one's family. Clan identity extends this 
tradition even further, to the legendary origins of the Kyrgyz 
people. Kyrgyz clans are said to spring from "first fathers," most 
of whom appear in both oral legends and in history. Clan his- 
tory and genealogy are entrusted to tribal elders, whose ongo- 
ing knowledge of those subjects makes falsification of lineage 
difficult. Because clan identity remains an important element 
of social status, however, Kyrgyz do sometimes claim to have 
descended from a higher branch of their clan than is actually 
the case. 

Domestic Life 

The Kyrgyz are classified as nomadic pastoralists, meaning 
that they traditionally have herded sheep, horses, or yaks, fol- 
lowing the animals up and down the mountains as the seasons 
change. The basic dwelling is the yurt, a cylindrical felt tent eas- 
ily disassembled and mounted on a camel or horse. The image 
of a yurt's circular smoke opening is the central design of Kyr- 
gyzstan's flag. Various parts of the yurt have ritual significance. 
Because the herding economy continues in many parts of the 
country, the yurt remains a strong symbol of national identity. 
Families living in Western-style dwellings erect yurts to cele- 
brate weddings and funerals. 

Traditional domestic life centers on the flocks. The diet of 
the nomads is limited to mutton and noodles; fruit and vegeta- 



133 



Country Studies 



bles are rare even in today's Kyrgyz cuisine. The most tradi- 
tional dishes are besh barmak, a mutton stew, and roast lamb. 
For ceremonial meals, the lamb is killed without spilling its 
blood, and the head is served to the guest of honor, who slices 
portions of the eyes and ears and presents them to other guests 
to improve their sight and hearing. Horsemeat is eaten fresh 
and in sausages. Traditional beverages are kumys, fermented 
mare's milk, and two varieties of beer. 

Family traditions continue to demonstrate the patriarchal 
and feudal character of a nomadic people. Family relations are 
characterized by great respect for older family members and 
the dominance of male heads of households. Traditional cele- 
brations of special events retain the markings of religious and 
magical rites. For example, the cutting of a child's umbilical 
cord is celebrated with elaborate consumption of food and 
humorous games. The naming of a child and the cutting of the 
child's hair are conducted in such away as to appease supernat- 
ural forces. The full observance of the most important family 
event, the wedding celebration, requires considerable expense 
that relatively few Kyrgyz can afford: payment for a bride, 
dowry, animal sacrifice, and an exchange of clothing between 
the relatives of the bride and the groom. 

The Role of Women 

In traditional Kyrgyz society, women had assigned roles, 
although only the religious elite sequestered women as was 
done in other Muslim societies. Because of the demands of the 
nomadic economy, women worked as virtual equals with men, 
having responsibility for chores such as milking as well as child- 
rearing and the preparation and storage of food. In the ordi- 
nary family, women enjoyed approximately equal status with 
their husbands. Kyrgyz oral literature includes the story of 
Janyl-myrza, a young woman who led her tribe to liberation 
from the enemy when no man in the tribe could do so. In the 
nineteenth century, the wife of Khan Almyn-bek led a group of 
Kyrgyz tribes at the time of the Russian conquest of Quqon. 

In modern times, especially in the first years of indepen- 
dence, women have played more prominent roles in Kyrgyzstan 
than elsewhere in Central Asia. Since 1991 women have occu- 
pied the positions of state procurator (the top law enforcement 
official in the national government), minister of education, 
ambassador to the United States and Canada, and minister of 
foreign affairs. Women have also excelled in banking and busi- 



134 



Kyrgyzstan 



ness, and the editor of Central Asia's most independent news- 
paper, Respublika, is a woman. Roza Otunbayeva, who was 
minister of foreign affairs in 1996, has been mentioned fre- 
quently as a successor to Akayev. 

Contemporary Culture 

As the capital of a Soviet republic, Bishkek (which until 1990 
had been named Frunze after the Soviet general who led the 
military conquest of the Basmachi rebels in the mid-1920s) was 
endowed with the standard cultural facilities, including an 
opera, ballet, several theater companies, and an orchestra, as 
well as a Lenin museum, national art and craft museums, and 
an open-air sculpture museum. Since independence, funding 
for those institutions has decreased dramatically, and the cul- 
tural facilities have also been hard hit by the departure of local 
Russians. It also is unclear whether younger Kyrgyz will con- 
tinue their parents' substantial interest in classical music, which 
in the Soviet era led several generations to support the national 
orchestra. 

In the Soviet-directed propagation of "all-union culture," 
Kyrgyz actors, directors, and dancers achieved fame through- 
out the Soviet Union. Chingiz Aitmatov, the republic's most 
prominent writer, became one of the best-known and most 
independent artists in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The Kyr- 
gyz film industry, which had been very productive while sup- 
ported by Soviet government funds, essentially vanished after 
1991. Film projects that survive, such as a large-scale produc- 
tion on the life of Chinggis Khan directed by noted Kyrgyz 
director T. Okeyev, do so through foreign financing (an Italian 
film company has supported production of the Okeyev film). 

Perhaps the best indicator of the condition of the fine arts in 
postcommunist Kyrgyzstan is the fate of the open-air sculpture 
museum in Bishkek, which began suffering a series of thefts in 
early 1993. Because the targets were all bronze, presumably the 
sculptures were stolen for their value as metal, not as art. When 
a large statuary group commemorating Aitmatov's Ysyk-K61 
Forum (a notable product of the early glasnost period) disap- 
peared, the museum's remaining statues were removed to a 
more secure location. 

Religion 

The vast majority of today's Kyrgyz are Muslims of the Sunni 



135 



Country Studies 



(see Glossary) branch, but Islam came late and fairly superfi- 
cially to the area. Kyrgyz Muslims generally practice their reli- 
gion in a specific way influenced by earlier tribal customs. The 
practice of Islam also differs in the northern and southern 
regions of the country. Kyrgyzstan remained a secular state 
after the fall of communism, which had only superficial influ- 
ence on religious practice when Kyrgyzstan was a Soviet repub- 
lic. Most of the Russian population of Kyrgyzstan is atheist or 
Russian Orthodox. The Uzbeks, who make up 12.9 percent of 
the population, are generally Sunni Muslims. 

The Introduction of Islam 

Islam was introduced to the Kyrgyz tribes between the ninth 
and twelfth centuries. The most intense exposure to Islam 
occurred in the seventeenth century, when the Jungars drove 
the Kyrgyz of the Tian Shan region into the Fergana Valley, 
whose population was totally Islamic. However, as the danger 
from the Jungars subsided and Kyrgyz groups returned to their 
previous region, the influence of Islam became weaker. When 
the Quqon Khanate conquered the territory of the Kyrgyz in 
the eighteenth century, the nomadic Kyrgyz remained aloof 
from the official Islamic practices of that regime. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, however, most of the Kyrgyz popula- 
tion had been converted to at least a superficial recognition of 
Islamic practice. 

Tribal Religion 

Alongside Islam the Kyrgyz tribes also practiced totemism, 
the recognition of spiritual kinship with a particular type of 
animal. Under this belief system, which predated their contact 
with Islam, Kyrgyz tribes adopted reindeer, camels, snakes, 
owls, and bears as objects of worship. The sun, moon, and stars 
also played an important religious role. The strong depen- 
dence of the nomads on the forces of nature reinforced such 
connections and fostered belief in shamanism (the power of 
tribal healers and magicians with mystical connections to the 
spirit world) and black magic as well. Traces of such beliefs 
remain in the religious practice of many of today's Kyrgyz. 

Knowledge of and interest in Islam are said to be much 
stronger in the south, especially around Osh, than farther 
north. Religious practice in the north is more heavily mixed 
with animism (belief that every animate and inanimate object 



136 



Gate leading to prayer house on 
Suleyman' s Mountain, Osh 
Courtesy Lisa Batey 



New mosque under 
construction, Naryn 
Courtesy RurieE. Miller 



contains a spirit) and shamanist practices, giving worship there 
a resemblance to Siberian religious practice. 

Islam and the State 

Religion has not played an especially large role in the poli- 
tics of Kyrgyzstan, although more traditional elements of soci- 
ety urged that the Muslim heritage of the country be 
acknowledged in the preamble to the 1993 constitution. That 
document mandates a secular state, forbidding the intrusion of 
any ideology or religion in the conduct of state business. As in 
other parts of Central Asia, non-Central Asians have been con- 
cerned about the potential of a fundamentalist Islamic revolu- 
tion that would emulate Iran and Afghanistan by bringing 
Islam directly into the making of state policy, to the detriment 
of the non-Islamic population. Because of sensitivity about the 
economic consequences of a continued outflow of Russians, 
President Akayev has taken particular pains to reassure the 
non-Kyrgyz that no Islamic revolution threatens (see Ethnic 
Groups, this ch.). Akayev has paid public visits to Bishkek's 



137 



Country Studies 

main Russian Orthodox church and directed 1 million rubles 
from the state treasury toward that faith's church-building 
fund. He has also appropriated funds and other support for a 
German cultural center. The state officially recognizes Ortho- 
dox Christmas (but not Easter) as a holiday, while also noting 
two Muslim feast days, Oroz ait (which ends Ramadan) and 
Kurban ait (June 13, the Day of Remembrance), and Muslim 
New Year, which falls on the vernal equinox. 

Education 

In the mid-1990s, much of the Soviet-era education system 
remained in Kyrgyzstan, which had made a conscientious effort 
to educate all of its citizens before 1991 and continued to do so 
after that date. Substantial structural and curriculum changes 
were underway by 1995, however. The 1993 constitution con- 
tinues the Soviet guarantee of free basic education at state insti- 
tutions to all citizens; education is compulsory through grade 
nine. Free education at the vocational, secondary specialized, 
and higher levels also continues to be offered by the state to 
qualified individuals. The fundamentals of post-Soviet educa- 
tion policy were enumerated in the 1992 law on education, 
which established the Ministry of Education as the central 
administrative body of the national system. Although Soviet-era 
statistics indicated that 100 percent of the people between the 
ages of nine and forty-nine were literate, the actual literacy rate 
probably is somewhat less. 

Education System 

Once independence was achieved, the Ministry of Education 
began working energetically to revamp the old Soviet course of 
study. The ministry is responsible for developing curriculum, 
setting national standards and educational policy, developing 
certification examinations, and awarding degrees. The minis- 
try is divided into departments for general education, higher 
education, and material support. Below the ministry level, the 
education hierarchy includes the six provinces and the sepa- 
rate city of Bishkek, representatives from each of which provide 
input to the ministry on local conditions. The level of basic 
local administration is the district (rayon), where the district 
education officer hires faculty and appoints school inspectors 
and methodology specialists. 



138 



Kindergarten for children of government officials, Bishkek 

Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 

General education is financed from district budgets, and the 
college preparatory and higher education programs are 
financed by the national budget. For the former category of 
expenditures, school principals negotiate their requirements 
with district officials, but the central government sets norms 
based on previous expenditures and on the relative resources 
of the provinces. In the last years of the Soviet period, Kyr- 
gyzstani schools had a surplus of money, but available funds 
declined sharply beginning in 1992. Since that time, insuffi- 
cient funds in local budgets have forced the Ministry of Educa- 
tion to make special requests for support from the Ministry of 
Economics and Finance. 

Instruction 

General education traditionally has been accessible to nearly 
all children in Kyrgyzstan. In primary and secondary grades, 



139 



Country Studies 



about 51 percent of students are female; that number increases 
to 55 percent in higher education, with a converse majority of 
males in vocational programs. There is little difference in 
school attendance between urban and rural areas or among 
the provinces. Higher education, however, has been much 
more available to the urban and more wealthy segments of the 
population. Because of a shortage of schools, 37 percent of 
general education students attend schools operating in two or 
three shifts. Construction of new facilities has lagged behind 
enrollment growth, the rate of which has been nearly 3 percent 
per year. 

In line with the reform of 1992, children start school at age 
six and are required to complete grade nine. The general edu- 
cation program has three stages: grades one through four, 
grades five through nine, and grades ten and eleven. Students 
completing grade nine may continue into advanced or special- 
ized (college preparatory) secondary curricula or into a tech- 
nical and vocational program. The school year is thirty-four 
weeks long, extending from the beginning of September until 
the end of May. The instruction week is twenty-five hours long 
for grades one through four and thirty-two hours for grades 
five through eleven. In 1992 about 960,000 students were 
enrolled in general education courses, 42,000 in specialized 
secondary programs, 49,000 in vocational programs, and 
58,000 in institutions of higher education. About 1,800 schools 
were in operation in 1992. That year Kyrgyzstan's state system 
had about 65,000 teachers, but an estimated 8,000 teachers 
resigned in 1992 alone because of poor salaries and a heavy 
work load that included double shifts for many. Emigration 
also has depleted the teaching staff. In 1993 the national pupil- 
teacher ratio for grades one through eleven was 14.4 to 1, 
slightly higher in rural areas, and considerably higher in the 
primary grades. The city of Bishkek, however, had a ratio of 
almost 19 to 1. 

Curriculum 

Post-Soviet curriculum reform has aroused much contro- 
versy in Kyrgyzstan. A fundamental question is the language of 
instruction, which has become increasingly Kyrgyz as non- 
indigenous citizens leave the country and textbooks in Kyrgyz 
slowly become available. The Ministry of Education has held 
competitions, supported by foreign donations, for the design 
of new textbooks in Kyrgyz. Until 1992 textbook production 



140 



Kyrgyzstan 



and distribution were inefficient and costly aspects of the edu- 
cation system. By the mid-1990s, the single, state-supported 
publisher of textbooks had gradually improved the quality and 
availability of its products. In 1992 the first major curriculum 
reform provided for mandatory foreign language study 
(English, French, or German) beginning in grade one; com- 
puter science courses in grades eight through eleven (a pro- 
gram hampered by lack of funds); and the replacement of 
Soviet ideology with concepts of market economy and ethnic 
studies. The reformed curriculum requirements also leave 
room for elective courses, and instructional innovation is 
encouraged. 

Higher Education 

In 1994 Kyrgyzstan had twenty-six institutions of higher 
learning, all but seven of which were located in Bishkek. Seven 
of the institutions were private and the remainder state-funded. 
Approximately 4,700 faculty were employed there, of which 
only 150 had doctoral degrees and 1,715 were candidates, the 
step below the doctorate in the Soviet system. The language of 
instruction remained predominantly Russian in the mid-1990s, 
although the use of Kyrgyz increased yearly. Long-term plans 
call for a more Western style of university study, so that, for 
example, the universities would begin to offer a baccalaureate 
degree. In 1992 President Akayev created a Slavic University in 
Bishkek to help Kyrgyzstan retain its population of educated 
Russians, for whom the increased "Kyrgyzification" of educa- 
tion was a reason to emigrate. Because Russian students from 
outside the Russian Federation had lost their Soviet-era right to 
free education in Russian universities, Akayev hoped to provide 
a Russian-language institution for Russian-speaking students 
from all the Central Asian states. The shortage of education 
funds in Kyrgyzstan brought strong objections to a project that 
did not promote the education of ethnic Kyrgyz students, how- 
ever. 

Health and Welfare 

In 1993 the World Bank reported that the population of Kyr- 
gyzstan enjoyed better health care than most other countries 
with similar per capita income, which averaged US$3,410 per 
year for Kyrgyzstan's category in 1992. The current health con- 
ditions and health prospects of Kyrgyzstan's population are dif- 



141 



Country Studies 

ficult to calculate, however, because of the sudden change that 
independence visited upon the medical community. Until 1991 
Kyrgyzstan's medical system was financed through the Soviet 
Union's Ministry of Health, which guaranteed a health estab- 
lishment equal to that of other Soviet republics. With the disso- 
lution of the Soviet Union and the slow collapse of fiscal ties 
between Kyrgyzstan and Moscow, the medical community has 
inherited an aging but generally adequate physical plant. How- 
ever, the system often lacks the vaccines, medicines, and other 
resources needed to maintain the health of the population. 

Health Care System 

Kyrgyzstan inherited the Soviet system of free universal 
health care, which in Kyrgyzstan's case generally provided suffi- 
cient numbers of doctors, nurses, and doctor's assistants, as 
well as medical clinics and hospitals. However, since 1991 citi- 
zens often have received inadequate care because medical per- 
sonnel are not well trained; pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, 
and equipment are insufficient; and facilities are generally 
inadequate and unsanitary. 

In 1991 Kyrgyzstan had 15,354 doctors, or 34.2 per 10,000 
people. Paramedical workers totaled 42,448, or 94.6 per 10,000 
people. Some 588 outpatient clinics were in operation, averag- 
ing 139 hours of patient visits per eight-hour shift. In addition, 
246 general and twenty specialized hospitals were in operation; 
nearly one-third of all hospitals were located in Osh Province 
(which also had about one-third of the country's total popula- 
tion). By contrast, the capital city, Bishkek, had the fewest hos- 
pital facilities per capita of all regions, providing 1.55 general 
hospitals per 100,000 population. Like other Central Asian 
countries, Kyrgyzstan has continued the Soviet practice of state 
enterprises having their own clinics and sanatoriums. With the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan's residents lost the 
right to free treatment in the hospitals of other former repub- 
lics, making unavailable many types of specialized treatment 
that the Soviet system had apportioned among adjacent repub- 
lics. 

Very few truly private health facilities have developed in the 
early post-Soviet period, and those that exist face very high 
licensing fees. Although it is illegal for state employees in the 
health field to diversify their activity into private practice, by 
1993 many health workers were accepting unreported pay- 
ments for providing additional treatment. In 1992 the maxi- 



142 




Patient in specialized cardiac hospital, Bishkek 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



mum salary of a medical specialist such as a surgeon was only 
about 18 percent higher than the maximum salary of a techni- 
cian or laboratory worker. Under such conditions, the rising 
cost of living in 1992 and 1993 forced many doctors to leave 
medicine for higher salaries in other professions. 

Kyrgyzstan produces no vaccines of its own and almost no 
medicines or other pharmaceuticals. Drug availability is sub- 
stantially higher at regional facilities than at smaller ones, but 
items such as antihistamines, insulin, antiseptics, vaccines, and 
some narcotics are either extremely scarce or extremely expen- 
sive. The other former Soviet republics now demand payment 
in United States dollars, which Kyrgyzstan does not have, for 
medical supplies. Because of the scarcity of vaccines, there is a 
greatly increased likelihood of epidemics of diseases such as 
diphtheria and measles. An outbreak of measles in Bishkek in 
early 1993 was said to be just below epidemic level. It has 
become common practice in hospitals and clinics to require 



143 



Country Studies 



patients to provide their own medicines for operations and 
other medical procedures. Because virtually the only available 
medicines are those for sale in the public bazaars, quality is 
questionable, and accidental poisonings caused by misuse and 
spoilage have been reported. 

Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet financial crisis has reduced govern- 
ment support of the Soviet-era health system, forcing govern- 
ment planners to formulate an ambitious health care delivery 
reform program. The center of the program is a transforma- 
tion of the national health system into a system of public health 
insurance, in which compulsory employer fees and a health 
insurance tax on employees would support care for employees, 
and state contributions would support care for unemployed cit- 
izens. All employed citizens would be required to carry health 
insurance. All care providers would switch from the salary basis 
of the old system to a fee-for-service payment system. Because 
the banking, record-keeping, and tax systems of the country 
are not ready to support such a nationwide program, however, 
installation has lagged far behind the original timetable, which 
called for a pilot program in Bishkek in 1993. 

Health Conditions 

The main causes of adult deaths in Kyrgyzstan are, in order 
of occurrence, cardiovascular conditions, respiratory infec- 
tions, and accidents (see table 5, Appendix). Sexually transmit- 
ted diseases reportedly are very low in incidence; only five cases 
of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) were 
recorded in 1992. In the early 1990s, major health hazards have 
been posed by growing shortages of chlorine to purify water 
supplies and the increasing danger of typhus outbreaks result- 
ing from the closure of most of the country's public baths. In 
1993 Kyrgyzstan suffered increasing cases of hepatitis and gas- 
trointestinal infections, especially in the southern provinces of 
Osh and Jalal-Abad. The cause of such infections is believed to 
be the use of open water supplies contaminated by livestock 
and improper disposal of waste (see Environmental Problems, 
this ch.). Although adults traditionally consume most of their 
water in the form of boiled tea, children have greater access to 
untreated water and foods. 

Additional stress is placed on the population by the rising 
cost of food, which has reduced the quality and quantity of 
most people's diets. In 1993 meat consumption was reported to 
have dropped by 20 percent since 1990, intake of milk prod- 



144 



Kyrgyzstan 



ucts by 30 percent, and consumption of fish (which was 
imported in the Soviet period) by 70 percent. The average 
caloric intake was reported to have decreased by about 12 per- 
cent since 1990. There are also frequent reports of deaths or 
injuries caused by tainted or falsely labeled food and drink, 
particularly alcoholic beverages, which are widely sold by extra- 
legal private concerns. The rising cost of energy has meant 
insufficient heat for many apartments and public buildings. 
Naryn Province, the coldest and most remote part of the coun- 
try, has been particularly affected. In that region, many build- 
ings lack central heating, and residents have been forced to 
devise homemade stoves vented directly out the windows. In 
addition, the availability and range of ambulance services have 
been restricted severely by fuel shortages. 

Social Welfare 

Like the other former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan inherited 
a social welfare system that allocated benefits very broadly with- 
out targeting needy groups in society. In this system, nearly half 
of society received some sort of benefit, and many benefit pay- 
ments were excessive. By necessity, the post-Soviet government 
has sought to make substantial reductions in state social protec- 
tion payments, emphasizing identification of the most vulnera- 
ble members of society. 

The Soviet Heritage 

In 1991, the last year of the Soviet Union, the payment of 
pensions, child allowances, and other forms of support 
amounted to 18 percent of the Kyrgyz Republic's gross domes- 
tic product (GDP — see Glossary). At that point, about 600,000 
pensioners and 1.6 million children received some form of pay- 
ment. Eligibility requirements were extremely liberal, defined 
mainly by age and work history rather than by social position or 
contributions to a pension *und. This generous system failed to 
eliminate poverty, however; according to a 1989 Soviet survey, 
35 percent of the population fell below the official income line 
for "poorly supplied" members of society. Thus poverty, which 
became an increasingly urgent problem during the economic 
decline of the transition period of the early 1990s, already was 
rooted firmly in Kyrgyzstan when independence was achieved. 

Reforming Social Welfare 

The Akayev government addressed the overpayment prob- 



145 



Country Studies 

lem by reducing categorical subsidies and government price 
controls; by indexing benefits only partially as inflation raised 
the cost of living; and by targeting benefits to the most needy 
parts of society. Under the new program, child allowances went 
only to people with incomes below a fixed level, and bread 
price compensation went only to groups such as pensioners 
who lacked earning power. By 1993 such measures had cut gov- 
ernment welfare expenses by more than half, from 57 percent 
of the state budget to 25 percent. 

Nevertheless, the percentage of citizens below the poverty 
line grew rapidly in the early 1990s as the population felt the 
impact of the government's economic stabilization program 
(see Economic Reform, this ch.). In addition, the Soviet system 
delegated delivery of many social services, including health, to 
state enterprises, which in the post-Soviet era no longer had 
the means to guarantee services to employees (or, in many 
cases, even to continue employing them). The state's Pension 
Fund (a government agency with the relatively independent 
status of a state committee) went into debt in 1994 because 
workers who retired early or worked only for a short period 
remained eligible for pensions and the poor financial state of 
enterprises made revenue collection difficult. The pension sys- 
tem is supported by payroll taxes of 33 percent on industries 
and 26 percent on collective and state farms. Besides retire- 
ment pensions, disability and survivors' benefits also are paid. 
Of the amount collected, 14 percent goes to the labor unions' 
Social Insurance Fund and the remainder to the Pension Fund. 
The standard pension eligibility age is sixty for men and fifty- 
five for women, but in 1992 an estimated 156,000 people were 
receiving benefits at earlier ages. In 1994 the minimum pen- 
sion amount was raised to forty-five som (for value of the som — 
see Glossary) per month, the latest in a long series of adjust- 
ments that did not nearly keep pace with inflation's impact on 
the real value of the pension. 

New pension legislation prepared in 1994 made enterprises 
responsible for the costs of early retirement; established a five- 
year minimum for pension eligibility; clearly separated the cat- 
egories of work pensions from social assistance payments; abol- 
ished supplementary pension payments for recipients needing 
additional support; eliminated the possibility of receiving a 
pension while continuing to work (the position of an estimated 
49,000 workers in 1992); and provided for long-term linkage of 
contributions made to pensions later received. 



146 



Kyrgyzstan 



Child allowances are paid for children up to the age of eigh- 
teen, and a lump sum payment is made on the birth of a child. 
In 1991 child allowances consumed 6.7 percent of GDP; since 
that time, targeting of benefits has been a major concern in 
this category to reduce spending but cover vulnerable groups. 
The first alteration of eligibility standards occurred in 1993. 
Cash for this category is provided by direct transfers from the 
state budget combined with Pension Fund contributions. 

Besides pensions and family allowances, Kyrgyzstani citizens 
also receive maternity benefits and sick pay covered by the 
Social Insurance Fund, which is managed by the Federation of 
Independent Labor Unions and the individual unions; it 
receives money only from its 14 percent share of payroll taxes, 
not from the state budget or individual contributions. All pub- 
lic and private employees are eligible for sick leave, with pay- 
ments depending on length of service. The maternity 
allowance is a single payment equal to two months' minimum 
wage. World Bank experts consider the sick and maternity ben- 
efits excessive in relation to the state of the economy and the 
state budget. 

In assessing the future of social assistance in Kyrgyzstan, 
experts predict that economic restructuring through the 1990s 
will increase the number of citizens requiring assistance from 
the state system. To meet such needs, thorough reform of the 
system — aimed mainly at tightening eligibility standards — will 
be necessary. It is also expected that Kyrgyzstan will require 
other methods of social assistance to provide for individuals 
who do not fall into existing categories, or for whom inflation 
erodes excessively the value of payments now received. The 
officially and unofficially unemployed (together estimated at 
300,000 at the end of 1994) are an especially vulnerable group 
because of the unlikelihood of workers being reabsorbed rap- 
idly into the country's faltering economy. (Unemployment 
benefits are paid for twenty-six weeks to those who register, but 
the number of "non-participants" is much greater than the 
number of registered unemployed.) 

The Economy 

In the first five years of independence, Kyrgyzstan's economy 
made more progress in market-oriented reform legislation but 
less progress in economic growth than the other four Central 
Asian states. This disparity was largely because Kyrgyzstan 
lacked the diversified natural resources and processing infra- 



147 



Country Studies 



structure that enable a national economy to survive the shut- 
down cf some sectors by shifting labor and other inputs to new 
areas of production. 

The economic system of Kyrgyzstan is undergoing a slow, 
painful, and uncertain transition. Once a highly integrated 
provider of raw materials for the centrally controlled economy 
of the Soviet Union, the republic's economy is reorienting itself 
toward processing its own raw materials and producing its own 
industrial products. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, industry accounted for only about one-third of the 
country's net material product (NMP — see Glossary) while 
employing less than one-fifth of the labor force. The primary 
emphasis of the economy remained agriculture, which 
accounted for about 40 percent of NMP and officially 
employed about one-third of the labor force. The transporta- 
tion and communications sector employed only about 3.2 per- 
cent of the labor force in 1991. As in other Soviet republics, the 
vast majority of workers were employed by the state, while most 
of the remainder worked on private agricultural plots. 

Role in the Soviet Economy 

As part of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan played a small but 
highly integrated role in the centrally controlled economy. Fig- 
ures for 1990 show that agriculturally the republic contributed 
1 percent or less of the total Soviet output of preserved vegeta- 
bles, animal fats, plant oils, and meat, and 3 percent of the total 
Soviet output of beet sugar. Kyrgyzstan also produced small 
proportions of Soviet wine products and tobacco. Industrially, 
the republic supplied 1 to 2 percent of the Soviet Union's total 
output of cotton cloth, silk cloth, linen, and woolen cloth, and 
an equal proportion of ready-made clothing and shoes. 
Machine-assembly plants, steel plants, motor-assembly plants, 
and miscellaneous light industry contributed another 1 per- 
cent or less of the Soviet total. The only energy resources that 
Kyrgyzstan contributed in any volume were coal (0.5 percent of 
the Soviet total) and hydroelectric power (0.8 percent). Kyr- 
gyzstan's radio-assembly and other electronic plants accounted 
for a small portion of the defense industry. A torpedo-assembly 
plant was located on the shores of Ysyk-K61. One of the Soviet 
Union's two military airbases for the training of foreign pilots 
was located outside Bishkek. 

Kyrgyzstan's largest role in the Soviet economy was as a sup- 
plier of minerals, especially antimony (in which the republic 



148 



Kyrgyzstan 



had a near monopoly), mercury, lead, and zinc. Of greatest sig- 
nificance economically, however, was gold, of which Kyrgyzstan 
was the Soviet Union's third-largest supplier. 

Natural Resources 

Soviet geologists have estimated Kyrgyzstan 's coal reserves at 
about 27 billion tons, of which the majority remained entirely 
unexploited in the mid-1990s. About 3 billion tons of that 
amount are judged to be of highest quality. This coal has 
proven difficult to exploit, however, because most of it is in 
small deposits deep in the mountains. Kyrgyzstan also has oil 
resources; small deposits of oil-bearing shale have been located 
in southern Kyrgyzstan, and part of the Fergana oil and natural 
gas complex lies in Kyrgyzstani territory. In the Osh region, 
four pools of oil, four of natural gas, and four mixed pools have 
been exploited since the 1950s; however, the yield of all of 
them is falling in the 1990s. In 1992 their combined output was 
112,000 tons of oil and 65 million cubic meters of natural gas, 
compared with the republic's annual consumption of 2.5 mil- 
lion tons of oil and 3 billion cubic meters of natural gas. 

Kyrgyzstan's iron ore deposits are estimated at 5 billion tons, 
most containing about 30 percent iron. Copper deposits in the 
mountains are located in extremely complex mineral deposits, 
making extraction costly. The northern mountains also contain 
lead, zinc, molybdenum, vanadium, and bismuth. The south 
has deposits of bauxite and mercury; Kyrgyzstan was the Soviet 
Union's main supplier of mercury, but in the 1990s plummet- 
ing mercury prices have damaged the international market. A 
tin and tungsten mine was 80 percent complete in 1995. Kyr- 
gyzstan had a virtual monopoly on supplying antimony to the 
Soviet Union, but post-Soviet international markets are small 
and highly specialized. Uranium, which was in high demand 
for the Soviet Union's military and atomic energy programs, no 
longer is mined in Kyrgyzstan. 

The Soviet Union's largest gold mine was located at Makmal 
in Kyrgyzstan, and in the Soviet period Kyrgyzstan's 170 proven 
deposits put it in third place behind only Russia and Uzbeki- 
stan in gold production in the union. Two more promising 
deposits, at Kumtor and Jerui, have been discovered. Kumtor, 
said to be the seventh-largest gold deposit in the world with an 
estimated value of US$5.5 billion, is being explored by the 
Canadian Metals Company (Cameco), a uranium company, in 
a joint-venture operation. Gold deposits are concentrated in 



149 



Country Studies 

Talas Province in north-central Kyrgyzstan, where as much as 
200 tons may exist; deposits in Makmal are estimated at sixty 
tons. Deposits adjacent to the Chatkal River in the northwest 
amount to an estimated 150 tons. 

The terms of the agreement for Kumtor exploitation with 
Cameco, which gains one-third of profits from gold extraction, 
caused public concern in 1992. To improve control of the min- 
eral-extraction and refining processes, and to address the 
uncontrolled movement of precious metals out of the country, 
President Akayev created a new administrative agency, Kyrgyz- 
altyn (Kyrgyzstan Gold), to replace Yuzhpolmetal, the Soviet- 
era body responsible for precious metals. In January 1993, 
Akayev also brought the country's antimony and mercury 
mines into Kyrgyzaltyn. The latter are especially important 
because mercury is used to refine gold. Control of the mercury 
mines makes more likely the realization of Akayev's hope that 
Kyrgyzstan will become more than just a supplier of raw materi- 
als. 

Although Kyrgyzstan has one of the largest proven gold 
reserves in the world, in the early 1990s fuel and spare parts 
shortages combined with political disputes to hamper output 
(see Government and Politics, this ch.). Production in 1994 
was 3.5 tons, but the output goal for 1996 was ten tons. 

Kyrgyzstan's major energy source, water, has also been dis- 
cussed as a commercial product. The export of bottled mineral 
and fresh water was the object of several unrealized plans in the 
mid-1990s. 

Agriculture 

The condition of agriculture in Kyrgyzstan is determined by 
the state's continuing control of production, marketing, and 
prices, as well as by the republic-wide specialization mandated 
by the former Soviet Union to promote interdependence 
among the republics. Most agricultural production continues 
to occur in the state farm and collective farm systems, which 
are slowly being privatized. In the early post-Soviet years, gov- 
ernment policy encouraged self-sufficiency in cereal grains to 
provide food security. Maintaining such self-sufficiency, how- 
ever, has entailed continued government regulation such as 
compulsory marketing, which in turn has discouraged the 
development of diversified farm enterprise. The main agricul- 
tural regions are in the Fergana Valley (Osh and Jalal-Abad 
provinces), in the northern Chu and Talas valleys, and in the 



150 



Kyrgyzstan 



Ysyk-K61 basin in the northeast. In the early 1990s, income 
declined steadily in both state-run and privatized agricultural 
enterprises. 

Agricultural Land 

Kyrgyzstan has about 1.4 million hectares of arable land, 
which is only about 7 percent of the nation's total area. More 
than 70 percent of the arable area depends on irrigation for its 
productivity. In the Soviet period, only about 4 percent of agri- 
cultural land was owned privately, although private plots con- 
tributed a much higher percentage of overall output, especially 
in fruits and vegetables. In 1994 only an additional 6 percent of 
agricultural land had passed to some form of private owner- 
ship. The privatization of land was a difficult issue that was con- 
tested between President Akayev and more conservative 
government officials. The latter reflected the Soviet-era view 
that land should be common property protected and disposed 
of only by the state. More immediately, these officials repre- 
sented the interests of state farm administrators, whose enter- 
prises suffered greatly from post-Soviet economic shocks and 
redistribution of resources. 

In 1992 and 1993, the land redistribution program also was 
hindered by poor cooperation between the national and local 
governments and by lack of clarity in the program outline. Nev- 
ertheless, by early 1993 some 165 of the 470 existing state and 
collective farms had been reorganized or privatized into about 
17,000 peasant enterprises, cooperatives, or peasant associa- 
tions. However, the state retained control over vital agricultural 
inputs and market distribution channels, meaning that private 
land users often lacked material support and that price con- 
trols limited the profitability of private farms. The privatization 
program was halted in early 1993, and a more comprehensive 
reform program was developed. In early 1995, the government 
offered debt relief to state and collective farms that expedited 
the availability of land to private farmers. 

According to privatization law, state agricultural assets are 
distributed according to a share system in which all citizens 
have the right to a garden plot, but only individuals in the rural 
population have the right to occupy land and other agricul- 
tural assets formerly owned by state and collective farms. Recip- 
ients of shares can maintain the property as part of the 
collective, transfer it to a cooperative, or establish an individual 
farm. In the early 1990s, the former alternative was much more 



151 



Country Studies 



popular because of the perception that larger units offered 
greater security in a time of financial uncertainty. Private own- 
ership of land remained illegal in 1995, but use rights are guar- 
anteed for forty-nine years, and use rights can be bought, sold, 
and used as collateral for loans. In 1994 a new decree on land 
reform expanded and clarified the legal basis for the use and 
exchange of land and improved the administration of land 
privatization, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Agri- 
culture and Food. 

Agricultural Production 

In the post-Soviet years, Kyrgyzstan has continued to empha- 
size production of raw materials for industrial processing, a 
role assigned to the republic in the Soviet system. An estimated 
62 percent of the population is rural (see Population, this ch.). 
The chief crops are fodder crops, wheat, barley, and cotton. 
Other agricultural products are sugar beets, tobacco, fruit, veg- 
etables, and silk (see table 13, Appendix). In 1994 the largest 
crop harvests were of wheat (611,000 tons), barley (300,000 
tons), potatoes (288,000 tons), and tomatoes (160,000 tons). 

The chief agricultural use of land is pasturage for livestock, 
mainly sheep, goats, and cattle, the tending of which is the tra- 
ditional vocation of the Kyrgyz people. An estimated 83 per- 
cent of land in agricultural use is mountainous pastureland. In 
the 1980s, livestock production accounted for about 60 percent 
of the value of the country's agricultural output; such produc- 
tion included mutton, beef, eggs, milk, wool, and thorough- 
bred horses. In 1987, when herds reached their largest 
numbers, about twice as much grain was used for animal feed 
as for human consumption. However, the prices of and 
demand for livestock products have dropped significantly in 
the 1990s relative to those of crops. For this reason and 
because Soviet-era herds had been supported largely by cheap 
imported grain, in 1994 livestock contributed less than half the 
total value of Kyrgyzstan 's agricultural earnings. In 1994 the 
most important livestock products were cow's milk (750,000 
tons), beef and veal (70,000 tons), mutton and lamb (50,000 
tons), eggs (30,600 tons), wool (56,300 tons), pork products 
(30,000 tons), and poultry meat (25,000 tons). All of those fig- 
ures were below the totals for the previous two years. 

Agricultural Trends and Problems 

The early 1990s saw many farmers turn from commercial 



152 



Kyrgyzstan 



production to subsistence crops, a trend that hurt the country's 
export activities (roughly half of its exports were agricultural in 
1990) as well as the availability of foods within Kyrgyzstan. 
Experts believe that Kyrgyzstan's main agricultural problems 
are inappropriate and slow-moving reforms (especially land 
redistribution), intrusive bureaucratic regulations, poor avail- 
ability of credit, and delayed payments to farmers for their 
crops. More immediately, both water and fertilizers have been 
in short supply since the end of the Soviet Union. In addition, 
Kyrgyzstan's agriculture uses an average of less than 50 percent 
of the amount of pesticides used by agriculture in the Western 
nations. 

In 1994 the agriculture sector was in the fourth and most dif- 
ficult year of a major decline that included reduced output, iso- 
lation from commercial markets, decreased earnings, and a 
deteriorating natural resource base (see table 6, Appendix). In 
1994 total agricultural output dropped by 17 percent, and the 
decline in marketed and processed output was substantially 
greater because of the trend toward subsistence farming. Pro- 
duction ceased to increase at about the time of the collapse of 
the Soviet system, an event that initiated the loss of markets 
and trading partners, the loss of transfer payments from Mos- 
cow, and a condition of general monetary instability. The 
national government did not address these problems effec- 
tively in the first years of independence; in fact, government 
marketing quotas, price controls, and trade restrictions exacer- 
bated the decline. By restricting farmers' marketing and pric- 
ing practices, the government in effect levied a tax on 
agriculture that redistributed income to other sectors of soci- 
ety. National reforms in land tenure, farm organization, and 
the financial system, together with privatization of services, 
were eroded by the continued authority of local officials to 
interfere in administration of those reforms. 

A key agricultural resource, pastureland, was degraded 
severely by the Soviet-era practice of mandating livestock popu- 
lations too large for available pasturage on state farms and by 
post-Soviet transfer of livestock from inefficient collective and 
state farms to private ownership without limiting grazing rights 
on common pastures. By 1994 over-grazing had led to serious 
erosion of much pasture land (see Environmental Problems, 
this ch.). 

In 1994 a continuing controversy over granting central bank 
credits to support farmers during the growing season again 



153 



Country Studies 



made financial support a dubious proposition. Without such 
support, planting and fertilization would be severely limited 
because farmers in many rural areas lack financial resources to 
buy seed and fertilizer. On the other hand, such credits have 
always been a threat to the government's overall economic pro- 
gram. For several reasons, including the state's failure to pay 
farmers on time for their crops, the agricultural sector's bank 
debts increased rapidly in the early 1990s. This situation was 
the basis of arguments that the government could not afford to 
pay agricultural credits. 

Industry 

Industrial production in Kyrgyzstan declined significantly in 
1992 and 1993, especially in comparison to the average annual 
growth rate from 1985 to 1990, which was 3.3 percent. Impor- 
tant factors in this decline were the energy crisis caused by the 
loss of Soviet-era fuel supply agreements and the outflow of 
skilled Russian industrial and management personnel. By 1994, 
when output had fallen by another 25 percent, Kyrgyzstan's 
production was only 42 percent of its 1990 level. Only four of 
the country's 200 most important industrial products — oil, 
electrical power, household electric appliances, and alcoholic 
beverages — showed an increased output in 1994. By the first 
quarter of 1995, some 120 enterprises, more than one-third of 
the national total, were idle. The decline was caused by prob- 
lems in obtaining raw materials, components, and other inputs; 
a drop in effective demand; the economic weakness of trading 
partners; and problems in arranging for payments. An impor- 
tant additional problem, however, is the nature of Kyrgyzstan's 
Soviet-era industrial structure, which was specialized for 
defense-related manufacturing. Many defense-related indus- 
tries closed in the early 1990s because they could not find alter- 
native types of production once Soviet defense contracts 
ended. The government's initial policy was to avoid supporting 
unprofitable state enterprises, but intense political pressure 
has kept many such firms open. 

Including mining, the electric power industries, and con- 
struction, industry contributed about 45 percent of GDP in 
1991, but that percentage dropped significantly in the follow- 
ing years, even with a parallel agricultural decline. For exam- 
ple, between 1991 and 1993 production of crude steel 
decreased 45 percent, cement production decreased by 49 per- 
cent, and production of metal cutting machines dropped by 77 



154 



Kyrgyzstan 



percent. Gross capital formation decreased an estimated 55 
percent in 1994, and investment for that year was below 25 per- 
cent of the rate at the end of the Soviet period. Private invest- 
ment, however, rose slightly to nearly half of total investment 
for 1994. 

None of the major industrial projects planned for 1993-94 
was completed on time. Included in major construction post- 
ponements was a cigarette factory in Osh, which could have 
taken advantage of southern Kyrgyzstan's favorable tobacco- 
growing conditions. Many other projects were completed on a 
much smaller scale than originally planned. As conversion to 
useful new lines of manufacture was delayed, the national 
economy shrank. In addition, unemployment grew rapidly as 
state-owned enterprises were phased out but not replaced. 

In the mid-1990s, the most valuable industrial components 
of Kyrgyzstan's economy were machine building, textiles, and 
food processing, which are centered in Bishkek, Osh, and Jalal- 
Abad (see fig. 5; table 14, Appendix). Some electronics and 
instruments are produced in former defense plants, and a lim- 
ited metallurgical industry also exists. The most produc- 
tive"industry" is electric power, which is produced in the 
country's numerous hydroelectric plants. 

Energy 

Unlike its neighbors Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
has no significant exploited reserves of oil or natural gas; in 
1994 petroleum production was 88,000 tons, and natural gas 
production was 39 million cubic meters. Although substantial 
coal deposits are present, in the mid-1990s experts described 
Kyrgyzstan's coal industry as in a state of collapse. In the early 
1990s, only four of the fourteen state-owned coal mines were 
considered economically viable, and little coal came from pri- 
vately owned mines. Between 1991 and 1993, brown coal pro- 
duction decreased by 50 percent (to 959,000 tons), and black 
coal production decreased by 53 percent (to 712,000 tons). 
The domestic price of conventional fuels rose slightly above 
world levels after the much cheaper energy-sharing arrange- 
ments of the Soviet era ended. (In 1992 oil and gas import 
costs were 50 percent of the total state budget, compared with 
10 percent in 1991.) In 1994 some 39 percent of Kyrgyzstan's 
total import expenditures went for the purchase of conven- 
tional fuels, contributing an estimated US$100 million to the 
country's trade imbalance (see Foreign Trade, this ch.). Energy 



155 



Country Studies 

consumption, meanwhile, has declined sharply since 1991, and 
experts do not expect it to return to its 1990 level. 

Management of national energy and fuel policy is distrib- 
uted among several ministries and other state agencies — an 
arrangement that has hindered efficient acquisition and distri- 
bution. Distribution of heat and electricity is the responsibility 
of the state-run Kyrgyzstan National Energy Holding Company, 
and natural gas purchases are managed by the Kyrgyzstan Natu- 
ral Gas Administration (Kyrgyzgas) . Oil, gas, and coal explora- 
tion is the responsibility of the State Geological Commission 
(Goskomgeologiya). Natural gas, provided by the Republic of 
Turkmenistan in the Soviet era, now comes mainly from neigh- 
boring Uzbekistan. Coal, used to heat households and to fuel 
some thermoelectric plants, is mainly received from Kazakstan 
in a barter arrangement for electrical power. Kazakstan's coal is 
preferred because the heaviest demand in Kyrgyzstan is con- 
centrated in the north, and Kyrgyzstan's remaining coal mines 
are in the south, from which transportation is problematic. 

For these reasons, existing thermoelectric stations have been 
deemphasized in the 1990s in favor of expanded hydroelectric 
production. Thus, in 1994 thermoelectric power production 
dropped by 46 percent while hydroelectric production rose by 
30 percent. These statistics enabled the national energy sector 
to show a modest drop of 4 percent in total power generation 
in 1994, but district heating, which comes from coal- and gas- 
powered combined heat and power plants, suffered heavily 
from the transition. Meanwhile, government promotion of 
electricity brought an increase of 117 percent in household 
power use between 1991 and 1994, although overall household 
energy consumption declined by 36 percent during that 
period. Some aspects of the promotion plan have been criti- 
cized, including the large-scale promotion of electric heat in a 
country with poorly insulated houses. 

Emphasis on electricity is backed by abundant water power, 
mainly from the country's location at the mountain headwaters 
of the Syrdariya, one of the two largest rivers in Central Asia. 
On the Naryn River, chief tributary of the Syrdariya, a series of 
hydroelectric stations has been built, the largest of which is the 
Kurp-Say Hydroelectric Plant, fed by the Toktogol Reservoir in 
central Kyrgyzstan. Other major hydroelectric plants are 
located at Atabashin, Alamedin, and Uchkorgon. Such stations 
have made possible the net export of electric power, worth an 
estimated US$100 million in 1994. That figure was only about 



156 



Construction work at Tash- 
Kumyr hydroelectric station 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 




half the value of Kyrgyzstan's 1990 export, however, because 
demand in neighboring republics dropped considerably in the 
early 1990s. The main customer is Kazakstan, with which power 
is exchanged through the Central Asian Integrated System. 

Only about 10 percent of Kyrgyzstan's hydroelectric power 
potential and only about 3 percent of the potential of its 
smaller streams are currently being exploited; the Naryn River 
is estimated to afford an additional 2,200 megawatts of easily 
accessible rated capacity. Meanwhile, the Fergana Valley, the 
only working oil field in the country, has remaining reserves of 
14 million tons of oil that require expensive recovery tech- 
nolgy. No serious oil exploration has been done elsewhere, 
although the Ghu and Ak-Say valleys are believed to be prom- 
ising. 

Economic Reform 

Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has undertaken significant 
structural reforms of its economy; in 1994 the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) ranked Kyrgyzstan fourth 
among former Soviet republics (behind the three Baltic states) 
in the pace of economic reform, but positive results have not 
been forthcoming. As elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, 
one of the most significant reforms is privatization. The goal of 



157 



Country Studies 



privatization, a high priority in the early 1990s, has been to cre- 
ate new productive enterprises with efficient management sys- 
tems while involving the population in the reform program at a 
fundamental level. The process began in December 1991 with 
the adoption of the Privatization and Denationalization Law 
and the creation of the State Property Fund as the agency to 
design and implement the program. In late 1992, a new parlia- 
mentary "Concept Note" reoriented the program toward rapid 
sale of small enterprises and ownership transition in larger 
enterprises by vouchers and other special payments. By the end 
of 1993, about 4,450 state enterprises, including 33 percent of 
total fixed enterprise assets, were fully or partially privatized. By 
mid-1994, nearly all services and 82 percent of assets in trade 
enterprises, 40 percent of assets in industry, and 68 percent of 
construction assets were in private hands. 

However, the practical results of those statistics have not 
been nearly so positive. Most privatization (and almost all priva- 
tization in industry) was accomplished by creation of joint- 
stock companies, transferring enterprise shares to labor groups 
within them. Almost no public bidding for enterprise shares 
occurred, and the state maintained significant shares in enter- 
prises after their conversion to joint-stock companies. Also, 
because the sale of shares was prohibited, shareholders wishing 
to leave the company had to return their holdings to the labor 
collective. The 1994 Law on Privatization remedied this situa- 
tion by providing for competitive bidding for shares in small 
enterprises (with fewer than 100 employees) as well as long- 
term privatization of medium-sized (with 100 to 1,000 employ- 
ees) and large enterprises by competitive cash bidding among 
individuals. The new law also provided for the auctioning of all 
enterprise shares remaining in state hands, over an undeter- 
mined period of time. In 1994 and early 1995, voucher privati- 
zation moved toward its goals quickly; by the end of 1994, an 
estimated 65 percent of industrial output came from non-state 
enterprises. 

Privatization was not the final step in economic success, how- 
ever. After that step, many firms needed drastic restructuring — 
most notably in management and technology — to function in a 
market environment. Because the commercial banking system 
had not been reformed substantially, enterprises found little 
financial or technical support for such upgrading (see Finan- 
cial System, this ch.). On the other hand, enterprises (espe- 
cially state enterprises) have not been discouraged from 



158 



Kyrgyzstan 



defaulting on loans because they often are closely associated 
with banks, whose pliable loan policy is backed by the National 
Bank of Kyrgyzstan. Plans called for establishment of an inter- 
mediary agency to distribute foreign and international funds 
to privatized enterprises until the banking system is able to take 
over lending activities. A stock exchange opened in Bishkek in 
May 1995 and was considered an important step in expediting 
this process. 

In the early years of independence, a major cause of Kyr- 
gyzstan's economic distress has been corruption and malfea- 
sance. In a January 1993 speech, President Akayev reported 
that as much as 70 percent of the money that the country had 
invested in its economy had been diverted into private hands. 
Meanwhile, a poll of the country's few entrepreneurs found 
that 85 percent of them reported having to offer bribes to stay 
in business. The truth of Akayev's statement was difficult to ver- 
ify, but reports in newspapers and elsewhere suggest that it 
could be correct. Official data indicated that since indepen- 
dence at least 100,000 tons of cast iron, steel, aluminum, and 
zinc had been sold abroad without legal permission, and that a 
credit for 1.7 billion rubles for the purchase of grain had van- 
ished. Other anecdotal evidence of corruption, often con- 
nected with local centers of political power, was plentiful (see 
Structure of Government, this ch.). 

Financial System 

In mid-1995, the banking system continued to be dominated 
by the central savings bank (the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan, 
created in 1991) and by the three major commercial banks that 
succeeded the sectoral banks of the Soviet era and remained 
under state control. Those banks — the Agricultural and Indus- 
trial Bank (Agroprombank), the Industrial and Construction 
Bank (Promstroybank), and the Commercial Bank of Kyr- 
gyzstan — owned 85 percent of banking assets in 1994. New 
commercial banks, of which fifteen were established in 1993 
and 1994, were owned by individuals or enterprises and had 
much less financial power than the state-owned banks. The new 
commercial banks have the right to buy and sell foreign cur- 
rency and open deposit accounts. The National Bank is the 
official center of currency exchange, but in the mid-1990s it 
did not adhere to official exchange rates. In mid-1994, the gov- 
ernment established the Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment, which uses state funds, foreign currency assets, and loans 



159 



Country Studies 

from abroad to aid small and medium-sized enterprises and to 
invest in targeted spheres of the economy, especially housing, 
construction, power generation, and agriculture. 

The banking system has remained concentrated in the same 
areas as in the Soviet period. Although some diversification has 
occurred, loans tend to go to traditional clients. Because new 
commercial banks are small and initially were owned by state 
ministries and state-owned enterprises, competition has devel- 
oped slowly. Through 1994 Soviet-style accounting and report- 
ing systems remained in use, and banking services such as 
domestic and international payments have remained at the 
same noncompetitive level as they were prior to 1991. Capabili- 
ties vital to a market-type economy, such as credit risk assess- 
ment and project appraisal, are lacking. Post-Soviet regulations 
on capital funds, exposure limits, and lending practices have 
not been enforced. The technical infrastructure of the banks 
also requires substantial overhaul. In addition, the National 
Bank has been plagued by scandal; the first director, an Akayev 
protege, was linked to several illegal financial operations in 
1993 and 1994. 

The limitations of the banking system have made it unable 
to efficiently mobilize and allocate financial resources into the 
national economy. This failure has hindered privatization and 
other types of economic reform that require substantial 
amounts of risk capital upon which borrowers can rely. Espe- 
cially critical are the bad loans held by the three state-owned 
banks (influenced by government interference in loan deci- 
sions, together with poor financial discipline on the part of 
major enterprises) and eroded capital base. In 1995 the 
National Bank's outstanding loans to agricultural and indus- 
trial enterprises totaled 1 billion som each. 

Prices, Monetary Policy, and Debt 

Kyrgyzstan paid dearly for its designated role as an exporter 
of raw materials when the Soviet Union unraveled and retail 
prices began to be freed: the prices paid for raw materials rose 
much more slowly than did prices of finished goods. Thus, in 
1992, for example, the cost of what Kyrgyzstan imported rose 
by fifty to 100 times, while the amounts received for exports 
rose by fifteen to twenty times. This explains in part why the 
GNP for 1992 was valued at 250 billion rubles (for value of the 
ruble — see Glossary), while the cost of Kyrgyzstan' s imports was 
put at 400 billion rubles. In 1992 Russia began discounting the 



160 



Kyrgyzstan 



paper value of the Kyrgyzstan ruble, effectively devaluing the 
goods that Kyrgyzstan was supplying. Moscow then required 
that the country assume the imposed "difference" as a loan, 
which had the effect of increasing Kyrgyzstan's debt burden. 

To escape the disparities inherent in dependence on the 
ruble, in May 1993 Kyrgyzstan was the first former Soviet 
republic to leave the ruble zone (see Glossary) and introduce 
its own currency, the som. This new policy earned Kyrgyzstan 
the hostility of neighboring Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, which 
had declared loyalty to the ruble and feared an avalanche of 
devalued Kyrgyzstani rubles entering their countries. The som, 
which is fully convertible to foreign currency and has a floating 
exchange rate, has been underwritten largely by the IMF, 
which has provided a large measure of stability. After introduc- 
tion at a rate of two som to the United States dollar, the som 
traded at eleven to the dollar at the end of 1995. According to 
President Akayev, about half the som in circulation are backed 
by gold or by international loans. Although the som has 
received strong international backing, experts questioned the 
likelihood that such support would continue once other new 
national currencies emerged in former Soviet republics, elimi- 
nating the som's status as a unique experiment. Such doubt 
grew clear as Kyrgyzstan's first international loans came due in 
1995, with scheduled payments of approximately US$58 mil- 
lion that year, rising to nearly US$1.00 million the next year. 
The republic's collapsed economy made it possible that Kyr- 
gyzstan would become a permanent international client state. 

Especially in the first year of independence, hyperinflation 
seriously eroded buying power (see table 10, Appendix). At the 
end of 1992, wholesale prices were more than eighteen times 
higher than in 1991. Retail prices rose 40 percent in December 
1992 alone, explaining in part why retail sales declined by 64 
percent from 1991, the greatest decline in all of Central Asia. 
Between 1990 and 1992, meat consumption dropped 20 per- 
cent, milk product consumption by 30 percent, and fats con- 
sumption by 40 percent. Beginning in 1993, however, 
international support for the som and for Kyrgyzstan's econ- 
omy in general has kept inflation much lower than it is else- 
where in the CIS. From a high of about 1,400 percent annually 
in 1992 and 1993 (caused mainly by large increases in fuel 
costs), inflation dropped to about 180 percent for 1994 
(mainly because of tighter credit and the government's 
reduced expenditures); the government's inflation target for 



161 



Country Studies 



1995, set in cooperation with the IMF, was 55 percent, with 
monthly declines throughout the year. Prices rose by 16 per- 
cent in the first quarter of 1995, slightly above target, but bud- 
getary expenditures for the first half of the year were far above 
the IMF target of 5 percent of GDP. 

In the spring of 1995, average monthly pay in Kyrgyzstan was 
508 som, compared with a government-estimated minimum 
family budget of 487 som. Earning statistics are not considered 
totally reliable, however. In 1995 food required an average of 
61 percent of the family budget. To eliminate price distortions 
inherited from price support policies of the Soviet regime, the 
Akayev government decontrolled most prices in 1992, which 
had the immediate result of fueling inflation and reducing 
individual purchasing power. The economic decline of 1993 
caused reintroduction of price controls, notably on agricultural 
products, and ceilings of 10 to 25 percent were placed on price 
increases for a wide range of retail commodities. The state 
Anti-Monopoly and Pricing Committee restricted pricing deci- 
sions in most of Kyrgyzstan's large enterprises. Although such 
institutional mechanisms did not work consistently, they 
encouraged development of unofficial economic arrange- 
ments and barter arrangements, which further undermined 
the national economy. In 1994 the government again reversed 
its policy, ending obligatory sale and price controls on agricul- 
tural goods that had depressed the agricultural market. The 
reform would nominally free farmers to negotiate commodity 
prices with government agencies and other buyers. However, 
because the government remained the only large-scale pur- 
chaser of many products, liberalizing the procurement process 
was not expected to have immediate effects. 

Foreign Investment 

Domestic economic investment declined precipitously in the 
early 1990s, with government investment falling 55 percent in 
1994 alone. In the first quarter of 1995, total public and private 
investment was reported to be 391 million som, of which about 
75 percent went to the Kumtor joint-venture gold field. To 
stimulate foreign investment, the Kyrgyz government has 
adopted a series of measures to improve the republic's deterio- 
rating economic environment. In the late 1980s, the republic 
already had begun creating a legal infrastructure to support 
private investment. The Basic Foreign Investment Law, 
adopted in June 1991, has been amended several times since 



162 



Kyrgyzstan 



that time. In general, this law allows foreign investors full use of 
their profits, including unlimited export of profits in the form 
of foreign currency or merchandise. 

Foreign firms also enjoy considerable tax advantages, which 
extend to Kyrgyzstani partners in joint ventures. Investors are 
granted relief from import duties on materials needed to estab- 
lish a business, and they continue receiving tax relief for up to 
five years, depending on their type of business. After that time, 
several other types of tax relief are available, including various 
forms of reinvestment in Kyrgyzstan's economy. 

As of April 1995, some 328 joint ventures were registered, 
but only 128 were actually in operation, the vast majority in 
trade. Only thirty-eight joint ventures were active in manufac- 
turing or mining. At that time, sixty-eight foreign firms (out- 
side the CIS) were registered, the majority of which were 
Chinese, Afghan, and Turkish. Some fifty-two Russian and 
thirty-six United States firms were present in some capacity. 
Kyrgyzstan was among the first of the former Soviet republics 
to create free economic zones, on the Chinese model, where 
taxes would be abated and duties waived. The government ini- 
tially created two such zones, in Naryn and Osh, with another 
under consideration in Bishkek. The zones became the object 
of heated debate, however, and by 1995 only the Naryn zone 
had taken form as planned. The only large-scale foreign invest- 
ment has been in the gold industry, where the Cameco and the 
United States Morrison-Knudson Corporation are participating 
in joint ventures. 

Foreign Trade 

Kyrgyzstan's principal exports include wool, hides, and cot- 
ton (which combined to provide nearly 80 percent of total 
exports in 1994), together with electric power, electronic prod- 
ucts, ferrous and nonferrous metals, food products, and shoes. 
Besides fuels, the largest volume of imports is in construction 
materials, ferrous metals, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and 
machinery. The largest CIS trading partners are Russia, Kazak- 
stan, and Uzbekistan, and the largest non-CIS partner is China 
(see table 15, Appendix). The predominance of barter agree- 
ments makes quantification of the latter relationship approxi- 
mate, however. Of the estimated US$44 million of trade with 
China in 1994, less than one-quarter was in cash. During the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan's economy was highly 
dependent on external trade. Total exports and imports in 



163 



Country Studies 



1991 amounted to nearly 80 percent of the country's GDP, but 
by 1993 that total had shrunk to 52.5 percent. External trade, 
which in the early 1990s was conducted principally with the 
other republics of the former Soviet Union, resulted in a large 
trade deficit, mainly because of the need to obtain petroleum 
products and natural gas at the much higher prices of post- 
Soviet markets. During the first years of independence, the def- 
icit from interrepublic and hard-currency (see Glossary) trade 
was about 20 percent of GDP. 

In 1994 Kyrgyzstan substantially liberalized state regulation 
of trade. All export and import license requirements, the issu- 
ance of which was the center of recurring corruption rumors 
in the early 1990s, were eliminated excepting some hazardous 
materials. Export taxes, which had been levied mainly in retali- 
ation for Russian export taxes, were reduced or eliminated, 
and plans called for their complete elimination by the end of 
1995. Import duties on goods from non-CIS countries were 
fixed at 5 to 15 percent; there are no duties on goods from 
within the CIS. 

The Ministry for Industry, Trade, and Material Resources is 
the chief agency for obtaining goods for export and distribut- 
ing imports. Until the liberalization of 1994, a number of gov- 
ernment-signed clearing agreements with former Soviet 
republics set terms for barter agreements that often avoided 
the problems caused by late payments. In 1993 such an agree- 
ment with Russia exchanged raw cotton, wool, and tobacco and 
scrap metal for petroleum products, wood, and metal products. 
Another agreement with Uzbekistan brought natural gas and 
fertilizers in exchange for nonferrous metals, electrical prod- 
ucts, and butter. A third example is the coal-for-electricity 
arrangement with Kazakstan (see Energy, this ch.). Commodity 
values for such agreements usually were close to world levels, 
but the rigid procurement methods required for such bilateral 
trades have distorted the rest of the national economy. 

In 1994 Kyrgyzstan's foreign trade decreased by 16.6 percent 
(to US$93.4 million, after a drop of 65 percent in the 1992-93 
period) for exports and by more than 50 percent (to US$52.6 
million) for imports. Trade with non-CIS partners showed a 
surplus, but more than 85 percent of trade still was transacted 
with CIS nations. Although the condition of the domestic econ- 
omy did not seem to favor an upturn in foreign trade for 1995, 
Kyrgyz policy makers expected that increased foreign assis- 
tance would improve the trade situation somewhat. 



164 



Kyrgyzstan 



In February 1994, Kyrgyzstan joined with Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan in creating the Central Asian Free Trade Zone in 
reaction to the collapse of the new ruble zone proposed by 
Russia in late 1993. Although not the full organization of Cen- 
tral Asian nations that had been envisioned by intellectuals 
since before independence, this exclusively economic agree- 
ment was able to abolish trade barriers among the partners 
immediately, and trade between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan 
increased in 1994. But further conditions on credit, prices, 
taxes, customs, currency convertibility, and creation of a com- 
mon economic zone in the Fergana Valley, the vital economic 
region shared by the three partners and Tajikistan, were 
delayed throughout 1994 and the first half of 1995. Kyrgyzstan 
has announced its intention to join the World Trade Organiza- 
tion (WTO — see Glossary), successor to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

For reasons of commerce and national unity, Kyrgyzstan 
urgently needs improved systems of transportation and tele- 
communications, neither of which has received adequate atten- 
tion since the 1980s. Some projects did, however, benefit from 
substantial foreign investment in the early and mid-1990s. 

Transportation 

The failure to develop Kyrgyzstan's internal communications 
has exacerbated the republic's tendencies toward regional divi- 
sion between the north (dominated by the population center 
of Bishkek) and the south (dominated by the population cen- 
ter of Osh). The two regions are separated by sparsely popu- 
lated, mountainous terrain (see fig. 2; Topography and 
Drainage, this ch.). Transportation problems have been exac- 
erbated by the country's energy dependence, which includes 
the import of 100 percent of its gasoline supply. The republic's 
road and railroad systems are divided into two parts. The 
northern part is integrated with the transportation networks of 
Kazakstan, and the southern part is integrated with the net- 
works of Uzbekistan. Three government agencies are responsi- 
ble for transportation: the Ministry of Transportation, the State 
Civil Aviation Agency, and the Bishkek Railway Department. 
Kyrgyzstan is part of a large-scale project to coordinate develop- 
ment of the transportation infrastructure in the heartland of 



165 



Country Studies 



Asia, sponsored by the UN Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific. The agency plans to spend as much as 
US$1.5 trillion between 1993 and 2000 to facilitate trans-Asian 
railroad and highway connections. 

In 1990 Kyrgyzstan had 28,400 kilometers of roads, of which 
22,400 were hard-surfaced. Some 371 million passengers and 
43.9 million tons of freight traveled by road in 1992, account- 
ing for 95 percent and 72 percent of total passengers and 
freight, respectively. The Karakorum Highway, a Chinese-built 
road from Urumqi, at the eastern end of the Tian Shan in 
China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, to Islamabad in 
northern Pakistan, has a connector to Bishkek, which is 1,900 
kilometers from Islamabad (and 3,500 kilometers from Karachi 
on the Arabian Sea) by that route. A planned connector from 
Osh via Sary-Tash would cut 200 kilometers from those dis- 
tances. In 1994 the condition of the country's roads was made a 
state secret. 

Although Kyrgyzstan imports 100 percent of the gasoline it 
uses, government subsidies have kept gasoline prices relatively 
low because of the economic role of the nation's roads; in early 
1995, tariff increases pushed the average price to roughly 
US$.30 per liter. The subsidy system has meant that supply is 
quite erratic and unpredictable; an acute shortage occurred in 
April 1995, raising the black-market gasoline price above 
US$.50 per liter. 

In a country where 95 percent of freight moves by truck, the 
gasoline shortage has largely isolated the more remote prov- 
inces, and it has made ambulance, fire, and police services dif- 
ficult to maintain. In at least one town in Osh Province, 
officials responded to the fuel shortage simply by shutting off 
all services, leaving the people without light, heat, or power. 
Public transportation has been doubly burdened because the 
gasoline shortage has restricted use of private cars and crowded 
an increased number of riders onto a reduced number of 
buses. In some cities, such as Kant and Naryn, the city bus ser- 
vices simply stopped running, making it almost impossible for 
people to get to work. Naryn's solution was to replace the 
municipal buses with horse-drawn omnibuses. 

Rail transport plays a minor role, with a total of 370 kilome- 
ters of track, mostly in the north, providing links to Russia via 
Kazakstan. In the Soviet system, all rail freight moved along this 
corridor. Short lines in the south connect towns with the Ursa- 
tevskaya-Andijon Line in Uzbekistan. In 1992 some 1.7 million 



166 



Kyrgyzstan 



passengers and 5.5 million tons of freight were transported by 
rail. A rail link from Urumqi to Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, was 
opened in 1994, widening Kyrgyzstan's export possibilities. In 
1995 a spur of that line opened from Ashgabat to Bandar- 
Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz in southern Iran. Although a 
proposal has been made to build a north-south rail link con- 
necting Balychki with Kara-Keche, the money for such a project 
is not expected to be available in the foreseeable future. 

In the early 1990s, available air transport facilities were inad- 
equate. The national airline was formed from a share of the air- 
craft and personnel allocated from the Soviet airline Aeroflot. 
Manas, the international airport at Bishkek (named after the 
mythical national hero), was modernized in 1988 to make it 
the most modern commercial airport in Central Asia. A second 
international facility is located at Osh, and about twenty-five 
usable local fields supplement air service. Manas Airport origi- 
nally offered flights to fifty cities in the CIS, including regular 
service to Moscow and Tashkent, and charter flights to China, 
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. However, that facility has been 
almost unused since 1991. The shortage of jet fuel has forced 
Kyrgyzstan to rely almost completely on the Almaty interna- 
tional airport, four hours by road from Bishkek, for interna- 
tional connections, and the availability of air transport greatly 
decreased in the early 1990s. The loss of air services has exacer- 
bated the country's tendency toward a north-south split. 

Telecommunications 

Telecommunications in Kyrgyzstan, generally inadequate, 
suffer from the historically low priority accorded by Soviet 
authorities to development of that type of infrastructure. In 
1994 only 364,000 main telephone lines, or one per twelve Kyr- 
gyzstanis, were in service. Since independence a thriving black 
market has developed in cable stolen from existing telephone 
installations, removing many portions of the telephone system 
from operation. The average age of system components is 
about fifteen years. Because much existing equipment is oper- 
ating at capacity, heavier service loads (which experts judge an 
absolutely necessary element of economic expansion) require 
large-scale equipment replacement. In 1991 about 600 lines 
connected Kyrgyzstan to the rest of the Soviet Union; sixty 
channels connected the republic to international lines via Mos- 
cow. In 1995 international calls still were connected through 
Moscow, allowing Kyrgyzstan to benefit indirectly from the gen- 



167 



Country Studies 

eral upgrading of services that has occurred in Russia in the 
early 1990s. In 1994 Kyrgyzstan received a loan of US$8 million 
and US$1.5 million in technical assistance from the European 
Bank for Recovery and Development (EBRD) to upgrade its 
telecommunications services, especially in the mountainous 
regions. The Ministry of Communications is responsible for 
local, national, and international telephone, telex, telegraph, 
and data communications. The ministry also is charged with 
postal services, radio and television broadcasting, and manage- 
ment of subscriptions and deliveries of news publications. Tele- 
communications, despite low tariffs, have been profitable 
enough to operate independently of the state budget since 
1986. But without a revision of the tariff structure and institu- 
tional and regulatory restructuring, the state of telecommuni- 
cations places a major constraint on the development of a 
market-oriented economy. 

Kyrgyzstan Radio and Kyrgyzstan Television are state broad- 
casting companies. The two state-run national radio stations 
broadcast some English and German programming. One com- 
mercial radio station is in operation. In 1993 three hours of 
television programming were available per day; Kyrgyzstan 
Television receives its color broadcasts from the Secam net- 
work. 

Government and Politics 

As independence has progressed, politics have grown 
increasingly tangled in Kyrgyzstan. President Akayev, who took 
office amid a chain of events that lent credence to an idealistic 
promise of democratic reform and stability, has proven more 
able to formulate goals than to carry them out. Although a 
constitution was ratified in 1993, many terms of that document 
have not yet gone into force. 

Background 

In March 1990, while still part of the Soviet Union, the 
republic elected a 350-member Jogorku Kenesh (parliament), 
which remained in power until it dissolved itself in September 
1994. This body was elected under the rules prescribed by the 
perestroika (see Glossary) policy of Soviet President Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev, which mandated that at least 80 percent of legisla- 
tive seats be contested even though communists likely would 
win most seats. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, five seats went to the 



168 



Kyrgyzstan 



initial opposition movement, the Democratic Movement of 
Kyrgyzstan (DDK). 

Over time it has become apparent that President Akayev pre- 
fers dealing with administrators subordinate to him rather than 
with legislators. The initial harmony between Akayev and the 
parliament began to sour in 1993. A number of specific points 
of contention arose, most of them related to growing legislative 
resistance to what was widely viewed to be government corrup- 
tion and mismanagement. Throughout 1993 the parliament 
sought aggressively to extend control over the executive 
branch. The allotment of development concessions for two of 
the republic's largest gold deposits was a particular rallying 
point (see Natural Resources, this ch.). The chief representa- 
tive of Cameco, Boris Birshtein, was a Swiss citizen who had 
been named in a number of financial scandals in Russia and 
elsewhere in the CIS. When it was discovered that the Kyr- 
gyzstani negotiating team that had sealed the Cameco transac- 
tion had financial interests in the deal, the agreement nearly 
was cancelled entirely. In December 1993, public protest about 
this gold concession brought down the government of Prime 
Minister Tursunbek Chyngyshev and badly damaged Akayev's 
popularity and credibility. 

Chyngyshev was replaced by Apas Jumagulov, who had been 
prime minister during the late Soviet period. Jumagulov was 
reappointed in March 1995 and again in March 1996. Akayev 
was not publicly accused of being involved in the gold scandals, 
but numerous rumors have mentioned corruption and influ- 
ence-peddling in the Akayev family, especially in the entourage 
of his wife. As these rumors circulated more widely, President 
Akayev held a public referendum of approval for his presidency 
in January 1994. Most impartial observers regarded the 96 per- 
cent approval that Akayev claimed after the referendum as a 
political fiction. 

Constitution 

Besides electing Akayev, the 1990 parliament fashioned the 
legislative foundation for the political transformation of the 
republic, in concert with the president. Perhaps the biggest 
accomplishment in this phase was the drafting and passage, in 
May 1993, of the country's constitution. The constitution man- 
dates three branches of government: a unicameral parliament; 
an executive branch, consisting of government and local offi- 



169 



Country Studies 

cials appointed by the president; and a judiciary, with a presi- 
dentially appointed Supreme Court and lower courts. 

In many ways, however, the constitution has not been put 
into force. Akayev is still president under a popular mandate 
gained in an uncontested election in 1991, and most of the 
judicial system has not been appointed. The existing bicameral 
parliament, which was elected early in 1995, does not match 
the unicameral body prescribed by the constitution. This struc- 
tural change was attained through popular referendum, for 
which the constitution does not provide, although the same 
referendum simultaneously gave popular (and retroactive) per- 
mission for this abrogation of the constitution. In February 
1996, Akayev's proposed constitutional amendments strength- 
ening the office of president were approved by 94 percent of 
voters in a national referendum. 

Structure of Government 

Although the constitution calls for a government of three 
branches, in practice the presidency has been the strongest 
government office. As economic and social conditions deterio- 
rated in the early 1990s, President Akayev sought extraconstitu- 
tional authority in dealing with a series of crises. Under these 
conditions, Akayev faced occasional opposition from parlia- 
ment, and pockets of local resistance grew stronger in the 
southern provinces. 

President and Council of Ministers 

Akayev is able to act as he does because under the constitu- 
tion the president stands outside the three-branch system in 
the capacity of guarantor of the constitutional functioning of 
all three branches. The president names the prime minister 
and the Council of Ministers, subject to legislative confirma- 
tion. 

According to the constitution, the president is to be elected 
once every five years, for no more than two terms, from among 
citizens who are between thirty-five and sixty-five years of age, 
who have lived at least fifteen years in the republic, and who 
are fluent in the state language, which is Kyrgyz. There is no 
vice president. Akayev defied predictions that he would seek 
referendum approval of an extension of his term rather than 
stand for reelection in 1996 as mandated in the constitution. 
(The presidents of Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 
had followed the former course in 1994 and 1995.) In the pres- 



170 



Kyrgyzstan 



idential election of December 1995, Akayev gained 71.6 per- 
cent of the vote against two communist challengers. Several 
other political figures protested that they had been prevented 
illegally from participating. International observers found the 
election free and fair. Earlier, newly elected deputies of the 
1995 parliament had proposed that presidential elections be 
postponed until at least the year 2000, with Akayev to remain 
president in the interim. According to rumors, Akayev favored 
using a referendum to extend his own term of office, but he 
found acceptance of parliament's proposal unwise. Kyrgyzstan 
depends heavily on the loans of Western banks and govern- 
ments, who objected strenuously to the cancellation of elec- 
tions as a "step back from democracy." 

The Council of Ministers nominally is entrusted with day-to- 
day administration of the government. In general, however, the 
office of the presidency has dominated policy making; in most 
cases, Akayev's prerogative of appointing the prime minister 
and all cabinet positions has not been effectively balanced by 
the nominal veto power of parliament over such appointments. 
The new parliament of 1995 showed considerably more inde- 
pendence by vetoing several key Akayev administrative appoint- 
ments. In February 1996, the government resigned following 
the approval of Akayev's constitutional amendments. The new 
government that Akayev appointed in March 1996 included fif- 
teen ministries: agriculture, communications, culture, defense, 
economy, education and science, finance, foreign affairs, 
health, industry and trade, internal affairs, justice, labor and 
social welfare, transportation, and water resources, plus deputy 
prime ministers for agrarian policy, sociocultural policy, and 
industrial policy and the chairmen of nine committees and 
agencies. Many individuals retained their positions from the 
preceding government; changes occurred mainly in agencies 
dealing with social affairs and the economy. 

Legislature 

In October 1994, Akayev took the legally questionable step 
of holding a referendum to ask public approval for bypassing 
legal requirements to amend the constitution. The referendum 
asked permission to amend the constitution to establish a 
bicameral legislature that would include an upper chamber, 
called the Legislative House, which would have only thirty-five 
members. Those deputies would receive government salaries 
and would sit in permanent session. A lower chamber, the 



171 



Country Studies 



House of National Representatives, would have seventy mem- 
bers and would convene more irregularly. Akayev's plan also 
provided that deputies in this new parliament would not be 
able to hold other government positions, a clause that caused 
most of the republic's prominent politicians to drop out of con- 
sideration for election to parliament. 

In the elections to the new parliament that began in Febru- 
ary 1995, only sixteen deputies managed to get clear mandates 
on the first round of balloting. Second-round voting also 
proved indecisive. When the parliament was convened for the 
first time, in March 1995, fifteen seats remained unfilled; two 
important provinces (Naryn and Talas) had no deputies in the 
upper house at all, prompting angry cries that regional inter- 
ests were not being properly represented when the two houses 
elected their respective speakers. A later round of elections, 
which extended into May, was marked by widespread accusa- 
tions of fraud, ballot-stuffing, and government manipulation. 

Such circumstances aroused strong doubts about the legisla- 
tive competency of the parliament. Only six of the deputies 
have previous parliamentary experience, and a number of 
prominent political figures, including Medetkan Sherymkulov, 
speaker of the 1990-94 parliament, failed to win what had been 
assumed were "safe" seats. Even more serious were concerns 
about the incomplete mandate of the new legislative system. 
The constitutional modifications voted on by referendum did 
not specify what the duties and limitations of the two houses 
would be. Thus, the early sessions of 1995 were preoccupied by 
procedural wranglings over the respective rights and responsi- 
bilities of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 
Because little business of substance was conducted in that ses- 
sion, several deputies threatened that this parliament, like the 
previous one, might "self-dissolve." However, the body 
remained intact as of mid-1996. 

Judiciary 

According to the constitution, judges are to be chosen by the 
president, subject to parliamentary confirmation. Potential 
judges must be Kyrgyzstani citizens between thirty-five and 
sixty-five years of age who have legal training and at least ten 
years of legal experience. The length of judges' tenure is 
unlimited, but judges are subject to dismissal for cause by par- 
liament. In the mid-1990s, the judicial system remained incom- 
plete both in the filling of prescribed positions and in the 



172 



Kyrgyzstan 



establishment of judicial procedures and precedents. A 
Supreme Court was appointed, but its functioning was delayed 
in 1995 by parliament's refusal to approve Akayev's nominee as 
chief justice. Although the parliament of 1991-94 also man- 
dated a national constitutional court (over the objections of 
Akayev) , that body never has been established. 

In general, the rule of law is not well established in the 
republic. The one area of the law that has flourished in Kyr- 
gyzstan is libel law, which public figures have used widely to 
control the republic's press. By contrast, the observance of laws 
designed for the regulation of the economy is not uniform or 
consistent, even by government officials. The functioning of 
the State Arbitration Court, which has responsibility for finan- 
cial and jurisdictional disputes within government agencies 
and between government agencies and private enterprises, has 
been extremely irregular and lacking in oversight by any other 
government institution. 

Local Government 

The republic is divided into seven administrative regions: six 
provinces and the capital city of Bishkek. The so-called north- 
ern provinces are Naryn, Ysyk-K61, Chu, and Talas, and the 
southern provinces are Osh and Jalal-Abad. Jalal-Abad was 
formed out of Osh Province in 1991, largely to disperse the 
political strength of the south that had become centered in 
Osh. Each province has a local legislature, but real power is 
wielded by the province governor (until 1996 called the akim), 
who is a presidential appointee. In some cases, the akim 
became a powerful spokesman for regional interests, running 
the district with considerable autonomy. Particularly notable in 
this regard was Jumagul Saadanbekov, the akim of Ysyk-K61 
Province. The government reorganization of early 1996 wid- 
ened the governors' responsibilities for tax collection, pen- 
sions, and a variety of other economic and social functions. 

Akayev has had difficulty establishing control over the two 
southern provinces. Several southern politicians (the most 
important of whom was Sheraly Sydykov, scion of an old Osh 
family that enjoyed great prominence in the Soviet era) have 
taken the lead in national opposition against Akayev. Sydykov 
headed the parliamentary corruption commission in 1994, and 
he headed the influential banking and ethics committees of 
the parliament elected in 1995. 



173 



Country Studies 

When the akim of Osh resigned to run for the new parlia- 
ment, Akayev appointed as his replacement Janysh Rustam- 
bekov, an Akayev protege who had been state secretary. 
Rustambekov, the first northerner to head this southern prov- 
ince and a highly controversial appointment, was considered to 
be a direct surrogate of Akayev in improving control over the 
south. Rustambekov, who has fired large numbers of local 
administrators, is opposed chiefly by Osh Province Council 
head Bekamat Osmonov, who is one of the most skilled and 
influential politicians in the south. Osmonov, who also was a 
deputy in the lower house of the new legislature, emerged as a 
powerful critic of Akayev and a possible presidential rival if 
Akayev could not prevent the next election. 

Political Parties 

The period immediately preceding and following indepen- 
dence saw a proliferation of political groups of various sizes 
and platforms. Although President Akayev emerged from the 
strongest of those groups, in the early 1990s no organized party 
system developed either around Akayev or in opposition to 
him. 

Communist Parties 

The Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (CPK), which was the 
only legal political party during the Soviet years, was abolished 
in 1991 in the aftermath of the failed coup against the Gor- 
bachev government of the Soviet Union. A successor, the Kyr- 
gyzstan Communist Party, was allowed to register in September 
1992. It elected two deputies to the lower house of parliament 
in 1995. In that party, significant oppositionists include past 
republic leader Absamat Masaliyev, a former first secretary of 
the CPK. The 1995 election also gave a deputy's mandate to T. 
Usubaliyev, who had been head of the CPK and leader of the 
republic between 1964 and 1982. Another party with many 
former communist officials is the Republican People's Party. 
Two other, smaller neocommunist parties are the Social Demo- 
crats of Kyrgyzstan, which gained three seats in the upper 
house and eight seats in the lower house of the 1995 parlia- 
ment, and the People's Party of Kyrgyzstan, which holds three 
seats in the lower house. 

Other Parties 

All of the other parties in existence in 1995 began as unsanc- 



174 



Kyrgyzstan 



tioned civic movements. The first is Ashar (Help), which was 
founded in 1989 as a movement to take over unused land for 
housing; Ashar took one seat in the upper house in the 1995 
elections. A fluctuating number of parties and groups are 
joined under the umbrella of the Democratic Movement of 
Kyrgyzstan (DDK); the most influential is Erkin Kyrgyzstan 
(Freedom for Kyrgyzstan), which in late 1992 split into two par- 
ties, one retaining the name Erkin Kyrgyzstan, and the other 
called Ata-meken (Fatherland). In the 1995 elections, Erkin 
Kyrgyzstan took one seat and Ata-meken two seats in the upper 
house. In the spring of 1995, the head of Erkin Kyrgyzstan was 
indicted for embezzling funds from the university of which he 
is a rector; it is unclear whether or not this accusation was polit- 
ically motivated. 

Another democratically inclined party, Asaba (Banner) also 
took one seat in the upper house. Registration was denied to 
another group, the Freedom Party, because its platform 
includes the creation of an Uygur autonomous district extend- 
ing into the Chinese Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 
which the Chinese government opposes. The Union of Ger- 
mans took one seat in the lower house, and a Russian national- 
ist group, Concord, also took one seat. 

For all their proliferation, parties have not yet played a large 
part in independent Kyrgyzstan. In the mid-1990s, early enthu- 
siasm for the democratic parties faded as the republic's econ- 
omy grew worse and party officials were implicated in the 
republic's proliferating political corruption. The communist 
successor parties, on the other hand, appeared to gain influ- 
ence in this period. In the absence of elections, and with Presi- 
dent Akayev belonging to no party, it is difficult to predict the 
future significance of any of these parties. 

The Media 

For the first two years of independence, Kyrgyzstan's newspa- 
pers were a remarkable phenomenon, with real political signif- 
icance and power. Save that Kyrgyzstan's newspapers had not 
yet developed a Western-style code of journalistic scrupulous- 
ness and restraint, it would have been possible to say that the 
press was beginning to become the fourth estate that the media 
represent in developed democracies. Through late 1993, Kyr- 
gyzstan's newspapers enjoyed the greatest freedom of publica- 
tion in any of the Central Asian nations, rivaling the freedom 
of the post-1991 Moscow press. Although a state secrecy com- 



175 



Country Studies 



mittee had the power to require submission of materials in 
advance of publication, in fact the newspapers were able to dis- 
cuss issues of public interest closely and dispassionately. During 
the gold scandals, for example, the newspapers played a crucial 
role in airing both opposition attacks on Akayev and his gov- 
ernment, and the government's defense against those attacks. 

Since 1993, however, the government has moved increas- 
ingly to impose control. In August 1993, formal censorship was 
briefly reimposed, but then a spirited outcry from the press 
brought a reversal of that move. More subtle methods of cen- 
sorship were applied in January 1994, during the run-up to the 
public referendum on Akayev's performance. Although there 
are several independent or quasi-independent newspapers in 
the republic, all printing presses remain in government hands, 
which gives the state the option of simply refusing to print 
opposition newspapers. 

In 1994 the Akayev government stepped up pressure on the 
local press, closing three newspapers entirely, including the 
popular Russian-language Svobodnye gory, the official organ of 
the parliament. Government officials also began to bring suits 
against newspapers as private individuals, claiming defamation 
and slander. One such case resulted in a costly judgement 
against the editor of Delo No, a tabloid-style scandal sheet that is 
perhaps the most widely read newspaper in the country. In the 
spring of 1995, Akayev used the same tactic against the editor 
of Respublika, long one of the most persistent and successful 
critics of the regime; the president succeeded in getting a 
judgement that forbids the editor from working for eighteen 
months. 

Beginning in 1994, the Kyrgyz populace began to feel threat- 
ened by the government and other forces in the republic. The 
atmosphere has not been helped by a series of unexplained 
attacks on journalists, including one popular commentator, a 
persistent investigator of the gold scandals, who died after 
being struck on the head. Although the newsman's grave also 
was desecrated shortly after his burial, no government investi- 
gation was conducted. The government has shown reluctance 
to impose direct Soviet-style censorship, but Akayev warned in 
January 1995 that the press would be wise to begin practicing 
self-censorship and to print more positive news. 

The economic conditions of journalism prevent any Kyr- 
gyzstani newspaper from being totally free. None of the repub- 
lic's papers has yet developed a sustaining readership, and 



176 



Kyrgyzstan 



because the economy is insufficiently developed to provide 
advertising revenue, all newspapers must depend on sponsors. 
For many papers, including Slovo Kyrgyzstana, which has the 
largest circulation, the sponsor is the government. Others such 
as Asaba have political sponsors, and at least one is sponsored 
by Turkish investors. Even the most independent of the papers, 
Respublika, has been forced to turn to commercial sponsors, 
which, according to rumor, include Seabeco-Kyrgyzstan, the 
scandal-tainted intermediary in the Kumtor gold deal. 

The most important Russian-language newspapers are Slovo 
Kyrgyzstana, the official government paper (circulation about 
15,000 in 1994); Vechernii Bishkek, a more domestic city paper 
(reaching 75,000 readers on Fridays); the tabloid scandal sheet 
Delo No (30,000 copies); Asaba, the organ of the party of the 
same name (20,000 copies); and Respublika, the most promi- 
nent surviving opposition paper (7,000 copies). The major Kyr- 
gyz language newspapers are Kyrgyz guusu and Kut Bilim. A 
bilingual newspaper, Erkin Too/Svobodnye gory, has appeared, 
but, unlike its earlier namesake, it is not an opposition paper. 
One English-language paper, Kyrgyzstan Chronicle, mostly repro- 
duces articles from foreign English-language sources. 

The electronic media are unevenly developed in the repub- 
lic, both because of the physical constraints imposed by the 
country's mountainous terrain and because of financial diffi- 
culties. Resources are concentrated in Bishkek, which is well 
supplied with television and with radio. Penetration of more 
remote areas, however, is incomplete. 

The government retains ownership of all but one broadcast 
facility, giving it a strong voice in the development of indepen- 
dent programming. There is at least one independent radio 
company, called Piramida, and several independent television 
production companies. In June 1995, the government pro- 
posed reinstitution of formal state control over all broadcasting 
in the republic. 

Financial problems have caused Kyrgyzstan to cut back on 
the number of hours of Russian television that it relays from 
Moscow, although the Russian government has shown an incli- 
nation to work with Kyrgyzstan to keep Russian-language pro- 
gramming on the air in the republic. In the south, most 
programming originates in Uzbekistan, a situation that tends 
to exacerbate the north-south split within Kyrgyzstan. 



177 



Country Studies 
Human Rights 

In its early days, Kyrgyzstan demonstrated a strong commit- 
ment to observation of human rights, from which it has subse- 
quently stepped back. Nevertheless, the republic remains 
generally more sensitive to human rights than are the states in 
its immediate environment. 

The republic's constitution provides very strong guarantees 
of personal liberty, protection of privacy, freedom of assembly 
and expression, and other hallmarks of democratic societies. 
On several occasions, the government has violated or abro- 
gated the constitution, raising the possibility of abuse of 
human rights. 

In practice, however, the Akayev government has proven 
itself generally responsive on issues of human rights, at least in 
part because of the republic's dependence upon the approval 
of Western financial supporters. The present legal system, 
which remains based almost entirely upon Soviet-era practices, 
does permit pre-trial detention of up to one year (there is no 
bail), which in one or two celebrated cases has appeared abu- 
sive. However, international monitoring organizations have 
found no evidence of political arrests, detentions, disappear- 
ances, or extrajudicial punishments. There have been some 
unsubstantiated complaints by political activists of wiretapping 
and other illegal surveillance. 

In a celebrated case in 1992, Uzbekistani security forces 
arrested two Uzbek delegates to a human rights conference 
held in Bishkek. Although this arrest was subsequently found 
to be in technical agreement with Kyrgyzstani law, the public 
manner in which the arrest was conducted demonstrated Kyr- 
gyzstan's lack of resources to defend human rights activists. 

Foreign Relations 

Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy has been controlled by two con- 
siderations — first, that the country is too small and too poor to 
be economically viable without considerable outside assistance, 
and second, that it lies in a volatile corner of the globe, vulner- 
able to a number of unpleasant possibilities. These two consid- 
erations have influenced substantially the international 
position taken by Kyrgyzstan, especially toward the developed 
nations and its immediate neighbors. 

Akayev and his ministers have traveled the globe tirelessly 
since independence, seeking relations and partners. In the first 



178 



Kyrgyzstan 



four years of independence, Akayev visited the United States, 
Turkey, Switzerland, Japan, Singapore, and Israel. His emissar- 
ies have also been to Iran, Lebanon, and South Africa, and his 
prime minister made a trip through most of Europe. One con- 
sequence of these travels is that Kyrgyzstan is recognized by 120 
nations and has diplomatic relations with sixty-one of them. 
The United States embassy opened in Bishkek in February 
1992, and a Kyrgyzstani embassy was established in Washington 
later that year. Kyrgyzstan is a member of most major interna- 
tional bodies, including the UN, the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE — see Glossary), the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the EBRD. It has also joined the Asian 
Development Bank, the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO — see Glossary), and the Islamic Bank. 

Akayev has stressed repeatedly that the principle behind his 
search for contacts is strict neutrality; Kyrgyzstan is a small, rela- 
tively resource-poor, remote nation more likely to seek help 
from the world community than to contribute to it. Especially 
in the first months of independence, Akayev stressed Kyr- 
gyzstan's intellectual and political potential, hoping to attract 
the world community to take risks in an isolated experiment in 
democracy. Akayev referred to making his nation an Asian Swit- 
zerland, transformed by a combination of international 
finance and the light, clean industry, mostly electronic, that he 
expected to spring up from conversion of the Soviet-era 
defense industries. Largely because of Akayev's reputation and 
personality, Kyrgyzstan has become the largest per capita recip- 
ient of foreign aid in the CIS (see Foreign Investment, this 
ch.). 

However, the decay of the domestic economy and increasing 
dissatisfaction among constituents have made the Akayev gov- 
ernment distinctly less optimistic about the degree to which it 
can rely upon the distant world community. At the same time, 
political and social developments in the republic's immediate 
area have directed the republic's attention increasingly to for- 
eign policy concerns much closer to home. 

Central Asian Neighbors 

Kyrgyzstan is bordered by four nations, three of which — 
Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan — are former Soviet 
republics. China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, where 
a substantial separatist movement has been active, also adjoins 
the republic. Although Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have recog- 



179 



Country Studies 



nized their existing borders with Kyrgyzstan, as of 1996 Tajiki- 
stan had not done so. China recognizes the old Soviet Union 
border but is said to have objections to twelve specific points of 
its common border with Kyrgyzstan. The objections have been 
referred to a Chinese-CIS border committee for resolution. 

Undoubtedly the most immediate concern is neighboring 
Uzbekistan, which, under the leadership of President Islam 
Karimov, is emerging as the strongest state in post-Soviet Cen- 
tral Asia. Although Uzbekistan faces serious economic prob- 
lems of its own, it has a homogeneous and well-educated 
population of more than 20 million, a diversified and devel- 
oped economy, and sufficient natural resources to allow the 
country to become self-sufficient in energy and a major 
exporter of gold, cotton, and natural gas (see The Economy, 
ch. 5). 

Uzbekistan has the best organized and best disciplined secu- 
rity forces in all of Central Asia, as well as a relatively large and 
experienced army and air force. Uzbekistan dominates south- 
ern Kyrgyzstan both economically and politically, based on the 
large Uzbek population in that region of Kyrgyzstan and on 
economic and geographic conditions (see Ethnic Groups, this 
ch.). Much of Kyrgyzstan depends entirely on Uzbekistan for 
natural gas; on several occasions, Karimov has achieved politi- 
cal ends by shutting pipelines or by adjusting terms of delivery. 
In a number of television appearances broadcast in the Osh 
and Jalal-Abad provinces of Kyrgyzstan, Karimov has addressed 
Akayev with considerable condescension; Akayev, in turn, has 
been highly deferential to his much stronger neighbor. 
Although Uzbekistan has not shown overt expansionist tenden- 
cies, the Kyrgyz government is acutely aware of the implications 
of Karimov's assertions that he is responsible for the well-being 
of all Uzbeks, regardless of their nation of residence. 

Although it presents no such expansionist threat, Kazakstan 
is as important to northern Kyrgyzstan as Uzbekistan is to the 
south. The virtual closure of Manas Airport at Bishkek makes 
Kazakhstan's capital, Almaty, the principal point of entry to Kyr- 
gyzstan. The northwestern city of Talas receives nearly all of its 
services through the city of Dzhambyl, across the border in 
Kazakstan. Although Kazakstan's president Nursultan Naz- 
arbayev has cooperated in economic agreements, in May 1993 
Kyrgyzstan's introduction of the som caused Nazarbayev to 
close his country's border with Kyrgyzstan to avoid a flood of 
worthless Kyrgyzstani rubles. 



180 



Kyrgyzstan 



Kyrgyzstan's relations with Tajikistan have been tense. Refu- 
gees and antigovernment fighters in Tajikistan have crossed 
into Kyrgyzstan several times, even taking hostages. Kyrgyzstan 
attempted to assist in brokering an agreement between contest- 
ing Tajikistani forces in October 1992 but without success. 
Akayev later joined presidents Karimov and Nazarbayev in 
sending a joint intervention force to support Tajikistan's presi- 
dent Imomali Rahmonov against insurgents, but the Kyr- 
gyzstani parliament delayed the mission of its small contingent 
for several months until late spring 1993. In mid-1995 Kyr- 
gyzstani forces had the responsibility of sealing a small portion 
of the Tajikistan border near Panj from Tajikistani rebel forces. 

The greater risk to Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan is the general 
destabilization that the protracted civil war has brought to the 
region. In particular, the Khorugh-Osh road, the so-called 
"highway above the clouds," has become a major conduit of 
contraband of all sorts, including weapons and drugs (see 
Internal Security, this ch.). A meeting of the heads of the state 
security agencies of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, and 
Uzbekistan, held in Osh in the spring of 1995, also drew the 
conclusion that ethnic, social, and economic conditions in Osh 
were increasingly similar to those in Tajikistan in the late 1980s, 
thus recognizing the contagion of Tajikistan's instability. 

Chinese-Kyrgyzstani relations are an area of substantial 
uncertainty for the government in Bishkek. China has become 
Kyrgyzstan's largest non-CIS trade partner, but China's influ- 
ence is stronger in the north of Kyrgyzstan than in the south. 
This limitation could change if efforts to join the Karakorum 
Highway to Osh through Sary-Tash are successful. The free- 
trade zone in Naryn has attracted large numbers of Chinese 
businesspeople, who have come to dominate most of the 
republic's import and export of small goods. Most of this trade 
is in barter conducted by ethnic Kyrgyz or Kazaks who are Chi- 
nese citizens. The Kyrgyzstani government has expressed alarm 
over the numbers of Chinese who are moving into Naryn and 
other parts of Kyrgyzstan, but no preventive measures have 
been taken. 

The Akayev government also must be solicitous of Chinese 
sensibilities on questions of nationalism because the Chinese 
do not want the independence of the Central Asian states to 
stimulate dreams of statehood among their own Turkic Muslim 
peoples. Although the Kyrgyz in China have been historically 
quiescent, China's Uygurs (of whom there is a small exile com- 



181 



Country Studies 



munity in Kyrgyzstan) have been militant in their desire to 
attain independence. This is the major reason that Kyrgyzstan 
has refused to permit the formation of an Uygur party (see 
Political Parties, this ch.). 

In the 1990s, trade with China has grown to such a volume 
that some officials in Kyrgyzstan fear that by the late 1990s Kyr- 
gyzstan's economy will be entirely dominated by China. In 
some political quarters, the prospect of Chinese domination 
has stimulated nostalgia for the days of Moscow's control. 

Russia 

In fact, whereas the other Central Asian republics have 
sometimes complained of Russian interference, Kyrgyzstan has 
more often wished for more attention and support from Mos- 
cow than it has been able to obtain. For all the financial sup- 
port that the world community has offered, Kyrgyzstan remains 
economically dependent on Russia, both directly and through 
Kazakstan. In early 1995, Akayev attempted to sell Russian com- 
panies controlling shares in the republic's twenty-nine largest 
industrial plants, an offer that Russia refused. 

Akayev has been equally enthusiastic about more direct 
forms of reintegration, such as the Euro-Asian Union that Naz- 
arbayev proposed in June 1994. Because Kyrgyzstan presum- 
ably would receive much more from such a union than it would 
contribute, Akayev's enthusiasm has met with little response 
from Russia and the other, larger states that would be involved 
in such an arrangement. Akayev's invitation for Russian border 
guards to take charge of Kyrgyzstan's Chinese border, a major 
revision of his policy of neutrality, was another move toward 
reintegration (see Armed Forces, this ch.). 

The Kyrgyzstani government also has felt compelled to 
request Russia's economic protection. The harsh reality of Kyr- 
gyzstan's economic situation means that the nation is an inevi- 
table international client state, at least for the foreseeable 
future. Despite concerted efforts to seek international "spon- 
sors," Akayev has not received much more than a great deal of 
international good will. Even if the president had not lived sev- 
enteen years in Russia himself and even if his advisers, family, 
and friends were not all Soviet-era intellectuals with a high 
degree of familiarity with Russia, economic necessity probably 
would push Kyrgyzstan further toward Russia. 

On his February 1994 visit to Moscow, Akayev signed several 
economic agreements. Having promised the republic a 75-bil- 



182 



Kyrgyzstan 



lion-ruble line of credit (presumably for use in 1994) and some 
US$65 million in trade agreements, Russia also promised to 
extend to Kyrgyzstan most-favored-nation status for the pur- 
chase of oil and other fuels. For its part, Kyrgyzstan agreed to 
the creation of a Kyrgyzstani-Russian investment company, 
which would purchase idle defense-related factories in the 
republic to provide employment for the increasingly dissatis- 
fied Russian population of Kyrgyzstan. In early 1995, prime 
ministers Jumagulov of Kyrgyzstan and Viktor Chernomyrdin 
of Russia signed a series of agreements establishing bilateral 
coordination of economic reform in the two states, further 
binding Kyrgyzstan to Russia. After lobbying hard for inclusion, 
Kyrgyzstan became a member of the customs union that Russia, 
Belarus, and Kazakstan established in February 1996. 

For its part, Russia sees aid to Kyrgyzstan as a successful pre- 
cedent in its new policy of gaining influence in its "near 
abroad," the states that once were Soviet republics. Russia does 
not want a massive in-migration of Russians from the new 
republics; some 2 million ethnic Russians moved back to Russia 
between 1992 and 1995, with at least that many again expected 
by the end of the century. Akayev, on the other hand, must find 
a way to stem the loss of his Russian population, which already 
has caused an enormous deficit of doctors, teachers, and engi- 
neers. 

For these reasons, despite opposition from Kyrgyz national- 
ists and other independence-minded politicians, in 1995 
Akayev granted the request of Russian president Boris N. 
Yeltsin to review the constitutional provision making Kyrgyz the 
sole official language. Early in 1996, Kyrgyzstan took legal steps 
toward making Russian the republic's second official language, 
subject to amendment of the constitution. That initiative coin- 
cided with the customs union signed with Russia, Kazakstan, 
and Belarus in February 1996. The long-term success of 
Akayev's search for reintegration is questionable because of 
Kyrgyzstan's minimal strategic importance and the potential 
cost to an outside country supporting the republic's shaky 
economy. 

National Security 

Located in a region of low strategic importance and sur- 
rounded by nations with major concerns in other directions, 
Kyrgyzstan did not make developing its own armed forces a 
high priority after separation from the Soviet Union. The long- 



183 



Country Studies 



standing civil war in nearby Tajikistan, however, has forced 
reevaluation of that conservative position. Internal security has 
been a major concern because of rampant crime and a well- 
developed narcotics industry. 

Armed Forces 

In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan began to build a small armed 
force based on the military doctrine that Russia will remain 
chief guarantor of Kyrgyzstan's national security interests. The 
only operational branch of the armed forces is the ground 

forces. 

Development of Military Policy 

Kyrgyzstan made its first moves toward a national military 
force in September 1991, immediately after declaring indepen- 
dence, by drawing up plans to create a national guard. How- 
ever, events overtook that plan, which was never realized. In the 
early months of independence, President Akayev was an avid 
supporter of a proposed "unified army" of the CIS, which 
would replace the former Soviet army. Those plans collapsed 
when Russia announced that it would not finance CIS troops. 
In April 1992, Kyrgyzstan formed a State Committee for 
Defense Affairs, and in June the republic took control of all 
troops on its soil (meaning remaining units of the foimer 
Soviet army). At that time, about 15,000 former Soviet soldiers 
of unknown ethnic identity remained in Kyrgyzstan. 

Although the Kyrgyzstani government did not demand a 
new oath of service until after adoption of the Law on Military 
Service (the first draft of which in 1992 was copied so hastily 
from Soviet law that it included provisions for a navy), the 
majority of the officer corps (mostly Russian) refused to serve 
in a Kyrgyzstani army, and since that time many Russian offi- 
cers have sought repatriation to Russia. A more informal out- 
flow of draftees already had been underway before Kyrgyzstan's 
independence. According to one estimate, as many as 6,000 
Russians deserted from duty in Kyrgyzstan, although that loss 
was partially offset by the return of almost 2,000 Kyrgyz who 
had been serving in the Soviet army outside their republic. 
According to reports, in 1993 between 3,000 and 4,000 non-Kyr 
gyz soldiers, mostly Russians, remained in the republic. 

In the early days of independence, Kyrgyzstani authorities 
spoke of doing without an army entirely. That idea since has 
been replaced by plans to create a standing conscripted army 



184 




Soldiers giving demonstration at Independence Day celebration, 

August 31, Bishkek 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 

of about 5,000 troops, with reserves of two to three times that 
number. The question of who would command these troops 
has been very troublesome. Russian officers continued leaving 
Kyrgyzstan through 1993 because of low pay and poor living 
conditions, and in 1994 Moscow was officially encouraging this 
exodus. To stem the out-migration, agreements signed in 1994 
by Bishkek and Moscow obligate Kyrgyzstan to pay housing and 
relocation costs for Russian officers who agree to serve in the 
Kyrgyzstani army until 1999. 

In 1994 Kyrgyzstan agreed to permit border troops of the 
Russian Army to assume the task of guarding Kyrgyzstan's bor- 
der with China. This agreement followed Russia's complaints 
that continuing desertions by Kyrgyzstani border troops were 
leaving the former Soviet border — which Russia continues to 
argue is its proper border — essentially unguarded. Akayev has 



185 



Country Studies 



periodically pushed for even more Russian military presence in 
the republic, hinting broadly that if Russia is not interested in 
resuming control of the Soviet airbases in the republic, perhaps 
other powers, such as the United States or the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization ( NATO — see Glossary), might be; how- 
ever, the fact that Kyrgyzstan in early 1995 gave the last rem- 
nants of its Soviet-era air fleet to Uzbekistan in a debt swap 
suggests that neither Moscow nor Tashkent has taken such 
offers seriously. 

It is not entirely clear what weapons Kyrgyzstan's army will 
possess. The republic lost twelve IL-39 jets in March 1992, 
when they were "repatriated" to Russia from a training field 
near the capital, and the 1995 swap with Uzbekistan lost an 
unknown number of MiG-21 fighters and L-39C close-support 
aircraft. Available information suggests strongly that Kyr- 
gyzstan, as the least militarized of the Central Asian republics, 
is incapable of defending itself against a military threat from 
any quarter. 

Command Structure 

Formally, the army is under the command of the president, 
in his role as commander in chief; the National Security Coun- 
cil is the chief agency of defense policy. Established in 1994, 
the National Security Council has seven members, not includ- 
ing the president, who is the chairman: the prime minister, the 
deputy prime minister, the state secretary, the minister of inter- 
nal affairs, the minister of defense, the chairman of the State 
Committee for National Security (successor to the Kyrgyzstan 
branch of the Committee for State Security — KGB), and the 
commander of the National Guard. The president appoints 
and dismisses senior military officers. President Akayev also has 
followed the formulation of defense policy quite closely. The 
Ministry of Defense has operational command of military 
units; General Myrzakan Subanov has been minister of defense 
since the agency was founded in 1992. The Ministry of Defense 
and the National Security Council are advised by the Center for 
Analysis, a research institution established in 1992. 

The chief of the General Staff, the second-ranking officer in 
the armed forces, is responsible for coordinating the National 
Security Council, the State Committee for National Security, 
the border troops, and civil defense. Since 1993 that position 
has been occupied by General Feliks Kulov, a Kyrgyz. The Gen- 
eral Staff, modeled after the Russian structure, includes the 



186 



Kyrgyzstan 



commanders of the National Guard, the ground forces, the air 
and air defense forces, and the internal forces. 

Ground Forces 

In 1996 the Kyrgyzstani ground forces included 7,000 troops, 
which comprise one motorized rifle division with armor and 
artillery capability. Sapper and signals regiments are attached, 
as is a mountain infantry brigade. Headquarters is at Bishkek. 
Plans called for the ground forces to be restructured in 1995 
into a corps of two motorized rifle brigades and for an airborne 
battalion to be added. In 1994 about 30 percent of the officer 
corps was Russian; the commander was General Valentin 
Luk'yanov, a Ukrainian. 

Air and Air Defense Forces 

Because of expense and military doctrine, Kyrgyzstan has 
not developed its air capability; a large number of the MiG-21 
interceptors that it borrowed from Russia were returned in 
1993, although a number of former Soviet air bases remain 
available. In 1996 about 100 decommissioned MiG-21s 
remained in Kyrgyzstan, along with ninety-six L-39 trainers and 
sixty-five helicopters. 

The air defense forces have received aid from Russia, which 
has sent military advisory units to establish a defense system. 
Presently Kyrgyzstan has twenty-six SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to- 
air missiles in its air defense arsenal. 

Border Troops 

In 1992 a Kyrgyzstani command took over the republic's 
directorate of the KGB's Central Asian Border Troops District, 
which had about 2,000 mostly Russian troops. In late 1992, 
alarmed by the possibility of penetration of the border from 
Tajikistan and China, Russia established a joint Kyrgyzstani-Rus- 
sian Border Troop Command, under Russian command. How- 
ever, that force has been plagued with desertions by Kyrgyz 
troops, about 200 of whom fled to China in 1993. Border troop 
bases are located at Isfara, Naryn, and Karakol. 

Training 

Cadets and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the 
ground forces are trained at the Bishkek Military School, which 
played the same role in the Soviet era. Under a 1993 agree- 



187 



Country Studies 



merit, a small number of ground forces cadets study at Russian 
military schools, with the specific goal of bolstering the ethnic 
Kyrgyz officer corps. Small groups of Kyrgyz cadets also attend 
military schools in Uzbekistan and Turkey. Officers selected for 
higher commands attend a three-year course at Frunze Military 
Academy in Moscow and other Russian military academies. 

For the air force, the main training site is the Bishkek Avia- 
tion School, once a major center for training foreign air cadets 
but reduced in 1992 to a small contingent of mostly Kyrgyz 
cadets. In 1992 Kyrgyzstan had five training regiments using 
430 aircraft, but that number was depleted by the mid-1990s. A 
1994 agreement calls for some Kyrgyz pilots to attend air force 
schools in Russia. 

Internal Security 

In the early and mid-1990s, preservation of internal security 
against a variety of crimes, and especially against growing com- 
merce in narcotics, became an extremely difficult task. White- 
collar crime and government corruption have added to the 
atmosphere of social disorder. 

Security Troops 

In 1991 President Akayev abolished the Kyrgyzstan branch of 
the KGB and replaced it with the State Committee for National 
Security, whose role subsequently was prescribed in a 1992 law. 
In 1996 the armed force of the committee, the National Guard, 
was an elite force of 1,000 recruited from all national groups in 
Kyrgyzstan. Organized in two battalions, the National Guard 
has been commanded since its inception by a Kyrgyz general; 
the chief of the border troops also is under that commander. 
The National Guard has the prescribed function of protecting 
the president and government property and assisting in natu- 
ral disasters; except under exceptional circumstances, its role 
does not include maintenance of domestic order. 

Police 

The republic's police system is largely unchanged from the 
Soviet era. Still called "militia," the police are under the juris- 
diction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A force estimated at 
25,000 individuals, the militia is commanded by the Central 
Police Force in Bishkek. The republic's police have suffered 
the same large-scale resignations because of low pay and bad 
working conditions as have other former Soviet republics lack- 



188 



Kyrgyzstan 



ing resources to support internal security. In April 1995, the 
national power company shut off power to the Central Police 
Force headquarters for nonpayment of electric bills, leaving 
the capital without even emergency police service for five 
hours. The poor equipment of the police further hampers 
their ability to respond to crimes. Police personnel frequently 
have been implicated in crime. Nearly 700 police were caught 
in the commission of crimes in the two months after President 
Akayev replaced the entire administration of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs in 1995. 

Crime 

Kyrgyzstan's crime problem is generally regarded as out of 
control. In 1994 more than 40,000 crimes were reported, or 
more than one crime per 100 citizens, and a high percentage 
of those crimes were classified as serious. 

Petty crime touches every sector of the economy. For exam- 
ple, although cellular telephone networks and satellite linkups 
have been established in Bishkek, telecommunications else- 
where have grown much worse because the theft and resale of 
cable has become common. Power outages are frequent for the 
same reason, and any sort of equipment with salvageable metal 
is said to be quickly stripped if left unattended. 

Foreigners are not exempt from crime, as they were in the 
Soviet era. In 1994 some 185 crimes against foreigners were 
registered in Bishkek. Most of these crimes were apartment 
burglaries, although beatings and armed robberies also have 
been reported. In April 1995, a small bomb was left in front of 
a Belgian relief mission's door, and "Foreigners Out of Bish- 
kek" was painted on the wall opposite. 

President Akayev vowed to crack down on crime in the mid- 
1990s, proposing much stiffer penalties for common crimes, 
including life imprisonment for auto theft. One sign of his seri- 
ousness was the replacement in January 1995 of the entire 
senior staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The new minis- 
ter, the Kyrgyz Modolbek Moldashev, served in the Soviet KGB 
and lived most of his life outside the republic. When he took 
office, Moldashev brought in his own people from the State 
Committee for National Security and the Ministry of Defense. 
However, it is far from clear that Kyrgyzstan's security organiza- 
tions are capable of cracking down on the drug-driven sector of 
the economy, and experts predict that if narcotics escape con- 
trol, the spiral of criminal activities will continue to grow. 



189 



Country Studies 



Government corruption and malfeasance also contribute to 
an atmosphere of lawlessness. In the mid-1990s, bribery, kick- 
backs, and influence peddling became increasingly common in 
government agencies. Law enforcement officials have received 
little cooperation from legislators in punishing their colleagues 
who are caught violating the law. In 1993 the Interregional 
Investigative Unit, established to combat bribery, found itself 
shut down after twenty successful investigations and replaced 
by an economic crimes investigation unit, some members of 
which began taking bribes themselves. 

Narcotics Control 

Perhaps the most lucrative, and certainly the most problem- 
atic, of Kyrgyzs tan's exports is narcotics, particularly opium and 
heroin. Government officials believe that the narcotics indus- 
try presents the greatest challenge to the internal security of 
Kyrgyzstan because of its capacity to destabilize the country. 

In the Soviet era, the Kyrgyz Republic was a legal producer 
of opium, with about 2,000 hectares of land planted to poppies 
in 1974, the last year before world pressure forced such farms 
to be closed. At that point, an estimated 16 percent of the 
world's opium came from Kyrgyzstan. The country's climate is 
exceptionally well suited to cultivation of opium poppies and 
wild marijuana, producing unusually pure final products from 
both types of plant. Kyrgyzstan is said to produce even better 
poppies than does nearby Afghanistan, which has surpassed 
Burma as the world's leading supplier of heroin. 

In 1992 Kyrgyzstan applied to the World Health Organiza- 
tion for permission to reinstitute the production of medicinal 
opium as a means of generating desperately needed revenue. 
The plan was to increase the planting in the northeastern Ysyk- 
K61 area to about 10,000 hectares and to open plantations in 
Talas and Naryn as well, yielding a projected annual profit of 
about US$200 million. Under pressure from the world commu- 
nity, the plan was dropped. 

In 1992 republic narcotics police uncovered thirteen drug- 
refining laboratories and seized two tons of ready narcotics. 
The police reported that drug-related crime rose 222 percent 
from 1991 to 1992 and that 830 people had been arrested on 
drug-distribution charges. Another report indicated that 70 
percent of the 44,000 crimes reported in the republic in 1992 
had a connection to drugs in one way or another. At that time, 
the head of the country's narcotics police estimated that only 



190 



Kyrgyzstan 



about 20 percent of the narcotics traffic was being interdicted, 
mainly because resources are very inadequate. Government 
officials fear that this industry will continue to grow, especially 
in the absence of large-scale international assistance; in 1994 
Russia ceased its cooperation with Kyrgyzstan in narcotics inter- 
diction. An emerging distribution chain moves opium to Mos- 
cow, then to Poland, from where it is transferred to Europe and 
the United States. 

Osh is said to have become a major new international point- 
of-purchase for opium and heroin, which is produced in all of 
the countries adjoining the Fergana Valley, including Kyr- 
gyzstan. More than 300 kilograms of opium were seized in Osh 
Province in 1994, an amount estimated to be less than 10 per- 
cent of the total moving through Osh. At the end of 1994, the 
head of the National Security Committee characterized the 
narcotics trade as the republic's sole growth industry, which he 
warned was solidifying its grip on the republic's conventional 
economy. 

Court System 

The court system remains essentially unchanged from the 
Soviet era. Nominally there are three levels in the court system: 
local courts, which handle petty crimes such as pickpocketing 
and vandalism; province-level courts, which handle crimes such 
as murder, grand larceny, and organized crime; and the 
Supreme Court, to which decisions of the lower courts can be 
appealed. However, there has been persistent conflict between 
Akayev and the legislature over the composition and authority 
of the Supreme Court, as well as over Akayev's choice of chief 
justice. As in the Soviet system, the office of the state procura- 
tor, chief civilian legal officer of the state, acts as both prosecut- 
ing attorney and chief investigator in each case. 

The protections for individuals accused of crimes remain at 
the primitive level of Soviet law. According to law, the accused 
can be held for three days before a charge is made, and pretrial 
detention can last for as long as a year. There is no system of 
bail; the accused remains incarcerated until tried. Both the 
police and forces of the State Committee for National Security 
have the right to violate guarantees of privacy (of the home, 
telephone, mail, and banks), with the sanction of the state 
procurator. In theory search warrants and judicial orders for 
such things as wiretaps only are issued by authority of a judge; 
in practice this is not always done. 



191 



Country Studies 
Prisons 

Very little current information is known about Kyrgyzstan's 
prison system. In the Soviet era, at least twelve labor camps and 
three prisons operated in the republic, including at least one 
uranium mine-labor camp in which prisoners worked without 
protective gear. The total prison capacity and present popula- 
tion are not known, but it may be presumed that prisons in Kyr- 
gyzstan are suffering the same overcrowding as are prisons 
elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. The 1995 purge of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs included appointment of a new 
head of the prison system, a colonel who had been assistant 
minister of internal affairs prior to the shakeup. 

National Security Prospects 

Although internal stability has not been a serious problem 
during the Akayev era, events in the mid-1990s threatened to 
make it so. By 1995 economic hardship, to which international 
experts did not predict a rapid end, combined with insufficient 
internal security forces and the opportunity for profits from 
organized narcotics activities to threaten the stability of Kyr- 
gyzstan's society, especially in the major urban centers of Bish- 
kek and Osh. The high crime rate also interfered with plans to 
attract Western tourist trade. 

Meanwhile, as of 1995 external security came exclusively 
from Russia, a situation that Kyrgyzstan officially welcomed in 
the absence of domestic resources to build a credible military 
force for its very small and isolated nation. As in the economic 
field, however, policy makers were not sure how long Russia 
would view strong support of Kyrgyzstan's national security as 
an important element of Russian foreign policy. Although no 
major regional threat loomed in the mid-1990s, major policy 
questions remained unanswered. 

* * * 

A useful reference for general historical background is Cen- 
tral Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth 
and revised in 1994. The Kyrgyzstan chapter of Martha Brill 
Olcott's Central Asia' s New States is a concise description of the 
republic's status in the post-Soviet world. Several publications 
of the World Bank provide detailed information about social 
and economic developments in the 1990s. Among the most 



192 



Kyrgyzstan 



useful are those entitled Kyrgyz Republic: Economic Report; Kyrgyz 
Republic: Agricultural Sector Review; Kyrgyz Republic: Energy Sector 
Review; and Kyrgyzstan: Social Protection in a Reforming Economy. 
For general background on Kyrgyz society and customs, the 
government's Discovery of Kyrghyzstan is a valuable source. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



193 



Chapter 3. Tajikistan 



Bronze vessel excavated at site of ancient city ofKhujand 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Tajikistan. 
Short Form: Tajikistan. 
Term for Citizens: Tajikistani(s). 
Capital: Dushanbe. 

Date of Independence: September 9, 1991. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 143,100 square kilometers. 

Topography: Mainly mountainous, with lower elevations in 
northwest, southwest, and Fergana Valley in far northern zone. 
Highest elevations in southeast, in Pamir-Alay system; 
numerous glaciers in mountains. Dense river network creates 
valleys through mountain chains. Lakes primarily in Pamir 
region to the east. 

Climate: Mainly continental, with drastic changes according to 
elevation. Arid in subtropical southwest lowlands, which have 
highest temperatures; lowest temperatures at highest altitudes. 
Highest precipitation near Fedchenko Glacier, lowest in 
eastern Pamirs. 

Society 

Population: By last Soviet census (1989), 5,092,603; no later 
reliable estimate available. Annual growth rate 3.0 percent in 
1992; 1991 population density 38.2 persons per square 
kilometer. 

Ethnic Groups: In 1989 census, Tajiks 62.3 percent, Uzbeks 
23.5 percent, Russians 7.6 percent, Tatars 1.4 percent, and 
Kyrgyz 1.3 percent. 

Languages: Official state language, Tajik, is spoken by an 



197 



Country Studies 



estimated 62 percent; Russian, widely used in government and 
business, a second language for most of urban non-Russian 
population. 

Religion: Islam practiced by about 90 percent of population, 
mainly Sunni; remainder Russian Orthodox, with some other 
small Christian and Jewish groups. 

Education and Literacy: Education compulsory through 
secondary school, but completion rate below 90 percent. 
Literacy estimated at 98 percent. In 1990s, facilities and 
materials extremely inadequate, and specialized secondary and 
higher education programs poorly developed. 

Health: Generally low level of care in Soviet era continued or 
declined in 1990s. Number and quality of medical personnel, 
hospitals, and equipment undermined by low funding and civil 
war. Mortality and incidence of disease rose in 1990s because of 
pollution and shortage of medicines. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): Estimated in 1993 at US$2.7 
billion, or US$470 per capita. Average growth rate 1985-92 was 
-7.8 percent per year. Beginning 1992, economic growth in all 
sectors crippled by transformation from Soviet system and by 
effects of civil war. 

Agriculture: Largest sector of economy, dominated by cotton, 
grain, vegetables; food production insufficient for domestic 
consumption. Nearly all agricultural labor unmechanized, and 
output declined sharply in mid-1990s. Commitment to cotton 
as primary crop continues in post-Soviet era, although 
production has decreased. 

Industry and Mining: Advancement and diversification slow in 
1990s after specialized roles in Soviet period emphasized 
aluminum processing and chemicals. Contributed about 30 
percent of net material product (NMP — see Glossary) in 1991. 
Productivity of nearly all industries declined in mid-1990s. 
Several minerals, including gold, mined on a small scale. 

Energy: Hydroelectric power only major source, providing 75 
percent of electricity; must import petroleum fuels and coal, 
only minor exploitation of domestic deposits. Power imports 



198 



Tajikistan 



from neighboring countries problematic in 1990s because of 
insufficient funds. 

Exports: In 1995, worth about US$720 million. Principal items 
electric power, cotton, fertilizers, nonferrous metals (especially 
aluminum), silk, fruits, and vegetables. Postcommunist export 
markets outside Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
very slow to form, and traditional barter ties remain strong; 
principal customers within CIS Russia, Kazakstan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan; outside CIS Poland, Sweden, Afghanistan, Austria, 
Norway, and Hungary. 

Imports: In 1995, worth about US$1.2 billion. Principal items 
fuels, grains, iron and steel, consumer goods, and finished 
industrial products. Principal suppliers in CIS Russia, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine; outside 
CIS Poland, Austria, France, Britain, and Turkey. Total non-CIS 
imports in 1995 US$265 million. 

Balance of Payments: Estimated 1994 budget deficit US$54.7 
million. 

Exchange Rate: Tajikistani ruble introduced in May 1995 after 
using Soviet ruble (withdrawn elsewhere in the CIS in late 
1993) until January 1994, then joining Russian ruble zone and 
adopting new Russian rubles then in use. January 1996 value of 
Tajikistani ruble 284 per US$1. 

Inflation: Consumer price index rose 416 percent 1993-94, 120 
percent 1994-95; controlled in 1995 by antiinflationary gov- 
ernment program. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Highly centralized government system, with little 
regional authority. Initial price decontrol in 1992 caused 
extensive hardship, led to retrenchment and resumption of 
strong government control of prices and wages. In 1993, major 
sources of national income value-added tax (30 percent), 
enterprise profits tax (26 percent), and excise tax (13 percent). 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways: In 1992, 32,750 kilometers of roads, of which 18,240 
classified as main roads. One major highway connecting 



199 



Country Studies 

Dushanbe in southwest with Khujand in northwest. 

Railroads: Most important means of transportation, but do not 
link vital areas of northwest and southwest. In 1990 total track 
891 kilometers, of which 410 industrial. Aging infrastructure 
depleting service reliability. 

Civil Aviation: Airport at Dushanbe, only one with scheduled 
flights, in poor condition; cannot accommodate large inter- 
national planes. Tajikistan International Airlines founded 1995 
with Western aid. 

Inland Waterways: None. 

Ports: None. 

Pipelines: Only short natural gas lines from Uzbekistan to 
Dushanbe and linking Uzbekistani points across Tajikistan's 
northwest extremity. 

Telecommunications: In 1993, 259,600 telephones (one per 
twenty-two persons). Radio and television broadcasting is 
monopoly of the State Television and Radio Broadcasting 
Company. Thirteen AM and three FM stations offer programs 
in Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek. Television broadcasts from 
Dushanbe with relays from Iran, Russia, and Turkey. In 1992, 
854,000 radios and 860,000 televisions in use. 

Government and Politics 

Government: National government with nearly all 
administrative powers, centered in executive branch (president 
and Council of Ministers, appointed by president). Head of 
government is prime minister. Supreme Assembly, unicameral 
parliament, with 181 deputies elected to five-year terms (first 
election 1995). Divided into three provinces, one capital 
district (Dushanbe), and one autonomous province with dis- 
puted status. Judiciary with nominal independence but no 
actual power to enforce rule of law. 

Politics: Essentially one-party system dominated by Communist 
Party of Tajikistan. In 1994 presidential election had only one 
nominal opposition candidate with similar platform. Several 
opposition parties formed around 1990 and influenced events 
in early years of independence, but all now operate from 
abroad. Substantial maneuvering for power among former 



200 



Tajikistan 

communist elements within and outside current government. 

Foreign Relations: Strong economic and military reliance on 
Russia and other CIS countries. Friction and distrust toward 
neighbors Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Postindependence cul- 
tivation of Afghanistan and Iran, the former complicated by 
Afghani role in Tajikistan civil war; limited relations with 
Western Europe and United States, despite policy of expanding 
contacts. Ongoing border dispute with China, 1996. 

International Agreements and Memberships: United Nations 
(UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
CIS, and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Total forces 3,000 in 1996 (army only; no air 
force or navy). Officer corps dominated by Russians. Russian 
201st Motorized Infantry Division, about 24,000 troops, con- 
tributes to CIS force, also including troops from Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and dominates overall national 
defense. Morale problems and local loyalties hinder conscrip- 
tion and organization of Tajikistani national force. 

Major Military Units: Army includes two brigades of motorized 
infantry and one brigade of special forces. Heavily reliant on 
Russian equipment and arms supply. Border troops include 
16,500 Russians, 12,500 Tajikistanis, 1995. 

Military Budget: In 1995 estimated US$67 million. 

Internal Security: Main agency Committee of National Security, 
based on Soviet-era Tajikistan Committee for State Security 
(KGB), with full cabinet status. Police authority divided 
between Committee for National Security and Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, which had 1,500 troops in 1993. Beginning 
1992, internal security poor because of civil war, pervasive 
corruption. 



201 



lional boundary 

pious province boundary 



KAZAKSje boundary 
Hi capital 
te capital 
fed place 



100 Kilometers 



100 Miles 



CHINA 




Figure 1 0. Tajikistan: A 



204 



TAJIKISTAN, LITERALLY THE "LAND OF THE TAJIKS," has 
ancient cultural roots. The people now known as the Tajiks are 
the Persian speakers of Central Asia, some of whose ancestors 
inhabited Central Asia (including present-day Afghanistan and 
western China) at the dawn of history. Despite the long heri- 
tage of its indigenous peoples, Tajikistan has existed as a state 
only since the Soviet Union decreed its existence in 1924. The 
creation of modern Tajikistan was part of the Soviet policy of 
giving the outward trappings of political representation to 
minority nationalities in Central Asia while simultaneously 
reorganizing or fragmenting communities and political enti- 
ties. 

Of the five Central Asian states that declared independence 
from the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan is the smallest in area 
and the third largest in population. Landlocked and mountain- 
ous, the republic has some valuable natural resources, such as 
waterpower and minerals, but arable land is scarce, the indus- 
trial base is narrow, and the communications and transporta- 
tion infrastructures are poorly developed. 

As was the case in other republics of the Soviet Union, nearly 
seventy years of Soviet rule brought Tajikistan a combination of 
modernization and repression. Although barometers of mod- 
ernization such as education, health care, and industrial devel- 
opment registered substantial improvements over low starting 
points in this era, the quality of the transformation in such 
areas was less impressive than the quantity, with reforms bene- 
fiting Russian-speaking city dwellers more than rural citizens 
who lacked fluency in Russian. For all the modernization that 
occurred under Soviet rule, the central government's policies 
limited Tajikistan to a role as a predominantly agricultural pro- 
ducer of raw materials for industries located elsewhere. 
Through the end of the Soviet era, Tajikistan had one of the 
lowest standards of living of the Soviet republics. 

Independence came to Tajikistan with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in December 1991. The first few years after that 
were a time of great hardship. Some of the new republic's prob- 
lems — including the breakdown of the old system of interde- 
pendent economic relationships upon which the Soviet 
republics had relied, and the stress of movement toward partic- 
ipation in the world market — were common among the Soviet 



205 



Country Studies 

successor states. The pain of economic decline was com- 
pounded in Tajikistan by a bloody and protracted civil conflict 
over whether the country would perpetuate a system of monop- 
oly rule by a narrow elite like the one that ruled in the Soviet 
era, or establish a reformist, more democratic regime. The 
struggle peaked as an outright war in the second half of 1992, 
and smaller-scale conflict continued into the mid-1990s. The 
victors preserved a repressive system of rule, and the lingering 
effects of the conflict contributed to the further worsening of 
living conditions. 

Historical Background 

Before the Soviet era, which began in Central Asia in the 
early 1920s, the area designated today as the Republic of Tajiki- 
stan underwent a series of population changes that brought 
with them political and cultural influences from the Turkic and 
Mongol peoples of the Eurasian steppe, China, Iran, Russia, 
and other contiguous regions. The Tajik people came fully 
under Russian rule, after a series of military campaigns that 
began in the 1860s, at the end of the nineteenth century. 

Ethnic Background 

Iranian (see Glossary) peoples, including ancestors of the 
modern Tajiks, have inhabited Central Asia since at least the 
earliest recorded history of the region, which began some 
2,500 years ago. Contemporary Tajiks are the descendants of 
ancient Eastern Iranian inhabitants of Central Asia, in particu- 
lar the Soghdians and the Bactrians, and possibly other groups, 
with an admixture of Western Iranian Persians (see Glossary) 
and non-Iranian peoples. The ethnic contribution of various 
Turkic and Mongol peoples, who entered Central Asia at later 
times, has not been determined precisely. However, experts 
assume that some assimilation must have occurred in both 
directions. 

The origin of the name Tajik has been embroiled in twenti- 
eth-century political disputes about whether Turkic or Iranian 
peoples were the original inhabitants of Central Asia. The 
explanation most favored by scholars is that the word evolved 
from the name of a pre-Islamic (before the seventh century 
A.D.) Arab tribe. 

Until the twentieth century, people in the region used two 
types of distinction to identify themselves: way of life — either 



206 



Tajikistan 



nomadic or sedentary — and place of residence. By the late 
nineteenth century, the Tajik and Uzbek peoples, who had 
lived in proximity for centuries and often used each other's lan- 
guages, did not perceive themselves as two distinct nationali- 
ties. Consequently, such labels were imposed artificially when 
Central Asia was divided into five Soviet republics in the 1920s. 

Early History 

Much, if not all, of what is today Tajikistan was part of 
ancient Persia's Achaemenid Empire (sixth to fourth centuries 
B.C.), which was subdued by Alexander the Great in the fourth 
century B.C. and then became part of the Greco-Bactrian king- 
dom, one of the successor states to Alexander's empire. The 
northern part of what is now Tajikistan was part of Soghdiana, 
a distinct region that intermittently existed as a combination of 
separate oasis states and sometimes was subject to other states. 
Two important cities in what is now northern Tajikistan, Khu- 
jand (formerly Leninobod; Russian spelling Leninabad) and 
Panjakent, as well as Bukhoro (Bukhara) and Samarqand 
(Samarkand) in contemporary Uzbekistan, were Soghdian in 
antiquity. As intermediaries on the Silk Route between China 
and markets to the west and south, the Soghdians imparted 
religions such as Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, Zoroastri- 
anism (see Glossary), and Manichaeism (see Glossary), as well 
as their own alphabet and other knowledge, to peoples along 
the trade routes. 

Between the first and fourth centuries, the area that is now 
Tajikistan and adjoining territories were part of the Kushan 
realm, which had close cultural ties to India. The Kushans, 
whose exact identity is uncertain, played an important role in 
the expansion of Buddhism by spreading the faith to the Sogh- 
dians,who in turn brought it to China and the Turks. 

By the first century A.D., the Han dynasty of China had 
developed commercial and diplomatic relations with the Sogh- 
dians and their neighbors, the Bactrians. Military operations 
also extended Chinese influence westward into the region. 
During the first centuries A.D., Chinese involvement in this 
region waxed and waned, decreasing sharply after the Islamic 
conquest but not disappearing completely. As late as the nine- 
teenth century, China attempted to press its claim to the Pamir 
region of what is now southeastern Tajikistan. Since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, China occasionally has revived its 
claim to part of this region. 



207 



Country Studies 

The Islamic Conquest 

Islamic Arabs began the conquest of the region in earnest in 
the early eighth century. Conversion to Islam occurred by 
means of incentives, gradual acceptance, and force of arms. 
Islam spread most rapidly in cities and along the main river val- 
leys. By the ninth century, it was the prevalent religion in the 
entire region. In the early centuries of Islamic domination, 
Central Asia continued in its role as a commercial crossroads, 
linking China, the steppes to the north, and the Islamic heart- 
land. 

Persian Culture in Central Asia 

The Persian influence on Central Asia, already prominent 
before the Islamic conquest, grew even stronger afterward. 
Under Iran's last pre-Islamic empire, the Sassanian, the Persian 
language and culture as well as the Zoroastrian religion spread 
among the peoples of Central Asia, including the ancestors of 
the modern Tajiks. In the wake of the Islamic conquest, Per- 
sian-speakers settled in Central Asia, where they played an 
active role in public affairs and furthered the spread of the Per- 
sian language and culture, their language displacing Eastern 
Iranian ones. By the twelfth century, Persian had also sup- 
planted Arabic as the written language for most subjects. 

The Samanids 

In the development of a modern Tajik national identity, the 
most important state in Central Asia after the Islamic conquest 
was the Persian-speaking Samanid principality (875-999), 
which came to rule most of what is now Tajikistan, as well as ter- 
ritory to the south and west. During their reign, the Samanids 
supported the revival of the written Persian language. 

Early in the Samanid period, Bukhoro became well-known as 
a center of learning and culture throughout the eastern part of 
the Persian-speaking world. Samanid literary patronage played 
an important role in preserving the culture of pre-Islamic Iran. 
Late in the tenth century, the Samanid state came under 
increasing pressure from Turkic powers to the north and 
south. After the Qarakhanid Turks overthrew the Samanids in 
999, no major Persian state ever again existed in Central Asia. 

Beginning in the ninth century, Turkish penetration of the 
Persian cultural sphere increased in Central Asia. The influx of 
even greater numbers of Turkic peoples began in the eleventh 
century. The Turkic peoples who moved into southern Central 



208 



Tajikistan 



Asia, including what later became Tajikistan, were influenced 
to varying degrees by Persian culture. Over the generations, 
some converted Turks changed from pastoral nomadism to a 
sedentary way of life, which brought them into closer contact 
with the sedentary Persian-speakers. Cultural influences flowed 
in both directions as Turks and Persians intermarried. 

During subsequent centuries, the lands that eventually 
became Tajikistan were part of Turkic or Mongol states. The 
Persian language remained in use in government, scholarship, 
and literature. Among the dynasties that ruled all or part of the 
future Tajikistan between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries 
were the Seljuk Turks, the Mongols, and the Timurids (Timur, 
or Tamerlane, and his heirs and their subjects). Repeated 
power struggles among claimants to these realms took their toll 
on Central Asia. The Mongol conquest in particular dealt a 
serious blow to sedentary life and destroyed several important 
cities in the region. Although they had come in conquest, the 
Timurids also patronized scholarship, the arts, and letters. 

In the early sixteenth century, Uzbeks from the northwest 
conquered large sections of Central Asia, but the unified 
Uzbek state began to break apart soon after the conquest. By 
the early nineteenth century, the lands of the future Tajikistan 
were divided among three states: the Uzbek-ruled Bukhoro 
Khanate, the Quqon (Kokand) Khanate, centered on the Fer- 
gana Valley, and the kingdom of Afghanistan. These three prin- 
cipalities subsequently fought each other for control of key 
areas of the new territory. Although some regions were under 
the nominal control of Bukhoro, or Quqon, local rulers were 
virtually independent. 

The Russian Conquest 

After several unsuccessful attempts in earlier times, the Rus- 
sian conquest and settlement of Central Asia began in earnest 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Spurred by vari- 
ous economic and geopolitical factors, increasing numbers of 
Russians moved into Central Asia in this period. Although 
some armed resistance occurred, Tajik society remained largely 
unchanged during this initial colonial period. 

The Occupation Process 

By 1860 the Central Asian principalities were ripe for con- 
quest by the much more powerful Russian Empire. Imperial 
policy makers believed that these principalities had to be sub- 



209 



Country Studies 



dued because of their armed opposition to Russian expansion 
into the Kazak steppe, which already was underway to the 
north of Tajikistan. Some proponents of Russian expansion saw 
it as a way to compensate for losses elsewhere and to pressure 
Britain, Russia's perennial nemesis in the region, by playing on 
British concerns about threats to its position in India. The Rus- 
sian military supported campaigns in Central Asia as a means 
of advancing careers and building personal fortunes. The 
region assumed much greater economic importance in the sec- 
ond half of the nineteenth century because of its potential as a 
supplier of cotton. 

An important step in the Russian conquest was the capture 
of Tashkent from the Quqon Khanate, part of which was 
annexed in 1866. The following year, Tashkent became the 
capital of the new Guberniya (Governorate General) of Turke- 
stan, which included the districts of Khujand and Uroteppa 
(later part of Tajikistan). After a domestic uprising and Russian 
military occupation, Russia annexed the remainder of the 
Quqon Khanate in 1876. 

The Bukhoro Khanate fought Russian invaders during the 
same period, losing the Samarqand area in 1868. Russia chose 
not to annex the rest of Bukhoro, fearing repercussions in the 
Muslim world and from Britain because Bukhoro was a bastion 
of Islam and a place of strategic significance to British India. 
Instead, the tsar's government made a treaty with Bukhoro, rec- 
ognizing its existence but in effect subordinating it to Russia. 
Bukhoro actually gained territory by this agreement, when the 
Russian administration granted the amir of Bukhoro a district 
that included Dushanbe, now the capital of Tajikistan, in com- 
pensation for the territory that had been ceded to Russia. 

In the 1880s, the principality of Shughnon-Rushon in the 
western Pamir Mountains became a new object of contention 
between Britain and Russia when Afghanistan and Russia dis- 
puted territory there. An 1895 treaty 7 assigned the disputed ter- 
ritory to Bukhoro, and at the same time put the eastern Pamirs 
under Russian rule. 

Tajikistan under Russian Rule 

Russian rule brought important changes in Central Asia, but 
many elements of the traditional way of life scarcely changed. 
In the part of what is now Tajikistan that was incorporated into 
the Guberniya of Turkestan, many ordinary inhabitants had 
limited contact with Russian officials or settlers before 1917. 



210 



Tajikistan 



Rural administration there resembled the system that governed 
peasants in the European part of the Russian Empire after the 
abolition of serfdom in 1861. Local administration in villages 
continued to follow long-established tradition, and prior to 
1917 few Russians lived in the area of present-day Tajikistan. 
Russian authorities also left education in the region substan- 
tially the same between the 1870s and 1917. 

An important event of the 1870s was Russia's initial expan- 
sion of cotton cultivation in the region, including the areas of 
the Fergana Valley and the Bukhoro Khanate that later became 
part of Tajikistan. The pattern of switching land from grain cul- 
tivation to cotton cultivation, which intensified during the 
Soviet period, was established at this time. The first cotton-pro- 
cessing plant was established in eastern Bukhoro during World 
War I. 

Some elements of opposition to Russian hegemony 
appeared in the late nineteenth century. By 1900 a novel edu- 
cational approach was being offered by reformers known as 
Jadidists (jadidis the Arabic word for "new") Thejadidists, who 
received support from Tajiks, Tatars, and Uzbeks, were mod- 
ernizers and nationalists who viewed Central Asia as a whole. 
Their position was that the religious and cultural greatness of 
Islamic civilization had been degraded in the Central Asia of 
their day. The Tatars and Central Asians who shared these views 
established Jadidist schools in several cities in the Guberniya of 
Turkestan. Although thejadidists were not necessarily anti-Rus- 
sian, tsarist officials in Turkestan found their kind of education 
even more threatening than traditional Islamic teaching. By 
World War I, several cities in present-day Tajikistan had under- 
ground Jadidist organizations. 

Between 1869 and 1913, uprisings against the amir of 
Bukhoro erupted under local rulers in the eastern part of the 
khanate. The uprisings of 1910 and 1913 required Russian 
troops to restore order. A peasant revolt also occurred in east- 
ern Bukhoro in 1886. The failed Russian revolution of 1905 
resonated very little among the indigenous populations of Cen- 
tral Asia. In the Duma (legislature) that was established in St. 
Petersburg as a consequence of the events of 1905, the indige- 
nous inhabitants of Turkestan were allotted only six representa- 
tives. Subsequent to the second Duma in 1907, Central Asians 
were denied all representation. 

By 1916 discontent with the effects of Russian rule had 
grown substantially. Central Asians complained especially of 



211 



Country Studies 



discriminatory taxation and price gouging by Russian mer- 
chants. A flashpoint was Russia's revocation that year of Central 
Asians' traditional exemption from military service. In July 
1916, the first violent reaction to the impending draft occurred 
when demonstrators attacked Russian soldiers in Khujand, in 
what would later be northern Tajikistan. Although clashes con- 
tinued in various parts of Central Asia through the end of the 
year, Russian troops quickly brought the Khujand region back 
under control. The following year, the Russian Revolution 
ended tsarist rule in Central Asia. 

In the early 1920s, the establishment of Soviet rule in Cen- 
tral Asia led to the creation of a new entity called Tajikistan as a 
republic within the Soviet Union. In contrast to the tsarist 
period, when most inhabitants of the future Tajikistan felt only 
limited Russian influence, the Soviet era saw a central authority 
exert itself in a way that was ideologically and culturally alien to 
the republic's inhabitants. The Tajik way of life experienced 
much change, even though social homogenization was never 
achieved. 

The Revolutionary Era 

The indigenous inhabitants of the former Guberniya of 
Turkestan played no role in the overthrow of the Russian mon- 
archy in March 1917 or in the seizure of power by the Russian 
Communist Party (Bolshevik) in November of that year. But 
the impact of those upheavals soon was felt in all parts of Cen- 
tral Asia. After the fall of the monarchy, Russia's Provisional 
Government abolished the office of governor-general of Turke- 
stan and established in its place a nine-member Turkestan 
Committee, in which Russians had the majority and provided 
the leadership. The Provisional Government, which ruled Rus- 
sia between March and November 1917, was unwilling to 
address the specific concerns of Central Asian reformers, 
including regional autonomy. Central Asians received no seats 
in Russia's short-lived Constituent Assembly. The events of 1917 
finally alienated both conservatives and radicals from the revo- 
lution. 

In 1917 the Soviets (local revolutionary assemblies including 
soldiers and workers) that sprang up in Russian areas of Turke- 
stan and Bukhoro were composed overwhelmingly of Russians. 
In November 1917, a regional congress of Soviets in Tashkent 
declared a revolutionary regime and voted by a wide margin to 
continue the policies of the Provisional Government. Thus, 



212 



Tajikistan 



Central Asians again were denied political representation. 
Eventually, local communists established a figurehead soviet 
for Central Asians. 

Having been denied access to the revolutionary organs of 
power, Central Asian reformers and conservatives formed their 
own organizations, as well as an umbrella group, the National 
Center. Although the groups cooperated on some issues of 
common interest, considerable animosity and occasional vio- 
lence marked their relations. One group of Central Asian Mus- 
lims declared an autonomous state in southern Central Asia 
centered in the city of Quqon. At the beginning of 1919, the 
Tashkent Soviet declared the Quqon group counterrevolution- 
ary and seized the city, killing at least 5,000 civilians. 

Meanwhile, in 1918 the Tashkent Soviet had been defeated 
soundly in its effort to overthrow the amir of Bukhoro, who was 
seen by the communists and the Central Asian reformers alike 
as an obstacle to their respective programs. The attempted 
coup provoked a campaign of repression by the amir, and the 
defeat forced the Russian authorities in Tashkent to recognize 
a sovereign Bukhoran state in place of a Russian protectorate. 

Impact of the Civil War 

An acute food shortage struck Turkestan in 1918-19, the 
result of the civil war, scarcities of grain caused by communist 
cotton-cultivation and price-setting policies, and the Tashkent 
Soviet's disinclination to provide famine relief to indigenous 
Central Asians. No authoritative estimate of famine deaths is 
available, but Central Asian nationalists put the number above 
1 million. 

In the fall of 1919, the collapse of the anti-Bolshevik White 
Army in western Siberia enabled General Mikhail Frunze to 
lead Red Army forces into Central Asia and gradually occupy 
the entire region. In 1920 the Red Army occupied Bukhoro 
and drove out the amir, declaring an independent people's 
republic but remaining as an occupation force. Turkestan, 
including the northern part of present-day Tajikistan, was offi- 
cially incorporated into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic in 1921. 

By 1921 the Russian communists had won the Russian Civil 
War and established the first Soviet republics in Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Belorussia (present-day Belarus), Georgia, and 
Ukraine. At this point, the communists reduced the party's 
token Central Asian leadership to figurehead positions and 



213 



Country Studies 



expelled a large number of the Central Asian rank and file. In 
1922 the Communist Party of Bukhoro was incorporated into 
the Russian Communist Party, which soon became the Commu- 
nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Thereafter, most major 
government offices in Bukhoro were filled by appointees sent 
from Moscow, many of them Tatars, and many Central Asians 
were purged from the party and the government. In 1924 
Bukhoro was converted from a people's republic to a Soviet 
socialist republic. 

The Basmachi 

An indigenous resistance movement proved the last barrier 
to assimilation of Central Asia into the Soviet Union. In the 
1920s, more than 20,000 people fought Soviet rule in Central 
Asia. The Russians applied a derogatory term, Basmachi (which 
originally meant brigand), to the groups. Although the resis- 
tance did not apply that term to itself, it nonetheless entered 
common usage. The several Basmachi groups had conflicting 
agendas and seldom coordinated their actions. After arising in 
the Fergana Valley, the movement became a rallying ground 
for opponents of Russian or Bolshevik rule from all parts of the 
region. Peasant unrest already existed in the area because of 
wartime hardships and the demands of the amir and the Sovi- 
ets. The Red Army's harsh treatment of local inhabitants in 
1921 drove more people into the resistance camp. However, 
the Basmachi movement became more divided and more con- 
servative as it gained numerically. It achieved some unity 7 under 
the leadership of Enver Pasha, a Turkish adventurer with ambi- 
tions to lead the new secular government of Turkey, but Enver 
was killed in battle in early 1922. 

Except for remote pockets of resistance, guerrilla fighting in 
Tajikistan ended by 1925. The defeat of the Basmachis caused 
as many as 200,000 people, including noncombatants, to flee 
eastern Bukhoro in the first half of the 1920s. A few thousand 
subsequently returned over the next several years. 

The communists used a combination of military force and 
conciliation to defeat the Basmachis. The military approach 
ultimately favored the communist side, which was much better 
armed. The Red Army forces included Tatars and Central 
xAsians, who enabled the invading force to appear at least partly 
indigenous. Conciliatory measures (grants of food, tax relief, 
the promise of land reform, the reversal of anti-Islamic policies 
launched during the Civil War, and the promise of an end to 



214 



Tajikistan 



agricultural controls) prompted some Basmachis to reconcile 
themselves to the new order. 

Creation of Tajikistan 

After establishing communist rule throughout formerly tsar- 
ist Central Asia in 1924, the Soviet government redrew internal 
political borders, eliminating the major units into which the 
region had been divided. The Soviet rationale was that this 
reorganization fulfilled local inhabitants' nationalist aspira- 
tions and would undercut support for the Basmachis. However, 
the new boundaries still left national groups fragmented, and 
nationalist aspirations in Central Asia did not prove as threat- 
ening as depicted in communist propaganda. 

One of the new states created in Central Asia in 1924 was 
Uzbekistan, which had the status of a Soviet socialist republic. 
Tajikistan was created as an autonomous Soviet socialist repub- 
lic within Uzbekistan. The new autonomous republic included 
what had been eastern Bukhoro and had a population of about 
740,000, out of a total population of nearly 5 million in Uzbeki- 
stan as a whole. Its capital was established in Dushanbe, which 
had been a village of 3,000 in 1920. In 1929 Tajikistan was 
detached from Uzbekistan and given full status as a Soviet 
socialist republic. At that time, the territory that is now north- 
ern Tajikistan was added to the new republic. Even with the 
additional territory, Tajikistan remained the smallest Central 
Asian republic. 

With the creation of a republic defined in national terms 
came the creation of institutions that, at least in form, were 
likewise national. The first Tajik-language newspaper in Soviet 
Tajikistan began publication in 1926. New educational institu- 
tions also began operation about the same time. The first state 
schools, available to both children and adults and designed to 
provide a basic education, opened in 1926. The central govern- 
ment also trained a small number of Tajiks for public office, 
either by putting them through courses offered by government 
departments or by sending them to schools in Uzbekistan. 

From 1921 to 1927, during the New Economic Policy 
(NEP — see Glossary) Soviet agricultural policy promoted the 
expansion of cotton cultivation in Central Asia. By the end of 
the NEP, the extent of cotton cultivation had increased dramat- 
ically, but yield did not match prerevolutionary levels. At the 
same time, the cultivation of rice, a staple food of the region, 
declined considerably. 



215 



Country Studies 

Collectivization 

The collectivization of agriculture was implemented on a 
limited scale in Tajikistan between 1927 and 1929, and much 
more aggressively between 1930 and 1934. The objective of 
Soviet agricultural policy was to expand the extent of cotton 
cultivation in Tajikistan as a whole, with particular emphasis on 
the southern part of the republic. The process included vio- 
lence against peasants, substantial expansion of the irrigation 
network, and forcible resettlement of mountain people and 
people from Uzbekistan in the lowlands. Many peasants in 
Tajikistan fought forced collectivization, reviving the Basmachi 
movement in upland enclaves between 1930 and 1936. The 
interwar years also saw small-scale industrial development in 
the republic (see Industry, this ch.). 

The Purges 

Like the CPSU branches elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the 
Communist Party of Tajikistan suffered waves of purges 
directed by the central government in Moscow between 1927 
and 1934. Conditions particular to Tajikistan were used to pro- 
vide additional justification for the crackdown. Many Tajik 
communists were highly critical of the ferocity with which the 
collectivization of agriculture was implemented, and central 
party authorities were dissatisfied with the local communists' 
advocacy of the republic's interests, including attempts to gain 
more autonomy and shield local intellectuals. About 70 per- 
cent of the party membership in Tajikistan — nearly 10,000 peo- 
ple at all levels of the organization — was expelled between 1933 
and 1935. Between 1932 and 1937, the proportion of Tajiks in 
the republic's party membership dropped from 53 to 45 per- 
cent as the purges escalated. Many of those expelled from party 
and state offices were replaced by Russians sent in by the cen- 
tral government. Another round of purges took place in 1937 
and 1938, during the Great Terror orchestrated by Joseph V. 
Stalin. Subsequently Russians dominated party positions at all 
levels, including the top position of first secretary. Whatever 
their nationality, party officials representing Tajikistan, unlike 
those from some other Soviet republics, had little influence in 
nationwide politics throughout the existence of the Soviet 
Union. 



216 



Tajikistan 



The Postwar Period 

The post-World War II era saw the expansion of irrigated 
agriculture, the further development of industry, and a rise in 
the level of education in Tajikistan. Like the rest of the Soviet 
Union, Tajikistan felt the effects of the party and government 
reorganization projects of Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev 
(in office 1953-64). Especially in 1957 and 1958, Tajikistan's 
population and economy were manipulated as part of Khru- 
shchev's overly ambitious Virgin Lands project, a campaign to 
forcibly increase the extent of arable land in the Soviet Union. 
Under Khrushchev and his successor, Leonid I. Brezhnev (in 
office 1964-82), Tajikistan's borders were periodically redrawn 
as districts and provinces were recombined, abolished, and 
restored, while small amounts of territory were acquired from 
or ceded to neighboring republics. 

During the Soviet period, the only Tajikistani politician to 
become important outside his region was Bobojon Ghafurov 
(1908-77), a Tajik who became prominent as the Stalinist first 
secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan in the late 
1940s. After Stalin's death in 1953, Ghafurov, a historian by 
training, established himself as a prominent Asia scholar and 
magazine editor, injecting notes of Tajik nationalism into some 
of his historical writings. 

The fate of Ghafurov's successors illustrates important 
trends in the politics of Soviet Central Asia in the second half 
of the twentieth century. The next first secretary, Tursunbai 
Uljabayev (in office 1956-61), was ousted amid accusations 
that he had falsified reports to exaggerate the success of cotton 
production in the republic (charges also leveled in the 1980s 
against Uzbekistan's leadership); apparently the central gov- 
ernment also objected to Uljabayev's preferential appoint- 
ments of his cronies from Leninobod Province to party 
positions (see Russification and Resistance, ch. 5). Uljabaev's 
replacement as first secretary, Jabbor Rasulov, was a veteran of 
the prestigious agricultural bureaucracy of the republic. Like 
first secretaries in the other Central Asian republics, Rasulov 
benefited from Brezhnev's policy of "stability of cadres" and 
remained in office until Brezhnev's death in 1982. 

Rasulov's successor, Rahmon Nabiyev, was a man of the 
Brezhnevite political school, who, like his predecessor, had 
spent much of his career in the agricultural bureaucracy. 
Nabiyev held office until ousted in 1985 as Soviet leader 
Mikhail S. Gorbachev (in office 1985-91) swept out the repub- 



217 



Country Studies 



lie's old-guard party leaders. Nabiyev's 1991 installation as pres- 
ident of independent Tajikistan, by means of an old-guard 
coup and a rigged election, exacerbated the political tensions 
in the republic and was an important step toward the civil war 
that broke out in 1992. 

All the post-Stalin party first secretaries came from Lenino- 
bod, in keeping with a broader phenomenon of Tajikistani pol- 
itics from the postwar period to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union — the linkage between regional cliques, especially from 
Leninobod Province, and political power. Although certain 
cliques from Leninobod were dominant, they allowed allies 
from other provinces a lesser share of power. As the conflict in 
the earlyl990s showed, supporters of opposing camps could be 
found in all the country's provinces. 

The forces of fragmentation in the Soviet Union eventually 
affected Tajikistan, whose government strongly supported con- 
tinued unity. Bowing to Tajik nationalism, Tajikistan's Supreme 
Soviet adopted a declaration of sovereignty in August 1990, but 
in March 1991, the people of Tajikistan voted overwhelmingly 
for preservation of the union in a national referendum. That 
August the Moscow coup against the Gorbachev government 
brought mass demonstrations by opposition groups in 
Dushanbe, forcing the resignation of President Kahar Mahka- 
mov. Nabiyev assumed the position of acting president. The fol- 
lowing month, the Supreme Soviet proclaimed Tajikistan an 
independent state, following the examples of Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. In November, Nabiyev was elected president of the 
new republic, and in December, representatives of Tajikistan 
signed the agreement forming the Commonwealth of Indepen- 
dent States (CIS — see Glossary) to succeed the Soviet Union. 

Antigovernment demonstrations began in Dushanbe in 
March 1992. In April 1992, tensions mounted as progovern- 
ment groups opposing reform staged counterdemonstrations. 
By May, small armed clashes had occurred, causing Nabiyev to 
break off negotiations with the reformist demonstrators and go 
into hiding. After eight antigovernment demonstrators were 
killed in Dushanbe, the commander of the Russian garrison 
brokered a compromise agreement creating a coalition govern- 
ment in which one-third of the cabinet positions would go to 
members of the opposition. The collapse of that government 
heralded the outbreak of a civil war that plagued Tajikistan for 
the next four years (see Transition to Post-Soviet Government, 
this ch.). 



218 



Tajikistan 



Physical Environment 

Mountains cover 93 percent of Tajikistan's surface area. The 
two principal ranges, the Pamir and the Alay, give rise to many 
glacier-fed streams and rivers, which have been used to irrigate 
farmlands since ancient times. Central Asia's other major 
mountain range, the Tian Shan, skirts northern Tajikistan. 
Mountainous terrain separates Tajikistan's two population cen- 
ters, which are in the lowlands of the southern and northern 
sections of the country. Especially in areas of intensive agricul- 
tural and industrial activity, the Soviet Union's natural resource 
utilization policies left independent Tajikistan with a legacy of 
environmental problems. 

Dimensions and Borders 

With an area of 143,100 square kilometers, Tajikistan is 
about the same size as the state of Wisconsin. Its maximum 
east-to-west extent is 700 kilometers, and its maximum north- 
to-south extent is 350 kilometers. The country's highly irregu- 
lar border is about 3,000 kilometers long, including 430 kilo- 
meters along the Chinese border to the east and 1,030 
kilometers along the frontier with Afghanistan to the south. 
Most of the southern border with Afghanistan is set by the Amu 
Darya (darya is the Persian word for river) and its tributary the 
Panj River (Darya-ye Panj), which has headwaters in Afghani- 
stan and Tajikistan. The other neighbors are the former Soviet 
republics of Uzbekistan (to the west and the north) and Kyr- 
gyzstan (to the north). 

Topography and Drainage 

The lower elevations of Tajikistan are divided into northern 
and southern regions by a complex of three mountain chains 
that constitute the westernmost extension of the massive Tian 
Shan system. Running essentially parallel from east to west, the 
chains are the Turkestan, Zarafshon, and Hisor (Gisar) moun- 
tains (see fig. 11). The last of these lies just north of the capital, 
Dushanbe, which is situated in west-central Tajikistan. 

More than half of Tajikistan lies above an elevation of 3,000 
meters. Even the lowlands, which are located in the Fergana 
Valley in the far north and in the southwest, are well above sea 
level. In the Turkestan range, highest of the western chains, 
the maximum elevation is 5,510 meters. The highest elevations 
of this range are in the southeast, near the border with Kyr- 



219 



Country Studies 

gyzstan. That region is dominated by the peaks of the Pamir- 
Alay mountain system, including two of the three highest eleva- 
tions in the former Soviet Union: Mount Lenin (7,134 meters) 
and Mount Communism (7,495 meters). Several other peaks in 
the region also exceed 7,000 meters. The mountains contain 
numerous glaciers, the largest of which, the Fedchenko, covers 
more than 700 square kilometers and is the largest glacier in 
the world outside the polar regions. Because Tajikistan lies in 
an active seismic belt, severe earthquakes are common. 

The Fergana Valley, the most densely populated region in 
Central Asia, spreads across northern Tajikistan from Uzbeki- 
stan on the west to Kyrgyzstan on the east (see fig. 1). This long 
valley, which lies between two mountain ranges, reaches its low- 
est elevation of 320 meters at Khujand on the Syrdariya. Rivers 
bring rich soil deposits into the Fergana Valley from the sur- 
rounding mountains, creating a series of fertile oases that have 
long been prized for agriculture (see Agriculture, this ch.). 

In Tajikistan's dense river network, the largest rivers are the 
Syrdariya and the Amu Darya; the largest tributaries are the 
Vakhsh and the Kofarnihon, which form valleys from northeast 
to southwest across western Tajikistan. The Amu Darya carries 
more water than any other river in Central Asia. The upper 
course of the Amu Darya, called the Panj River, is 921 kilome- 
ters long. The river's name changes at the confluence of the 
Panj, the Vakhsh, and the Kofarnihon rivers in far southwest- 
ern Tajikistan. The Vakhsh, called the Kyzyl-Suu upstream in 
Kyrgyzstan and the Surkhob in its middle course in north-cen- 
tral Tajikistan, is the second largest river in southern Tajikistan 
after the Amu-Panj system. In the Soviet era, the Vakhsh was 
dammed at several points for irrigation and electric power gen- 
eration, most notably at Norak (Nurek), east of Dushanbe, 
where one of the world's highest dams forms the Norak Reser- 
voir. Numerous factories also were built along the Vakhsh to 
draw upon its waters and potential for electric power genera- 
tion. 

The two most important rivers in northern Tajikistan are the 
Syrdariya and the Zarafshon. The former, the second longest 
river in Central Asia, stretches 195 kilometers (of its total 
length of 2,400 kilometers) across the Fergana Valley in far- 
northern Tajikistan. The Zarafshon River runs 316 kilometers 
(of a total length of 781 kilometers) through the center of 
Tajikistan. Tajikistan's rivers reach high-water levels twice a 
year: in the spring, fed by the rainy season and melting moun- 



220 



KAZAK 



ndary 



Ige 



acier 



^ 'Ipeters 
#N A Miles 




AFGH 



N 



tion not 
five 



Figure 11. Tajikistan: To 



222 



Tajikistan 



tain snow, and in the summer, fed by melting glaciers. The 
summer freshets are the more useful for irrigation, especially 
in the Fergana Valley and the valleys of southeastern Tajikistan. 
Most of Tajikistan's lakes are of glacial origin and are located in 
the Pamir region. The largest, the Qarokul (Kara-Kul), is a salt 
lake devoid of life, lying at an elevadon of 4,200 meters. 

Climate 

In general, Tajikistan's climate is continental, subtropical, 
and semiarid, with some desert areas. The climate changes 
drastically according to elevation, however. The Fergana Valley 
and other lowlands are shielded by mountains from Arctic air 
masses, but temperatures in that region still drop below freez- 
ing for more than 100 days a year. In the subtropical southwest- 
ern lowlands, which have the highest average temperatures, 
the climate is arid, although some sections now are irrigated 
for farming. At Tajikistan's lower elevations, the average tem- 
perature range is 23° to 30° C in July and -1° to 3°C in January. 
In the eastern Pamirs, the average July temperature is 5° to 
10°C, and the average January temperature is -15° to -20°C. 
The average annual precipitation for most of the republic 
ranges between 700 and 1,600 millimeters. The heaviest precip- 
itation falls are at the Fedchenko Glacier, which averages 2,236 
millimeters per year, and the lightest in the eastern Pamirs, 
which average less than 100 millimeters per year. Most precipi- 
tation occurs in the winter and spring. 

Environmental Problems 

Most of Tajikistan's environmental problems are related to 
the agricultural policies imposed on the country during the 
Soviet period. By 1991 heavy use of mineral fertilizers and agri- 
cultural chemicals was a major cause of pollution in the repub- 
lic. Among those chemicals were DDT, banned by international 
convention, and several defoliants and herbicides. In addition 
to the damage they have done to the air, land, and water, the 
chemicals have contaminated the cottonseeds whose oil is used 
widely for cooking. Cotton farmers and their families are at 
particular risk from the overuse of agricultural chemicals, both 
from direct physical contact in the field and from the use of the 
branches of cotton plants at home for fuel. All of these toxic 
sources are believed to contribute to a high incidence of mater- 
nal and child mortality and birth defects. In 1994 the infant 
mortality rate was 43.2 per 1,000 births, the second highest rate 



223 



Country Studies 



among former Soviet republics. The rate in 1990 had been 40.0 
infant deaths per 1,000 births (see table 5, Appendix; Health 
Conditions, this ch.). 

Cotton requires particularly intense irrigation (see Agricul- 
ture, this ch.). In Tajikistan's cotton-growing regions, farms 
were established in large, semiarid tracts and in tracts 
reclaimed from the desert, but cotton's growing season is sum- 
mer, when the region receives virtually no rainfall. The 50 per- 
cent increase in cotton cultivation mandated by Soviet and 
post-Soviet agricultural planners between 1964 and 1994 conse- 
quently overtaxed the regional water supply. Poorly designed 
irrigation networks led to massive runoff, which increased soil 
salinity and carried toxic agricultural chemicals downstream to 
other fields, the Aral Sea, and populated areas of the region. 

By the 1980s, nearly 90 percent of water use in Central Asia 
was for agriculture. Of that quantity, nearly 75 percent came 
from the Amu Darya and the Syrdariya, the chief tributaries of 
the Aral Sea on the Kazakstan-Uzbekistan border to the north- 
west of Tajikistan. As the desiccation of the Aral Sea came to 
international attention in the 1980s, water-use policy became a 
contentious issue between Soviet republics such as Tajikistan, 
where the main rivers rise, and those farther downstream, 
including Uzbekistan. By the end of the Soviet era, the central 
government had relinquished central control of water-use pol- 
icy for Central Asia, but the republics had not agreed on an 
allocation policy. 

Industry also causes pollution problems. A major offender is 
the production of nonferrous metals. One of Tajikistan's lead- 
ing industrial sites, the aluminum plant at Regar (also known 
as Tursunzoda), west of Dushanbe near the border with 
Uzbekistan, generates large amounts of toxic waste gases that 
have been blamed for a sharp increase in the number of birth 
defects among people who live within range of its emissions. 

In 1992 the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan established a Minis- 
try of Environmental Protection. However, the enforcement 
activity of the ministry was limited severely by the political 
upheavals that plagued Tajikistan in its first years of indepen- 
dence (see Transition to Post-Soviet Government, this ch.). 
The only registered private environmental group in Tajikistan 
in the early 1990s was a chapter of the Social-Ecological Alli- 
ance, the largest informal environmental association in the 
former Soviet Union. The Tajikistani branch's main functions 
have been to conduct environmental research and to organize 



224 



Tajikistan 



protests against the Roghun Hydroelectric Plant project (see 
Energy, this ch.). 

Population 

Tajikistan's population has been characterized as primarily 
rural, with a relatively high birth rate and substantial ethnic 
tensions. Substantial forced relocation has occurred, first as a 
result of various Soviet programs and then because of the civil 
war. 

By the time Tajikistan became independent, its social struc- 
ture reflected some of the changes that Soviet policy had con- 
sciously promoted, including urbanization, nearly universal 
adult literacy, and the increased employment of women outside 
the home. However, the changes were not as far-reaching as the 
central government had intended, nor did they take the exact 
form the government wanted. Tajikistan's cities grew, but the 
republic remained predominantly rural. More women had 
wage-paying jobs, but society still held traditional women's 
roles in higher regard. Tajikistan had an especially high birth 
rate and the highest rate of population increase of all the 
former Soviet republics. 

Population Characteristics 

The 1970 census showed a population of 2,899,602. Overall, 
the rate of growth, which averaged 3.1 percent per year in the 
1970s, rose to an annual average of 3.4 percent in the 1980s. 
According to the last Soviet census, taken in 1989, Tajikistan's 
population was 5,092,603. Since that time, no reliable estimate 
has been available; however, in the 1990s conditions in the 
country seem likely to preclude continuation of the rapid pop- 
ulation increases of the 1970s and 1980s. The main factor in 
that change is the civil war and its repercussions: an estimated 
50,000 dead, extensive shifting of populations within Tajiki- 
stan, heavy emigration, and a decreased birth rate caused by 
political turmoil and a plummeting standard of living. The 
birth rate was estimated at 3.0 percent in 1992. 

Tajikistan's population is concentrated at the lower eleva- 
tions; 90 percent of its inhabitants live in valleys, often in 
densely concentrated urban centers. In mid-1991, the overall 
population density for the republic was 38.2 persons per square 
kilometer, but density varied greatly among the provinces. In 
the northern Khujand Province, the density was 61.2; in the 



225 



Country Studies 



two southern provinces of Qurghonteppa and Kulob (which, at 
the time of the census and again after the civil war, merged into 
a single province, Khatlon), 71.5; in those districts not part of 
any province, including Dushanbe, 38.9; and in the eastern- 
most jurisdictions, the mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Province, whose borders encompass more than 
40 percent of Tajikistan's territory, only 2.6. 

The mountain areas, which never have been densely popu- 
lated, lost many of their inhabitants beginning in the 1930s 
through a combination of voluntary migration in pursuit of 
better opportunities, forced relocations to the lowlands, and 
the destruction of villages for construction of Soviet-sponsored 
hydroelectric dams. This pattern reversed partially after 1992, 
as people fled to the mountains to escape the civil war. 

According to the 1989 census, Tajikistan's population was 
overwhelmingly young and 50.3 percent female. People under 
age thirty made up 75 percent of the population; people under 
age fifteen were 47 percent of the total (see table 3, Appendix). 

In the last two decades of the Soviet era, Tajikistan had the 
highest birth rate of any Soviet republic (see table 2, Appen- 
dix). Average family size in the republic, according to the 1989 
census, was 6.1 people, the largest in the Soviet Union. The 
average Tajik woman gave birth to between seven and nine 
children. The average annual population growth rate for rural 
Tajikistan in the 1970s and 1980s was higher than the rate for 
urban areas. 

The two main causes of Tajikistan's growth pattern were the 
high value placed by society on large families and the virtual 
absence of birth control, especially in rural areas, where the 
majority of the population lived. Women under the age of 
twenty gave birth to 5.1 percent of the babies born in Tajikistan 
in 1989, and a relatively high proportion of women continued 
to have children late into their child-bearing years. According 
to the 1989 census, 2 percent of all the babies born in Tajiki- 
stan were born to women between the ages of forty and forty- 
four; 81 percent of those babies had been preceded by at least 
six other children. 

In the late 1980s, the Soviet government reacted to the high 
birth rate by encouraging family planning. The plan failed 
because of poor promotion of the pronatalist policy in the 
European republics of the union, inadequate birth control 
methods, and the Tajiks' traditional admiration for large fami- 
lies and opposition to birth control. In rural areas, the inade- 



226 



Town of Kalay-Kum, across the Panj River from Afghanistan 
Playing bozkashi, a traditional game played on horseback 

Courtesy Stephane Herbert 



227 



Country Studies 

quacies of health care and the reluctance of women to 
undergo gynecological examinations contributed to the failure 
of family planning prior to independence. 

Urbanization 

Statistically, Tajikistan is the least urban of all the former 
Soviet republics (see table 3, Appendix). By the 1980s, the 
republic had nineteen cities and forty-nine "urban-type settle- 
ments" (the term used for populated places developed as part 
of Soviet planning). At the time of the first Soviet census, in 
1926, when Tajikistan still was an autonomous republic of 
Uzbekistan, only 10 percent of its inhabitants lived in cities. By 
the 1959 census, urbanization had risen to 33 percent. This 
growth reflected not only the development of Tajikistan in its 
own right but the resettlement of people from other parts of 
the Soviet Union to occupy government, party, and military 
positions. It also reflected an influx of political deportees. Most 
of the immigrants went to Tajikistan's two largest cities, 
Dushanbe and Leninobod. During the period before 1960, 
some populated places also were reclassified as urban or incor- 
porated into an existing city's boundaries, thus creating an 
impression of even greater urbanization. 

The growth of the urban population continued for most of 
the postwar era. Between the 1959 and 1979 censuses, Tajiki- 
stan's urban population more than doubled, while the rural 
population increased almost as rapidly. However, by the 1970s 
the rate of rural population growth had begun to outstrip that 
of urban areas. After reaching a peak of 35 percent in the 1979 
census, the proportion of the urban population declined. 

According to the 1989 census, although Tajikistan's urban 
population increased by 26 percent in the 1980s, the propor- 
tion of urban inhabitants in the total population declined to 
32.5 percent during that period. By the start of 1991, the 
republic's five largest cities, Dushanbe, Khujand, Kulob, Qur- 
ghonteppa, and Uroteppa, accounted for 17 percent of the 
total population of the republic. Beginning with the 1979 cen- 
sus, emigration from cities exceeded immigration into them. 
In the 1980s, urban immigration also came predominantly 
from within Tajikistan rather than from other Soviet republics, 
as had been the case in earlier decades. As other ethnic groups 
emigrated from Tajikistan more rapidly beginning in the late 
Soviet period, the percentage of Tajiks in the cities rose. Never- 
theless, Tajiks in Tajikistan were one of the Soviet nationalities 



228 



Tajikistan 



least likely to move from villages to cities. Those who did so 
were usually single men reacting to the scarcity of employment 
in rural areas. 

Tajikistan's largest city, Dushanbe (which was called Stalina- 
bad from 1929 to 1961), was a Soviet-era development. Badly 
battered in the Russian Civil War of 1918-21, the village experi- 
enced a population drop from more than 3,000 in 1920 to 283 
by 1924, and few buildings remained intact. Nevertheless, in 
1924 Dushanbe was chosen as the capital of the new Tajikistan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Centrally planned 
development projects inaugurated in 1926, 1938, 1965, and 
1983 established housing, government office buildings, cul- 
tural facilities, and sports and recreational facilities, as well as 
the municipal infrastructure. With the addition of about 100 
factories, Dushanbe also became Tajikistan's industrial center. 
It is the headquarters of the republic's radio and television 
broadcasting facilities and film studio. Several institutions of 
higher education and scholarship are located there. 

Soviet-era industrial development projects played a major 
role in the growth of cities on the sites of former villages. For 
example, Regar, which was established in 1952, is the center of 
Tajikistan's vital aluminum industry, as well as several factories 
dedicated to other activities. Norak and Yovon (Russian spell- 
ing Yavan — site of a large chemical plant), were developed as 
industrial centers near Dushanbe to play specific economic 
roles in the Soviet system. 

The Rural Majority 

In the last decade of the Soviet era, the rural population of 
Tajikistan grew in both absolute and relative terms. By 1989 the 
rural population had risen to 3,437,498, or 68 percent of the 
total population, an increase of nearly 1 million people over 
the 1979 figure. By the 1980s, the republic had more than 
3,000 inhabited villages, of which about one-quarter had 200 
inhabitants or fewer. Observers have estimated that 75 to 89 
percent of all Tajikistantis were villagers in 1990. 

The rural standard of living is considerably below that of 
urban areas. Sanitation often is poor, and in many cases no safe 
source of drinking water is available. By the late 1980s, fewer 
than half of rural inhabitants and only 14 percent of collective 
farm residents had a piped-in water supply. In the same period, 
hundreds of villages lacked electricity, and some had no access 
to telephones or radio or television broadcasts (see Transporta- 



229 



Country Studies 

tion and Telecommunications, this ch.). Many rural areas expe- 
rienced shortages of doctors and teachers. The ratio of hospital 
beds to inhabitants is much lower in rural Tajikistan than in 
urban areas and far worse than the average for the former 
Soviet Union as a whole (see Health Care System, this ch.). 
Even large villages are unlikely to have libraries or other cul- 
tural facilities. 

Gender and Family Structure 

The Soviet era saw the implementation of policies designed 
to transform the status of women. During the 1930s, the Soviet 
authorities launched a campaign for women's equality in Tajiki- 
stan, as they did elsewhere in Central Asia. Eventually major 
changes resulted from such programs, but initially they pro- 
voked intense public opposition. For example, women who 
appeared in public without the traditional all-enveloping veil 
were ostracized by society or even killed by relatives for suppos- 
edly shaming their families by what was considered unchaste 
behavior. 

World War II brought an upsurge in women's employment 
outside the home. With the majority of men removed from 
their civilian jobs by the demands of war, women compensated 
for the labor shortage. Although the employment of indige- 
nous women in industry continued to grow even after the war, 
they remained a small fraction of the industrial labor force 
after independence. In the early 1980s, women made up 51 
percent of Tajikistan's population and 52 percent of the work 
force on collective farms, but only 38 percent of the industrial 
labor force, 16 percent of transportation workers, 14 percent of 
communications workers, and 28 percent of civil servants. 
(These statistics include women of Russian and other non-Cen- 
tral Asian nationalities.) In some rural parts of the republic, 
about half the women were not employed at all outside the 
home in the mid-1980s. In the late Soviet era, female underem- 
ployment was an important political issue in Tajikistan because 
it was linked to the Soviet propaganda campaign portraying 
Islam as a regressive influence on society. 

The issue of female employment was more complicated than 
was indicated by Soviet propaganda, however. Many women 
remained in the home not only because of traditional attitudes 
about women's roles but also because many lacked vocational 
training and few child care facilities were available. By the end 
of the 1980s, Tajikistan's preschools could accommodate only 



230 



Tajikistan 

16.5 percent of the children of appropriate age overall and 
only 2.4 percent of the rural children. Despite all this, women 
provided the core of the work force in certain areas of agricul- 
ture, especially the production of cotton and some fruits and 
vegetables. Women were underrepresented in government and 
management positions relative to their proportion of the 
republic's population. The Communist Party of Tajikistan, the 
government (especially the higher offices), and economic 
management organizations were largely directed by men. 

In the last decades of the twentieth century, Tajik social 
norms and even de facto government policy still often favored 
a traditionalist, restrictive attitude toward women that tolerated 
wife beating and the arbitrary dismissal of women from respon- 
sible positions. In the late Soviet period, Tajik girls still com- 
monly married while under age despite official condemnation 
of this practice as a remnant of the "feudal" Central Asian men- 
tality. 

Tajik society never has been organized by tribal affiliation. 
The core of the traditional social structure of Tajiks and other 
sedentary peoples of Central Asia is usually the extended fam- 
ily, which is composed of an adult couple, their unmarried 
daughters, and their married sons and their wives and chil- 
dren. Such a group normally has joint ownership of the family 
homestead, land, crops, and livestock. The more prosperous a 
family, the more members it is likely to have. In the 1930s, 
some particularly wealthy Tajik families had fifty members or 
more. Although Islam permits polygamy, that practice has been 
illegal in Tajikistan for about seventy years; monogamy is the 
more typical form of spousal relationship because of the high 
bride-price traditionally required of suitors. 

Traditional family ties remain strong. Tajikistan had one of 
the highest percentages of people living in families rather than 
singly in the Soviet Union. According to the 1989 census, 69 
percent of the men aged sixteen or older and 67 percent of the 
women in that age group were married, 2 percent of the men 
and 10 percent of the women were widowers or widows, and 1.7 
percent of the men and 4 percent of the women were divorced 
or separated. Only 7.5 percent of men over age forty and 0.4 
percent of women over forty never had been married. 

The strength of the family is sometimes misinterpreted as 
simply a consequence of Islam's influence on Tajik society. 
However, rural societies in general often emphasize the family 
as a social unit, and Islam does not forbid divorce. Grounds for 



231 



Country Studies 

divorce in Tajikistan include childlessness, emotional estrange- 
ment (in some cases the result of arranged marriages), a short- 
age of housing, drunkenness, and economic dissatisfaction. 
The highest rate of divorce is in Dushanbe, which has not only 
an acute housing shortage but a large number of inhabitants 
belonging to non-Central Asian nationalities. Marriage across 
nationality lines is relatively uncommon. Ethnically mixed mar- 
riages are almost twice as likely to occur in urban as in rural 
areas. 

Emigration 

After the Soviet census of 1989, a wave of emigration 
occurred. In the absence of a more recent census, the scale of 
that movement has not been determined reliably. It is known 
that non-Central Asians, especially Russians, were a large com- 
ponent of the emigre group. According to one estimate, about 
200,000 Tajikistani citizens had left by early 1992. Among the 
causes of emigration in the late Soviet and early independence 
eras were opposition to the 1989 law that made Tajik the offi- 
cial language of the republic, resentment of the growing 
national assertiveness of Tajiks, dissatisfaction with the stan- 
dard of living in the republic, fear of violence directed against 
non-Central Asians (a fear based partly on the Dushanbe riots 
of 1990 but intensified by rumor and the propaganda of com- 
munist hard-liners looking for support against a rising opposi- 
tion), and, in 1992, the escalation of political violence into 
outright civil war. Some of the people who left Tajikistan were 
Germans and Jews who emigrated not just from the republic 
but from the Soviet Union altogether. 

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 50,000 to 70,000 Tajiks fled from southern Tajikistan 
to northern Afghanistan to escape the carnage of the civil war 
that began in 1992. The total number of people who fled their 
homes during the troubles of 1992 and 1993, either for other 
parts of Tajikistan or for other countries, is estimated to be at 
least 500,000. Most of these people probably returned to their 
home districts in 1993 or 1994, with help from foreign govern- 
ments and international aid organizations. The return entailed 
hardships for many. Some were harmed or threatened by 
armed bands from the victorious side in the civil war. For oth- 
ers the difficulty lay in the devastation of homes and the col- 
lapse of the economy in districts battered by the war. 



232 



Tajikistan 



Regardless of motive, the increased emigration in the late 
1980s and early 1990s deprived the republic of needed skilled 
workers and professionals. The number of doctors and teach- 
ers declined, and industries lost trained workers who could not 
be replaced. 

Ethnic Groups 

In creating the new Central Asian republics in the 1920s, the 
central political leadership arbitrarily defined national identi- 
ties, which until that time had had little political importance. 
In the case of the Tajiks, this meant not only differentiating 
them from the Uzbeks, with whom they had much in common 
despite their different native languages, but also from fellow 
Persian-speakers outside the Soviet Union. Although the labels 
"Tajik" and "Uzbek" were not Soviet inventions, they had little 
meaning to many of the people to whom they were suddenly 
applied. This circumstance led to much confusion when peo- 
ple were required to identify themselves by one of these two 
national designations. 

The Tajiks' language, which they traditionally had called Per- 
sian (Farsi), was relabeled Tajik. Major Persian-language writ- 
ers were called Tajiks, even if they had not used that term to 
describe themselves and had not lived in Central Asia. Tajik, 
like the other Central Asian languages, underwent a two-stage 
alphabet reform by order of the Soviet regime. First, the Arabic 
alphabet was abandoned in 1929 in favor of the Latin. Then, in 
1940 Moscow declared Cyrillic the official alphabet of the Tajik 
language. 

Meanwhile, during the 1930s and 1940s Tajik culture was 
redefined and Sovietized to suit the political requirements of 
the central government of Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin. In this 
period, the accusation of "bourgeois nationalism" could 
destroy a member of the intelligentsia or a political figure. In 
the renewed wave of Stalinist repression after World War II, 
Tajik intellectuals were purged for being nationalists, a loosely 
defined offense that could be applied to any form of opposi- 
tion to central government policies. 

By the time Tajikistan became an independent republic in 
1991, its multiethnic population included an ethnic majority of 
Tajiks and an even larger religious majority of Muslims (see 
table 4, Appendix). Despite Soviet claims that ethnic and reli- 
gious loyalties had diminished sharply and were bound for 
extinction, there were strong indications in the late 1980s and 



233 



Country Studies 



early 1990s that ethnic and religious identities remained essen- 
tially intact. Indeed, those factors began to exert greater influ- 
ence as Soviet controls weakened and people sought 
alternative ideologies. 

According to the latest census, taken in 1989, Tajikistan had 
a population of 5,092,603, of whom Tajiks constituted about 
3.17 million, or 62.3 percent. The accuracy of subsequent pop- 
ulation estimates suffers from the region's large-scale popula- 
tion movement. In 1989 about three-quarters of all Tajiks in 
the Soviet Union lived in Tajikistan. Of the remaining 1 million 
Tajiks, about 933,000 lived in neighboring Uzbekistan. Much 
smaller Tajik populations lived in Afghanistan and China. The 
other major nationalities living in Tajikistan were Uzbeks, 23.5 
percent (1,197,841); Russians, 7.6 percent (388,481); Volga 
Tatars, 1.4 percent (72,228); and Kyrgyz, 1.3 percent (63,832). 
In order of size, the remaining 3.9 percent included popula- 
tions of Ukrainians, Germans, Turkmen, Koreans, Jews (includ- 
ing those of European ancestry and "Bukhoran Jews," whose 
ancestors had lived in Central Asia for centuries), Belorussians, 
Crimean Tatars, and Armenians. 

Although ethnically classified with the Tajiks in the Soviet 
era, several Eastern Iranian peoples who had not been assimi- 
lated over the centuries by their Persian- or Turkic-speaking 
neighbors preserved distinct identities. These groups were the 
Yaghnobs and seven Pamiri peoples. At the end of the Soviet 
era, the Dushanbe government allowed some leeway for educa- 
tion, broadcasting, and publication in the Pamiri languages. 
However, these limited reforms were more than outweighed by 
the repression that the victors in the civil war directed against 
the Pamiris in 1992 on the grounds that they tended to support 
political reform. 

In the last decade of Soviet power, Tajiks became a larger 
proportion of the republic's total population. The 62.3 percent 
they constituted in the 1989 census was an increase from their 
58.8 percent proportion in the 1979 census. This trend seemed 
likely to continue into the late 1990s, barring such countervail- 
ing factors as civil war and emigration, because Tajiks 
accounted for 70 percent of the republic's natural population 
increase in 1989. 

For much of the Soviet era, the central government used 
inducements such as scholarships and cash bonuses, as well as 
outright reassignment, to increase the settlement of Russian 
workers in Tajikistan. In the 1920s and 1930s, the small num- 



234 



Tajikistan 



ber of Tajikistanis with industrial and professional skills 
prompted the central authorities to relocate individuals with 
special expertise to Tajikistan, and Moscow sent many other 
people as political prisoners. By 1940 roughly half of the repub- 
lic's industrial work force belonged to nonindigenous national- 
ities; most of these people were Russian. The engineering 
profession had a particularly large proportion of Russians and 
other non-Central Asians. Non-Central Asians settled in Tajiki- 
stan during World War II as industries and their workers were 
shifted east of the Ural Mountains to prevent their capture by 
the German army. Additional Russians and other Europeans 
went to Tajikistan in this period as war refugees or political 
deportees. As a result, between 1926 and 1959 the proportion 
of Russians among Tajikistan's population grew from less than 
1 percent to 13 percent. During the same period, the propor- 
tion of Tajiks dropped from 80 percent to about 50 percent. 
This figure fell especially fast during the agricultural collectiv- 
ization of the 1930s. 

Because of the prominence of Russians and other non- 
Tajiks in such urban activities as government and industry, 
Dushanbe, the capital, became a predominantly non-Tajik city. 
According to the 1989 census, Tajiks constituted 39.1 percent, 
Russians 32.4 percent, Uzbeks 10 percent, Tatars 4.1 percent, 
and Ukrainians 3.5 percent of Dushanbe's population of about 
602,000. Although educated, urban Tajiks were likely to speak 
Russian well, few Russians living in Dushanbe spoke Tajik or 
felt a need to do so. This situation caused increasing resent- 
ment among Tajiks in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 

By the end of the Soviet era, many educated Tajiks were crit- 
icizing what they perceived as the continued privileged posi- 
tion of Russians in society. Even after decades of improved 
education and indoctrination of younger generations of Tajiks, 
Russians and other nonindigenous peoples still occupied a dis- 
proportionate number of top positions in the republic's com- 
munist party (see Political Parties, this ch.). Tajiks also saw 
Russians perpetuating their dominance by hiring practices 
biased against Tajiks. By the end of the Soviet era, Tajiks often 
were a small minority in the administration of the republic's 
main industrial enterprises, including the chemical plants, the 
cotton textile industry, and large construction projects (see 
Labor, this ch.). 

The preindependence government of Tajikistan made some 
provision for the distinctive needs of minority nationalities liv- 



235 



Country Studies 



ing within the republic's borders. It provided education, mass 
media, and cultural offerings in Russian (see Education; The 
Media, this ch.). In 1988 state radio began broadcasting in Ger- 
man, Kyrgvz, and Crimean Tatar. There were several Uzbek-lan- 
guage bookstores in the republic. Late in the Soviet era, 
Dushanbe had cultural centers for Uzbeks, Ukrainians, and 
members of other nationalities as well as restaurants that pro- 
vided ethnic foods for Uzbeks, Tatars, Koreans, and Germans. 

Forces of Nationalism 

Ethnic tensions increased in Tajikistan, as they did elsewhere 
in Central Asia, under the troubled conditions of the late 
Soviet era. Already in the late 1970s, some ethnic disturbances 
and anti-Soviet riots had occurred. One consequence of 
heightened resentment of Soviet power was violence directed 
at members of other nationalities, who were made scapegoats 
for their attackers' economic grievances (see Economic Condi- 
tions in the Early 1990s, this ch.). An example of this conflict 
was a clash between Tajiks and Kyrgvz over land and water 
claims in 1989. Antagonism between Uzbeks and Tajiks 
reached a new level during Tajikistan's civil war of 1992, when 
Uzbeks living in Tajikistan joined the faction attempting to 
restore a neo-Soviet regime to power (see Transition to Post- 
Soviet Government, this ch.). 

In 1989 attacks on Meskhetians (one of the Muslim groups 
deported from Central Asia by Stalin) spilled over from 
Uzbekistan to Tajikistan when about 2,000 Meskhetians were 
evacuated from eastern Uzbekistan to a remote settlement in 
northern Tajikistan. A violent conflict between inhabitants of 
the area and the Meskhetians resulted in the intervention of 
security forces and removal of the Meskhetians entirely from 
Central Asia. 

The late 1980s and early 1990s also saw open criticism by 
Tajiks of their treatment as a people by the central Soviet 
authorities and by their Turkic neighbors, especially the 
Uzbeks. A key issue was disparagement of the Tajik heritage in 
statements of Soviet nationalities policy, which labeled the 
Tajiks a "formerly backward" people that only began to 
progress under Russian and Soviet tutelage. Tajiks, who 
claimed a heritage of more than 2,000 years of Persian and 
Eastern Iranian civilization, also were indignant at the empha- 
sis on Russian and Western civilization, at the expense of the 
Tajik heritage, in the history and literature curricula of Soviet- 



236 



Tajikistan 



era schools in their republic. Soviet policy toward publication 
of literature and the two Soviet-mandated alphabet changes 
served to isolate Tajiks from their cultural heritage. 

One of the important consequences of the growth of Tajik 
nationalism in the late Soviet era was the enactment in 1989 of 
a law declaring Tajik the state language (although the use of 
Russian, Uzbek, or other languages was still recognized under 
some circumstances). The law officially equated Tajik with Per- 
sian and called for a gradual reintroduction of the Arabic 
alphabet. By the early 1990s, however, the law's main impact 
was to alarm the republic's Russian speakers; although some 
Russian loanwords were dropped in favor of contemporary Ira- 
nian Persian terms, the use of the Arabic alphabet remained 
sharply limited. 

Like the Russians, the Uzbeks were criticized for denying the 
Tajiks' distinctive ethnic identity and ancient roots in Central 
Asia. Tajik nationalists accused the authorities in Soviet Uzbeki- 
stan of practicing overt discrimination against the Tajik popula- 
tion by forcing Tajiks to register their nationality as Uzbek, 
undercounting the size of the Tajik minority in Uzbekistan, 
and failing to provide Tajiks there with adequate access to edu- 
cational and cultural resources in Tajik. Tajik nationalists also 
complained that the central government and their Central 
Asian neighbors had exploited Tajikistan's raw materials and 
damaged its environment. 

Although nationalism had an increased appeal in Tajikistan 
in the late Soviet and early independence periods, it was not a 
dominant political force there. No popular movement advo- 
cated secession from the Soviet Union before its dissolution at 
the end of 1991, although there was support for renegotiating 
the union treaty to obtain more favorable conditions for Tajiki- 
stan. In the late 1980s, supporters of the communist old guard 
played on nationalist feelings to enhance their own position, 
but after Tajikistan became independent, those individuals 
became increasingly antinationalist; identification with local 
patron-client networks continued to rival nationalism as a polit- 
ical force. 

Religion 

Islam, the predominant religion of all of Central Asia, was 
brought to the region by the Arabs in the seventh century. 
Since that time, Islam has become an integral part of Tajik cul- 
ture. Although Soviet efforts to secularize society were largely 



237 



Country Studies 

unsuccessful, the post-Soviet era has seen a marked increase in 
religious practice. The majority of Tajikistan's Muslims adhere 
to the Sunni (see Glossary) branch of Islam, and a smaller 
group belongs to the Shia (see Glossary) branch of that faith. 
Among other religions, the Russian Orthodox faith is the most 
widely practiced, although the Russian community shrank sig- 
nificantly in the early 1990s. Some other small Christian groups 
now enjoy relative freedom of worship. There also is a small 
Jewish community. 

Islam 

The Sunni branch of Islam has a 1,200-year-old tradition 
among the sedentary population of Central Asia, including the 
Tajiks. A small minority group, the Pamiris, are members of a 
much smaller denomination of Shia Islam, Ismailism, which 
first won adherents in Central Asia in the early tenth century. 
Despite persecution, Ismailism has survived in the remote 
Pamir Mountains. 

During the course of seven decades of political control, 
Soviet policy makers were unable to eradicate the Islamic tradi- 
tion, despite repeated attempts to do so. The harshest of the 
Soviet anti-Islamic campaigns occurred from the late 1920s to 
the late 1930s as part of a unionwide drive against religion in 
general. In this period, many Muslim functionaries were killed, 
and religious instruction and observance were curtailed 
sharply. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 
1941, official policy toward Islam moderated. One of the 
changes that ensued was the establishment in 1943 of an offi- 
cially sanctioned Islamic hierarchy for Central Asia, the Muslim 
Board of Central Asia. Together with three similar organiza- 
tions for other regions of the Soviet Union having large Mus- 
lim populations, this administration was controlled by the 
Kremlin, which required loyalty from religious officials. 
Although its administrative personnel and structure were inad- 
equate to serve the needs of the Muslim inhabitants of the 
region, the administration made possible the legal existence of 
some Islamic institutions, as well as the activities of religious 
functionaries, a small number of mosques, and religious 
instruction at two seminaries in Uzbekistan. 

In the early 1960s, the Khrushchev regime escalated anti- 
Islamic propaganda. Then, on several occasions in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Kremlin leadership called for renewed efforts to 
combat religion, including Islam. Typically, such campaigns 



238 



9 



Morning ceremony of a Sufi 
brotherhood group, 
Naqshbandiya 
Courtesy Stephane Herbert 



included conversion of mosques to secular use; attempts to 
reidentify traditional Islamic-linked customs with nationalism 
rather than religion; and propaganda linking Islam to back- 
wardness, superstition, and bigotry. Official hostility toward 
Islam grew in 1979 with Soviet military involvement in nearby 
Afghanistan and the increasing assertiveness of Islamic revival- 
ists in several countries. From that time through the early post- 
Soviet era, some officials in Moscow and in Tajikistan warned 
of an extremist Islamic menace, often on the basis of limited or 
distorted evidence. Despite all these efforts, Islam remained an 
important part of the identity of the Tajiks and other Muslim 
peoples of Tajikistan through the end of the Soviet era and the 
first years of independence. 

Identification with Islam as an integral part of life is shared 
by urban and rural, old and young, and educated and unedu- 
cated Tajiks. The role that the faith plays in the lives of individ- 
uals varies considerably, however. For some Tajiks, Islam is 
more important as an intrinsic part of their cultural heritage 
than as a religion in the usual sense, and some Tajiks are not 
religious at all. 

In any case, Tajiks have disproved the standard Soviet asser- 
tion that the urbanized industrial labor force and the educated 
population had little to do with a "remnant of a bygone era" 
such as Islam. A noteworthy development in the late Soviet and 



239 



Country Studies 



early independence eras was increased interest, especially 
among young people, in the substance of Islamic doctrine. In 
the post-Soviet era, Islam became an important element in the 
nationalist arguments of certain Tajik intellectuals. 

Islam survived in Tajikistan in widely varied forms because of 
the strength of an indigenous folk Islam quite apart from the 
Soviet-sanctioned Islamic administration. Long before the 
Soviet era. rural Central Asians, including inhabitants of what 
became Tajikistan, had access to their own holy places. There 
were also small, local religious schools and individuals within 
their communities who were venerated for religious knowledge 
and piety. These elements sustained religion in the country- 
side, independent of outside events. Under Soviet regimes, 
Tajiks used the substantial remainder of this rural, popular 
Islam to continue at least some aspects of the teaching and 
practice of their faith after the activities of urban-based Islamic 
institutions were curtailed. Folk Islam also played an important 
role in the survival of Islam among the urban population. One 
form of this popular Islam is Sufism — often described as 
Islamic mysticism and practiced by individuals in a variety of 
ways. The most important form of Sufism in Tajikistan is the 
Xaqshbandiwa, a Sufi order with followers as far away as India 
and Malaysia. Besides Sufism, other forms of popular Islam are 
associated with local cults and holy places or with individuals 
whose knowledge or personal qualities have made them influ- 
ential. 

By late 1989, the Gorbachev regime's increased tolerance of 
religion began to affect the practices of Islam and Russian 
Orthodoxy. Religious instruction increased. New mosques 
opened. Religious observance became more open, and partici- 
pation increased. New Islamic spokesmen emerged in Tajiki- 
stan and elsewhere in Central Asia. The authority of the 
official, Tashkent-based Muslim Board of Central Asia crum- 
bled in Tajikistan. Tajikistan acquired its own seminary in 
Dushanbe, ending its reliance on the administration's two sem- 
inaries in Uzbekistan. 

Bv 1990 the Muslim Board's chief official in Dushanbe, the 
senior qadi, Hajji Akbar Turajonzoda (in office 1988-92), had 
become an independent public figure with a broad following. 
In the factional political battle that followed independence, 
Turajonzoda criticized the communist hard-liners and sup- 
ported political reform and official recognition of the impor- 
tance of Islam in Tajikistani society. At the same time, he 



240 



Tajikistan 



repeatedly denied hard-liners' accusations that he sought the 
establishment of an Islamic government in Tajikistan. After the 
hard-liners' victory in the civil war at the end of 1992, Tura- 
jonzoda fled Dushanbe and was charged with treason. 

Muslims in Tajikistan also organized politically in the early 
1990s. In 1990, as citizens in many parts of the Soviet Union 
were forming their own civic organizations, Muslims from vari- 
ous parts of the union organized the Islamic Rebirth Party 
(IRP; see Political Parties, this ch.). By the early 1990s, the 
growth of mass political involvement among Central Asian 
Muslims led all political parties — including the Communist 
Party of Tajikistan — to take into account the Muslim heritage 
of the vast majority of Tajikistan's inhabitants. 

Islam also played a key political role for the regime in power 
in the early 1990s. The communist old guard evoked domestic 
and international fears that fundamentalist Muslims would 
destabilize the Tajikistani government when that message was 
expedient in fortifying the hard-liners' position against opposi- 
tion forces in the civil war. However, the Nabiyev regime also 
was willing to represent itself as an ally of Iran's Islamic repub- 
lic while depicting the Tajik opposition as unfaithful Muslims. 

Other Religions 

The vast majority of the non-Tajik population of Tajikistan is 
composed of peoples who were also historically Sunni Muslims 
(Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tatars, and Turkmen). The next largest reli- 
gious community is presumably Russian Orthodox, the histori- 
cal faith of many Ukrainians as well as Russians. A cathedral in 
Dushanbe, St. Nicholas, serves the Orthodox community. By 
the end of the Soviet era, Tajikistan also was home to small 
numbers of people belonging to other Christian denomina- 
tions, including Roman Catholics (most of whom were Ger- 
man), Seventh-Day Adventists, and Baptists. There also was a 
small Armenian minority, most of whose members belonged 
historically to the Armenian Apostolic (Gregorian) Church. 
Other religious groups included small numbers of Jews and 
Bahais. The number of adherents to these minority religions 
probably decreased sharply in the 1990s because of the wave of 
emigration from Tajikistan in the early independence period. 

Culture and the Arts 

As they did during the Soviet era, educated Tajiks define 



241 



Country Studies 



their cultural heritage broadly, laying claim to the rich legacy 
of the supraethnic culture of Central Asia and other parts of 
the Islamic world from the eastern Mediterranean to India. 
Soviet rule institutionalized Western art forms, publishing, and 
mass media, some elements of which subsequently attracted 
spontaneous support in the republic. However, since the begin- 
ning of Soviet rule in the 1920s, the media and the arts always 
have been subject to political constraints. 

Literature 

Despite long-standing Soviet efforts to differentiate between 
the Persian speakers of Central Asia and those elsewhere, Tajiks 
in Tajikistan describe all of the major literary works written in 
Persian until the twentieth century as Tajik, regardless of the 
ethnicity and native region of the author. In Soviet times, such 
claims were not merely a matter of chauvinism but a strategy to 
permit Tajiks some contact with a culture that was artificially 
divided by state borders. Nevertheless, very little Persian litera- 
ture was published in Cyrillic transcription in the Soviet era. 

Three writers dominated the first generation of Soviet Tajik 
literature. Sadriddin Aini (1878-1954), a Jadidist writer and 
educator who turned communist, began as a poet but wrote 
primarily prose in the Soviet era. His works include three major 
novels dealing with social issues in the region and memoirs that 
depict life in the Bukhoro Khanate. Aini became the first presi- 
dent of Tajikistan's Academy of Sciences. 

Abu'l-Qasem Lahuti (1887-1957; in Tajik, Abdulqosim 
Lohuti) was an Iranian poet who emigrated to the Soviet 
Union for political reasons and eventually settled in Tajikistan. 
He wrote both lyric poetry and "socialist realist" verse. Another 
poet, Mirzo Tursunzoda (1911-77), collected Tajik oral litera- 
ture, wrote poetry of his own about social change in Tajikistan, 
and turned out various works on popular political themes of 
the moment. Since the generation that included those three 
writers, Tajikistan has produced numerous poets, novelists, 
short story writers, and playwrights. 

Cultural Institutions 

By the mid-1980s, more than 1,600 libraries were operating 
in Tajikistan. Of particular importance is the Firdavsi State 
Library, which houses a significant collection of Oriental 
manuscripts. In 1990 Tajikistan had twenty-seven museums, the 
fewest of any Soviet republic. Among the most notable are the 



242 



Tajikistan 



Behzed Museum of History, Regional Studies, and Art, and the 
Ethnographic Museum of the Academy of Sciences, both in 
Dushanbe. There are also significant museums of history and 
regional studies in several of the republic's other cities. The 
republic had fourteen theaters in 1990. Only the three Baltic 
republics, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan — all with smaller pop- 
ulations — had fewer. The republic's film studio, since 1958 
called TadzhikfiTm, opened in Dushanbe in 1930. By the mid- 
1980s, it was producing seven or eight feature films and thirty 
documentaries per year for cinemas and television. 

The Soviet era saw the introduction of opera and ballet to 
Tajikistan, as well as the organization of Tajik-style song and 
dance troupes. Dushanbe's opera and ballet theater was the 
first large public building in the city; its construction began in 
1939. Dushanbe also has theaters devoted to Tajik and Russian 
drama, as well as a drama school. There are theaters for music, 
musical comedy, and drama in several other Tajik cities as well. 

Films are shown in theaters in Tajikistan's cities and in vil- 
lages on an irregular basis. In the last decade of Soviet rule and 
in the early 1990s, video and audio cassettes became increas- 
ingly popular sources of entertainment, as well as a means of 
disseminating information outside government control. The 
political turmoil and economic problems of Tajikistan in the 
1990s took a severe toll on the country's cultural life and on the 
elite that fostered it. 

Education 

Soviet social policy created a modern education system in 
Tajikistan where nothing comparable had existed before. How- 
ever, by the time the republic became independent the quality 
and availability of education had not reached the Soviet Union- 
wide average, still less the standards for Western industrial soci- 
eties. After independence, the education system remained 
under the control of the national Ministry of Education with 
full state funding. 

Historical Development 

By the 1920s, few Tajiks had received a formal education. 
According to the first Soviet census, in 1926 the literacy rate 
was 4 percent for Tajik men and 0.1 percent for Tajik women in 
the territory of present-day Tajikistan and in the Republic of 
Uzbekistan. During the late 1930s, the Soviet government 



243 



Country Studies 

began to expand the network of state-run schools. There was 
strong public opposition to this change, especially from Islamic 
leaders. As a result, some new state schools were burned and 
some teachers were killed. 

Over the ensuing decades, however, the Soviet education sys- 
tem prevailed, although a uniform set of standards was not 
established in every instance. For the average Tajikistani citizen 
in the 1980s, the duration, if not necessarily the quality, of the 
education process was neither the greatest nor the least among 
Soviet republics. As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the system 
was divided into schools for primary, middle (or secondary), 
and higher education. Middle schools were differentiated as 
either general or specialized. For the period between 1985 and 
1990, an annual average of 86,800 students attended general- 
education middle schools and an average of 41,500 students 
attended specialized middle schools. In the academic year 
1990-91, Tajikistan reported 68,800 students in institutions of 
higher education. 

Education in the 1980s and 1990s 

Prior to 1991, the level of educational attainment in the 
adult Tajikistani population was below the average for Soviet 
republics. Of the population over age twenty-five in 1989, some 
16 percent had only primary schooling, 21 percent had incom- 
plete secondary schooling, and 55 percent had completed a 
secondary education. Those statistics placed Tajikistan ninth 
among the fifteen Soviet republics. Some 7.5 percent of inhab- 
itants had graduated from an institution of higher education, 
placing Tajikistan last among Soviet republics in that category, 
and another 1.4 percent had acquired some higher education 
but not a degree. 

In secondary education, 427 out of 1,000 Tajikistanis gradu- 
ated from a nonspecialized middle school and another 211 out 
of 1,000 went through several grades of such schools without 
graduating. An additional 110 out of 1,000 had attended a spe- 
cialized middle school. Despite the nominal emphasis placed 
by the Soviet system on science and mathematics, the quality of 
education in those subjects was rated as poor in the last 
decades of the Soviet period. 

The languages of instruction in the state system were Tajik, 
Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Russian. When Tajik became the state lan- 
guage in 1989, schools using Russian as the primary language 
of instruction began teaching Tajik as a second language from 



244 



Tajikistan 



the first through the eleventh grades. After independence, 
school curricula included more Tajik language and literature 
study, including classical Persian literature. However, few text- 
books were available in Tajik; by the end of the 1980s, only 10 
to 25 percent of students attending Tajik-language schools had 
textbooks or other teaching materials in their own language. 

By the late Soviet era, education in Tajikistan also suffered 
from infrastructure problems. School buildings were in poor 
repair. The construction industry, an area of particular weak- 
ness in the republic's economy, produced only a small fraction 
of the new school and preschool facilities it was assigned to 
complete each year. As a result, schools sometimes ran on tri- 
ple shifts. 

Vocational Education 

In the late Soviet era, the quality of technical training avail- 
able in Tajikistan fell far below the standard for the Soviet 
Union as a whole. Graduates often were far less prepared for 
technical jobs than their counterparts elsewhere in the union. 
Many vocational schools were poorly equipped and lacked 
basic supplies. The general shortage of textbooks in Tajik also 
affected vocational courses. Although instruction was available 
in about 150 trades in 1990, that range fell far short of supply- 
ing the various types of expertise needed by the republic's 
economy. A large proportion of students in vocational second- 
ary schools had poor skills in basic arithmetic and Russian. 
Although Tajikistan's population was nearly two-thirds rural, in 
1990 only thirty-eight of eighty-five technical schools were 
located in the countryside, and fifteen of those were in serious 
disrepair. Many factories failed to provide students vocational 
training despite agreements to do so. 

Higher Education and Research 

By the late 1980s, Tajikistan had twenty institutions of higher 
education. Despite the ample number of such institutions, the 
proportion of students receiving a higher education (115 per 
10,000 inhabitants) was slightly below the average for the 
Soviet republics in the late 1980s. In scientific and technical 
fields, Tajikistan ranked near the bottom among Soviet repub- 
lics in the proportion of residents receiving advanced degrees. 
During the Soviet era, Russian, rather than Tajik, was the pre- 
ferred medium of instruction in several fields of higher educa- 
tion. 



245 



Country Studies 

The first institution of higher education in Tajikistan was the 
State Pedagogical Institute in Dushanbe, which opened in 
1931. Tajikistan State University opened in 1948. By the mid- 
1980s, about 14,000 students were enrolled in the university's 
thirteen departments. At that time, admission was highly com- 
petitive only for applicants seeking to study history, Oriental 
studies, Tajik philology, and economic planning. In 1994 the 
university had 864 faculty in fourteen departments and 6,196 
full-time students. 

The Tajikistan Polytechnic Institute opened in Dushanbe in 
1956, then was reclassified as a university after independence. 
In 1994 it offered training in energy, construction, mechanical 
engineering, automobile repair, road building, and architec- 
ture. In 1996 preparations began to open a new university for 
the Pamiri peoples; it was to be located in Khorugh, the capital 
of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province. 

Health 

Considering the virtual absence of modern health care in 
Tajikistan at the start of the Soviet era, the quality of medical 
services had improved markedly by the close of that era. Statis- 
tically, Tajikistan rated at or below the average for Soviet repub- 
lics for most indicators of health conditions and health care 
delivery (see table 5, Appendix). 

Health Care System 

After nearly seventy years of inclusion in the Soviet state, 
with its avowed aim of modernization, Tajikistan had a level of 
health care that was low both in absolute terms and by Soviet 
standards. State spending for health care and medical equip- 
ment in Tajikistan was a fraction of the average for the Soviet 
Union. Tajikistani regimes had long regarded social needs such 
as medical care as less important than economic development. 
Admission standards for the republic's best medical school, the 
Abu Ali ibn Sino Institute of Medicine in Dushanbe, were noto- 
riously lax. In 1986, according to government statistics, Tajiki- 
stan had 325 hospitals with a total of 50,115 beds, 697 
outpatient clinics, 1,313 paramedic and midwife facilities, and 
567 maternity and pediatric clinics and hospitals. In 1994 the 
Ministry of Health reported 59,000 hospital beds. As in other 
parts of Central Asia, a large proportion of health care profes- 
sionals in Tajikistan were members of nonindigenous nationali- 



246 




Traditional herb doctor 
preparing a potion in the 
Pamir Mountains 
Courtesy Stephane Herbert 



ties, especially Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews, many of whom 
emigrated after 1989. Within months of the February 1990 dis- 
turbances in Dushanbe, about 1,300 doctors and nurses emi- 
grated from the republic. 

In 1994 the republic had 13,000 doctors, one for every 447 
inhabitants, by far the worst proportion among the Central 
Asian republics. The number of other health care workers, 80.3 
per 1,000 inhabitants, was also far below the level for other 
republics. Rural Tajikistan suffered a particular deficiency of 
health care professionals. Dushanbe felt this scarcity less than 
the rest of the country. 

In the late 1980s, the average number of hospital beds per 
10,000 inhabitants in the Soviet Union was 130, but Tajikistan's 
proportion was 104.3 per 10,000. The figure was half that in 
rural areas. Dushanbe was estimated to have a 5,000-bed short- 
age, according to Soviet standards, in 1990. In the mid-1990s, 
there was a great backlog in the construction of new medical 
facilities. More than 80 percent of Tajikistan's health care facili- 
ties were evaluated as substandard, and most lacked running 
water and central heating. Only one drug treatment center 
existed in Dushanbe, with twenty to thirty beds, and there was 
no rehabilitation program (see Internal Security, this ch.). 

Acquiring medicines is difficult or impossible for ordinary 
citizens. In some areas, one drug dispensary serves as many as 



247 



Country Studies 



20,000 inhabitants, compared with the Soviet standard of one 
dispensary for every 8,000 people. According to one health 
organization, when the Soviet distribution system disappeared 
in 1992, Tajikistan, which had no modern pharmaceutical 
plants, lost access to 258 different kinds of drugs, including 
streptomycin and analgesics. 

Since independence, steady reductions in the state health 
budget have further eroded the salaries of medical profession- 
als and the availability of care. (In 1992 the Ministry of Health 
already had the smallest budget of the state ministries.) For 
that reason, health planners have considered privatization of 
the national health system an urgent priority. In the mid-1990s, 
however, little progress had been made toward that goal. 

Health Conditions 

The life expectancy of a male born in Tajikistan in 1989 was 
66.8 years, and of a female, 71.7 years. In 1989 this was the 
longest life span projection among the five Central Asian 
republics, but it was snorter than those of all the other Soviet 
republics except Moldavia. In Tajikistan, urban women had the 
longest life expectancy (72.9 years), and urban men had the 
shortest (65.2 years). According to the 1989 census, the most 
frequent causes of death in Tajikistan were infections and para- 
sitic diseases, circulatory disorders, respiratory disorders, 
tumors, and accidents. Those causes accounted for 78 percent 
of the 33,395 deaths in that year. In the 1970s and the 1980s, 
Tajikistan's mortality rate rose from 8.5 to 9.8 per 100 male 
inhabitants and from 6.7 to 7.3 per 100 female inhabitants. 

In the mid-1990s, the health of Tajikistan's citizens was 
threatened increasingly by the condition of the country's water 
supply, which conveyed disease-causing organisms as well as 
toxic chemicals from agricultural and industrial origins to the 
population. By the late Soviet era, cases of typhoid occurred 
thirteen times more frequently in Tajikistan than in the Soviet 
Union as a whole. The health of rural inhabitants was jeopar- 
dized by inadequate sanitation and improper storage of toxic 
substances, and by environmental pollution (see Environmen- 
tal Problems, this ch.). 

Maternal and infant mortality remained serious problems in 
Tajikistan in the 1990s. In 1988 Tajikistani women were 1,6 
times more likely to die in childbirth than were women in the 
Soviet Union as a whole. By 1989, according to official statistics, 
forty of every 1,000 babies born in Tajikistan did not survive to 



248 



Tajikistan 



the age of one year. In many parts of southern Tajikistan, the 
rate was more than sixty per thousand. (The rate of infant mor- 
tality was higher than indicated by official Soviet statistics, 
which were underreported in rural areas and often were 
adjusted downward.) Factors contributing to infant mortality 
include family poverty; inadequate nutrition for nursing moth- 
ers, babies, and schoolchildren (who receive inadequate meals 
in school); and a lack of safe drinking water. Experts believe 
that environmental pollution, especially that caused by the 
agricultural chemicals used in cotton production, plays a major 
role in the rising rates of maternal and child mortality, as well 
as in the relatively high incidence of birth defects. 

Employment in heavy industry also poses health risks for 
women and their children. By the late 1980s, some 80 percent 
of low birth-weight babies were born to women employed in 
heavy industry at jobs posing the risk of physical injury. Most 
important of all was the poor quality of health care that moth- 
ers and infants received and the inadequacy of the maternal 
and child care facilities where care was delivered. By Soviet 
national standards, Tajikistan in the late 1980s lacked 8,000 
beds in maternity facilities and 13,000 bed for infants. Prob- 
lems related to infant and maternal health were more serious 
in rural areas than in the cities. Soviet studies linked infant 
death to poor preventive health care, a lack of proper medica- 
tion, and a lack of professional medical care. 

Narcotics use in Tajikistan is rated as a minor health prob- 
lem; in 1995 there were an estimated 40,000 drug users in the 
country (see Internal Security, this ch.). Authorities discovered 
heroin traffic into the country in 1995. As of the end of 1995, 
Tajikistan had reported no cases of acquired immune defi- 
ciency syndrome (AIDS) to the World Health Organization, 
although the Ministry of Health reported that twenty-four 
AIDS diagnostic laboratories were in operation in 1993. 

The Economy 

Tajikistan possesses many elements that will be needed to 
diversify its national economy after decades of specialization 
within the Soviet system. Significant deposits of gold, iron, 
lead, mercury, and tin exist, and some coal is present. Some 
regions have ample water for irrigation, and the country's riv- 
ers are a largely untapped source of hydroelectric power gener- 
ation. The labor supply is sufficient, provided Tajikistan can 
retain qualified workers in critical fields. The civil war of 1992- 



249 



Country Studies 

93, the collapse of the integrated Soviet economic system, and 
the lack of significant economic reform by the post-civil war 
government all have severely impeded economic performance, 
however. 

Economic problems that had developed in Tajikistan during 
the Soviet era persisted into the first decade of independence. 
These included overreliance on production of cotton and raw 
materials in general, a high level of unemployment, and a low 
standard of living. Although the old Soviet economic system 
ceased to exist officially, several aspects of it survived after 
1991. The transition to a market economy progressed slowly, 
and Russia and other former Soviet republics continued to play 
an important role in Tajikistan's economy. Yet Tajikistan also 
took the first steps toward developing economic relations with 
a wide assortment of other countries. Quite apart from the 
deliberate changes implemented by policy makers, the econ- 
omy of Tajikistan was profoundly affected in the early stages of 
its independence by the political turmoil that accompanied the 
transition. 

Agriculture 

In the early 1990s, Tajikistan remained primarily an agricul- 
tural state. In 1990 agriculture contributed 38 percent of the 
country's net material product (NMP — see Glossary). Despite 
development of an extensive irrigation network in the Soviet 
era, water supply problems combined with Tajikistan's moun- 
tainous topography to limit agriculture to 8 percent of the 
republic's land in 1990. Some 800,000 hectares were under cul- 
tivation in 1990, of which about 560,000 hectares were irri- 
gated. The irrigated land was used mostly to grow cotton; 
potatoes, vegetables, and grains also were cultivated (see table 
16, Appendix). In 1994 the republic produced about 490,000 
tons of vegetables and about 254,000 tons of cereals. The dom- 
inance of cotton combined with the rapidly growing popula- 
tion to render Tajikistan unable to meet domestic 
consumption requirements for some basic foodstuffs, espe- 
cially meat and dairy products, in the last years of the Soviet 
era, even though the republic produced a surplus of fruits, veg- 
etables, and eggs. In the early 1990s, about 98 percent of agri- 
cultural labor remained almost entirely unmechanized. 

Through the mid-1990s, agricultural output continued to 
decline precipitously as a consequence of the civil war and the 
awkward transition to a post-Soviet economy. By 1995 overall 



250 



Head accountant of a cotton processing plant, Regar 

Courtesy Stephane Herbert 

production was estimated at about half the 1990 level, and 
shortages continued in urban areas. Besides the civil war, low 
prices for agricultural products and a shortage of animal feed 
contributed to the decline. Hardly any privatization of collec- 
tive farms had occurred by the mid-1990s. 

Cotton is by far the most important crop in Tajikistan's agrar- 
ian economy. In parts of the republic, 85 percent of the land 
was planted to cotton by the late 1980s, a figure that even 
republic officials described as excessive. At the same rime, the 
average cotton yield per hectare was about half that achieved in 
the United States. Cotton production declined in the early 
1990s. In 1993 Tajikistan produced about 754,000 tons, a drop 
of 30 percent from the 1991 figure. 

Although cotton is fundamental to Tajikistan's economy, the 
republic's rewards for cotton production in the Soviet system 
were disappointing. About 90 percent of the harvest was 



251 



Country Studies 

shipped elsewhere for processing. Tajikistani factories pro- 
duced thread from some of the cotton harvest, but, by the end 
of the Soviet era, more than 90 percent of the cotton thread 
that was spun went elsewhere to be turned into finished goods. 
In 1990 the two southern provinces of Qurghonteppa and 
Kulob produced roughly two-thirds of the republic's cotton, 
but they processed only 1 percent of the crop locally. 

Despite widespread concern about overemphasis on cotton 
cultivation, the post-civil war government attempted to expand 
the production of the country's most important cash crop. For 
example, in 1995 it mandated an increase over the preceding 
year of 10,000 hectares in land assigned to cotton. However, 
the cotton output remained far below both the government 
quota and the production levels of the late Soviet era. Indepen- 
dent Tajikistan continued to send most of its cotton crop else- 
where — mainly to CIS countries — for processing. 

Industry 

Industrial development in Tajikistan has proceeded slowly 
and inefficiently, both in the Soviet era and afterward. The civil 
war and ensuing political turmoil kept production levels low in 
the mid-1990s. 

Historical Background 

Tajikistan's industrial development began in earnest in the 
late 1930s. The early emphasis was on processing cotton and 
manufacturing construction materials. World War II was a 
major stimulus to industrial expansion. The output of existing 
factories was increased to meet wartime demands, and some 
factories were moved to the republic from the European part 
of the Soviet Union to safeguard them from the advancing Ger- 
man army 

Skilled workers who relocated to Tajikistan from points west 
received preferential treatment, including substantially higher 
wages than those paid to Tajiks; this practice continued long 
after the war. Such migrants provided the bulk of the labor 
force in many of the republic's industries through the end of 
the Soviet era. Cotton textile mills and metallurgy, machine 
construction, the aluminum smelting plant, and the chemical 
industry all had disproportionately small percentages of Tajik 
workers, or none at all. 

The Vakhsh River valley in southern Tajikistan became a cen- 
ter of extensive industrial development (see Topography and 



252 



Tajikistan 



Drainage, this ch.). The river was dammed at several points to 
provide water for agriculture and cheap hydroelectric power, 
which stimulated construction of factories in the area. Many of 
the plants in the valley process agricultural products or provide 
agricultural materials such as fertilizer. A large chemical plant 
also uses power from the Vakhsh. 

Industry in the 1990s 

In the early 1990s, the configuration of industry continued 
to reflect the specialized roles assigned to Tajikistan within the 
Soviet system, hindering advancement of enterprises that uti- 
lized the republic's natural resources most effectively. The civil 
war also made industrial reorganization problematic. 

In 1991 industry and construction contributed 43.5 percent 
of the country's NMP, of which industry's share was 30.6 per- 
cent — but those sectors employed only 20.4 percent of the 
work force. Tajikistan's only heavy manufacturing industries 
are aluminum and chemical production and a very small 
machinery and metalworking industry. The most important 
light industries are food processing and fabric and carpet weav- 
ing. After declining an estimated 40 percent between 1990 and 

1993, industrial production dropped another 31 percent in 

1994. Declines in the Dushanbe and Khujand regions 
exceeded that figure. The output of only five industrial prod- 
ucts increased in 1994: high-voltage electrical equipment, tex- 
tile equipment, winding machines, processed cereals, and salt. 
The most serious declines were in chemicals, engineering, 
metal processing, building materials, light industry, and food 
processing. According to government reports, production 
declines generally were greater in privately owned industries 
than in state enterprises. 

Tajikistan's overall industrial production capacity was 
underutilized in the first half of the 1990s. The steadily rising 
cost of raw materials, fuel, and energy combined with the obso- 
lescence of production equipment and the lack of qualified 
industrial workers to place Tajikistani industrial products, 
which never had been of especially high quality, at a great dis- 
advantage in foreign markets. 

Aluminum 

Tajikistan's major industrial enterprise is the aluminum pro- 
cessing plant at Regar in the western part of the republic. 
When the plant opened in 1975, it included the world's largest 



253 



Country Studies 

aluminum smelter, with a capacity of 500,000 tons per year. But 
difficulties arose in the early 1990s because of the civil war and 
unreliable raw material supply. Aluminum production and 
quality began to decline in 1992 because Azerbaijan and Russia 
cut the supply of semiprocessed alumina upon which the plant 
depended. By 1995 the plant's management was predicting a 
yearly output of 240,000 tons, still less than half the maximum 
capacity. The prolonged decline was caused by outmoded 
equipment, low world prices for aluminum, the emigration of 
much of the plant's skilled labor force, difficulties in obtaining 
raw materials, and continued disruption resulting from the 
civil war. 

Mining 

In the Soviet period, several minerals, including antimony, 
mercury, molybdenum, and tungsten, were mined in Tajiki- 
stan; the Soviet system assigned Tajikistan to supply specific raw 
or partially processed goods to other parts of the Soviet Union. 
For example, nearly all of Tajikistan's gold went to Uzbekistan 
for processing. However, in the 1990s the presence in Tajiki- 
stan of a hitherto-secret uranium-mining and preliminary-pro- 
cessing operation became public for the first time. The 
operation, whose labor force included political prisoners and 
members of nationalities deported by Stalin from certain 
autonomous republics of the Russian Republic, may have 
accounted for almost one-third of total mining in the Soviet 
Union. According to official Tajikistani reports, the mines were 
exhausted by 1990. 

Energy 

Tajikistan's domestic energy supply situation is dominated by 
hydroelectric power. The nation is an importer of petroleum- 
based fuels, of which only small domestic deposits are being 
exploited. Insufficient access to imported oil and natural gas, a 
persistent problem under the Soviet system, became more 
acute after 1991. 

The Soviet central government, which determined energy 
policy for Tajikistan, saw the republic's rivers as prime locations 
for hydroelectric dams. However, Tajikistanis raised serious 
objections to the resettlement of villages, the potential for 
flooding if an earthquake damaged a dam, and the prospect of 
pollution from the factories that would be attracted by cheap 
electrical power. Although damming the rivers would increase 



254 



Mining combine in central Tajikistan 
Courtesy Stephane Herbert 

the supply of water for irrigation, the central government tar- 
geted much of the water for neighboring Uzbekistan and Turk- 
menistan rather than for domestic use. Resistance was 
especially strong in the case of the Roghun Dam on the Vakhsh 
River, initiated in 1976 as the largest dam of its kind in Central 
Asia. By 1992 some 75 percent of the country's electricity came 
from hydroelectric plants, and in the mid-1990s Russia pro- 
vided aid for the construction of a new Roghun hydroelectric 
station. 

Deposits of coal, petroleum, and natural gas are known to 
exist but by the mid-1990s had yet to be developed. In the 
Soviet era, the unreliability of fuel sources in other republics 
resulted in frequent power shortages. Fuel supply problems 
mounted during the transition to a post-Soviet economy, as oil- 
exporting former Soviet republics often chose not to abide by 
the delivery agreements upon which Tajikistan had depended. 



255 



Country Studies 

Furthermore, beginning in 1993, independent Tajikistan's 
mounting economic problems left it unable to pay more than a 
small fraction of the cost of importing energy. Energy provid- 
ers, especially Uzbekistan, responded with periodic interrup- 
tions of deliveries. Irregular delivery disrupted industrial 
production, crop harvests, and the flow of electricity to resi- 
dential consumers. 

Labor 

In 1991 some 1.95 million people were regularly employed 
outside the home in Tajikistan. However, about 2.4 million 
Tajikistanis were classified as being of working age. Of those 
who worked outside the home, 22 percent were employed in 
industry; 43 percent in agriculture; 18 percent in health care 
and social services; 6 percent in commerce, food services, state 
procurement, and "material-technical supply and sales"; 5 per- 
cent in transportation; 2 percent in the government bureau- 
cracy; and 4 percent in miscellaneous services. 

In the 1980s, light industry continued to employ the largest 
proportion of industrial workers, 38.6 percent. The processing 
of food and livestock feed employed an additional 11.7 per- 
cent. Machine building and metal-working employed 19.7 per- 
cent. Three of Tajikistan's main areas of heavy industrial 
development employed rather small proportions of the indus- 
trial work force: chemicals and petrochemicals, 7.4 percent; 
nonferrous metallurgy, 5.4 percent; and electric power, 2.4 per- 
cent. 

One of the most serious economic problems in the late 
1980s and early 1990s was unemployment. Unemployment and 
underemployment remained extensive after the civil war, and 
the republic's high birth rate led observers to predict that the 
number of unemployed people would continue to grow 
through 2000. Tajikistan's designation in the Soviet economy as 
primarily a producer of raw materials meant that until 1992 
agriculture was expected to provide the bulk of employment 
opportunities for the population. However, the limited amount 
of arable land and the fast growth of the rural population 
made further absorption of labor impossible by the 1990s (see 
Agriculture, this ch.). Although Tajikistan had the resources to 
increase its production of consumer goods, Soviet economic 
planning did not develop as much light industry in the repub- 
lic as the human and material resources could have supported. 
Two of Tajikistan's largest industrial complexes, which pro- 



256 



Tajikistan 



duced chemicals and aluminum, were capital-intensive and 
provided relatively few jobs. 

Unemployment is a particular problem for the republic's 
young people. Roughly three-quarters of the graduates of gen- 
eral education middle schools (which most students attend) do 
not go on to further education (see Education, this ch.). Upon 
entering the job market with such basic qualifications, many 
cannot find employment. A disproportionate number of young 
Tajikistanis enter low-paying manual jobs; in 1989 about 40 per- 
cent of the agricultural labor force was below age thirty. By the 
end of the Soviet era, however, a growing number of Tajiki- 
stan's young people could not find employment even in agri- 
culture. The paucity and low quality of schools at the vocational 
level and higher schools prevented those institutions from 
improving the employment prospects of large numbers of 
potential workers. In the 1980s, a Soviet campaign to shift labor 
into "labor deficit" regions in the European republics or in 
Siberia met with vocal opposition. 

With skilled workers leaving the country in the mid-1990s, 
industrial and professional jobs, most notably in engineering, 
often go unfilled. Shortages have been especially acute in light 
industry, construction, health care, transportation, engineer- 
ing, and education. The exodus of qualified workers intensi- 
fied in the early 1990s. In 1992 and 1993, an estimated 123,000 
specialists with higher education, mostly Russians, left Tajiki- 
stan. 

Standard of Living 

Beginning in the late 1980s, the troubled state of the Soviet 
economy in general led to shortages of consumer necessities in 
Tajikistan, including flour, meat, sugar, and soap. In every year 
from 1986 through 1989, the value of per capita consumption 
of goods and services was substantially lower there than in any 
other Soviet republic. The government in Dushanbe began 
rationing food early in 1991, but Tajikistan's consumption of 
meat and dairy products already had been the lowest in the 
Soviet Union for the previous six years. In 1990 annual per cap- 
ita meat consumption was twenty-six kilograms in Tajikistan, 
compared with sixty-seven kilograms for the Soviet Union as a 
whole. In the same year, annual per capita milk consumption 
was 161 kilograms in Tajikistan, compared with 358 kilograms 
for the Soviet Union as a whole. 



257 



Country Studies 



The national consumer price index went up about 6,000 per- 
cent in 1993 alone (see table 10, Appendix). In 1994 bread- 
lines began forming at Dushanbe's single bakery at five in the 
morning, and the demand often exceeded the supply. Mean- 
while, most state stores stood empty as bazaars offered food at 
prohibitively high prices. Such conditions worsened in the mid- 
1990s. Although at times bread (whose price was still govern- 
ment subsidized), meat, rice, soap, and other commodities 
were rationed, basic necessities often were difficult to obtain. 
In 1995 a 150 percent increase in bread prices, meant as a step 
toward price decontrol, had the side effect of compounding 
the difficulty of maintaining an adequate diet. Fuel deliveries 
in Dushanbe were irregular, and city apartments were cold in 
the winter. 

By the end of the Soviet era, the great majority of Tajikistan's 
citizens had extremely low incomes even by Soviet standards. 
Industrial wages ranked second lowest among the republics in 
1990. The income of peasants on collective farms was the low- 
est among all republics; for those on state farms, it was the sec- 
ond to lowest. The situation did not improve in the first post- 
Soviet years. At the end of 1994, the average monthly wage was 
25,000 rubles, or US$7.30, and wages often went unpaid for 
several months. The maximum weekly wage was set at 
US$19.30 by a government policy that automatically deposited 
any payment above that level in the recipient's bank savings 
account. 

By the 1980s, housing had become a serious problem, espe- 
cially in Dushanbe. The "Housing-93" project of that period 
promised to provide accommodations by 1993 to families that 
were on the waiting lists in 1988, but construction fell far 
behind. By 1990, some 150,000 families were waiting to get an 
apartment in the capital, a situation that contributed to the 
outbreak of riots there in February of that year. The housing 
shortage in the northern province of Leninobod was similarly 
acute. 

Economic Conditions in the Early 1990s 

At the close of the Soviet phase of Tajikistan's history, the 
economy deteriorated rapidly, and the level of economic activ- 
ity declined sharply in the early 1990s. In 1992 the gross domes- 
tic product (GDP — see Glossary) was approximately half of 
what it had been in 1990. In the first half of 1991, agricultural 
and industrial output dropped substantially, and construction, 



258 



Tajikistan 



a chronic weak point of the economy, was especially sluggish. 
The state's revenues for the same period were half as large as its 
expenses. According to Soviet statistics, the generation of 
national income in Tajikistan had already declined 7.8 percent 
from 1988 to 1989 and 8.9 percent from 1989 to 1990. In 1990, 
the per capita generation of national income was the lowest by 
far among Soviet republics, and 17 percent below the 1985 
level. These figures reflect not only Tajikistan's poverty but also 
the low prices that were assigned to agricultural products and 
raw materials, Tajikistan's main products, in the state-run econ- 
omy. Although Tajikistan was primarily an agricultural repub- 
lic, in 1989 it imported more agricultural products, including 
foodstuffs, than it exported. 

Political turmoil and the civil war of 1992-93 did enormous 
damage to Tajikistan's economy. According to an official esti- 
mate, that damage extended to 80 percent of the republic's 
industries. The conflict spurred the departure of large num- 
bers of Russians and Germans who had been key technical per- 
sonnel in Tajikistan's industries (see Population, this ch.). After 
independence, the government was very slow to develop an 
institutional framework to promote movement toward a mar- 
ket economy. Through the mid-1990s, virtually no privatization 
of industry or agriculture occurred. 

The scarcity of reliable statistics makes quantification of 
Tajikistan's economic situation difficult. In 1994 the total eco- 
nomic loss from the civil war was estimated at 15 trillion rubles 
(see Glossary for value of ruble) — about US$12 billion at the 
January 1, 1994, exchange rate. According to Western esti- 
mates, by 1994 production in industry had dropped 60 per- 
cent, in agriculture 33 percent, and in the transportation 
enterprises several hundred percent — all in comparison with 
1990 levels. The GDP fell an estimated 28 percent in 1993, 12 
percent in 1994, and 14 percent in 1995. Inflation soared at a 
rate of 1,157 percent in 1992; 2,195 percent in 1993; 341 per- 
cent in 1994; and 120 percent in 1995. The relatively lower rate 
in 1995 reflected the government's new anti-inflationary poli- 
cies launched in the second half of the year. 

Transition to a Market Economy 

In the last years of the Soviet system, Tajikistan followed the 
rest of the union in beginning a transition from the conven- 
tional Soviet centralized command system to a market econ- 
omy. Early in 1991, the Dushanbe government legalized the 



259 



Country Studies 



leasing and privatization of state enterprises (excluding indus- 
tries deemed critical for national security) . However, the transi- 
tion met firm resistance from individuals who still held 
positions that gave them access to economic power and techno- 
logical know-how; political figures with ideological objections 
to market reforms also voiced opposition. Such influential peo- 
ple insisted that the previous system could be made efficient if 
Tajikistanis were urged to work harder. This view was made 
popular by the sharp price increases that followed price decon- 
trol in the initial reform stage. Citizens' hardships, fear, and 
anger resulting from the initial economic shock greatly slowed 
the transition to a market economy. For instance, in the first 
year of independence, only four private farms were established. 

The regime of Imomali Rahmonov, who came to power in 
December 1992, showed little interest in continuing the lim- 
ited market reforms of 1991 and 1992. At the same time, the 
new regime declared its support for private enterprise on a 
small or moderate scale, expressing the hope that foreign 
investment would help revive the country's shattered economy. 
By the mid-1990s, about half of all small businesses, especially 
those in the service sector, were privately owned. In November 
1995, the legislature approved a reform plan for the period 
1995-2000, but the plan included no specific steps toward the 
general goals of privatization and the fostering of foreign and 
domestic investment. 

In 1992 Tajikistan acquired its first commercial bank, the 
Tajikbankbusiness. Established primarily to invest in the repub- 
lic's economy, the state-owned bank assumed the functions of 
the former Soviet State Bank (Gosbank); it also sought to 
develop links with the United States, Iran, China, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Britain, among other countries. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan continued to use the 
old Soviet ruble until Russia replaced that currency with the 
Russian ruble in 1994. At that time, Tajikistan joined the Rus- 
sian ruble zone (see Glossary), a move that worked against 
Tajikistani interests. Russia did not send as many rubles as 
promised, and many of the new rubles that were sent quickly 
left Tajikistan as inhabitants bought commodities from other 
Soviet successor states, especially Uzbekistan and Russia. Thus 
handicapped, the cash economy often gave way to barter and 
promissory notes. As a result, the Dushanbe government 
decided to leave the ruble zone by introducing the Tajikistani 
ruble in 1995. At the time of its introduction, the new currency 



260 



Tajikistan 



had an exchange rate of fifty per US$1, but its value slipped 
drastically through 1995, reaching 284 per US$1 in January 
1996. 

Foreign Economic Relations 

As the economic reforms of the Gorbachev regime relaxed 
restrictions on foreign business activity in the Soviet Union in 
the last years of the 1980s, Tajikistan began to make economic 
arrangements with foreign businesses. Despite some interest 
on the part of the Nabiyev regime in arranging joint ventures 
with foreign firms, only four such agreements were reached in 
1991, and just six more were concluded by 1992. One of the 
joint-venture agreements of that period brought United States 
investment in the manufacture of fur and leather products in 
Tajikistan. Israeli businesses began irrigation projects in Tajiki- 
stan in 1992. A deal with two Austrian companies called for 
construction of a factory to produce prefabricated housing and 
other buildings to be financed by US$3.5 million raised from 
cotton export funds. A similar construction agreement was 
signed in 1992 with Czechoslovakia. In 1995 an Italian com- 
pany began construction of a textile factory in Tajikistan. One 
of the most important foreign undertakings in the country was 
a joint venture with a Canadian firm, the Zarafshon Mining 
Project, to mine and process gold at three known sites in the 
Panjakent area of northwestern Tajikistan and to prospect in 
an area of 3,000 square kilometers for additional deposits. The 
agreement was concluded in 1994; production began in Janu- 
ary 1996. 

The post-civil war government has emphasized cultivation of 
economic relations with a variety of Western and Middle East- 
ern countries, China, and the other former Soviet republics 
(see table 17, Appendix). In 1991 an Afghan company opened 
shops in Dushanbe and the northern city of Uroteppa to sell 
clothing, textiles, fruits, and nuts that the company shipped 
into Tajikistan from Afghanistan and other countries. The 
company also planned to export textiles woven in Tajikistan. In 
1992 fourteen people were sent from Tajikistan to Turkey to 
study banking procedures. 

Iran and Pakistan 

In the early 1990s, Iran pursued economic cooperation as a 
means of expanding its regional influence by assuming part of 
the Soviet Union's role as the major customer for Tajikistani 



261 



Count n Studies 



exports. The first foreign firm registered in Tajikistan was Ira- 
nian. In 1992 pacts were signed for cooperation in the spheres 
of banking and commerce, transportation, and tourism: a joint 
company. Tajiran, was established to handle bilateral trade. In 
October 1992. Iran declared its intention to buy 1 million tons 
of cotton and 400.000 tons of aluminum (a figure that 
exceeded Tajikistan's entire aluminum production for 1992). 

The two countries continued to make economic cooperation 
agreements into the mid-1990s. Iran loaned Tajikistan USS10 
million to be used to stimulate exports and imports while offer- 
ing assistance in dealing with the costs of imported energy. In 
1994,. the two countries established a commission to promote 
bilateral economic and technical relations. In 1995 Iran agreed 
to pay for Tajikistan's importation of natural gas from Turk- 
menistan: Tajikistan then was to reimburse Iran in cotton 
rather than currency 

Pakistan extended USS20 million in credits to Tajikistan in 
1994 for the purchase of Pakistani goods. However, the most 
ambitious parts of the cooperation plans between the two 
countries., the completion of the Roghun hydroelectric dam 
and the highway between the two countries, fell through: the 
reasons included Pakistan's own economic problems, political 
opposition in Tajikistan to allocating state funds on such a 
larsre scale to a foreign country and the continued turmoil in 
.Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 

The United States 

In 1992 newlv independent Tajikistan and the United States 
expressed an interest in developing trade relations. President 
Xabiyev made an urgent plea to a delegation from the United 
States Congress for development assistance, especially in the 
area of natural resource use. At about the same time, Tajikistan 
made a barter trade agreement with a United States company 
to exchange dried fruits from Tajikistan for bricks, greenhouse 
equipment, and consumer goods from the United States. In 
1992 the United States offered Tajikistan credits to use for the 
purchase of food, and the United States Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation made an agreement to provide Tajiki- 
stan loans and other assistance to promote United States invest- 
ment. In 1994 the United States established the Central Asian- 
American Enterprise Fund to provide loans and technical 
expertise that would promote the growth of the private sector 
in all the Central Asian states. Generally however, the level of 



262 



Tajikistan 



United States involvement in Tajikistan has remained very low. 
The first significant undertaking in Tajikistan by a United 
States firm was a US$40 million textile mill established in 1995. 

Russia and the CIS 

After Tajikistan achieved independence, it maintained 
extensive economic relations with other former Soviet repub- 
lics individually and with the CIS. Relations with the CIS and 
the Russian Federation preserved some characteristics of 
Tajikistan's relationship with the Soviet central authorities. 
Until 1995 Tajikistan remained in the ruble zone rather than 
establishing its own national currency, as the other four Cen- 
tral Asian republics had done. 

In the meantime, Russia retained the dominant position in 
the CIS and, hence, in commerce with Tajikistan that the Mos- 
cow government had enjoyed in the Soviet period. Russia and 
Tajikistan undertook to maintain their bilateral exchange of 
goods at existing levels as the republics made the transition to a 
market economy. In 1992 some 36 percent of Tajikistan's 
imports came from Russia, and 21 percent of its exports went 
to Russia; about 60 percent of total external trade was with CIS 
countries, and 45 percent of exports went to those countries. 
In 1992 a bilateral agreement called for Tajikistan to send Rus- 
sia fruits and vegetables, vegetable oil, silk fabrics, and paint in 
return for automobiles, televisions, and other consumer and 
industrial goods. 

Post-civil war Tajikistan was heavily dependent on Russia for 
fuel and other necessities. In 1993 Russia made another barter 
agreement, by which Tajikistan would send Russia agricultural 
products, machinery, and other goods in return for Russian oil. 
Despite the agreements, trade between the two countries 
encountered serious difficulties. In the 1990s, a sharp drop in 
independent Tajikistan's cotton production caused it to fall far 
short of the deliveries promised to Russia. This development 
impeded Tajikistan's ability to pay for vital fiiel imports and dis- 
rupted Russia's textile industry. Nevertheless, private bilateral 
commercial activity expanded to some extent. By 1995 more 
than twenty Tajikistani businesses had made joint-venture 
agreements with Russian enterprises. 

Membership in the ruble zone required Tajikistan to cede 
control over its money supply and interest rates to Russia and 
to comply with the regulations of Russia's central bank. After 
the civil war, Russia provided a majority of the funds for Tajiki- 



263 



Country Studies 



stan's budget and had considerable influence over budgetary 
policy. Russia also sent periodic infusions of cash to the 
Dushanbe government. 

As the old interrepublic delivery system decayed at the end 
of the Soviet era, Tajikistan, like other republics, reduced sales 
of some commodities and consumer goods to other republics. 
At the same time, direct agreements were made with several 
republics to place commercial relations on a new footing. 
These pacts included statements of principle on economic 
cooperation and general promises to deliver products from 
one republic to the other and to set up joint ventures. In 1992 
such agreements were made with Georgia, Armenia, and 
Belarus, and a separate trade agreement called for Turkmeni- 
stan to send Tajikistan natural gas and various other goods in 
exchange for aluminum, farm machinery, and consumer 
goods. 

One of Tajikistan's most important trading partners among 
the Soviet successor states is Uzbekistan, the source of most of 
its natural gas since independence. In 1994 the two countries 
concluded a barter agreement, which the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) subsequently criticized as disad- 
vantageous to Tajikistan. According to the agreement, 
Uzbekistan was to send Tajikistan natural gas, fuel oil, and elec- 
tricity. In return, Uzbekistan was to have mining rights to vari- 
ous metals in Tajikistan, which also would supply electricity to 
locations in southern Uzbekistan lacking generating capacity, 
as well as cotton, construction materials, various metals, and 
other goods. In 1995 Uzbekistan halted its natural gas deliver- 
ies several times, citing nonpayment by Tajikistan. 

In the mid-1990s, the uncertain condition of Tajikistan's 
economy left the country in a weak position to conduct foreign 
trade. The balance of trade was consistently unfavorable; in 
1994 imports exceeded exports by nearly US$116 million, and 
by 1995 Tajikistan's foreign debt exceeded US$731 million. 
Imports consisted mostly of food, energy, and medicines. The 
main exports were aluminum and cotton, with a large share of 
the production of both commodities earmarked for export. 
The income derived from cotton and aluminum sales went 
largely to pay for Tajikistan's energy imports, to repay foreign 
debts in general, and to cover government expenses. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Topographical barriers between northern and southern 



264 



Tajikistan 



Tajikistan have prevented the effective transportation and com- 
munication linkage of the two regions (see Topography and 
Drainage, this ch.). The most important form of transportation 
has been the railroad; highways are few and of low quality (see 
fig. 10). Radio and television systems are limited and govern- 
ment controlled. 

Railroads 

The north and the south are served by railway networks that 
link them to neighboring regions of Uzbekistan rather than to 
each other. Rail traffic between the two regions of Tajikistan 
must follow a 1,340-kilometer route through Uzbekistan. As is 
the case with other parts of the economic infrastructure in 
Central Asia, railway routes reflect the needs of the larger eco- 
nomic system of which Tajikistan was a part until 1991. The rail- 
way system in the north was established when that area was part 
of the Russian Empire's Guberniya of Turkestan. In that era, 
the railroad from Tashkent, the capital of Turkestan, extended 
into the agricultural and industrial centers in the Fergana Val- 
ley, which includes the far northern part of today's Tajikistan. 
The railroads in the south were built in the Soviet era, in part 
to facilitate the shipment of cotton grown in the southernmost 
parts of Central Asia, not just in Tajikistan, to other parts of the 
Soviet Union. 

In the early 1990s, substandard equipment was the most seri- 
ous problem of the Tajikistani railroad system. Levels of freight 
haulage and passenger service declined steadily as railroad cars 
sat idle, waiting for spare parts and repairs. By 1994 delivery of 
goods to the more remote regions of the country had become 
a hazardous and unpredictable operation. 

Roads 

In 1992 Tajikistan had 32,750 kilometers of roads, of which 
18,240 kilometers were classified as main roads. Unlike the rail- 
roads, the principal highway connects Dushanbe with the main 
northern city, Khujand, about 300 kilometers away. However, 
because the road crosses three chains of mountains, it is 
blocked by heavy snows, avalanches, and landslides for several 
months each year. Other main roads connect Dushanbe with 
Qurghonteppa and Kulob. In 1993 only about 1,500 private 
automobiles were in use. 



265 



Country Studies 
Air Travel 

Tajikistan's principal airport is located in Dushanbe, the cap- 
ital. By the mid-1990s, the facility's only runway, which was too 
short to accommodate large international planes, was in poor 
condition. In 1995 the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) gave Tajikistan a grant of US$4 million 
to repair and lengthen the runway. 

Tajikistan made two attempts to start its own airline in the 
1990s. Tajik Air, a private joint venture with a British company, 
lasted only a few months in the winter of 1993-94. That airline 
had only a single airplane, leased from United Airlines, with a 
crew of former employees of the defunct Pan American Air- 
lines. The venture failed because of increasing debts and lack 
of support from the government. In 1995 Tajikistan entered 
into a joint venture with the Portuguese airline Transportes 
Aereos Portugueses (TAP) to provide two airplanes and per- 
sonnel to a new national service, Tajikistan International Air- 
lines; maintenance of the aircraft was to be performed by 
British Airways. 

Telecommunications 

Television and radio broadcasting is the monopoly of the 
State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company of Tajiki- 
stan, which is controlled by the Ministry of Communications. 
In 1995 the radio broadcasting system included thirteen AM 
stations and three FM stations. Several frequencies offer 
relayed programming from Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Although 
radio broadcasting is primarily in Tajik, Russian and Uzbek 
programming also is offered. In 1988 broadcasting began in 
German, Kyrgyz, and Crimean Tatar as well. In February 1994, 
the state broadcasting company came under the direct control 
of head of state Imomali Rahmonov. 

Television broadcasts first reached Tajikistan in 1959 from 
Uzbekistan. Subsequently, Tajikistan established its own broad- 
casting facilities in Dushanbe, under the direction of the gov- 
ernment's Tajikistan Television Administration. Color 
broadcasts use the European SECAM system. Television pro- 
gramming is relayed from stations in Iran, Russia, and Turkey. 
In mountainous villages, television viewing is restricted by lim- 
ited electrical supply and retransmission facilities. 

In 1994 Tajikistan's telephone system remained quite lim- 
ited. It included 259,600 main lines, an average of one line per 



266 



Tajikistan 



twenty-two people — the lowest ratio among former Soviet 
republics. 

Government and Politics 

In the first years of independence, politics in Tajikistan were 
overshadowed by a long struggle for political power among 
cliques that sought Soviet-style dominance of positions of 
power and privilege and a collection of opposition forces seek- 
ing to establish a new government whose form was defined 
only vaguely in public statements. The result was a civil war that 
began in the second half of 1992. A faction favoring a neo- 
Soviet system took control of the government in December 
1992 after winning the civil war with help from Russian and 
Uzbekistani forces. 

Transition to Post-Soviet Government 

In the late 1980s, problems in the Soviet system had already 
provoked open public dissatisfaction with the status quo in 
Tajikistan. In February 1990, demonstrations against govern- 
ment housing policy precipitated a violent clash in Dushanbe. 
Soviet army units sent to quell the riots inflicted casualties on 
demonstrators and bystanders alike. Using the riots as a pretext 
to repress political dissent, the regime imposed a state of emer- 
gency that lasted long after the riots had ended. In this period, 
criticism of the regime by opposition political leaders was cen- 
sored from state radio and television broadcasts. The state 
brought criminal charges against the leaders of the popular 
front organization Rastokhez (Rebirth) for inciting the riots, 
although the Supreme Soviet later ruled that Rastokhez was 
not implicated. Students were expelled from institutions of 
higher education merely for attending nonviolent political 
meetings. The events of 1990 made the opposition even more 
critical of the communist old guard than it had been previ- 
ously. 

In the highly charged political atmosphere after the failure 
of the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, Tajikistan's 
Supreme Soviet voted for independence for the republic in 
September 1991. That vote was not intended to signal a break 
with the Soviet Union, however. It was rather a response to 
increasingly vociferous opposition demands and to similar dec- 
larations by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Following the dissolu- 
tion of the Soviet Union, a development in which Tajikistan 



267 



Country Studies 

played no role, the republic joined the CIS when that loose fed- 
eration of former Soviet republics was established in December 
1991. 

The political opposition within Tajikistan was composed of a 
diverse group of individuals and organizations. The three 
major opposition parties were granted legal standing at various 
times in 1991. The highest-ranking Islamic figure in the repub- 
lic, the chief qadi, Hajji Akbar Turajonzoda, sided openly with 
the opposition coalition beginning in late 1991. The opposi- 
tion's ability to govern and the extent of its public support 
never were tested because it gained only brief, token represen- 
tation in a 1992 coalition government that did not exercise 
effective authority over the entire country. 

In the early independence period, the old guard sought to 
depict itself as the duly elected government of Tajikistan now 
facing a power grab by Islamic radicals who would bring to 
Tajikistan fundamentalist repression similar to that occurring 
in Iran and Afghanistan. Yet both claims were misleading. The 
elections for the republic's Supreme Soviet and president had 
been neither free nor truly representative of public opinion. 
The legislative election was held in February 1990 under the 
tight constraints of the state of emergency. In the presidential 
election of 1991, Nabiyev had faced only one opponent, film- 
maker and former communist Davlat Khudonazarov, whose 
message had been stifled by communist control of the news 
media and the workplace. Despite Nabiyev's advantageous posi- 
tion, Khudonazarov received more than 30 percent of the vote. 

In the first half of 1992, the opposition responded to 
increased repression by organizing ever larger proreform dem- 
onstrations. When Nabiyev assembled a national guard force, 
coalition supporters, who were concentrated in the southern 
Qurghonteppa Province and the eastern Pamir region, 
acquired arms and prepared for battle. Meanwhile, opponents 
of reform brought their own supporters to Dushanbe from 
nearby Kulob Province to stage counterdemonstrations in April 
of that year. Tensions mounted, and small-scale clashes 
occurred. In May 1992, after Nabiyev had broken off negotia- 
tions with the oppositionist demonstrators and had gone into 
hiding, the confrontation came to a head when opposition 
demonstrators were fired upon and eight were killed. At that 
point, the commander of the Russian garrison in Dushanbe 
brokered a compromise. The main result of the agreement was 



268 



Tajikistan 



the formation of a coalition government in which one-third of 
the cabinet posts would go to members of the opposition. 

For most of the rest of 1992, opponents of reform worked 
hard to overturn the coalition and block implementation of 
measures such as formation of a new legislature in which the 
opposition would have a voice. In the summer and fall of 1992, 
vicious battles resulted in many casualties among civilians and 
combatants. Qurghonteppa bore the brunt of attacks by antire- 
formist irregular forces during that period. In August 1992, 
demonstrators in Dushanbe seized Nabiyev and forced him at 
gunpoint to resign. The speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Akbar- 
sho Iskandarov — a Pamiri closely associated with Nabiyev — 
became acting president. Iskandarov advocated a negotiated 
resolution of the conflict, but he had little influence over 
either side. 

The political and military battles for control continued 
through the fall of 1992. In November the Iskandarov coalition 
government resigned in the hope of reconciling the contend- 
ing factions. Later that month, the Supreme Soviet, still domi- 
nated by hard-liners, met in emergency session in Khujand, an 
antireform stronghold, to select a new government favorable to 
their views. When the office of president was abolished, the 
speaker of parliament, Imomali Rahmonov, became de facto 
head of government. A thirty-eight-year-old former collective 
farm director, Rahmonov had little experience in government. 
The office of prime minister went to Abdumalik Abdullojanov, 
a veteran hard-line politician. 

Once in possession of Dushanbe, the neo-Soviets stepped up 
repression. Three leading opposition figures, including Tura- 
jonzoda and the deputy prime minister in the coalition govern- 
ment, were charged with treason and forced into exile, and two 
other prominent opposition supporters were assassinated in 
December. There were mass arrests on nebulous charges and 
summary executions of individuals captured without formal 
arrest. Fighting on a smaller scale between the forces of the old 
guard and the opposition continued elsewhere in Tajikistan 
and across the border with Afghanistan into the mid-1990s. 

The conflict in Tajikistan often was portrayed in Western 
news reports as occurring primarily among clans or regional 
cliques. Many different lines of affiliation shaped the configu- 
ration of forces in the conflict, however, and both sides were 
divided over substantive political issues. The old guard had 
never reconciled itself to the reforms of the Gorbachev era 



269 



Country Studies 

(1985-91) or to the subsequent demise of the Soviet regime. 
Above all, the factions in this camp wanted to ensure for them- 
selves a monopoly of the kinds of benefits enjoyed by the ruling 
elite under the Soviet system. The opposition coalition factions 
were divided over what form the new regime in Tajikistan 
ought to take: secular parliamentary democracy, nationalist 
reformism, or Islamicization. Proponents of the last option 
were themselves divided over the form and pace of change. 

In April 1994, peace talks arranged by the United Nations 
(UN) began between the post-civil war government in 
Dushanbe and members of the exiled opposition. Between that 
time and early 1996, six major rounds of talks were held in sev- 
eral different cities. Several smaller-scale meetings also 
occurred directly between representatives of both sides or 
through Russian, UN, or other intermediaries. Observers at 
the main rounds of talks included representatives of Russia, 
other Central Asian states, Iran, Pakistan, the United States, the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE — 
after 1994 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, OSCE — see Glossary), and the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference. In the first two years, these negotiations 
produced few positive results. The most significant result was a 
cease-fire agreement that took effect in October 1994. The ini- 
tial agreement, scheduled to last only for a few weeks, was 
renewed repeatedly into 1996, albeit with numerous violations 
by both sides. As a result of the cease fire, the UN established 
an observer mission in Tajikistan, which had a staff of forty- 
three in early 1996. 

Government Structure 

Independent Tajikistan's initial government conformed to 
the traditional Soviet formula of parliamentary-ministerial gov- 
ernance and complete obeisance to the regime in Moscow. The 
office of president of the republic was established in 1990, fol- 
lowing the example set by the central government in Moscow. 
Until the establishment of the short-lived coalition government 
in 1992, virtually all government positions were held by com- 
munist party members. After December 1992, power was in the 
hands of factions opposed to reform. Former allies in that 
camp then contended among themselves for power. 

The 1994 Constitution 

In 1994 Tajikistan adopted a new constitution that restored 



270 



Tajikistan 



the office of president, transformed the Soviet-era Supreme 
Soviet into the Supreme Assembly (Majlisi Oli), recognized 
civil liberties and property rights, and provided for a judiciary 
that was not fully independent. Like constitutions of the Soviet 
era, the document did not necessarily constrain the actual 
exercise of power. For example, the mechanism by which the 
constitution was formally adopted was a referendum held in 
November 1994. Balloting occurred simultaneously with the 
vote for president, even though that office could not legally 
exist until and unless the constitution was ratified. 

The Executive 

The president was first chosen by legislative election in 1990. 
In the first direct presidential election, held in 1991, former 
communist party chief Rahmon Nabiyev won in a rigged vote. 
The office of president was abolished in November 1992, then 
reestablished de facto in 1994 in advance of the constitutional 
referendum that legally approved it. In the interim, the chair- 
man of the Supreme Soviet, Imomali Rahmonov, was nominal 
chief of state. In the presidential election of November 1994, 
Rahmonov won a vote that was condemned by opposition par- 
ties and Western observers as fraudulent. Rahmonov's only 
opponent was the antireformist Abdumalik Abdullojanov, who 
had founded an opposition party after being forced to resign as 
Rahmonov's prime minister in 1993 under criticism for the 
country's poor economic situation. 

The Council of Ministers is responsible for management of 
government activities in accordance with laws and decrees of 
the Supreme Assembly and decrees of the president. The presi- 
dent appoints the prime minister and the other council mem- 
bers, with the nominal approval of the Supreme Assembly. In 
1996 the Council of Ministers included fifteen full ministers, 
plus six deputy prime ministers, the chairmen of five state com- 
mittees, the presidential adviser on national economic affairs, 
the secretary of the National Security Council, and the chair- 
man of the National Bank of Tajikistan. 

The Legislature 

The republic's legislature, the Supreme Assembly, is elected 
directly for a term of five years. According to the 1994 constitu- 
tion, any citizen at least twenty-five years of age is eligible for 
election. The unicameral, 230-seat Supreme Soviet elected in 
1990 included 227 communists and three members from other 



271 



Country Studies 

parties. The constitution approved in November 1994 called 
for a unicameral, 181-seat parliament to replace the Supreme 
Soviet. In the first election under those guidelines, 161 depu- 
ties were chosen in February 1995 and nineteen of the remain- 
ing twenty in a second round one month later. (One 
constituency elected no deputy, and one elected deputy died 
shortly after the election.) In the 1995 parliamentary election, 
an estimated forty seats were uncontested, and many candi- 
dates reportedly were former Soviet regional and local officials. 
The sixty communist deputies who were elected gave Rah- 
monov solid support in the legislative branch because the 
majority of deputies had no declared party affiliation. Like the 
1994 presidential election, the parliamentary election was not 
considered free or fair by international authorities. 

The Judiciary 

The 1994 constitution prescribes an independent judiciary, 
including at the national level the Supreme Court, the Consti- 
tutional Court (theoretically, the final arbiter of the constitu- 
tionality of government laws and actions), the Supreme 
Economic Court, and the Military Court. The Gorno-Badakh- 
shan Autonomous Province has a regional court, and subordi- 
nate courts exist at the regional, district, and municipal levels. 
Judges are appointed to five-year terms, but theoretically they 
are subordinate only to the constitution and are beyond inter- 
ference from elected officials. However, the president retains 
the power to dismiss judges, and in practice Tajikistan still 
lacked an independent judiciary after the adoption of the 1994 
constitution. In June 1993, the Supreme Court acted on behalf 
of the Rahmonov regime in banning all four opposition parties 
and all organizations connected with the 1992 coalition gov- 
ernment. The ban was rationalized on the basis of an accusa- 
tion of the parties' complicity in attempting a violent overthrow 
of the government. 

As in the Soviet system, the Office of the Procurator General 
has authority for both investigation and adjudication of crimes 
within its broad constitutional mandate to ensure compliance 
with the laws of the republic. Elected to a five-year term, the 
procurator general of Tajikistan is the superior of similar offi- 
cials in lower-level jurisdictions throughout the country. 

Local Government 

Below the republic level, provinces, districts, and cities have 



272 



Tajikistan 



their own elected assemblies. In those jurisdictions, the chief 
executive is the chairman of a council of people's deputies, 
whose members are elected to five-year terms. The chairman is 
appointed by the president of the republic. The Supreme 
Assembly may dissolve local councils if they fail to uphold the 
law. For most of the late Soviet and early independence peri- 
ods, Tajikistan had four provinces: Leninobod in the north, 
Qurghonteppa and Kulob in the south, and the Gorno- 
Badakhshan Autonomous Province in the southeast. The pre- 
cise status of that region is unclear because separatists have 
declared it an autonomous republic and even the government 
does not always call it a province (see fig. 10). Beginning in 
1988, Qurghonteppa and Kulob were merged into a single 
province, called Khatlon. (The two parts were separated again 
between 1990 and 1992.) A large region stretching from the 
west-central border through Dushanbe to the north-central 
border is under direct federal control. 

Political Parties 

As long as Tajikistan was a Soviet republic, political power 
resided in the Communist Party of Tajikistan, not in the state. 
Until 1991 the party was an integral part of the CPSU, subordi- 
nate to the central party leadership. In the years before inde- 
pendence, several opposition parties appeared with various 
agendas. Since the civil war, the opposition's official participa- 
tion has been limited severely, although some parties remain 
active abroad. 

Communist Party of Tajikistan 

During the 1920s, Tajik communist party membership 
increased substantially. But in the following decades, the per- 
centage of Tajik membership in the Communist Party of Tajiki- 
stan rose and fell with the cycle of purges and revitalizations. 
Throughout the Soviet period, however, Russians retained 
dominant positions. For example, the top position of party first 
secretary was reserved for an individual of the titular ethnic 
group of the republic, but the powerful position of second sec- 
retary always belonged to a Russian or a member of another 
European nationality. 

In the mid-1980s, the Communist Party of Tajikistan had 
nearly 123,000 members, of whom about two-thirds repre- 
sented urban regions, with subordinate provincial, district, and 
municipal organizations in all jurisdictions. The Communist 



273 



Country Studies 



Youth League (Komsomol), which provided most of the future 
party members, had more than 550,000 members in 1991. The 
end of the Soviet era witnessed a waning of interest in party 
membership, however, despite the privileges and opportunities 
the party could offer. By 1989 many districts were losing mem- 
bers much faster than new members could be recruited. 

In August 1991, the failure of the coup by hard-liners in Mos- 
cow against President Gorbachev left the Communist Party of 
Tajikistan even less popular and more vulnerable than it had 
been before. However, although it was suspended in 1991, the 
party in Tajikistan was able to retain its property during its sus- 
pension. Just before sanctions were imposed, the party 
changed the adjective in its name from communist to socialist. In 
December 1991, the party reassumed its original name and 
began a vigorous campaign to recapture its earlier monopoly of 
power. 

After the civil war, the communist party remained the coun- 
try's largest party, although its membership was far smaller 
than it had been in the late Soviet era. In the early 1990s, the 
party rebuilt its organizational network, from the primary party 
organizations in the workplace to the countrywide leadership. 
Communist candidates did well in the legislative elections of 
1995, although they did not win an outright majority. 

Opposition Parties 

The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s saw the 
open establishment of opposition parties representing a variety 
of secular and religious views. In 1991 and 1992, these groups 
engaged in an increasingly bitter power struggle with those 
who wanted to preserve the old order in substance, if not in 
name. By the summer of 1992, the battle had escalated into an 
open civil war that would claim tens of thousands of lives. 

A branch of the Islamic Rebirth Party (IRP) was established 
in Tajikistan in 1990 with an initial membership of about 
10,000. The Tajikikistan IRP was established as an open organi- 
zation, although it was rumored to have existed underground 
since the late 1970s. The IRP received legal recognition as a 
political party in the changed political climate that existed after 
the 1991 Moscow coup attempt. Despite its links to the party of 
the same name with branches throughout the Soviet Union, 
the Tajikistan IRP focused explicitly on republic-level politics 
and national identity rather than supranational issues. When 
the antireformists gained power in December 1992, they again 



274 



Tajikistan 

banned the IRP. At that point, the party claimed 20,000 mem- 
bers, but no impartial figures were available for either the size 
of its membership or the extent of its public support. After the 
civil war, the party changed its name to the Movement for 
Islamic Revival. 

Two other parties, the Democratic Party and Rastokhez 
(Rebirth), also were banned, with the result that no opposition 
party has had official sanction since early 1993. The Demo- 
cratic Party, which has a secular, nationalist, and generally pro- 
Western agenda, was founded by intellectuals in 1990 and mod- 
eled on the contemporaneous parliamentary democratization 
movement in Moscow. In 1995 the party moved its headquar- 
ters from Tehran to Moscow. Although the government nomi- 
nally lifted its ban on the Democratic Party in 1995, in practice 
the party remains powerless inside the republic. In early 1996, 
it joined several other parties in signing an agreement of rec- 
onciliation with the Dushanbe government. 

Like the Democratic Party, Rastokhez was founded in 1990 
with substantial support from the intellectual community; its 
visibility as an opposition popular front made Rastokhez a 
scapegoat for the February 1990 demonstrations and riots in 
Dushanbe (see Transition to Post-Soviet Government, this ch.). 
In 1992 Rastokhez, the Democratic Party, and another party, 
La"li Badakhshon, played an important role in the opposition 
movement that forced President Nabiyev to resign. The leader- 
ship of the much-weakened Rastokhez movement also made 
peace with the Dushanbe regime early in 1996. 

La"li Badakhshon is a secularist, democratic group that was 
founded in 1991. The chief aim of the party, which represents 
mainly Pamiris, is greater autonomy for the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Province. La"li Badakhshon joined with the other 
three opposition groups in the demonstrations of spring 1992. 

Since the civil war, several new political parties have func- 
tioned legally in Tajikistan. Some are organized around inter- 
est groups such as businessmen, some around powerful 
individuals such as former prime minister Abdumalik Abdullo- 
janov. All of these parties lack the means to influence the polit- 
ical process, however. For instance, the most important of 
them, Abdullojanov's Popular Unity Party, was prevented by the 
government from mounting an effective campaign in the legis- 
lative elections of February 1995. 



275 



Country Studies 



The Media 

At the time of independence, Tajikistan had several long- 
established official newspapers that had been supported by the 
communist regime. These included newspapers circulated 
throughout the republic in Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek, as well as 
papers on the provincial, district, and city levels. Beginning in 
1991, changes in newspapers' names reflected political changes 
in the republic. For example, the Tajik republican newspaper, 
long known as Tojikistoni Soveti (Soviet Tajikistan), became first 
Tojikistoni Shuravi (using the Persian word for "council" or 
"soviet") and then Jumhuriyat (Republic). The equivalent Rus- 
sian-language newspaper went from Kommunist Tadzhikistana 
(Tajikistan Communist) to Narodnaya gazeta (People's News- 
paper). Under the changing political conditions of the late- 
Soviet and early independence periods, new newspapers 
appeared, representing such groups as the journalists' union, 
the Persian-Tajik Language Foundation, cultural and religious 
groups, and opposition political parties. After antireformists 
returned to power at the end of 1992, however, the victors 
cracked down on the press. 

In the Soviet era, Tajikistan's magazines included publica- 
tions specializing in health, educational, rural, and women's 
issues, as well as communist party affairs. Several were intended 
especially for children. Literary magazines were published in 
both Russian and Tajik. The Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan 
published five scholarly journals. In the postindependence 
years, however, Tajikistan's poverty forced discontinuation of 
such items. In the early 1990s, Tajikistan had three main pub- 
lishing houses. After the civil war, the combination of political 
repression and acute economic problems disrupted many pub- 
lication activities. In this period, all of the country's major 
newspapers were funded fully or in part by the government, 
and their news coverage followed only the government's line. 
The only news agency, Khovar, was a government bureau. 
Tajikistan drew international criticism for the reported killing 
and jailing of journalists. 

Human Rights 

Under the extension of emergency powers justified by the 
government in response to opposition in 1993 and 1994, 
numerous human rights violations were alleged on both sides 
of the civil war. A wave of executions and "disappearances" of 



276 



Tajikistan 



opposition figures began after antireformist forces captured 
Dushanbe in December 1992. The People's Front of Tajikistan, 
a paramilitary group supported by the government, was 
responsible in many such cases. In 1993 and 1994, a number of 
journalists were arrested, and prisoners of conscience were tor- 
tured for alleged antigovernment activities. In 1994 some pris- 
oners of conscience and political prisoners were released in 
prisoner exchanges with opposition forces. The death sen- 
tence, applicable by Tajikistani law to eighteen peacetime 
offenses, was officially applied in six cases in both 1993 and 
1994, but only one person, a political prisoner, is known to 
have been executed in 1994. No state executions were reported 
in 1995. 

Afghanistan-based oppositionist forces, who labeled them- 
selves a government in exile, were accused by the Dushanbe 
government of killing a large number of civilians and some 
government soldiers near the Afghan border. These accusa- 
tions had not been confirmed by impartial observers as of early 
1996. Amnesty International appealed to both sides to desist, 
without apparent effect. 

Foreign Relations 

Tajikistan had a ministry of foreign affairs for nearly forty 
years before it became an independent state at the end of 1991. 
As long as it was part of the Soviet Union, however, the republic 
had no power to conduct its own diplomacy. The central objec- 
tive of newly independent Tajikistan's foreign policy was to 
maximize its opportunities by developing relations with as 
many states as possible. Particular diplomatic attention went to 
two groups of countries: the other former Soviet republics and 
Tajikistan's near neighbors, Iran and Afghanistan, which are 
inhabited by culturally related peoples. At the same time, 
Tajikistan pursued contacts with many other countries, includ- 
ing the United States, Turkey, and Pakistan. In 1995 Tajikistan 
opened its first embassy outside the former Soviet Union, in 
Turkey. The potential for political support and economic aid is 
at least as important in shaping Tajikistan's diplomacy as are 
ideological and cultural ties. 

Former Soviet Republics 

Like the other Central Asian republics, Tajikistan joined the 
CIS, which was created in December 1991, three weeks before 
the Soviet Union collapsed officially. Shortly before opposition 



277 



Country Studies 



demonstrators forced President Rahmon Nabiyev to resign in 
August 1992, he asked several presidents of former Soviet 
republics, including President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia, to 
help him stay in power. They refused this request. In the fall of 
1992, the increasingly embattled coalition government that 
succeeded Nabiyev asked the other members of the CIS to 
intervene to end the civil war. However, such assistance was not 
provided. 

Through the mid-1990s, Russia played a role in independent 
Tajikistan by its military presence there, in the form of the 
201st Motorized Rifle Division and the Border Troops (see Rus- 
sia's Role in the Early 1990s, this ch.). Russian personnel in 
Dushanbe acted as advisers to the post-civil war government. 
Russians also held important positions in the Dushanbe gov- 
ernment itself, most notably the Ministry of Defense, which was 
led from 1992 to 1995 by Aleksandr Shishlyannikov. Yuriy 
Ponosov, who had a generation of experience as a CPSU offi- 
cial in Tajikistan before the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
became Tajikistan's first deputy prime minister in March 1996. 

The protection of the Russian minority in strife-ridden 
Tajikistan is a stated foreign policy goal of the Russian govern- 
ment. Russia's concern was eased somewhat by the conclusion 
of a dual-citizenship agreement between the two countries in 
1995. Russia also has justified its active involvement in the 
affairs of Tajikistan by citing the need to defend the Tajikistan- 
Afghanistan border — and thus, the CIS — from penetration by 
Islamic extremism and drug trafficking. 

Independent Tajikistan has troubled relations with two 
neighboring former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan and Kyr- 
gyzstan, a situation that began long before independence. In 
the 1980s, a dispute over two scarce resources in Central Asia, 
water and arable land, soured relations between Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. In June 1989, the situation burst into spontaneous, 
grassroots violence over competing claims to a small parcel of 
land. That conflict led to mutual recriminations that continued 
until a settlement was reached in 1993. Tensions were height- 
ened in 1992 by Kyrgyzstan's fear that the Tajikistani civil war 
would spill over the border, which had never been defined by a 
bilateral treaty. Despite tense relations between the two repub- 
lics, Kyrgyzstan attempted to negotiate an end to Tajikistan's 
civil war, and it sent medicine and other aid to its beleaguered 
neighbor. After the civil war, Kyrgyzstan sent a contingent of 



278 



Tajikistan 



troops to Tajikistan as part of the joint CIS peacekeeping mis- 
sion (see The Armed Forces, this ch.). 

Tajikistan's relations with Uzbekistan present a contradictory 
picture. On the one hand, Tajik intellectuals, and at times the 
Dushanbe government, have criticized Uzbekistan for discrimi- 
nation against its Tajik minority. In response, citing fears of 
Islamic radicalism in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan closed its Tajik-lan- 
guage schools in mid-1992. On the other hand, antireformists 
in both republics have maintained good relations based on the 
interest they shared in the defeat of reformers in Tajikistan in 
the early 1990s. Uzbekistan gave military support to the fac- 
tions that won Tajikistan's civil war and closed its border with 
Tajikistan in the fall of 1992 to prevent opposition refugees 
from the civil war from fleeing to Uzbekistan. 

After the civil war, Uzbekistan's attitude toward Tajikistan 
became increasingly ambivalent. One aspect of Uzbekistan's 
policy continued its earlier effort to prevent the opposition 
from taking power in Tajikistan; a 1993 cooperation treaty 
between the two countries, stipulating a role for Uzbekistan's 
air force in the defense of Tajikistan — which has no air force of 
its own — manifested that concern. However, the government 
in Tashkent was increasingly displeased that the dominant fac- 
tions among the victors in Tajikistan's civil war were much less 
amenable to Uzbekistan's leadership than were the factions 
that had controlled Tajikistani politics before the war. By 1995 
the Uzbekistani government was urging the government in 
Dushanbe to be more conciliatory toward the opposition in 
postwar peace talks. 

The leaders of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni- 
stan, and Uzbekistan repeatedly extolled the value of regional 
economic and environmental cooperation in the early 1990s. 
In reality, however, only limited progress was made toward such 
cooperation. Oil and natural gas producers Kazakstan and 
Turkmenistan interrupted fuel deliveries to Tajikistan, in the 
hopes of improving the terms of the sales agreements that had 
prevailed under the Soviet system. With consumer goods gen- 
erally in short supply, Tajikistan has taken measures to prevent 
citizens of the neighboring republics from purchasing such 
items from Tajikistani stockpiles. Tajikistan also is wary of 
regional water use plans that might increase the share of 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in water emanating from Tajiki- 
stan. 



279 



Country Studies 
Iran 

When Tajikistan declared independence, Iran was one of the 
first countries to extend diplomatic recognition, and the first 
to establish an embassy in Dushanbe. In 1992 Iran provided 
training for a group of Tajik diplomats from Tajikistan. After 
1991 bilateral contacts in the mass media and in sports 
increased significantly, and Iran funded construction of several 
new mosques in Tajikistan. Some of Tajikistan's most important 
contacts with Iran in the early 1990s were cultural. For exam- 
ple, Tajikistan held an Iranian film festival, an exhibition of Ira- 
nian art, and two exhibits of Iranian publications. Dushanbe 
was the site of international conferences on Persian culture 
and the Tajik language. In the early 1990s, Iranian books and 
magazines became increasingly available in Tajikistan, and 
Dushanbe television carried programs from Iran. The main 
obstacle to such cultural contact is the fact that only a very 
small portion of the Tajikistani population can read the Arabic 
alphabet (see Ethnic Groups and Forces of Nationalism, this 
ch.). 

Despite the obvious ideological differences between the 
Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran and the secular commu- 
nist regime in newly independent Tajikistan, Nabiyev actively 
cultivated relations with Iran. When Nabiyev's position was 
threatened in 1992, his speeches repeatedly stressed both the 
cultural and the religious ties between the two countries. He 
subsequently made a direct request for aid from Iranian presi- 
dent Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (see Transition to Post- 
Soviet Government, this ch.). 

The leading figures of the Islamic revival movement in 
Tajikistan say emphatically that whatever eventual form of 
Islamic state they advocate for Tajikistan, Iran is not the model 
to be followed. Part of the reason for this position is that Iran is 
predominantly Shia Muslim while Tajikistan is mainly Sunni, a 
distinction with important implications for the organization of 
the religious leadership and its relationship with the state. An 
equally important reason is that the social structures of Tajiki- 
stan and Iran are considered too different for Iran's linkage of 
religious and political powers to be adopted in Tajikistan. 

In the fall of 1992, Iran repeatedly offered to help mediate 
Tajikistan's civil war in cooperation with other Central Asian 
states. Although such offers produced no negotiations, Iran 
did send food and set up camps for refugees from Tajikistan. 
After the civil war, relations between Iran and the new govern- 



280 



Tajikistan 



ment in Dushanbe included efforts to develop a modus vivendi 
as well as periodic recriminations. Iran worked with Russia in 
attempting to negotiate a peace agreement between the 
Dushanbe government and the opposition. In July 1995, Tajiki- 
stan opened an embassy in Tehran, one of its few outside the 
former Soviet Union. 

Afghanistan 

Tajikistan's relations with Afghanistan, the country with 
which it shares its long southern border, have been affected 
not only by the cultural and ethnic links between inhabitants of 
the countries but also by the way the Soviet regime tried to use 
those links to ensure the survival of a communist government 
in Kabul after 1979. The Soviets put Tajiks from Tajikistan in 
positions of power in the Soviet-backed Afghan government 
and sent propaganda publications from Tajikistan to Afghani- 
stan. Afghans were brought to Tajikistan for education and 
communist indoctrination, and Tajiks served in the Soviet mili- 
tary occupation of Afghanistan. In 1991 the political climate in 
Tajikistan allowed some citizens to criticize the war openly, 
although there was no reliable gauge of how widely this antiwar 
opinion was shared. 

Into the early 1990s, the communist government in 
Dushanbe and the then-communist government in Kabul 
favored the development of economic relations and exchanges 
in the fields of education and publishing. During the civil war, 
the antireformist side alleged that its opponents relied heavily 
on the subversive actions of Afghan mujahidin. Most neutral 
observers dismissed the large-scale role of Afghans as a propa- 
ganda ploy. 

Rugged terrain and poor border enforcement make the 
Tajikistan- Afghanistan border very permeable. Beginning in 

1992, border crossings — for private smuggling, to escape the 
Tajikistani civil war, or to obtain weapons for one side or the 
other in that war — became increasingly numerous. By early 

1993, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
estimated that 50,000 to 70,000 refugees had gone from south- 
ern Tajikistan to northern Afghanistan. By 1994 many of them 
had returned home, although the exact number is not avail- 
able. 

Relations between Tajikistan's post-civil war government and 
Afghanistan often were troubled through the first half of the 
1990s. Tajikistan accused Afghanistan of complicity in cross- 



281 



Country Studies 



border attacks by exiled opposition members based in north- 
ern Afghanistan. In turn, Afghanistan accused Russian forces 
on the Tajikistan side of the border of killing Afghan civilians 
in reprisal attacks. The situation changed in late 1995 and early 
1996, when Russia began to support President Burhanuddin 
Rabbani's faction in the ongoing Afghan civil war. Rabbani 
then tried to improve relations with the Dushanbe government 
and to mediate a settlement between it and the opposition. 

The United States 

Although the United States was the second country to open 
an embassy in Dushanbe, that outpost was evacuated in Octo- 
ber 1992, at the height of the civil war, and was not reopened 
until March 1993. Beginning in 1992, antireformists and the 
opposition both sought support from the United States. Thus, 
a trip by Secretary of State James Baker to Tajikistan in Febru- 
ary 1992 antagonized members of the opposition, who saw the 
visit as granting tacit approval to Nabiyev's political repression. 
Relations with the opposition were improved somewhat a few 
months later, when a human rights delegation from the United 
States Congress met with several opposition leaders. 

During the civil war, the United States provided emergency 
food supplies and medicines to Tajikistan, and independent 
Tajikistan continued the cooperative program on earthquake 
forecasting techniques that had begun with the United States 
during the Soviet era. By the mid-1990s, United States policy 
toward Tajikistan centered on support for peace negotiations 
and on encouraging Tajikistan to develop closer relations with 
the IMF and other financial organizations that could help in 
the rebuilding process. 

China 

The main source of tension between China and Tajikistan is 
China's claim on part of Tajikistan's far eastern Gorno-Bada- 
khshan region. Between 1992 and 1995, sixteen rounds of 
negotiations between China and a commission representing 
Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan failed to produce 
a border agreement. An interim agreement, scheduled for 
signing in April 1996, stipulated that no attacks would be 
launched across the border in either direction and that both 
sides would provide ample notice of military exercises in the 
area. Despite their border dispute, China and the post-civil war 
government of Tajikistan share a hostility toward reformist 



282 



Tajikistan 



political movements, especially those that could be stigmatized 
as Islamic fundamentalist. By the mid-1990s, this common 
ground had become the basis for a working relationship 
between the two governments. 

International Organizations 

Tajikistan joined the UN in 1992. In the fall of that year, the 
Tajikistani coalition government requested UN aid in ending 
the civil war and supporting political democratization, but only 
a UN mission and a call for an end to hostilities resulted. Tajiki- 
stan joined the CSCE in February 1992. In 1993 and 1994, 
membership was obtained in the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development (IBRD), the World Bank (see Glos- 
sary), the IMF, and the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(see Glossary). 

National Security 

In the years following independence, Tajikistan has made 
some efforts to establish independent national security institu- 
tions and forces. At the same time, in the mid-1990s a contin- 
gent of CIS troops remain in place under a Russian-dominated 
command. At least until resolution of its internal conflict, 
Tajikistan seems assured that more powerful countries will 
exert substantial influence on its national security affairs. 

Russia's Role in the Early 1990s 

Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 
1991, Tajikistan had no army of its own. Administratively, the 
republic was part of the Soviet Union's Turkestan Military Dis- 
trict, which was abolished in June 1992. By the end of the 
Soviet era, the old military system, which commonly (although 
not exclusively) assigned draftees from Tajikistan to noncom- 
bat units in the Soviet army, had begun to break down, and 
draft evasion became a common occurrence in Tajikistan. 
Reform plans for Tajikistan's conscription system were over- 
taken by the breakup of the union. 

Following independence, the Nabiyev government made 
repeated efforts between December 1991 and June 1992 to 
organize a national guard. Those efforts met strong opposition 
from factions fearing that an antireformist president would use 
the guard as a tool of repression. When his national guard 
plans failed, Nabiyev turned to private armies of his political 



283 



Country Studies 

supporters to kill or intimidate political opponents. In 1992 
additional armed bands were organized in Tajikistan, some 
associated with opposition political groups and others simply 
reflecting the breakdown of central authority in the country 
rather than loyalty to a political faction. 

The main regular military force in Tajikistan at indepen- 
dence was the former Soviet 201st Motorized Rifle Division, 
headquartered in Dushanbe. This division, whose personnel 
are ethnically heterogeneous, came under jurisdiction of the 
Russian Federation in 1992 and remained under Russian com- 
mand in early 1996. Officially neutral in the civil war, Russian 
and Uzbekistani forces, including armored vehicles of the 
201st Division and armored vehicles, jets, and helicopters from 
Uzbekistan, provided significant assistance in antireformist 
assaults on the province of Qurghonteppa and on Dushanbe. 
The 201st Division failed to warn the inhabitants of Dushanbe 
that neo-Soviet forces had entered the city, nor did it interfere 
with the victors' wave of violence against opposition supporters 
in Dushanbe. In the ensuing months, the 201st Division was 
involved in some battles against opposition holdouts. Russian 
troops stationed in Tajikistan were a major source of weapons 
for various factions in the civil war. Combatants on both sides 
frequently were able to buy or confiscate Russian military hard- 
ware, including armored vehicles. 

In January 1993, a Russian, Colonel (later Major General) 
Aleksandr Shishlyannikov, was appointed minister of defense 
of Tajikistan (a post he held until 1995, when he was replaced 
by Major General Sherali Khayrulloyev, a Tajik), and many 
positions in the Tajikistani high command were assumed by 
Russians in 1993. Meanwhile, in mid-1993 the joint CIS peace- 
keeping force was created. The force, which remained by far 
the largest armed presence in Tajikistan through 1995, 
included elements of the 201st Division, units of Russian bor- 
der troops, and some Kazakstani, Kyrgyzstani, and Uzbekistani 
units. By 1995 the officially stated mission of the 201st Division 
in Tajikistan included artillery and rocket support for the bor- 
der troops. Included in the division's weaponry in 1995 were 
180 M-72 main battle tanks; 185 pieces of artillery, including 
sixty-five pieces of towed artillery; fifty self-propelled guns; fif- 
teen rocket launchers; and fifty-five mortars. 

Border security is a key part of Russia's continued military 
role in Tajikistan. In June 1992, the formerly Soviet border 
guards stationed in Tajikistan came under the direct authority 



284 



"Kulabi" (Tajikistani communist forces, in black) and Russian soldiers 

outside the parliament building, Dushanbe 
Courtesy Stephane Herbert 

of Russia; in 1993 a reorganization put all Russian border 
troops under the Russian Federal Border Service. By 1995 an 
estimated 16,500 troops of that force were in Tajikistan, but 
about 12,500 of the rank-and-file and noncommissioned offi- 
cers were drawn from the inhabitants of Tajikistan. 

The Armed Forces 

Tajikistan began assembling its own army in February 1993. 
The initial units were drawn from Popular Front forces active 
in the civil war. In the new army, those bands initially kept their 
distinct identity and their old commanders. This proved to be 
an impediment to the development of a cohesive military when 
some units resisted subordination to any higher authority, and 
casualties resulted from battles among units. Early in 1996, a 
rebellion by the First Battalion of Tajikistan's army, based in the 



285 



Country Studies 

Qurghonteppa area, brought about the replacement of the 
prime minister, a deputy prime minister, and the president's 
chief of staff to placate the rebel unit. 

By the mid-1990s, Tajikistan's army numbered about 3,000 
personnel. Russians, many of them veterans of the war in 
Afghanistan, made up almost three-quarters of the officer 
corps. The Russian Ministry of Defense continued to provide 
material assistance to Tajikistan's army. Through the mid- 
1990s, Tajikistan did not have an air force but relied instead on 
Russian air power; however, the Dushanbe government voiced 
the intention of purchasing some helicopters for military use 
and forming an air force squadron. 

Internal Security 

Preservation of internal security was impossible during the 
civil war, whose concomitant disorder promoted the activities 
of numerous illegal groups. Because of Tajikistan's location, 
the international narcotics trade found these conditions espe- 
cially inviting in the early and mid-1990s. 

Security Organizations 

When Tajikistan was part of the Soviet Union, the republic's 
Committee for State Security (KGB) was an integral part of the 
Soviet-wide KGB. Neither the administration nor the majority 
of personnel were Tajik. When Tajikistan became independent, 
the organization was renamed the Committee of National 
Security and a Tajik, Alimjon Solehboyev, was put in charge. In 
1995 the committee received full cabinet status as the Ministry 
of Security. 

Police powers are divided between the forces of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Security. The two most 
significant characteristics of the current system are the failure 
to observe the laws that are on the books in political cases and 
the penetration of the current regime by criminal elements. 

Narcotics 

In the last years of the Soviet Union and in the Russian Fed- 
eration of the mid-1990s, the issue of drug trafficking was 
embroiled in political rhetoric and public prejudices. The 
Yeltsin administration used the combined threats of narcotics 
and Islamic fundamentalism to justify Russian military involve- 
ment in Tajikistan, and the Rahmonov regime used accusations 



286 



Preparing for an antinarcotics expedition supported by United States 

Drug Enforcement Administration 
Courtesy Stephane Herbert 

of drug crimes to justify the repression of domestic political 
opponents. 

Despite the presence of Russian border guards, the border 
between Afghanistan and Tajikistan has proved easily penetra- 
ble by narcotics smugglers, for whom the lack of stable law 
enforcement on both sides of the boundary provides great 
opportunities. For some Central Asians, the opium trade has 
assumed great economic importance in the difficult times of 
the post-Soviet era. An established transit line moves opium 
from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Khorugh in Tajikistan's 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, from which it 
moves to Dushanbe and then to Osh on the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbeki- 
stan border. The ultimate destination of much of the narcotics 
passing through Tajikistan is a burgeoning market in Moscow 
and other Russian cities, as well as some markets in Western 



287 



Country Studies 



Europe and in other CIS nations. Besides Pakistan and Afghan- 
istan, sources have been identified in Russia, Western Europe, 
Colombia, and Southeast Asia. A shipment of heroin was con- 
fiscated for the first time in 1995; previously, traffic apparently 
had been limited to opium and hashish. 

An organized-crime network reportedly has developed 
around the Moscow narcotics market; Russian border guards, 
members of the CIS peacekeeping force, and senior Tajikistani 
government officials reportedly are involved in this activity. 
Besides corruption, enforcement has been hampered by anti- 
quated Soviet-era laws and a lack of funding. In 1995 the num- 
ber of drug arrests increased, but more than two-thirds were 
for cultivation; only twenty were for the sale of drugs. A 
national drug-control plan was under government consider- 
ation in early 1996. Regional drug-control cooperation broke 
down after independence. In 1995 the Tajikistani government 
planned to implement a new regional program, based in the 
UN Drug Control Program office in Tashkent, for drug inter- 
diction along the Murghob-Osh-Andijon overland route. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the customs authorities, the Minis- 
try of Health, and the procurator general all have responsibili- 
ties in drug interdiction, but there are no formal lines of 
interagency cooperation. 

Criminal Justice and the Penal System 

Independent Tajikistan's system of courts and police evolved 
from the institutional framework established in the Soviet era. 
The judiciary is not fully independent; the 1994 constitution 
gives the president the power to remove judges from office. In 
the wake of the victors' wave of violence against actual or poten- 
tial supporters of the opposition at the end of the civil war, the 
post-civil war regime continued to ignore due process of law in 
dealing with opposition supporters. Numerous opposition fig- 
ures were arrested and held without trial for prolonged peri- 
ods; representatives of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and Helsinki Watch were not permitted to see political 
prisoners. Extrajudicial killings, disappearances, warrantless 
searches, the probable planting of incriminating evidence, 
arrests for conduct that was not illegal, and physical abuse of 
prisoners were all part of the new regime's treatment of opposi- 
tion supporters. The regime established its own secret prisons 
for those held on political charges. 



288 



Tajikistan 



In the new government installed at the end of the civil war, 
the minister of internal affairs, hence the national head of 
police, was Yaqub Salimov, who had no law enforcement expe- 
rience and himself had led a criminal gang. Salimov was an 
associate of Sangak Safarov, a top antireformist military leader 
who also had an extensive criminal record. Salimov used his 
law enforcement position to shield his criminal confederates 
and to intimidate other members of the cabinet. In 1995 Presi- 
dent Rahmonov finally maneuvered Salimov out of power by 
appointing him ambassador to Turkey. Salimov's successor as 
minister of internal affairs was Saidomir Zuhurov, a KGB vet- 
eran who had been minister of security in the post-civil war gov- 
ernment. 

Thus, in the mid-1990s Tajikistan's national security condi- 
tion was tenuous from both domestic and international stand- 
points. Internally, the concept of uniform law enforcement for 
the protection of Tajikistani citizens had not taken hold, in 
spite of constitutional guarantees. Instead, the republic's law 
enforcement agencies were at the service of the political goals 
of those in power. Externally, Tajikistan remained almost com- 
pletely reliant upon Russia and its Central Asian neighbors for 
military protection of its borders. By 1996 years of internation- 
ally sponsored negotiations had failed to bring about a satisfac- 
tory compromise between the government and the opposition, 
offering little hope that CIS troops could leave but providing 
the Rahmonov government a pretext for ongoing restraint of 
civil liberties. 

* * * 

Relatively little has been written in English about Tajikistan. 
An important study of the largely Persian civilization and politi- 
cal history of southern Central Asia in the early centuries of the 
Islamic era is Richard N. Frye's Bukhara: The Medieval Achieve- 
ment The first three chapters of Turko-Persia in Historical Perspec- 
tive, edited by Robert L. Canfield, describe the interaction of 
Turkic- and Persian-speaking peoples in the region. The Rus- 
sian scholar Vasilii V. Bartol'd wrote a seminal historical work 
that has been translated as Turkestan Down to the Mongol Inva- 
sion. Tajikistan's Persian-language literature is covered in the 
chapter "Modern Tajik Literature" in Persian Literature, edited 
by Ehsan Yarshater. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's Russia and 
Nationalism in Central Asia describes Tajikistani politics in the 



289 



Country Studies 



Stalin and Khrushchev eras from the Russian viewpoint. Muriel 
Atkin's The Subtlest Battle and "Islam as Faith, Politics and Bogey- 
man in Tajikistan" (a chapter in The Politics of Religion in Russia 
and the New States of Eurasia, edited by Michael Bourdeaux) 
describe the role of Islam in Soviet and post-Soviet times. A 
description of events leading to the 1992 civil war is contained 
in Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh's "The 'Tajik Spring' of 1992." Ser- 
gei Gretsky has covered aspects of the civil war in two articles, 
one appearing in Critique (Spring 1995) and the other in Cen- 
tral Asia Monitor (No. 1, 1994), and an assessment of Russian- 
Tajikistani relations in a chapter of Regional Power Rivalries in the 
New Eurasia, edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolan- 
sky. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibli- 
ography.) 



290 



Ivory wine vessel excavated at site ofNisa, ancient city near Ashgabat 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Turkmenistan. 
Short Form: Turkmenistan. 
Term for Citizens: Turkmenistani(s). 
Capital: Ashgabat. 

Date of Independence: October 27, 1991. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 488,100 square kilometers. 

Topography: Center of country dominated by Turan Depres- 
sion and Garagum Desert, flatlands of which occupy nearly 80 
percent of country's area; Kopetdag Range along southwestern 
border reaches 2,912 meters; Balkan Mountains in far west and 
Kugitang Range in far east only other appreciable elevations. 

Climate: Subtropical, desert, and severely continental, with 
little rainfall; winters mild and dry, most precipitation falling 
between January and May. Heaviest precipitation in Kopetdag 
Range. 

Society 

Population: In 1991, population 3,808,900; 1989 annual 
growth rate 2.5 percent; 1991 population density 7.8 persons 
per square kilometer. 

Ethnic Groups: In 1991, Turkmen 72 percent, Russians nearly 
10 percent, Uzbeks 9 percent, and Kazaks 2 percent. 

Languages: Turkmen, official national language, spoken by 
about 75 percent of population; Russian, replaced as official 



293 



Country Studies 



language in 1992 constitution, still much used in official 
communications despite campaigning to limit its influence; 
English given status behind Turkmen as second official 
language, 1993. 

Religion: Approximately 87 percent Muslim (mainly Sunni), 11 
percent Russian Orthodox; many who profess Islam are not 
active adherents. 

Education and Literacy: In 1991, estimated 98 percent of those 
above age fifteen literate; education compulsory through 
eighth grade. Much of Soviet education system still in place; 
substantial modification in progress to raise quality of work 

force. 

Health: Soviet system of free care for all citizens remains in 
place, but in early 1990s supply shortages and poor medical 
staff made care inadequate in many areas; infant mortality 
highest and life expectancy lowest in Central Asia. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): 1994 estimate US$4.3 billion, 
or US$1,049 per capita. Real growth rate estimated at -24 
percent, 1994. 

Agriculture: Limited, gradual privatization of state-held arable 
land, with state control of marketing and inputs. Irrigation, a 
major expense in support of nearly all agricultural areas, 
hampered by inefficient delivery. Major crops cotton, grains, 
fodder crops, with wool, meat, and milk from raising of 
livestock, chiefly sheep. 

Industry and Mining: Specialized for oil and gas industry and 
cotton products, post-Soviet diversification slow; some machine 
building, production of construction materials, carpet weaving, 
and food and wine processing. Fuel-related industries slowed in 
early 1990s by difficulties in fuel sales abroad. Wide variety of 
mineral deposits, especially sulfur, used in chemical industry. 

Energy: Self-sufficient in natural gas and oil, with major 
untapped deposits expected to sustain supply in foreseeable 
future. Natural gas dominates domestic energy consumption 
and energy exports. 

Exports: In 1995 worth about US$1.9 billion. Principal items 



294 



Turkmenistan 



natural gas, petroleum, cotton, chemicals, processed foods, 
and minerals. Postcommunist export market in Russia remains 
steady; markets with other former Soviet republics have 
declined. Post-1991 expansion of specific products, especially 
cotton, outside Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
Western Europe, Mexico, Far East. 

Imports: In 1995 worth about US$1.5 billion. Principal items 
food and beverages, textiles, and machinery. Principal import 
suppliers Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, 
and Germany. 

Balance of Payments: In 1992, estimated as US$108 million 
deficit. 

Exchange Rate: Manat introduced November 1993, replacing 
Russian ruble. One manat equals 100 tenge. Revaluation late 
1995 from US$1=500 manat to US$1=2,100 manat, but wide 
variation of value in unofficial markets. Official rate January 
1996, 200 manat per US$1. 

Inflation: In 1995 estimated at more than 1,000 percent, about 
same rate as previous years. Increased entitlements and loose 
government lending policy caused repeated increases in early 
1990s. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Highly centralized government policy, with no 
regional authority. Ministry of Economy and Finance has 
nominal control over public finance, but many extrabudgetary 
expenditures block effective control, incur deficits. Lack of 
experience hinders development of commercially oriented 
banking system. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways: In 1990 about 23,000 kilometers of roads, of which 
15,300 paved. One major highway connects eastern and 
western population centers. 

Railroads: In 1993, about 2,120 kilometers of track in system 
inadequate to serve current needs. Major renovation and 
expansion in planning stage, including 1,000 kilometers of new 



295 



Country Studies 
track. 

Civil Aviation: Seven airports, four with permanent-surface 
runways. Main international airport at Ashgabat. Turkmenistan 
Airlines offers connections to some European cities, Middle 
and Far East, and southern Asia. 

Inland Waterways: None. 

Ports: Main shipping facility at Turkmenbashy on Caspian Sea; 
three smaller Caspian ports, undergoing reconstruction 1995. 

Pipelines: Critical part of economic infrastructure; in 1994, 
some 4,400 kilometers in operation, with plans for new natural 
gas lines westward to Bulgaria (4,000 kilometers) and eastward 
to China (6,700 kilometers) before 2000. 

Telecommunications: In poorly developed telephone system, 
28 percent of households with telephones, many villages 
lacking telephone service entirely, and much outdated 
equipment; modernization program began early 1990s. Two 
television broadcasting centers relaying satellite transmissions 
from Orbita and International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (Intelsat) to all cities and rural centers. All 
broadcasting controlled by State Committee for Television and 
Radio Broadcasting. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Many Soviet-era officials still in place, 1996; 
constitution of 1992 stipulates democratic separation of 
powers, but presidency sole center of actual power under 
Saparmyrat Niyazov. Legislative branch, fifty-member Milli 
Mejlis, has same ratification functions as Soviet-era Supreme 
Soviet. Judiciary very weak — -judges appointed by president; 
Supreme Court reviews constitutionality of legislation. Sixty- 
member National Council with advisory function, actually 
subsidiary to presidential power. 

Politics: Constitution guarantees political freedom, but former 
Communist Party, now Democratic Party, dominates and 
retains same structure and propaganda machine as in Soviet 
era. Niyazov's cult of personality provides further domination. 
Small, weak opposition groups concentrate on single issues; 



296 



Turkmenistan 



some groups outlawed. 

Foreign Relations: Basic policy "positive neutrality" — 
noninterference and neutrality toward all countries and 
attempts to establish relations as widely as possible. Marketing 
and transport of natural gas and oil given priority in foreign 
economic deals. Remains independent of other Central Asian 
and CIS countries when possible, but maintains strong bilateral 
military and economic ties with Russia. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of 
United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
Islamic Development Bank, and CIS. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: All personnel except officers conscripts. 
Turkmenistan army, includes about 11,000 Turkmen personnel 
(under joint Turkmen-Russian control); 12,000 Russian troops 
also present, 1995. Air force has 2,000 men, plus substantial 
Russian force remaining in country pending final distribution. 
Coastal defense force is included in multinational Caspian 
Flotilla. Border Guard, under joint Turkmen and Russian 
command, has 5,000 personnel, mainly on Afghan and Iranian 
borders. 

Major Military Units: Army consists of one corps, including 
three motorized rifle divisions, one artillery brigade, one 
multiple rocket launcher regiment, one antitank regiment, 
three engineer regiments, one helicopter squadron, and 
signal, reconnaissance, and logistics support units. Air force 
includes four regiments, 175 combat aircraft; air defense force 
has two fighter regiments; air and air defense organization 
contingent on negotiations with Russia on disposition of 
former Soviet forces. 

Military Budget: Estimated 1995, US$61 million. 

Internal Security: Committee for National Security continues 
as main security force similar to Soviet-era Turkmenistan 
Committee for State Security (KGB). Ministry of Internal 
Affairs administers regular police, working closely with 
Committee for National Security in matters of national 



297 



Country Studies 



security. Criminal investigation under procurator's offices, not 
regular police, who have only routine functions. As in Soviet 
system, procurators investigate and prosecute crimes. Rule of 
law hampered by judiciary's subordinate position to executive 
branch and lack of independent judicial tradition. 



298 




I 



KAZAK 



KSTAN 



V '1 



'"1 



QaraBog 




Turkmenbashy \ 

Caspian 
Sea 




® 



Intematiq 
Province | 
National 
Provincel 
Populate 
Garagurrj 
Railroad j 
Road 
Airport 
Port 

100 200! 

" -100 i 



TAN 



Figure 12. Turkmenista 



300 



DURING MUCH OF ITS PAST, Turkmenistan has received lit- 
tle attention from the outside world. Apart from its role in 
establishing the Seljuk dynasty in the Middle East in the Middle 
Ages, for most of its history this territory was not a coherent 
nation but a geographically defined region of independent 
tribal groups and other political entities. Like other republics 
of the former Soviet Union, Turkmenistan has emerged on the 
world scene as a newly independent country in need of both 
national and international acceptance, security, and develop- 
ment. 

Turkmenistan's authoritarian regime and regional social 
structure have produced the most politically and economically 
stable of the former Soviet republics. Although its leadership 
has gained a reputation abroad for repression of political 
opposition, it is perceived at home as promoting the social ben- 
efits, national traditions, and security of the Turkmen people. 
In addition, to ensure its national security and trade prospects, 
Turkmenistan has charted an independent course in establish- 
ing a military alliance with Russia and trade and security agree- 
ments with Iran and Central Asian countries. In terms of 
natural assets, Turkmenistan is a landlocked, desert country 
beneath whose surface lie substantial deposits of oil and the 
fifth largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Foreign inves- 
tors, attracted by the republic's calm and receptive atmosphere, 
have sidestepped human rights issues on their way to establish- 
ing joint exploitation of Turkmenistan's rich energy resources. 

Historical Setting 

Like the other Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan under- 
went the intrusion and rule of several foreign powers before 
falling under first Russian and then Soviet control in the mod- 
ern era. Most notable were the Mongols and the Uzbek khan- 
ates, the latter of which dominated the indigenous Oghuz 
tribes until Russian incursions began in the late nineteenth 
century. 

Origins and Early History 

Sedentary Oghuz tribes from Mongolia moved into present- 
day Central Asia around the eighth century. Within a few cen- 



301 




300 



Country Studies 



turies, some of these tribes had become the ethnic basis of the 
Turkmen population. 

The Oghuz and the Turkmen 

The origins of the Turkmen may be traced back to the 
Oghuz confederation of nomadic pastoral tribes of the early 
Middle Ages, which lived in present-day Mongolia and around 
Lake Baikal in present-day southern Siberia. Known as the 
Nine Oghuz, this confederation was composed of 
Turkic-speaking peoples who formed the basis of powerful 
steppe empires in Inner Asia. In the second half of the eighth 
century, components of the Nine Oghuz migrated through 
Jungaria into Central Asia, and Arabic sources located them 
under the term Guzz in the area of the middle and lower Syr- 
dariya in the eighth century. By the tenth century, the Oghuz 
had expanded west and north of the Aral Sea and into the 
steppe of present-day Kazakstan, absorbing not only Iranians 
but also Turks from the Kipchak and Karluk ethnolinguistic 
groups. In the eleventh century, the renowned Muslim Turk 
scholar Mahmud al-Kashgari described the language of the 
Oghuz and Turkmen as distinct from that of other Turks and 
identified twenty-two Oghuz clans or sub-tribes, some of which 
appear in later Turkmen genealogies and legends as the core 
of the early Turkmen. 

Oghuz expansion by means of military campaigns went at 
least as far as the Volga River and Ural Mountains, but the geo- 
graphic limits of their dominance fluctuated in the steppe 
areas extending north and west from the Aral Sea. Accounts of 
Arab geographers and travelers portray the Oghuz ethnic 
group as lacking centralized authority and being governed by a 
number of "kings" and "chieftains." Because of their disparate 
nature as a polity and the vastness of their domains, Oghuz 
tribes rarely acted in concert. Hence, by the late tenth century, 
the bonds of their confederation began to loosen. At that time, 
a clan leader named Seljuk founded a dynasty and the empire 
that bore his name on the basis of those Oghuz elements that 
had migrated southward into present-day Turkmenistan and 
Iran. The Seljuk Empire was centered in Persia, from which 
Oghuz groups spread into Azerbaijan and Anatolia. 

The name Turkmen first appears in written sources of the 
tenth century to distinguish those Oghuz groups who migrated 
south into the Seljuk domains and accepted Islam from those 
that had remained in the steppe. Gradually, the term took on 



302 



Turkmenistan 



the properties of an ethnonym and was used exclusively to des- 
ignate Muslim Oghuz, especially those who migrated away 
from the Syrdariya Basin. By the thirteenth century, the term 
Turkmen supplanted the designation Oghuz altogether. The ori- 
gin of the word Turkmen remains unclear. According to popular 
etymologies as old as the eleventh century, the word derives 
from Turk plus the Iranian element manand, and means 
"resembling a Turk." Modern scholars, on the other hand, have 
proposed that the element man/ men acts as an intensifier and 
have translated the word as "pure Turk" or "most Turk-like of 
the Turks." 

The Seljuk Period 

In the eleventh century, Seljuk domains stretched from the 
delta of the Amu Darya delta into Iran, Iraq, the Caucasus 
region, Syria, and Asia Minor. In 1055 Seljuk forces entered 
Baghdad, becoming masters of the Islamic heartlands and 
important patrons of Islamic institutions. The last powerful Sel- 
juk ruler, Sultan Sanjar (d. 1157), witnessed the fragmentation 
and destruction of the empire because of attacks by Turkmen 
and other tribes. 

Until these revolts, Turkmen tribesmen were an integral part 
of the Seljuk military forces. Turkmen migrated with their fam- 
ilies and possessions on Seljuk campaigns into Azerbaijan and 
Anatolia, a process that began the Turkification of these areas. 
During this time, Turkmen also began to settle the area of 
present-day Turkmenistan. Prior to the Turkmen habitation, 
most of this desert had been uninhabited, while the more hab- 
itable areas along the Caspian Sea, Kopetdag Mountains, Amu 
Darya, and Murgap River (Murgap Deryasy) were populated 
predominantly by Iranians. The city-state of Merv was an espe- 
cially large sedentary and agricultural area, important as both a 
regional economic-cultural center and a transit hub on the 
famous Silk Road. 

Formation of the Turkmen Nation 

During the Mongol conquest of Central Asia in the thir- 
teenth century, the Turkmen-Oghuz of the steppe were pushed 
from the Syrdariya farther into the Garagum (Russian spelling 
Kara Kum) Desert and along the Caspian Sea. Various compo- 
nents were nominally subject to the Mongol domains in east- 
ern Europe, Central Asia, and Iran. Until the early sixteenth 
century, they were concentrated in four main regions: along 



303 



Country Studies 

the southeastern coast of the Caspian Sea, on the Mangyshlak 
Peninsula (on the northeastern Caspian coast), around the 
Balkan Mountains, and along the Uzboy River running across 
north-central Turkmenistan. Many scholars regard the four- 
teenth through the sixteenth centuries as the period of the 
reformulation of the Turkmen into the tribal groups that exist 
today. Beginning in the sixteenth century and continuing into 
the nineteenth century, large tribal conglomerates and individ- 
ual groups migrated east and southeast. 

Historical sources indicate the existence of a large tribal 
union often referred to as the Salor confederation in the 
Mangyshlak Peninsula and areas around the Balkan Moun- 
tains. The Salor were one of the few original Oghuz tribes to 
survive to modern times. In the late seventeenth century, the 
union dissolved and the three senior tribes moved eastward 
and later southward. The Yomud split into eastern and western 
groups, while the Teke moved into the Akhal region along the 
Kopetdag Mountains and gradually into the Murgap River 
basin. The Salor tribes migrated into the region near the Amu 
Darya delta in the oasis of Khorazm south of the Aral Sea, the 
middle course of the Amu Darya southeast of the Aral Sea, the 
Akhal oasis north of present-day Ashgabat and areas along the 
Kopetdag bordering Iran, and the Murgap River in present-day 
southeast Turkmenistan. Salor groups also live in Turkey, 
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and China. 

Much of what we know about the Turkmen from the six- 
teenth to nineteenth centuries comes from Uzbek and Persian 
chronicles that record Turkmen raids and involvement in the 
political affairs of their sedentary neighbors. Beginning in the 
sixteenth century, most of the Turkmen tribes were divided 
among two Uzbek principalities: the Khanate (or amirate) of 
Khiva (centered along the lower Amu Darya in Khorazm) and 
the Khanate of Bukhoro (Bukhara). Uzbek khans and princes 
of both khanates customarily enlisted Turkmen military sup- 
port in their intra- and inter-khanate struggles and in cam- 
paigns against the Persians. Consequently, many Turkmen 
tribes migrated closer to the urban centers of the khanates, 
which came to depend heavily upon the Turkmen for their mil- 
itary forces. The height of Turkmen influence in the affairs of 
their sedentary neighbors came in the eighteenth century, 
when on several occasions (1743, 1767-70), the Yomud 
invaded and controlled Khorazm. From 1855 to 1867, a series 
of Yomud rebellions again shook the area. These hostilities and 



304 



Turkmenistan 



the punitive raids by Uzbek rulers resulted in the wide dispersal 
of the eastern Yomud group. 

Incorporation into Russia 

Russian attempts to encroach upon Turkmen territory 
began in earnest in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
Of all the Central Asian peoples, the Turkmen put up the stiff- 
est resistance against Russian expansion. In 1869 the Russian 
Empire established a foothold in present-day Turkmenistan 
with the foundation of the Caspian Sea port of Krasnovodsk 
(now Turkmenbashy) . From there and other points, they 
marched on and subdued the Khiva Khanate in 1873. Because 
Turkmen tribes, most notably the Yomud, were in the military 
service of the Khivan khan, Russian forces undertook punitive 
raids against the Turkmen of Khorazm, in the process slaugh- 
tering hundreds and destroying their settlements. In 1881 the 
Russians under General Mikhail Skobelev besieged and cap- 
tured Gokdepe, one of the last Turkmen strongholds, north- 
west of Ashgabat. With the Turkmen defeat (which is now 
marked by the Turkmen as a national day of mourning and a 
symbol of national pride), the annexation of what is 
present-day Turkmenistan met with only weak resistance. Later 
the same year, the Russians signed an agreement with the Per- 
sians and established what essentially remains the current bor- 
der between Turkmenistan and Iran. In 1897 a similar 
agreement was signed between the Russians and Afghans. 

Following annexation to Russia, the area was administered as 
the Trans-Caspian District by corrupt and malfeasant military 
officers and officials appointed by the Guberniya (Governorate 
General) of Turkestan (see fig. 3). In the 1880s, a railroad line 
was built from Krasnovodsk to Ashgabat and later extended to 
Tashkent. Urban areas began to develop along the railway. 
Although the Trans-Caspian region essentially was a colony of 
Russia, it remained a backwater, except for Russian concerns 
with British colonialist intentions in the region and with possi- 
ble uprisings by the Turkmen. 

Soviet Turkmenistan 

Because the Turkmen generally were indifferent to the 
advent of Soviet rule in 1917, little revolutionary activity 
occurred in the region in the years that followed. However, the 
years immediately preceding the revolution had been marked 
by sporadic Turkmen uprisings against Russian rule, most 



305 



Country Studies 



prominently the anti-tsarist revolt of 1916 that swept through 
the whole of Turkestan. Their armed resistance to Soviet rule 
was part of the larger Basmachi Rebellion throughout Central 
Asia from the 1920s into the early 1930s. Although Soviet 
sources describe this struggle as a minor chapter in the repub- 
lic's history, it is clear that opposition was fierce and resulted in 
the death of large numbers of Turkmen. 

In October 1924, when Central Asia was divided into distinct 
political entities, the Trans-Caspian District and Turkmen 
Oblast of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
became the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. During the 
forced collectivization and other extreme socioeconomic 
changes of the first decades of Soviet rule, pastoral nomadism 
ceased to be an economic alternative in Turkmenistan, and by 
the late 1930s the majority of Turkmen had become sedentary. 
Efforts by the Soviet state to undermine the traditional Turk- 
men way of life resulted in significant changes in familial and 
political relationships, religious and cultural observances, and 
intellectual developments. Significant numbers of Russians and 
other Slavs, as well as groups from various nationalities mainly 
from the Caucasus, migrated to urban areas. Modest industrial 
capabilities were developed, and limited exploitation of Turk- 
menistan's natural resources was initiated. 

Sovereignty and Independence 

Beginning in the 1930s, Moscow kept the republic under 
firm control. The nationalities policy of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) fostered the development of a 
Turkmen political elite and promoted Russification. Slavs, both 
in Moscow and Turkmenistan, closely supervised the national 
cadre of government officials and bureaucrats; generally, the 
Turkmen leadership staunchly supported Soviet policies. Mos- 
cow initiated nearly all political activity in the republic, and, 
except for a corruption scandal in the mid-1980s, Turkmeni- 
stan remained a quiet Soviet republic. Mikhail S. Gorbachev's 
policies of glasnost (see Glossary) and perestroika (see Glossary) 
did not have a significant impact on Turkmenistan. The repub- 
lic found itself rather unprepared for the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the independence that followed in 1991. 

When other constituent republics of the Soviet Union 
advanced claims to sovereignty in 1988 and 1989, Turkmeni- 
stan's leadership also began to criticize Moscow's economic and 
political policies as exploitative and detrimental to the 



306 



Turkmenistan 



well-being and pride of the Turkmen. By a unanimous vote of 
its Supreme Soviet, Turkmenistan declared its sovereignty in 
August 1990. After the August 1991 coup attempt against the 
Gorbachev regime in Moscow, Turkmenistan's communist 
leader Saparmyrat Niyazov called for a popular referendum on 
independence. The official result of the referendum was 94 
percent in favor of independence. The republic's Supreme 
Soviet had little choice other than to declare Turkmenistan's 
independence from the Soviet Union and the establishment of 
the Republic of Turkmenistan on October 27, 1991. 

Physical Environment 

Turkmenistan is the southernmost republic of the Common- 
wealth of Independent States (CIS — see Glossary), the loose 
federation created at the end of 1991 by most of the post-Soviet 
states. Its longest border is with the Caspian Sea (1,786 kilome- 
ters). The other borders are with Iran (to the south, 992 kilo- 
meters), Afghanistan (to the south, 744 kilometers), 
Uzbekistan (to the north and east, 1,621 kilometers) and 
Kazakstan (to the north, 379 kilometers). Turkmenistan is 
slightly larger than California in territory, occupying 488,100 
square kilometers. That statistic ranks Turkmenistan fourth 
among the former Soviet republics. The country's greatest 
extent from west to east is 1,100 kilometers, and its greatest 
north-to-south distance is 650 kilometers (see fig. 12). 

Physical Features 

Turkmenistan's average elevation is 100 to 220 meters above 
sea level, with its highest point being Mount Ayrybaba (3,137 
meters) in the Kugitang Range of the Pamir-Alay chain in the 
far east, and its lowest point in the Transcaspian Depression 
(100 kilometers below sea level). Nearly 80 percent of the 
republic lies within the Turon Depression, which slopes from 
south to north and from east to west. 

Turkmenistan's mountains include 600 kilometers of the 
northern reaches of the Kopetdag Range, which it shares with 
Iran. The Kopetdag Range is a region characterized by foot- 
hills, dry and sandy slopes, mountain plateaus, and steep 
ravines; Mount Shahshah (2,912 meters), southwest of Ash- 
gabat, is the highest elevation of the range in Turkmenistan. 
The Kopetdag is undergoing tectonic transformation, meaning 
that the region is threatened by earthquakes such as the one 



307 



Country Studies 

that destroyed Ashgabat in 1948 and registered nine on the 
Richter Scale. The Krasnovodsk and Ustirt plateaus are the 
prominent topographical features of northwestern Turkmeni- 
stan. 

A dominant feature of the republic's landscape is the Gara- 
gum Desert, which occupies about 350,000 square kilometers 
(see Environmental Issues, this ch.). Shifting winds create 
desert mountains that range from two to twenty meters in 
height and may be several kilometers in length. Chains of such 
structures are common, as are steep elevations and smooth, 
concrete-like clay deposits formed by the rapid evaporation of 
flood waters in the same area for a number of years. Large 
marshy salt flats, formed by capillary action in the soil, exist in 
many depressions, including the Kara Shor, which occupies 
1,500 square kilometers in the northwest. The Sundukly Desert 
west of the Amu Darya is the southernmost extremity of the 
Qizilqum (Russian spelling Kyzyl Kum) Desert, most of which 
lies in Uzbekistan to the northeast. 

Climate 

Turkmenistan has a subtropical desert climate that is 
severely continental. Summers are long (from May through 
September), hot, and dry, while winters generally are mild and 
dry, although occasionally cold and damp in the north. Most 
precipitation falls between January and May; precipitation is 
slight throughout the country, with annual averages ranging 
from 300 millimeters in the Kopetdag to eighty millimeters in 
the northwest. The capital, Ashgabat, close to the Iranian bor- 
der in south-central Turkmenistan, averages 225 millimeters of 
rainfall annually. Average annual temperatures range from 
highs of 16.8°C in Ashgabat to lows of -5.5°C in Dashhowuz, on 
the Uzbek border in north-central Turkmenistan. The almost 
constant winds are northerly, northeasterly, or westerly. 

Hydrological Conditions 

Almost 80 percent of the territory of Turkmenistan lacks a 
constant source of surface water flow. Its main rivers are 
located only in the southern and eastern peripheries; a few 
smaller rivers on the northern slopes of the Kopetdag are 
diverted entirely to irrigation. The most important river is the 
Amu Darya, which has a total length of 2,540 kilometers from 
its farthest tributary, making it the longest river in Central Asia. 
The Amu Darya flows across northeastern Turkmenistan, 



308 



Turkmenistan 



thence eastward to form the southern borders of Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan. Damming and irrigation uses of the Amu Darya 
have had severe environmental effects on the Aral Sea, into 
which the river flows (see Environmental Issues, this ch.). The 
river's average annual flow is 1,940 cubic meters per second. 
Other major rivers are the Tejen (1,124 kilometers); the Mur- 
gap (852 kilometers); and the Atrek (660 kilometers). 

Environmental Issues 

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, environmental regu- 
lation is largely unchanged in Turkmenistan. The new govern- 
ment created the Ministry of Natural Resources Use and 
Environmental Protection in July 1992, with departments 
responsible for environmental protection, protection of flora 
and fauna, forestry, hydrometeorology, and administrative 
planning. Like other CIS republics, Turkmenistan has estab- 
lished an Environmental Fund based on revenues collected 
from environmental fines, but the fines generally are too low to 
accumulate significant revenue. Thanks to the former Soviet 
system of game preserves and the efforts of the Society for 
Nature Conservation and the Academy of Sciences, flora and 
fauna receive some protection in the republic; however, 
"hard-currency hunts" by wealthy Western and Arab business- 
people already are depleting animals on preserves. 

Desertification 

According to estimates, as a result of desertification pro- 
cesses and pollution, biological productivity of the ecological 
systems in Turkmenistan has declined by 30 to 50 percent in 
recent decades. The Garagum and Qizilqum deserts are 
expanding at a rate surpassed on a planetary scale only by the 
desertification process in the Sahara and Sahel regions of 
Africa. Between 800,000 and 1,000,000 hectares of new desert 
now appears per year in Central Asia. 

The most irreparable type of desertification is the saliniza- 
tion process that forms marshy salt flats. A major factor that 
contributes to these conditions is inefficient use of water 
because of weak regulation and failure to charge for water that 
is used. Efficiency in application of water to the fields is low, 
but the main problem is leakage in main and secondary canals, 
especially Turkmenistan's main canal, the Garagum Canal. 
Nearly half of the canal's water seeps out into lakes and salt 
swamps along its path. Excessive irrigation brings salts to the 



309 



Country Studies 

surface, forming salt marshes that dry into unusable clay flats. 
In 1989 Turkmenistan's Institute for Desert Studies claimed 
that the area of such flats had reached one million hectares. 

The type of desertification caused by year-round pasturing of 
cattle has been termed the most devastating in Central Asia, 
with the gravest situations in Turkmenistan and the Kazak 
steppe along the eastern and northern coasts of the Caspian 
Sea. Wind erosion and desertification also are severe in settled 
areas along the Garagum Canal; planted windbreaks have died 
because of soil waterlogging and/or salinization. Other factors 
promoting desertification are the inadequacy of the 
collector-drainage system built in the 1950s and inappropriate 
application of chemicals. 

The Aral Sea 

Turkmenistan both contributes to and suffers from the con- 
sequences of the desiccation of the Aral Sea. Because of exces- 
sive irrigation, Turkmen agriculture contributes to the steady 
drawdown of sea levels. In turn, the Aral Sea's desiccation, 
which had shrunk that body of water by an estimated 59,000 
square kilometers by 1994, profoundly affects economic pro- 
ductivity and the health of the population of the republic. 
Besides the cost of ameliorating damaged areas and the loss of 
at least part of the initial investment in them, salinization and 
chemicalization of land have reduced agricultural productivity 
in Central Asia by an estimated 20 to 25 percent. Poor drinking 
water is the main health risk posed by such environmental deg- 
radation. In Dashhowuz Province, which has suffered the great- 
est ecological damage from the Aral Sea's desiccation, bacteria 
levels in drinking water exceeded ten times the sanitary level; 
70 percent of the population has experienced illnesses, many 
with hepatitis, and infant mortality is high (see table 5, Appen- 
dix; Health Conditions, this ch.). Experts have warned that 
inhabitants will have to evacuate the province by the end of the 
century unless a comprehensive cleanup program is under- 
taken. Turkmenistan has announced plans to clean up some of 
the Aral Sea fallout with financial support from the World Bank 
(see Glossary). 

Chemical Pollution 

The most productive cotton lands in Turkmenistan (the 
middle and lower Amu Darya and the Murgap oasis) receive as 
much as 250 kilograms of fertilizer per hectare, compared with 



310 



Turkmenistan 



the average application of thirty kilograms per hectare. Fur- 
thermore, most fertilizers are so poorly applied that experts 
have estimated that only 15 to 40 percent of the chemicals can 
be absorbed by cotton plants, while the remainder washes into 
the soil and subsequently into the groundwater. Cotton also 
uses far more pesticides and defoliants than other crops, and 
application of these chemicals often is mishandled by farmers. 
For example, local herdsmen, unaware of the danger of DDT, 
have reportedly mixed the pesticide with water and applied it 
to their faces to keep away mosquitoes. In the late 1980s, a 
drive began in Central Asia to reduce agrochemical usage. In 
Turkmenistan the campaign reduced fertilizer use 30 percent 
between 1988 and 1989. In the early 1990s, use of some pesti- 
cides and defoliants declined drastically because of the coun- 
try's shortage of hard currency. 

Population 

Turkmenistan's population is rather stable, with distribution 
between urban and rural areas and migration trends showing 
minor changes between censuses (see table 3, Appendix). The 
annual population growth rate, however, is rather high, and 
population density has increased significantly in the last forty 
years. 

Size and Distribution 

In 1993 Turkmenistan had a population of 4,254,000 peo- 
ple, making it the fifth most sparsely populated former Soviet 
republic. Of that number, Turkmen comprised about 73 per- 
cent, Russians nearly 10 percent, Uzbeks 9 percent, Kazaks 2 
percent, and other ethnic groups the remaining 5 percent (see 
table 4, Appendix). According to the last Soviet census (1989), 
the total Turkmen population in the Soviet Union was 
2,728,965. Of this number, 2,536,606 lived in Turkmenistan 
and the remainder in the other republics. Outside of the CIS, 
approximately 1.6 million Turkmen live in Iran, Afghanistan, 
and China (see The Spoken Language, this ch.). 

Population density increased in the republic from one per- 
son per square kilometer in 1957 to 9.2 persons per square 
kilometer in 1995. Density varies drastically between desert 
areas and oases, where it often exceeds 100 persons per square 
kilometer. Within Turkmenistan, the population is 50.6 per- 
cent female and 49.4 percent male. In 1995 the estimated 



311 



Country Studies 



annual growth rate was 2.0 percent, and the fertility rate was 
3.7 births per woman (a decline of 1.5 births per woman since 
1979) (see table 2, Appendix). The population was demo- 
graphically quite young, with 40 percent aged fourteen or 
younger and only four percent aged over sixty-four. 

Migration Trends 

In 1989 about 45 percent of the population was classified as 
urban, a drop of 3 percent since 1979. Prior to the arrival of 
Russians in the late nineteenth century, Turkmenistan had 
very few urban areas, and many of the large towns and cities 
that exist today were developed after the 1930s. Ashgabat, the 
capital and largest city in Turkmenistan, has a population of 
about 420,000. The second-largest city, Charjew on the Amu 
Darya, has about 165,000 people. Other major cities are Turk- 
menbashy on the Caspian seacoast, Mary in the southeast, and 
Dashhowuz in the northeast. Because much of the Russian 
population only came to Turkmenistan in the Soviet period, 
separate Russian quarters or neighborhoods did not develop in 
Turkmenistan's cities as they did elsewhere in Central Asia. 
This fact, combined with a relatively small Slavic population, 
has led to integration of Turkmen and Slavs in neighborhoods 
and housing projects. 

Apart from the outflow of small numbers of Russians imme- 
diately following Turkmenistan's independence, neither out- 
migration nor in-migration is a significant factor for Turkmeni- 
stan's population. In 1992 there were 19,035 emigrants from 
Turkmenistan to the Russian Federation and 7,069 immigrants 
to Turkmenistan. 

Society 

Fundamental social institutions generally remained 
unchanged by the presence of Marxist dogma for over seventy 
years, although the presence of large numbers of Russians 
changed the distribution of the classes and the cultural loyal- 
ties of the intelligentsia. With some weakening in urban areas 
in the twentieth century, kinship and tribal affiliation retain a 
strong influence over the structure of Turkmen society. 

National Traditions 

Today's Turkmen have fully embraced the concepts of 
national unity and a strong national consciousness, which had 



312 



Turkmenistan 



been elusive through most of their history. The Turkmen have 
begun to reassess their history and culture, as well as the effects 
of Soviet rule. Some of the more notable changes since inde- 
pendence have been a shift from open hostility to cautious offi- 
cial sanctioning of Islam, the declaration of Turkmen as the 
state language, and the state's promotion of national and reli- 
gious customs and holidays. For example, the vernal equinox, 
known as Novruz ("New Year's Day"), is now celebrated offi- 
cially country-wide. 

Interest and pride in national traditions were demonstrated 
openly prior to independence, particularly following the intro- 
duction of glasnosf by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev in 
1985. Since independence, the government has played a less 
restrictive and at times actively supportive role in the promo- 
tion of national traditions. For example, in a move to replace 
the Soviet version of Turkmen history with one more in har- 
mony with both traditional and current values, President Niya- 
zov formed a state commission to write the "true history of 
sunny Turkmenistan." 

The Soviet period dampened but did not suppress the 
expression of prominent Turkmen cultural traditions. Turk- 
men carpets continue to receive praise and special attention 
from Western enthusiasts. The high sheepskin hats worn by 
men, as well as distinctive fabrics and jewelry, also are age-old 
trademarks of Turkmen material culture. The Ahal-Teke breed 
of horse, world-renowned for its beauty and swiftness, is partic- 
ular to the Turkmen. Aside from a rich musical heritage, the 
Turkmen continue to value oral literature, including such epic 
tales as Korkut Ata and Gurogly. 

Increased national awareness is reflected in modifications of 
the school curriculum as well. Among new courses of instruc- 
tion is a class on edep, or proper social behavior and moral con- 
duct according to traditional Turkmen and Islamic values. 
Officially sanctioned efforts also have been made to contact 
members of the Turkmen population living outside of Turk- 
menistan, and several international Turkmen organizations 
have been established. 

Social Structure 

Although it is not a basis for political groupings, the rather 
vague phenomenon of tribal identity is a complex social phe- 
nomenon that retains important influence at the end of the 
twentieth century. The Soviet era added an element of cohe- 



313 



Country Studies 



sion to a previously loose and unassertive set of social loyalties 
among Turkmen. 

Social Classes 

Turkmen society recognizes a class structure, ideologically 
based on Marxist doctrine, composed of intelligentsia, workers, 
and peasants. In practical terms, the intelligentsia and peas- 
antry consist of Turkmen, while the worker class is the domain 
of Russians. Power and some wealth are associated with the 
Western-oriented intelligentsia, who hold the key positions in 
government, industry, and education. Most intelligentsia are 
educated in Russian language schools, often complete higher 
educational institutions in Russia, speak Russian as their lan- 
guage of choice, and are concentrated in urban centers, espe- 
cially in Ashgabat. 

Although many members of the intelligentsia favor cultural 
revival, more support restricting nationalist manifestations and 
the role of Islam in society. Many who are atheists and have 
identified with Soviet ideals harbor anxieties that distance from 
traditional values and especially from the Turkmen language 
will limit their career potential in the post-Soviet era. 

Kinship 

Before the Soviet period, the Turkmen were organized into 
a segmentary system of territorial groups that Western scholars 
loosely designate as tribes. These groupings featured little 
sharp social stratification within or strong unity among them. 
Tribal structure always has been complex, and the 
Turkmen-language terminology used to designate lineage affil- 
iation sometimes is confusing. Generally, the largest groupings, 
which may be equivalent to what Western scholarship labels 
"tribes," are called khalk, il, or taipa'm Turkmen. Smaller lin- 
eage groups are equivalent to Western terms like "clans," "sub- 
tribes," or "branches." The smallest affiliations are equivalent 
to subclans or lineages in Western terminology. 

In the past, Turkmen tribes remained relatively isolated and 
politically independent from one another. All tribes possessed 
specific distinguishing features. Their dialects differed greatly, 
and in terms of material culture each large tribe had a unique 
carpet pattern, clothing, headgear, and brand of identification. 

Although Soviet nationality policy was somewhat successful 
in diluting tribal consciousness, tribal identity remains a factor 
in present-day social relations. Except in such urban areas as 



314 



Street scene in 
Turkmenbashy, formerly 
Krasnovodsk 
Courtesy A. James Firth, 
United States Department 
of Agriculture 




Charjew and Ashgabat, virtually all Turkmen have a knowledge 
of their parents' and consequently their own tribal affiliation. A 
Turkmen's tribal affiliation still is a reliable indicator of his or 
her birthplace, for example. Lineage still may play a role in the 
arranging of marriages in rural areas. In Soviet Turkmenistan, 
the membership of collective and state farms often was formed 
according to clan and tribal affiliation. Although kinship 
undoubtedly retains significance in contemporary Turkmen 
society, attempts to use tribal affiliation as the determining fac- 
tor in such realms as current politics usually are not instructive. 

Until the Soviet period, the Turkmen lacked paramount 
leaders and political unity. The Turkmen rarely allied to cam- 
paign against sedentary neighbors, nor did they form a unified 
front against the Russian conquest. Unlike other Central Asian 
peoples, the Turkmen recognized no charismatic bloodline. 
Leaders were elected according to consensus, and their author- 
ity was based on conduct. Raids and other military pursuits 
could be organized by almost any male, but the power he exer- 
cised lasted only as long as the undertaking. Turkmen tribal 
structure did include a leader or chief (beg), but these posi- 
tions, too, were mostly honorary and advisory, based on kin- 
ship ties and perceived wisdom. Real power was located among 
the community's older members, whose advice and consent 
usually were required prior to any significant endeavor. 



315 



Country Studies 

Although women rarely assumed prominent political rank and 
power, there were instances of influential female leaders in the 
nineteenth century. 

The Family 

Prior to Soviet rule, the extended family was the basic and 
most important social and economic unit among the Turkmen. 
Grouped according to clan, small bands of Turkmen families 
lived as nomads in their traditional regions and consolidated 
only in time of war or celebration. In most cases, the families 
were entirely self-sufficient, subsisting on their livestock and at 
times on modest agricultural production. For some groups, 
raiding sedentary populations, especially the Iranians to the 
south, was an important economic activity. 

Although Soviet power brought about fundamental changes 
in the Turkmen family structure, many traditional aspects 
remain. Families continue to be close-knit and often raise more 
than five children. Although no longer nomadic, families in 
rural areas still are grouped according to clan or tribe, and it is 
the rule rather than the exception for the inhabitants of a vil- 
lage to be of one lineage. Here, also, it is common for sons to 
remain with their parents after marriage and to live in an 
extended one-story clay structure with a courtyard and an agri- 
cultural plot. In both rural and urban areas, respect for elders 
is great. Whereas homes for the elderly do exist in Turkmeni- 
stan, Turkmen are conspicuously absent from them; it is almost 
unheard of for a Turkmen to commit his or her parent to such 
an institution because grandparents are considered integral 
family members and sources of wisdom and spirituality. 

The marriage celebration, together with other life-cycle 
events, possesses great importance in Turkmen society. In rural 
areas especially, marriages are often arranged by special match- 
makers (sawcholar) . Aside from finding the right match in 
terms of social status, education, and other qualities, the 
matchmakers invariably must find couples of the same clan and 
locale. Most couples have known each other beforehand and 
freely consent to the marriage arrangement. Divorce among 
Turkmen is relatively rare. One important custom still prac- 
ticed in Turkmenistan is the brideprice (kalong). Depending 
on region and a family's wealth, the bride's family may demand 
huge sums of money from the groom in return for the bride's 
hand in marriage. 



316 



Turkmenistan 



The role of women in Turkmen society has never conformed 
to Western stereotypes about "Muslim women." Although a 
division of labor has existed and women usually were not visible 
actors in political affairs outside the home, Turkmen women 
never wore the veil or practiced strict seclusion. They generally 
possessed a host of highly specialized skills and crafts, especially 
those connected with the household and its maintenance. Dur- 
ing the Soviet period, women assumed responsibility for the 
observance of some Muslim rites to protect their husbands' 
careers. Many women entered the work force out of economic 
necessity, a factor that disrupted some traditional family prac- 
tices and increased the incidence of divorce. At the same time, 
educated urban women entered professional services and 
careers. 

The Spoken Language 

Turkmen belongs to the family of Turkic languages spoken 
in Eastern Europe (Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash), the Caucasus 
(Azeri, Kumik), Siberia (Yakut, Tuva, Khakas), China (Uygur, 
Kazak), Central Asia (Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek), and the Near East 
(Turkish, Azeri). Its closest relatives are the languages of the 
Turks in northeastern Iran and the Khorazm Province of south 
central Uzbekistan (Khorasani), Azerbaijan (Azeri), and Tur- 
key (Turkish), all of which belong to the Oghuz group of this 
language family. 

In 1989 some 2,537,000 speakers of Turkmen lived in Turk- 
menistan, with 121,578 in Uzbekistan (the vast majority in the 
Khorazm region on Turkmenistan's north central border), 
39,739 in the Russian Federation (including 12,000 in the 
Stavropol' region along Russia's southwestern border), 20,487 
in Tajikistan, and 3,846 in Kazakstan. A high degree of lan- 
guage loyalty was reflected in the fact that some 99.4 percent of 
Turkmen in the republic claimed Turkmen as their native lan- 
guage in the 1989 census. At the same time, 28 percent claimed 
Russian as their second language — a figure that remained con- 
stant between the 1979 and 1989 censuses. More than half of 
the second category were part of the urban population. Only 3 
percent of Russians in the republic spoke Turkmen. 

The total number of Turkmen speakers in Europe and Asia 
has been estimated at between 4 and 4.8 million. These figures 
include the 2,517,000 Turkmen in the republic, 185,000 Turk- 
men in other Central Asian states and Russia, an estimated 
700,000 Turkmen in Afghanistan, and 850,000 Turkmen in 



317 



Country Studies 



Iran who speak a closely related but distinct language called 
Khorasanli. 

The Written Language 

Beginning in the eighteenth century, Turkmen poets and 
chroniclers used the classical Chaghatai language, which was 
written in Arabic script and reflected only occasional Turkmen 
linguistic features. Famous poets who wrote in this language 
include Mammetveli Kemine (1770-1840), Mollanepes (1810- 
62), and the most honored literary figure, Magtymguly (1733?- 
90?), whose legacy helped mold Turkmen national conscious- 
ness. In the years 1913-17, periodicals were published in 
Chaghatai. Two reforms of this script undertaken in 1922 and 
1925 were designed to reflect features of the spoken Turkmen 
language. From 1928 to 1940, early Soviet Turkmen literature 
was written in a Latin alphabet that accurately reflected most of 
its features. Since 1940, standard Turkmen has been written in 
the Cyrillic script. 

In the mid-1990s, language policy in independent Turkmen- 
istan has been marked by a determination to establish Turk- 
men as the official language and to remove the heritage of the 
Russian-dominated past. The 1992 constitution proclaims 
Turkmen the "official language of inter-ethnic communica- 
tion." In 1993 English was moved ahead of Russian as the "sec- 
ond state language," although in practical terms Russian 
remains a key language in government and other spheres. That 
same year, President Niyazov issued a decree on the replace- 
ment of the Cyrillic-based alphabet with a Latin-based script 
that would become the "state script" by 1996. Some publica- 
tions and signs already appear in this Latin script, but its full 
implementation will not occur until after the year 2000. The 
new alphabet has several unique letters that distinguish it from 
those of Turkey's Latin alphabet and the newly adopted Latin 
scripts of other republics whose dominant language is Turkic. 

Other steps were taken to erase the Russian linguistic overlay 
in the republic. A resolution was adopted in May 1992 to 
change geographic names and administrative terms from Rus- 
sian to Turkmen. As a result, the names of many streets, institu- 
tions, collective farms, and buildings have been renamed for 
Turkmen heroes and cultural phenomena, and the terminol- 
ogy for all governmental positions and jurisdictions has been 
changed from Russian to Turkmen. 



318 



Turkmenistan 



Religion 

Traditionally, the Turkmen of Turkmenistan, like their kin 
in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, are Sunni Muslims (see 
Glossary). Shia Muslims (see Glossary), the other main branch 
of Islam, are not numerous in Turkmenistan, and the Shia reli- 
gious practices of the Azerbaijani and Kurdish (see Glossary) 
minorities are not politicized. Although the great majority of 
Turkmen readily identify themselves as Muslims and acknowl- 
edge Islam as an integral part of their cultural heritage, many 
are non-believers and support a revival of the religion's status 
only as an element of national revival. They do not attend 
mosque services or demonstrate their adherence publicly, 
except through participation in officially sanctioned national 
traditions associated with Islam on a popular level, including 
life-cycle events such as weddings, burials, and pilgrimages. 

History and Structure 

Islam came to the Turkmen primarily through the activities 
of Sufi (see Glossary) shaykhs rather than through the mosque 
and the "high" written tradition of sedentary culture. These 
shaykhs were holy men critical in the process of reconciling 
Islamic beliefs with pre-Islamic belief systems; they often were 
adopted as "patron saints" of particular clans or tribal groups, 
thereby becoming their "founders." Reformulation of commu- 
nal identity around such figures accounts for one of the highly 
localized developments of Islamic practice in Turkmenistan. 

Integrated within the Turkmen tribal structure is the "holy" 
tribe called dvlat. Ethnographers consider the ovlat, of which 
six are active, as a revitalized form of the ancestor cult injected 
with Sufism. According to their genealogies, each tribe 
descends from the Prophet Muhammad through one of the 
Four Caliphs. Because of their belief in the sacred origin and 
spiritual powers of the ovlat representatives, Turkmen accord 
these tribes a special, holy status. In the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries, the ovlat tribes became dispersed in small, 
compact groups in Turkmenistan. They attended and con- 
ferred blessings on all important communal and life-cycle 
events, and also acted as mediators between clans and tribes. 
The institution of the ovlat retains some authority today. Many 
of the Turkmen who are revered for their spiritual powers trace 
their lineage to an ovlat, and it is not uncommon, especially in 



319 



Country Studies 

rural areas, for such individuals to be present at life-cycle and 
other communal celebrations. 

In the Soviet era, all religious beliefs were attacked by the 
communist authorities as superstition and "vestiges of the 
past." Most religious schooling and religious observance were 
banned, and the vast majority of mosques were closed. An offi- 
cial Muslim Board of Central Asia with a headquarters in Tash- 
kent was established during World War II to supervise Islam in 
Central Asia. For the most part, the Muslim Board functioned 
as an instrument of propaganda whose activities did little to 
enhance the Muslim cause. Atheist indoctrination stifled reli- 
gious development and contributed to the isolation of the 
Turkmen from the international Muslim community. Some 
religious customs, such as Muslim burial and male circumci- 
sion, continued to be practiced throughout the Soviet period, 
but most religious belief, knowledge, and customs were pre- 
served only in rural areas in "folk form" as a kind of unofficial 
Islam not sanctioned by the state-run Spiritual Directorate. 

Religion after Independence 

The current government oversees official Islam through a 
structure inherited from the Soviet period. Turkmenistan's 
Muslim Religious Board, together with that of Uzbekistan, con- 
stitutes the Muslim Religious Board of Mavarannahr. The 
Mavarannahr board is based in Tashkent and exerts consider- 
able influence in appointments of religious leaders in Turk- 
menistan. The governing body of Islamic judges (Kaziat) is 
registered with the Turkmenistan Ministry of Justice, and a 
council of religious affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers mon- 
itors the activities of clergy. Individuals who wish to become 
members of the official clergy must attend official religious 
institutions; a few, however, may prove their qualifications sim- 
ply by taking an examination. 

Since 1990, efforts have been made to regain some of the 
cultural heritage lost under Soviet rule. President Niyazov has 
ordered that basic Islamic principles be taught in public 
schools. More religious institutions, including religious schools 
and mosques, have appeared, many with the support of Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey. Religious classes are held in both 
the schools and the mosques, with instruction in Arabic lan- 
guage, the Koran (Quran) and the hadith, and the history of 
Islam. 



320 



Turkmenistan 



Turkmenistan's government stresses its secular nature and 
its support of freedom of religious belief, as embodied in the 
1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organi- 
zations in the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic and institu- 
tionalized in the 1992 constitution. That document guarantees 
the separation of church and state; it also removes any legal 
basis for Islam to play a role in political life by prohibiting pros- 
elytizing, the dissemination of "unofficial" religious literature, 
discrimination based on religion, and the formation of reli- 
gious political parties. In addition, the government reserves 
the right to appoint and dismiss anyone who teaches religious 
matters or who is a member of the clergy. Since independence, 
the Islamic leadership in Turkmenistan has been more asser- 
tive, but in large part it still responds to government control. 
The official governing body of religious judges gave its official 
support to President Niyazov in the June 1992 elections. 

On the other hand, some Muslim leaders are opposed to the 
secular concept of government and especially to a government 
controlled by former communists (see Centers of Political 
Power, this ch.). Some official leaders and teachers working 
outside the official structure have vowed to increase the popu- 
lation's knowledge of Islam, increase Islam's role in society, and 
broaden adherence to its tenets. Alarmed that such activism 
may aggravate tensions between Sunnis and Shiites and espe- 
cially alienate Orthodox Slavs, the government has drawn up 
plans to elevate the council of religious affairs to ministry status 
in an effort to regulate religious activities more tightly. 

Education 

According to Soviet government statistics, literacy in Turk- 
menistan was nearly universal in 1991. Experts considered the 
overall level of education to be comparable to the average for 
the Soviet republics. According to the 1989 census, 65.1 per- 
cent of the population aged fifteen and older had completed 
secondary school, compared with 45.6 percent in 1979. In the 
same period, the percentage of citizens who had completed a 
higher education rose from 6.4 percent to 8.3 percent. 

Education is free of charge, although introduction of fees is 
being considered by selected institutions. Formal schooling 
begins with kindergarten (bagcha) and primary school 
(mekdep). School attendance is compulsory through the eighth 
grade. At this point, students are tested and directed into tech- 
nical, continuing, and discontinuing tracks. Some students 



321 



Country Studies 



graduate to the workforce after completing the tenth grade, 
while others leave in the ninth grade to enter a trade or techni- 
cal school. 

Education System 

Although the education system in Turkmenistan retains the 
centralized structural framework of the Soviet system, signifi- 
cant modifications are underway, partly as a response to 
national redefinition, but mainly as a result of the govern- 
ment's attempts to produce a highly skilled work force to pro- 
mote Turkmenistan's participation in international 
commercial activities. Reforms also include cultural goals such 
as the writing of a new history of Turkmenistan, the training of 
multilingual cadres able to function in Turkmen, English, and 
Russian, and the implementation of alphabet reform in 
schools. 

Turkmenistan's educational establishment is funded and 
administered by the state. The Ministry of Education is respon- 
sible for secondary education and oversees about 1,800 schools 
offering some or all of the secondary grades. Of that number, 
43.5 percent are operated on one shift and 56.5 percent on two 
shifts (primarily in cities). Secondary schools have 66,192 
teachers who serve 831,000 students. Thirty-six secondary 
schools specialize in topics relevant to their ministerial affilia- 
tion. The primary and secondary systems are being restruc- 
tured according to Western models, including shorter 
curricula, more vocational training, and human resource 
development. 

Curriculum 

The curriculum followed by schools is standardized, allow- 
ing little variation among the country's school districts. The 
prescribed humanities curriculum for the ninth and tenth 
grades places the heaviest emphasis on native language and lit- 
erature, history, physics, mathematics, Turkmen or Russian lan- 
guage, chemistry, foreign language, world cultures, and 
physical education. A few elective subjects are available. 

Although teaching continues to enjoy respect as a vocation, 
Turkmenistan's school system suffers from a shortage of quali- 
fied teachers. Many obstacles confront a teacher: heavy teach- 
ing loads and long hours, including Saturdays and double 
shifts; wholly inadequate textbooks and instructional materials; 
serious shortages of paper, supplies, and equipment; low sala- 



322 



Turkmenistan 



ries; and, at times, even failure to be paid. An estimated 13 per- 
cent of schools have such serious structural defects in their 
physical plants that they are too dangerous to use for classes. 

Instruction in 77 percent of primary and general schools is 
in Turkmen, although the 16 percent of schools that use Rus- 
sian as their primary language generally are regarded as pro- 
viding a better education. Some schools also instruct in the 
languages of the nation's Uzbek and Kazak minorities. Espe- 
cially since the adoption of Turkmen as the "state language" 
and English as the "second state language," the study of these 
two languages has gained importance in the curriculum, and 
adults feel pressure to learn Turkmen in special courses 
offered at schools or at their workplaces. 

Higher Education 

After completing secondary school, students may continue 
their education at one of the dozens of specialized institutes or 
at Turkmenistan State University in Ashgabat. Admittance into 
higher education institutions often is extremely competitive, 
and personal connections and bribes may play a role in gaining 
entry and later advancement. Prospective students must pass a 
lengthy, pressure-packed entrance examination. Like all the 
other tests and evaluations in the educational system, this 
examination consists of both written and oral parts. 

Completion of a course of study in higher institutions may 
take up to five years. Attempts are being made to decrease the 
number of years one must study so that young women may fin- 
ish their higher education by their twentieth or twenty-first 
birthday, by which time they are expected to be married. Grad- 
uate study is an option for outstanding students at the univer- 
sity or in one of the Academy of Science's many research 
institutes. 

The recently formed Council of Higher Education super- 
vises Turkmenistan State University, the republic's eight insti- 
tutes, and its two pedagogical institutes; these institutes are 
located in Ashgabat, with the exception of a pedagogical insti- 
tute in Charjew. These higher education institutions served 
41,700 students in 1991, of which 8,000 were enrolled in the 
state university. Some institutes that train professionals for spe- 
cific sectors of the national economy fall under the aegis of the 
relevant ministries. An education committee also functions 
under the president of the republic. 



323 



Country Studies 

Health 

As under the Soviet system, health care continues to be uni- 
versally available to all citizens without charge. The health care 
system that Turkmenistan inherited from the Soviet regime is 
fraught with deficiencies, however. On the whole, physicians 
are poorly trained, modern medical technologies are almost 
unheard of, and many basic medicines are in short supply. 
Although health care is available to most urban residents, the 
system is financially bankrupt, and treatment is often primitive. 
Only recently have some medical professionals been allowed to 
offer private medical care, and the state maintains a near 
monopoly of health care. 

Structure of Health Care 

Health and welfare institutions are administered by the min- 
istries of health, culture, education, and social welfare. Various 
coordination committees also operate under the aegis of presi- 
dential advisers. Between 1989 and 1992, health care as a share 
of the state budget declined from 11.2 to 6.9 percent, leaving 
inadequate local budgets to bear the brunt of expenditures. 
The comparison of health care statistics before and after 1991 
is somewhat misleading, however, because the statistics do not 
account for changes in health budgeting at the end of the com- 
munist era. 

In 1989 the republic had about 13,000 doctors and 298 hos- 
pitals, totaling more than 40,000 beds (111 per 10,000 per- 
sons). Some industrial enterprises had separate clinics for their 
workers. The number of doctors reached 13,800 or (36.2 per 
10,000 persons) in 1991; at that time, medical personnel num- 
bered 40,600, or 106.9 per 10,000. Until the early 1990s, all 
health personnel were government employees. 

Health Care Conditions 

Despite the nominally universal availability of free health 
care, in the rural areas medical care often is deplorable by 
Western standards. In both rural and urban areas, under- 
trained physicians and staff, underequipped facilities, short- 
ages of medicines and supplies, and chronic sanitation 
problems contribute to the system's inadequacy. For example, 
one study found that because 70 percent of the obstetricians 
and gynecologists in Dashhowuz Province lacked adequate sur- 
gical training, half of their patients died. A factor in the high 



324 



Army conscripts unloading 
food and medicine donated 
by United States, 
Ashgabat airport 
Courtesy A. James Firth, 
United States Department 
of Agriculture 



mortality rate is the provision of piped-in water to only 15 per- 
cent of maternity clinics in the republic. Because of the disrup- 
tion of trade at the end of the Soviet period, pharmaceuticals 
must be obtained with hard currency, making them even more 
scarce than before. Of particular concern are shortages of oral 
rehydration salts for children, syringes and needles, and vac- 
cines, which previously had been imported from Russia and 
Finland. According to experts, current conditions of conven- 
tional medical care may prompt many Turkmen to turn once 
again to "traditional" medicine. Healers employing herbs and 
prayer are common, and in some rural areas this type of treat- 
ment may be the only medical attention that is available. 

Health Conditions 

According to health statistics, life expectancy in Turkmeni- 
stan (62.9 for males, 69.7 for females) is the lowest in the CIS. 
The relatively high rate of natural population growth (2.0 per- 
cent per year), is based on a birth rate of 29.9 per 1,000 per- 
sons and a death rate of 7.3 per 1,000 persons. In 1992 
cardiovascular disease was the most common cause of death, 
followed by cancer, respiratory disease, and accidents (see table 
5, Appendix). Poor diet, polluted drinking water, and indus- 
trial wastes and pesticides cause or exacerbate many medical 
problems, which are especially acute in the northeastern areas 



325 



Country Studies 



of the country near the Amu Darya and Aral Sea. Women in 
their child-bearing years and children appear to be in the poor- 
est health and the most susceptible to disease and sickness. Of 
CIS countries, in 1991 Turkmenistan ranked first in infant mor- 
tality rate, with forty-seven deaths per 1,000 live births, and very 
high on maternal death rate, with fifty-five deaths per 100,000 
births. Some specialists attribute high infant mortality to fac- 
tors of diet and health care while others relate it to poor 
hygienic practices and lack of family planning. 

Welfare 

Under the conditions of independence in the early 1990s, 
the standard of living in Turkmenistan did not drop as dramat- 
ically as it did in other former Soviet republics. Thus, the rela- 
tively small population of the nation of Turkmenistan did not 
require extensive state investment for the basic requirements 
of survival as the nation attempted the transition to a market 
economy. 

Living Standards 

Although living standards have not declined as sharply in 
Turkmenistan as in many other former Soviet republics, they 
have dropped in absolute terms for most citizens since 1991. 
Availability of food and consumer goods also has declined at 
the same time that prices have generally risen. The difference 
between living conditions and standards in the city and the vil- 
lage is immense. Aside from material differences such as the 
prevalence of paved streets, electricity, plumbing, and natural 
gas in the cities, there are also many disparities in terms of cul- 
ture and way of life. Thanks to the rebirth of national culture, 
however, the village has assumed a more prominent role in 
society as a valuable repository of Turkmen language and tradi- 
tional culture. 

Wages 

Most families in Turkmenistan derive the bulk of their 
income from state employment of some sort. As they were 
under the Soviet system, wage differences among various types 
of employment are relatively small. Industry, construction, 
transportation, and science have offered the highest wages; 
health, education, and services, the lowest. Since 1990 direct 
employment in government administration has offered rela- 



326 



Turkmenistan 



tively high wages. Agricultural workers, especially those on col- 
lective farms, earn very low salaries, and the standard of living 
in rural areas is far below that in Turkmen cities, contributing 
to a widening cultural difference between the two segments of 
the population. 

In 1990 nearly half the population earned wages below the 
official poverty line, which was 100 rubles per month at that 
time (for value of the ruble — see Glossary). Only 3.4 percent of 
the population received more than 300 rubles per month in 
1990. In the three years after the onset of inflation in 1991, real 
wages dropped by 47.6 percent, meaning a decline in the stan- 
dard of living for most citizens (see Labor, this ch.). 

Prices 

Prices of all commodities rose sharply in 1991 when the 
Soviet Union removed the pervasive state controls that had lim- 
ited inflation in the 1980s. Retail prices rose by an average of 
90 percent in 1991, and then they rose by more than 800 per- 
cent when the new national government freed most prices 
completely in 1992. The average rate for the first nine months 
of 1994 was 605 percent. As world market prices rise and cur- 
rency fluctuations affect prices and purchasing power, con- 
sumer price increases continue to outstrip rises in per capita 
incomes. In 1989 the average worker spent about two-thirds of 
his or her salary on food, fuel, clothing, and durable goods, but 
that ratio increased sharply in the years that followed. As prices 
rose, the supply of almost all food and many consumer goods 
was curtailed. The introduction of the manat (see Glossary) as 
the national currency in November 1993 likely worsened the 
already deteriorating consumer purchasing power. The prices 
of forty basic commodities immediately rose 900 percent, and 
wages were raised only 200 percent to compensate. 

Housing 

In 1989 the state owned more than 70 percent of urban 
housing and about 10 percent of rural housing. The remainder 
of urban housing was owned privately or by housing coopera- 
tives. The average citizen had 11.2 square meters of housing 
space in urban areas, 10.5 square meters in rural areas. In 1989 
some 31 percent of housing (urban and rural areas combined) 
had running water, 27 percent had central heating, and 20 per- 
cent had a sewer line. 



327 



Country Studies 



In 1991 nearly all families had television sets, refrigerators, 
and sewing machines, and 84 percent had washing machines. 
Only 26 percent owned cars, however, and the quality of dura- 
ble goods was quite low by Western standards. 

Government Welfare Programs 

In 1992, President Niyazov announced "Ten Years of Pros- 
perity," a government program that provides virtually free natu- 
ral gas, electricity, and drinking water to all households in the 
republic; increases minimum wages and other social payments, 
confirms food subsidies and price liberalizations, and aims at 
giving families their own house, car, and telephone. In 1993 
two-thirds of the state budgetary expenditures went toward 
such "social needs," and half of that amount for the subsidiza- 
tion of food prices. Social programs also accounted for 60 per- 
cent of the 1995 budget. 

The pension system has two main types of expenditures: 
retirement and disability payments and children's payments. 
Employees pay 1 percent of their wages to their pension fund, 
and the employer's share totals 80.5 percent of the total payroll 
contribution. In industries, the payroll contribution is 37 per- 
cent of the total pension fund; in agricultural enterprises, it is 
26 percent. Because pension fund expenditures always exceed 
their receipts at this ratio of contribution, additional funds are 
allotted from the state budget. The normal retirement age is 
sixty for men and fifty-five for women, but the age is five or ten 
years less for occupations classified as hazardous. In the early 
1990s, the number of pensioners grew at a rate of 17,000 per 
year; in 1993 some 404,000 individuals were in this category. 

In December 1994, President Niyazov issued an edict setting 
the minimum wage at 1,000 manat per month and the mini- 
mum old-age pension at up to 1,000 manat per month. Pen- 
sions set at 60 percent of wages will be given to men retiring at 
the age of sixty and women at the age of fifty-five if they have 
worked for twenty-five and twenty years, respectively. In 1995 
pensions for invalids and war veterans were set at 3,000 manat 
per month. Pensions are indexed to increases in minimum 
wages and are funded by payroll taxes. Allowances are granted 
to households with children under age sixteen. Payments 
depend on the age of the children and the economic and mar- 
ital status of their parents. In 1993 such payments ranged from 
110 rubles to 270 rubles per month. That year payments were 
made for about 1.75 million children. Funding is from the gen- 



328 



Turkmenistan 



eral budget for children age six and older and from the pen- 
sion fund for those younger than six. 

The Economy 

Turkmenistan's economy is predominantly agricultural. 
Agriculture accounts for almost half of the gross domestic 
product (GDP — see Glossary) and more than two-fifths of total 
employment, whereas industry accounts for about one-fifth of 
GDP and slightly more than one-tenth of total employment. In 
1988 the per capita net material product (NMP — see Glossary) 
output was 61 percent of the Soviet average, fourth lowest of 
the Soviet republics. In 1991, 17.2 percent of the work force 
was engaged in private-sector occupations such as farming, 
individual endeavors, and employment on agreement; 0.7 per- 
cent worked in rented enterprises, and the rest worked for state 
enterprises, social organizations, and collective farms. 

Macroeconomic indicators of the performance of Turkmen- 
istan's national economy have differed widely in the late Soviet 
and early independence years, making precise assessment diffi- 
cult. According to one source, the per capita GDP was 
US$2,509 in 1992, placing it higher than Tajikistan and Uzbeki- 
stan, but lower than Kazakstan and much lower than some of 
the other former Soviet republics. Another source lists a 17 
percent increase in industrial output between 1991 and 1992. 
On the other hand, several sources agree that the NMP aggre- 
gate figure for 1992 was a 15 percent decline from the previous 
year (see table 6, Appendix). One source claims that GDP in 
Turkmenistan increased by 8.5 percent in 1993, while another 
regards as suspect the statistical methods applied to the data on 
which this figure is based. 

Natural Resources 

Turkmenistan has substantial reserves of oil and gas, and 
geologists have estimated that 99.5 percent of its territory is 
conducive to prospecting. The republic also has deposits of sul- 
fur, hydrocarbons, iodine, celestine, potassium salt, magnesium 
salt, sodium chloride, bentonite clays, limestone, gypsum, 
brown coal, cement, basalt, and dolomite. Its soils, which have 
been formed under conditions of continental climate, are 
mostly desert sands, with a variety of other types such as desert 
loess, meadow clays, and "irrigated" soils, in some regions. 



329 



Country Studies 

Under those conditions, large-scale agriculture must be sup- 
ported by irrigation in nearly all areas. 

Agriculture 

Turkmenistan inherited the system of state and collective 
farms from the Soviet Union, with its command structure of 
production quotas, fixed procurement prices, and soft budget 
constraints. The state still controls marketing and distribution 
of agricultural produce through the Ministry of Trade in urban 
areas and the Cooperative Alliance in rural locales; the Minis- 
try of Agriculture's Commercial Center has a monopoly on cot- 
ton exports. Turkmenistan is highly dependent upon external 
sources for its agricultural inputs, the price of which has esca- 
lated more that those for agricultural products since indepen- 
dence. 

Structure of 1he Agriculture Sector 

Instead of restructuring the agricultural economy, the gov- 
ernment's "New Countryside" policy envisions only limited 
privatization of agricultural enterprises and expansion of grain 
production to reduce dependence on imports. The develop- 
ment of transportation is critical to agricultural reform in 
Turkmenistan. 

In 1991 field and orchard crops accounted for 70.4 percent 
of the value of agricultural sales prices (computed in 1983 
prices), while livestock raising accounted for the remaining 
29.6 percent (see table 18, Appendix). Almost half the culti- 
vated land was under cotton, and 45 percent of the land under 
grains and fodder crops. Livestock raising centered on sheep, 
especially for the production of Karakul wool. Whereas produc- 
tion of meat and milk rose substantially in the 1986-91 period 
(increases of 14,000 and 110,000 tons, respectively), actual pro- 
duction in 1991 of 100,000 tons of meat and 458,000 tons of 
milk represented a decrease from 1990. Production of meat in 
1992 declined 21 percent from that of 1991. Fishing, 
bee-keeping, and silk-rendering occupy small areas of the agri- 
cultural sector. 

Irrigation 

Under the prevailing climatic conditions, irrigation is a nec- 
essary input for agriculture and has been developed extensively 
throughout Turkmenistan. Irrigation management is divided 
between the Ministry of Irrigation, which is responsible for 



330 



Selling furs at market 
outside Ashgabat 
Courtesy Barry Peterson 



operation and maintenance along the Garagum Canal and for 
interrepublic water management, and the Irrigation Institute, 
which designs, evaluates, and builds new projects. State farms 
and collective farms are responsible for operation and mainte- 
nance on their own farms, but they have no other autonomy. 
Because only 55 percent of the water delivered to the fields 
actually reaches the crops, an average of twelve cubic meters of 
water is expended annually per hectare of cotton. 

As a result of the construction of irrigation structures, and 
especially of the Garagum Canal, the hydrological balance of 
the republic has changed, with more water in the canals and 
adjacent areas and less in the rivers and the Aral Sea. The larg- 
est of the republic's eleven reservoirs are the Sary Yazy on the 
Murgap River, which occupies forty-six square kilometers of 
surface and has a capacity of 239 million cubic meters, and the 
Hawuz Khan on the Garagum Canal, which occupies ninety 
square kilometers of surface and has a capacity of 460 million 
cubic meters. 

In 1983 Turkmenistan had an irrigated area of 1,054,000 
hectares. Its most developed systems are along the middle and 
lower course of the Amu Darya and in the Murgap Basin. The 
Garagum Canal, which flows 1,100 kilometers with a capacity of 
500 cubic meters per second, accounts for almost all irrigation 
in Ahal and Balkan provinces along the northern reaches of 



331 



Country Studies 



the Kopetdag Range. The canal also supplies additional water 
to the Murgap oasis in southeastern Turkmenistan. The main 
canal was built in sections between 1959 and 1976, initially pro- 
viding irrigation for about 500,000 hectares. Plans call for con- 
struction to continue until the canal reaches a length of 1,435 
kilometers and a carrying capacity of 1,000 cubic meters per 
second, enabling it to irrigate 1,000,000 hectares. 

Cotton 

At a rate of 300 kilograms per citizen, Turkmenistan pro- 
duces more cotton per capita than any other country in the 
world. Among the Soviet republics, Turkmenistan was second 
only to Uzbekistan in cotton production. In 1983 Turkmeni- 
stan contributed 12.7 percent of the cotton produced in the 
Soviet Union. Four of the republic's five provinces are consid- 
ered to be "cotton provinces": Ahal, Mary, Charjew, and Dash- 
howuz. Convinced that cotton is its most marketable product, 
the post-Soviet government is committed to maintaining previ- 
ous levels of cotton production and area under cultivation. 

In accordance with the Soviet policy of delegating the Cen- 
tral Asian republics as the nation's cotton belt, the area under 
cotton climbed rapidly from 150,400 hectares in 1940 to 
222,000 hectares in 1960, 508,000 hectares in 1980, and 
602,000 hectares in 1991. Because independence brought fuel 
and spare-parts shortages, the cotton harvest declined in the 
first half of the 1990s, however. 

Industrial inputs for cotton production such as harvesters, 
sowing machines, mechanized irrigation equipment, fertilizer, 
pesticides, and defoliants have become less available to cotton 
farms in Turkmenistan because the other former Soviet repub- 
lics, which were the chief suppliers of such items, raised their 
prices sharply in the first years of independence. 

For most Turkmen farmers, cotton is the most important 
source of income, although cotton's potential contribution to 
the republic's economy was not approached in the Soviet 
period. Experts predict that by the year 2000, Turkmenistan 
will process one-third of its raw cotton output in textile mills 
located within the republic, substantially raising the rate 
achieved in the Soviet and early post-Soviet periods. In 1993, 
the state's procurement prices were raised significantly for 
high-grade raw seeded cotton. State planners envision selling 
70 percent of the crop to customers outside the CIS. 



332 



Turkmenistan 



Other Crops 

Since independence, Turkmenistan's agricultural policy has 
emphasized grain production in order to increase 
self-sufficiency in the face of a sharp decline in trade among 
the former Soviet republics. A 50 percent increase in the grain 
harvest in 1992 was followed by a rise of 70 percent in 1993, 
despite unfavorable climatic conditions. Production of vegeta- 
bles declined in 1992 to 13 percent below the 1991 level, 
whereas that of potatoes rose by 24 percent. High-quality mel- 
ons are grown in the lower and middle reaches of the Amu 
Darya and in the Tejen and Murgap oases. In addition to these 
crops, subtropical fruits and nuts, especially pomegranates, 
almonds, figs, and olives, are grown in the Ertek and Sumbar 
valleys. 

Industry 

Turkmenistan possesses a formidable resource base for 
industry, although that base was not utilized to build diversified 
industry in the Soviet period. In the post-Soviet period, extrac- 
tion and processing of natural gas and oil remain the country's 
most important industrial activities. 

Structure of Industry 

Turkmenistan did not inherit a substantial industrial base 
from the Soviet Union. Beginning in the 1970s, Moscow made 
major investments only in the oil and gas production and cot- 
ton-processing sectors. As a result, industry is highly specialized 
and potentially vulnerable to external shocks. Well-developed 
cotton ginning, natural gas, and cottonseed oil dominate at the 
expense of other sectors, such as the petrochemical and chemi- 
cal industries, cotton textile production, food processing, and 
labor-intensive assemblage, in which Turkmenistan has a com- 
parative advantage (see table 19, Appendix). 

The shocks of independence slowed industrial production 
in the early 1990s. In the first half of 1994, macroeconomic 
fluctuations caused by the introduction of the manat as the 
national currency and limitations placed on gas exports caused 
aggregate industrial production to fall to 68.3 percent com- 
pared with the same period in 1993 (see Fiscal and Monetary 
Conditions, this ch.). The price index for industrial producers 
was 858 percent, indicating runaway inflation in this sector. 



333 



Country Studies 



Gas and CHI 

Turkmenistan ranks fourth in the world to Russia, the 
United States, and Canada in natural gas and oil extraction. 
The Turkmenistan Natural Gas Company (Turkmengaz) , 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Oil and Gas, controls gas 
extraction in the republic. Gas production is the youngest and 
most dynamic and promising sector of the national economy. 
Turkmenistan's gas reserves are estimated at 8.1-8.7 trillion 
cubic meters and its prospecting potential at 10.5. trillion cubic 
meters. The Ministry of Oil and Gas oversees exploration of 
new deposits. Sites under exploration are located in Mary Prov- 
ince, in western and northern Turkmenistan, on the right bank 
of the Amu Darya, and offshore in the Caspian Sea. 

In 1958 Turkmenistan produced only 800,000 cubic meters 
of natural gas. With the discovery of large deposits of natural 
gas at Achak, Qizilqum, Mary, and Shatlik, production grew to 
1.265 billion cubic meters by 1966, and since then the yield has 
grown dramatically. In 1992 gas production accounted for 
about 60 percent of GDP. As a result of a dispute with Ukraine 
over payments for gas deliveries, in 1992 gas production fell by 
20 billion cubic meters to around 60 billion cubic meters. In 
the first eight months of 1994, transportation restrictions 
forced Turkmenistan to cut gas production to 26.6 billion 
cubic meters, only 57 percent of the production for the same 
period in 1993. An additional factor in this reduction was the 
failure of CIS partners, to whom Russia distributes Turkmeni- 
stan's gas, to pay their bills. 

Most of Turkmenistan's oil is extracted from fields at Kotur- 
depe, Nebitdag, and Chekelen near the Caspian Sea, which 
have a combined estimated reserve of 700 million tons. The oil 
extraction industry started with the exploitation of the fields in 
Chekelen in 1909 and Nebitdag in the 1930s, then production 
leaped ahead with the discovery of the Kumdag field in 1948 
and the Koturdepe field in 1959. All the oil produced in Turk- 
menistan is refined in Turkmenbashy. 

Oil production reached peaks of 14,430,000 tons in 1970 
and 15,725,000 tons in 1974, compared with 5,400,000 tons in 
1991. Since the years of peak production, general neglect of 
the oil industry in favor of the gas industry has led to equip- 
ment depreciation, lack of well repairs, and exhaustion of 
deposits for which platforms have been drilled. 



334 



Turkmenistan 



Other Industries 

Besides petrochemical processing at the Turkmenbashy and 
Charjew refineries, the chemicals industry is underdeveloped 
in comparison with the potential provided by the republic's 
mineral and fuel resources. The industry has specialized in fer- 
tilizer for cotton at the Charjew superphosphate plant and 
such chemicals as sulfur, iodine, ammonia, mirabilite, salt, and 
various sulfates at the Turkmenbashy facility. 

Because of the ready availability of natural gas, Turkmeni- 
stan is a net exporter of electrical power to Central Asian 
republics and southern neighbors. The most important gener- 
ating installations are the Hindukush Hydroelectric Station, 
which has a rated capacity of 350 megawatts, and the Mary 
Thermoelectric Power Station, which has a rated capacity of 
1,370 megawatts. In 1992 electrical power production totaled 
14.9 billion kilowatt-hours. 

Turkmenistan's machine building capability has not devel- 
oped significantly since the conversion of agricultural repair 
installations for that purpose in Ashgabat and Mary in the late 
1960s. Goods produced at these plants include dough knead- 
ing and confectionery mixing machines, ventilators, centrifu- 
gal oil pumps, gas stove pieces, cables, and lighting equipment. 

Construction has grown as a result of a shift in state invest- 
ment toward housing, education, and joint enterprises. Since 
1989, construction has accounted for around 10 percent of the 
GDP. Building materials produced in the republic include 
lime, cement, brick and wall stone, ferro-concrete structures, 
asbestos-concrete pipes, silicate concrete, lime, brick, slate, and 
glass. 

Most food processing consists of rendering cottonseed oil 
and such related products as soap and grease from cotton 
plants. Because of the distance between plants and farms and 
an inadequate transportation infrastructure, only 8 percent of 
the fruits and vegetables grown in the republic are processed. 
Other processing capabilities include winemaking, brewing, 
baking, meat packing and processing, and production of table 
salt. 

Turkmenistan's carpets are famous for their density, which 
reaches 240,000 knots per square meter in some traditional 
weaves. The Turkmenistan Carpet Production Association 
supervises ten carpet factories, but home looms account for a 
substantial share of production. Other traditional crafts 
include the fashioning of national clothing such as wool caps 



335 



Country Studies 

and robes, galvanized dishes, and jewelry in forms that state 
enterprises do not produce or supply. In the mid-1990s, other 
light industries provided secondary processing of cotton, wool, 
and silk for yarn, some finished textiles, and wadding. 

Labor 

The labor force comprised 1,923,000 people in 1991-92, of 
whom 1,571,000 (almost 46 percent of the population) were 
employed in the national economy. Over half of this number 
worked in state enterprises — a number that is expected to 
decline in general and to vary radically from sector to sector 
during the transitional phases of privatization. 

In 1990, 37 percent of the workforce was in agricultural and 
15 percent in industrial employment; however, one-fourth of 
industrial employment was in industries related to agriculture. 
Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of the workforce 
employed in industry decreased slightly from 23.4 to 20.0 per- 
cent. The share of the agricultural sector within the workforce 
rose slightly in this period from 38.4 to 41.1 percent. In trans- 
portation and communications, the percentages were 7.0 and 
6.3, respectively, while in the sectors of health, education, 
social services, arts and sciences, they rose from 16.5 to 18.6 
percent. The state apparatus maintained a share ranging from 
2.9 percent of the labor force in 1970 to 2.5 in 1989. 

In 1989, some 62.5 percent of all workers were employed at 
state enterprises, 22.3 percent on collective farms, 1.1 percent 
in cooperatives (up from in 1986), 0.1 percent in individual 
labor (a constant percentage since 1970), and 14.1 percent in 
private plots (up from 8.5 percent in 1970, largely at the 
expense of the collective farm percentage). 

Figures from 1989 for the distribution of the populace 
according to source of sustenance show that of the entire popu- 
lation of Turkmenistan, 40.6 percent worked in the national 
economy, 1.9 percent held stipends, 10.9 percent were pen- 
sioners and others receiving state welfare, 46.5 percent were 
dependents and those employed only on individual supple- 
mental endeavors, and 0.1 percent had other unspecified 
means of subsistence. 

The percentage of women within the total work force of 
Turkmenistan was 41.7 in 1989, reflecting a near constant since 
1970 (39.5). The percentage of women within the total num- 
ber of specialists in the work force who have completed middle 
and upper special education rose from 44.0 in 1970 to 49.4 in 



336 



Carpet bazaar outside Ashgabat 
Courtesy Barry Peterson 



1989. Workers under thirty years of age who have completed a 
secondary general education accounted for 66.4 percent of 
Turkmenistan's work force in 1989; those with middle special- 
ized education, 16.0 percent; those with an incomplete higher 
education, 1.6 percent; and those with a complete higher edu- 
cation, 8.7 percent. 

The national minimum wage is a critical component of the 
macro-level "price-wage feedback" in inflationary processes; 
this wage is established by presidential decree. The basic wage 
structure is set by a cross-classification of occupations and phys- 
ical exertion levels, which determines relative minimum wages 
for various sectors. After a negotiating process, minimum 
wages can be set above the national minimum in profitable sec- 
tors. Wages in agriculture and industry were similar until 1991, 
when agricultural wages declined relative to average wage. 



337 



Country Studies 

Plans call for the Ministry of Labor to be replaced by a State 
Corporation for Specialist Training, with the bulk of the minis- 
try's nontraining functions to shift to the Ministry of Economy, 
Finance, and Banking. Those functions include oversight of 
unemployment, salary administration and minimum wage 
determination, and labor protection. There is no independent 
labor union movement in Turkmenistan. Trade union leaders 
are appointed by the president, meaning that no true collective 
bargaining can occur. 

Labor productivity is one of the major concerns of economic 
planners in Turkmenistan. According to Soviet statistics, for 
industrial enterprises this indicator grew at a rate of 6.3 per- 
cent per year in the period 1971-5; then it declined drastically 
to 0.1 percent per year in 1976-80 before reaching 3.2 percent 
in 1989. Similar changes occurred in agricultural labor produc- 
tivity in the 1970s and the 1980s, moving from 2.6 percent 
growth in 1971-75 to negative 1.4 percent in 1976-80 and then 
to 4.0 percent in 1989. 

Economic Structure 

Although Turkmenistan's economic situation has deterio- 
rated somewhat since 1990, the overall standard of living has 
not dropped as dramatically as it has in other former Soviet 
republics (see table 10, Appendix). Economic reforms have 
been modest, and the majority of businesses remain 
state-owned. Thanks to government subsidies, basic food prod- 
ucts continue to be relatively affordable despite inflation. One 
of the most important modifications in economic policy took 
effect in early 1993 when President Niyazov decreed that natu- 
ral gas, water, and electricity would be supplied virtually free of 
charge to all homes in Turkmenistan for an indefinite period. 
Gasoline and other fuels also remain cheap, relative to neigh- 
boring republics. Such economic stability has been possible 
because Turkmenistan has a comparatively small population 
and it is rich in important resources such as natural gas and oil. 

The main blueprint for Turkmenistan's development is the 
Ten Years of Prosperity program, which was announced in 
December 1992. It calls for a ten-year transition to a market 
economy, with a first phase that maintains the Soviet system of 
planned management accompanied by extensive social protec- 
tion programs. The program envisages development of Turk- 
menistan's natural resources and restructuring of industry to 
provide import substitution. 



338 



Turkmenistan 



Privatization 

One of the most important reforms of Turkmenistan's eco- 
nomic plan is privatization. Article 9 of the 1992 constitution 
guarantees citizens the right to own capital, land, and other 
material or intellectual property, but no law has stipulated the 
source from which land could be acquired. No fund of land 
available for private purchase has been established. A law on 
land ownership allows every citizen the right to own and 
bequeath to heirs plots smaller than fifty hectares, so long as 
they are continuously cultivated, and to obtain a long-term 
lease on up to 500 hectares. Such land may not be bought or 
sold, however. In 1993 only about 100 peasant farms were pri- 
vately run, and they were leased rather than owned. Neverthe- 
less, after the government announced the 1993 law allowing 
fifty-hectare plots, it soon received more than 5,000 applica- 
tions. 

In February 1993, a State Committee on Land Reform was 
established, with a goal of privatizing 10 to 15 percent of all 
agricultural land. Beginning in May 1993, the state began leas- 
ing land on the condition that 35 percent of the state procure- 
ment for cotton be surrendered, with no monetary 
compensation, as payment of rent. Estimates of the irrigated 
land since leased or under private ownership range from 3 to 
12 percent. The state also intends to privatize all unprofitable 
agricultural enterprises. 

The privatization process is managed by the Department of 
State Property and Privatization, which is part of the Ministry 
of Economy, Finance, and Banking. Short-term plans call for 
continued state control of the gas, oil, railway, communica- 
tions, and energy industries and agriculture — sectors that com- 
bine to account for 80 percent of the economy. Laws on 
leasing, joint-stock companies, and entrepreneurship were 
adopted in the early 1990s. A general privatization law passed 
in 1992 describes the gradual denationalization of state prop- 
erty through a variety of methods. 

In 1992 only 2,600 small enterprises — mostly individual ven- 
tures such as trading outlets and home-worker operations — 
were privately owned. Through the end of 1993, only a few 
small trade and service enterprises had moved to private own- 
ership, mostly sold to foreign buyers. Plans called for conver- 
sion of large manufacturing firms into joint-stock enterprises 
by the end of 1994, and private ownership of all trade and ser- 
vice-sector enterprises with fewer than 500 employees by the 



339 



Country Studies 



end of 1995. However, the state would maintain a "controlling 
interest" in businesses that become joint stock companies and 
would retain control over profitable larger concerns. 

A second important component of Turkmenistan's eco- 
nomic development plan is marketization. To promote this 
process, a decree was issued in March 1993 for the formation of 
a joint-stock bank, the granting of additional credits to the 
Agroindustrial Bank for the development of entrepreneurship, 
and the establishment of seven free economic zones. Agricul- 
tural entrepreneurs are to be granted special profits tax and 
land payment exemptions. Within free economic zones, com- 
panies with more than 30 percent foreign ownership are to 
receive special exemptions from profit tax and rental pay- 
ments. 

Fiscal and Monetary Conditions 

In the first half of the 1990s, Turkmenistan slowly estab- 
lished independent fiscal and monetary institutions and poli- 
cies to replace the centralized Soviet system upon which the 
republic had relied prior to independence. These innovations 
have included a separate national currency, an independent 
national bank, and mechanisms to control budgetary deficits. 

Banking System 

Until Turkmenistan became independent, its banks essen- 
tially functioned as accounting branches of the Soviet State 
Bank. Especially after introducing its own currency in Novem- 
ber 1993, Turkmenistan experienced a need to develop a true 
banking system. The current structure, defined by the 1993 
State Banking Law, includes a central bank (called by the Rus- 
sian term Gosbank) that is responsible for the conduct of mon- 
etary policy and supervision of the banking system, a state-run 
savings bank (called by the Russian term Sberbank) and an 
external trade bank (called by the Russian term Vneshekonom- 
bank), and commercial banks such as the Turkmenistan Inter- 
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The latter 
institution is designed specifically to attract investments and 
promote exports in the gas and oil industries. 

Turkmenistan's banks are expected to operate under a frac- 
tional reserve system that allows commercial banks to set inter- 
est rates based upon the increase or decline of their reserves in 
the state bank, giving them an incentive to allocate credit more 
easily or stringently as the market allows. However, in reality 



340 



Turkmenistan 



the republic's Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Banking 
determines the levels of bank access to central bank credit. 

The central bank favors credits to lower-level banks for sup- 
porting privatization, developing market infrastructures, 
expanding exports, and strengthening the banking structure. 
Generally, foreign companies are encouraged to seek external 
sources for financing projects in the republic. Banking policies 
include loans at significantly lower interest rates for agriculture 
than those granted to industrial enterprises. Goods purchased 
from state administrations can be paid for by checks that will 
be debited to accounts in the commercial banks. 

Currency 

Turkmenistan introduced its own currency, the manat, in 
November 1993, beginning at an exchange rate of two manat 
to one United States dollar and one manat to 500 rubles (for 
value of the manat — see Glossary). Manat banknotes are 
printed in denominations of 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, and 500, and 
tenge coins (100 tenge to 1 manat) are minted in denomina- 
tions of 1,5, 10, 20, and 50. 

Procedures were devised to prevent a run on the currency 
and to stabilize the economy as much as possible during the 
introduction of the manat, including the closing of currency 
stores, posting of new prices that were to remain stable until an 
exchange rate had been reached, limiting the conversion of 
rubles to manat to a one-time 30,000 rubles exchange, and giv- 
ing everybody sixty manat gratis. However, people began to 
produce false passports to get the free manat and to exceed the 
30,000-ruble exchange limit. The state did not have enough 
stocks of the new currency to satisfy those who had "overcome 
their suspicions of the banking system." 

Following the inauspicious introduction of the manat, Turk- 
menistan's government has not tried to artificially support offi- 
cial exchange rates, which have varied significantly from those 
in illegal money markets. By May 1994, the official rate was 60 
manat to US$1, while in black markets it was 80-85 manat to 
US$1. In January 1996, the official rate was 200 manat per 
US$1. 

Fiscal Policy 

Turkmenistan was the only CIS country to have a balanced 
budget in 1992. Under the Interrepublican Memorandum of 
Understanding of October 1991, Turkmenistan's share of the 



341 



Country Studies 

Soviet Union's remaining international debt was fixed at 0.7 
percent, or about US$420 million. An agreement with Russia in 
July 1992 erased this debt entirely when Turkmenistan 
renounced claims to former Soviet assets. This agreement vir- 
tually eliminated all of Turkmenistan's hard-currency debt. 

In 1993 increases in the minimum wage and social safety net 
strained fiscal discipline, but the government introduced a 
"sub-soil" tax on oil and gas exploration by Turkmengaz and 
other companies, as well as a value-added tax (VAT — see Glos- 
sary) of 20 percent and a profits tax of 30-45 percent to 
increase government revenues for its social programs. Despite 
this strategy, the 1993 deficit was estimated at 10 percent of 
GDP, far more than the 2-3 percent projected by the govern- 
ment. 

By the mid-1990s, increased entitlements such as free utili- 
ties had combined with careless monetary management to 
reduce investment and raise deficit spending and inflation. 
Until other gas pipelines are opened up to paying customers, 
experts predicted that Turkmenistan's hard currency reserves 
(estimated at US$500 million in 1993) would not remain at a 
high enough level to cover the government's undisciplined 
approach to budgeting. 

Foreign Trade 

In the early 1990s, Turkmenistan's foreign trade remained 
completely under the control of the central government. Dur- 
ing that period, the most important trading partners remained 
the former republics of the Soviet Union, with which the great 
majority of trade had been conducted during the Soviet era. 
Natural gas is the most profitable item available for foreign 
sale. 

Trade Structure 

In controlling Turkmenistan's trade sector, the main goal of 
government policy is to maintain and expand foreign markets 
for gas, fuel products, electricity, and cotton. Just prior to inde- 
pendence, trade with other Soviet republics accounted for 93 
percent of Turkmenistan's exports and 81 percent of its 
imports. In the mid-1990s, the country's main trading partners 
(as they were in 1990) were Russia, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan 
in the CIS and Germany and countries in Eastern Europe out- 
side the CIS (see table 20, Appendix). In 1990 nearly 27 per- 
cent of exports were mineral products, 6 percent were 



342 



Turkmenistan 



chemical industry products, 46 percent were some form of cot- 
ton fiber, and 17 percent were processed food products. 

In 1991 the largest components of Turkmenistan's imports 
were food (17 percent of the total), chemical products (6 per- 
cent), light industry products including textiles (22 percent), 
and machinery (30 percent). Among Western countries, Turk- 
menistan imported the most goods from Finland, France, and 
Italy in 1992. 

In 1990, the overall trade deficit was US$500 million, which 
declined to $US300 million in 1991. In 1991 the trade deficit 
constituted some 13.9 percent of the net material product 
(NMP — see Glossary). In 1992 the deficit with Russia, Turk- 
menistan's main trading partner, was about US$38 million. 
That year the value of exports to Russia was 52.7 percent of the 
value of imports from Russia, the highest percentage among 
Russia's CIS trading partners. However, because it exports fuel, 
in the mid-1990s Turkmenistan maintained a positive trade bal- 
ance at world prices with the CIS as a whole, making it the only 
republic besides Russia to do so. 

In 1993 Turkmenistan's main CIS import partners were (in 
order of import volume) Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Ukraine, and Tajikistan. The main CIS customers were (in 
order of export volume) Ukraine, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazak- 
stan, and Georgia. In 1992 Turkmenistan had bilateral trade 
surpluses with Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. 

Russia continues to trade with Turkmenistan in much the 
same way as in the Soviet era, although by 1992 trade with the 
other republics was curtailed by difficulties in collecting pay- 
ments and other factors. Central Asian republics traditionally 
traded more with Russia than with each other; the conditions 
of the 1990s promote even less regional trade because several 
of the republics specialize in similar products. For example, 
cotton and gas are the chief export products of both Turkmen- 
istan and Uzbekistan. 

Because of its specialization in cotton and natural gas, Turk- 
menistan imports a large percentage of the food it consumes. 
In 1991 the republic imported 65 percent of its grain consump- 
tion, 45 percent of its milk and dairy products, 70 percent of its 
potatoes, and 100 percent of its sugar — a profile typical of the 
Central Asian republics. In 1991 the trade deficit was 684 mil- 
lion rubles in food goods, compared with a deficit of 1.25 bil- 
lion rubles in non-food goods. 



343 



Country Studies 

Turkmenistan's cotton exports follow the pattern of other 
Central Asian republics. Governments of these countries have 
raised the price of cotton for trade with their Central Asian 
neighbors nearly to world market levels while discounting their 
cotton on the world market because of its relatively poor qual- 
ity and less reliable delivery. Since 1991, Central Asian coun- 
tries have more than doubled their exports of cotton to 
countries outside the CIS, accounting for 70 percent of West 
European cotton imports. Exports to the Far East and Mexico 
also have increased. In 1992 Turkmenistan cut its cotton 
export prices by 30 percent to stimulate sales. In response, the 
National Cotton Council of America refused to make subsi- 
dized shipments of cotton to Russia, where around 350 textile 
mills were threatened with closure because of insufficient 
imports, unless Central Asian republics reversed their aggres- 
sive stance in the world cotton market. 

Natural gas, Turkmenistan's main export for foreign cur- 
rency, accounted for an estimated 70 percent of its exports in 
1993. Planners expected per capita earnings from sales of gas 
in 1993 to approach US$1,300, but Azerbaijan and Georgia 
failed to make payments. Turkmenistan, like Russia, has intro- 
duced a policy of cutting off gas supplies in response to such 
situations. In the case of Azerbaijan and Georgia, supply was 
curtailed until the bills were paid. In the mid-1990s, the prac- 
tice of shutting off delivery was a thorny issue between Turk- 
menistan and Ukraine, which owns the main pipeline to 
Europe but has failed to pay for gas deliveries on many occa- 
sions (see Transportation and Telecommunications, this ch.). 

CIS agreements on tariffs and customs have been worked 
out, but in reality a "legal vacuum" exists with regard to interre- 
public economic ties. Technically, CIS members are not 
allowed to discriminate against one another in trade, but trade 
wars began to break out immediately upon independence. As a 
result, most republics have made a series of bilateral accords. A 
month before the major CIS agreement was worked out in 
1992, Turkmenistan signed a customs union agreement with 
Russia and the other Central Asian republics. Later, it renegoti- 
ated its terms with Russia. 

In a move toward trade liberalization in early 1993, Turk- 
menistan abolished import duties on around 600 goods, 
including all CIS goods. Imports from former Soviet republics 
outside the ruble zone (see Glossary) were prohibited. Tariffs 
for goods exported for hard currency have remained in place 



344 



Turkmenistan 



to increase government revenue and prevent capital flight; 
thus, for natural gas the tariff is 80 percent; for oil, 20 percent; 
and for chemicals, 15 percent. The state can fix the volume, 
price, and tariff of any export leaving Turkmenistan. 

Beginning in November 1993, Turkmenistan stopped the 
Soviet-era practice of accepting goods in exchange for natural 
gas, restricting payments to hard currency, precious metals, 
and precious stones. However, this policy may not be successful 
because Russia buys gas from Turkmenistan and then redistrib- 
utes it to CIS customers rather than to Europe. Under these 
conditions, some customers may turn to Uzbekistan, which 
sells its gas directly and at a much lower price. Turkmenistan 
found it necessary to negotiate barter agreements with certain 
nonpaying customers such as Azerbaijan and Georgia. Until 
the end of 1994, Kazakstan was the only CIS customer to pay in 
cash. 

In 1993 gas constituted 66.2 percent of Turkmenistan's 
exports to non-CIS countries, cotton 26.1 percent, and other 
goods 7.7 percent. Turkmenistan barters large quantities of 
cotton for textile-processing equipment from Italy, Argentina, 
and Turkey. Almost half of cotton exports (more than 20 per- 
cent of total exports) have been diverted to non-CIS customers 
since 1992. An increase in barter trade with China and Iran 
partially offsets the collapse of interrepublic supply. In 1994 
Iran bought 20,000 tons of cotton fiber, a volume expected to 
increase by five times in 1995. Turkmenistan also will sell sur- 
plus electrical power via Iran. 

Despite payment problems, Turkmenistan's export position 
has improved substantially since independence. Its consoli- 
dated current account surplus rose from US$447 million to 
US$927 million between 1991 and 1992, so that the increase in 
gas and cotton exports has offset the increase in imports. By 
mid-1994, the United States Export-Import Bank extended 
US$75.7 million to insure Turkmenistan's trade deals, and the 
United States Department of Agriculture offered US$5 million 
in grain credits. Turkey's export-import bank extended a credit 
line worth $US90 million to Turkmenistan to help cover the 
growing volume of trade between these two countries. Japan's 
Eximbank allocated $5 million in trade credits for machinery. 

Investments from Abroad 

In November 1991, Turkmenistan officially opened its sys- 
tem to foreign economic activity by ratifying the laws "On 



345 



Country Studies 

Enterprises in Turkmenistan" and "On Entrepreneur Activity 
in Turkmenistan." Subsequent laws on foreign investment have 
covered protection against nationalization, tax breaks on rein- 
vestment of hard currency obtained for profits, property own- 
ership, and intellectual property rights protection to attract 
foreign investment, and the important 1993 decree allowing 
domestic enterprises to form joint ventures with foreign oil 
companies. The Ten Years of Prosperity plan envisages "free 
economic zones, joint enterprises, and a broadening of entre- 
preneurship." 

Foreign investors have been attracted by the republic's calm 
and receptive atmosphere. In 1993 parts of the country took 
on the appearance of a huge construction site, with twenty-six 
foreign joint ventures operating there. Turkish joint ventures 
alone were building sixty factories for the processing of agricul- 
tural produce. Despite official discouragement of economic 
activity on the grounds of human rights violations in Turkmen- 
istan, United States business people have been attracted by the 
republic's stable conditions, and they have invested in a num- 
ber of significant projects. In the early 1990s, United States 
companies paid particular attention to the oil and gas industry, 
establishing investment agreements with the consultative aid of 
former United States secretaries of state Alexander Haig and 
James Baker. 

Economic Agreements Abroad 

In the formative phase following independence, Turkmeni- 
stan concluded several key agreements with trade partners. In 
December 1991, President Niyazov became the first Central 
Asian leader to secure cooperation agreements with Turkey on 
trade, rail and air links, communications, education, and cul- 
ture. Turkmenistan also secured Turkey's agreement on a gas 
pipeline routed through its territory and assistance in the trad- 
ing of petroleum, electricity, and cotton. Also in 1991, Turk- 
menistan established terms with Russia on cotton-for-oil trades, 
as well as for other industrial goods such as automobiles. In 
1992 agreements with Iran established Iranian aid to Turkmen- 
istan's gas and oil industry and its livestock raising, grain, sugar 
beet, and fruit sectors, in return for aid to Iran's cotton sector. 
At the same time, Iran pledged support for Turkmenistan's 
pipeline project through Iran to Turkey. 

Since its initial agreement, Turkmenistan has pursued its 
trade relationship with Iran with great vigor. Agreements focus 



346 



Turkmenistan 



on the pipeline project that will bring gas from Turkmenistan 
to Europe via Iran and Turkey, transportation projects such as 
the Tejen-Saragt-Mashhad railroad link, whose construction 
was undertaken in 1993, and development of the oil and gas 
industries, including the establishment of a joint venture in 
Turkmenistan for the transport of petroleum products and 
construction of a plant to produce motor oil. Cooperation in 
mining and other fields also has been discussed. 

At the beginning of 1992, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Russia and Kazakstan formed the Caspian States Cooperation 
Organization to reach regional agreements on fishing, ship- 
ping, environmental protection, and cooperation among the 
member nations' oil and gas operations. Iran also has sought to 
gain support for a project, discontinued in 1979, that would 
replenish the sturgeon population of the Caspian Sea. 

The participation of foreign companies in the development 
of Turkmenistan's oil industry is expected to triple extraction 
by the year 2000. In February 1993, the United States firm Viv- 
tex designed a competition among oil companies to win con- 
tracts in Turkmenistan. The "winners" for three of the seven 
blocks put up for bid were Larmag Energy of the Netherlands, 
Noble Drilling of the United States, Eastpac of the United Arab 
Emirates, and the Bridas firm of Argentina. Just for holding the 
competition, Turkmenistan received an initial non-returnable 
"bonus" payment of US$65 million. The total investment of 
competition winners was to amount to US$160 million over the 
course of three years. Turkmenistan would receive between 71 
and 75 percent of the profits from these joint enterprises. 

In the mid-1990s, Turkmenistan has sought to establish a 
natural gas pipeline that would pass through Afghanistan, Paki- 
stan, and China to reach Japan, as well as an interim rail line 
for liquefied gas through China until the pipeline is finished. 
President Niyazov visited Beijing in November 1992 for talks on 
the pipeline, at the same time securing credits of 45 million 
Chinese yuan to be repaid after two years. Niyazov then held 
talks with representatives of the Japanese firm Mitsubishi and 
the Chinese Ministry of Oil in December 1992. A delegation of 
Japanese experts visited Ashgabat in February 1993 to discuss 
prospects for aid. Declaring Turkmenistan the "most solvent" 
of the Central Asian republics, the delegation signed agree- 
ments for the development of oil deposits in the Caspian shelf, 
communications, and water desalinization. 



347 



Country Studies 

In the mid-1990s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary) denied assistance to Turkmenistan on the 
grounds that Turkmenistan has not taken the required human 
rights steps for economic cooperation. However, in March 
1993, the United States conferred most-favored-nation trading 
status on Turkmenistan. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

The current government has an aggressive program aimed 
at developing a transport infrastructure both within the repub- 
lic and to the outside world (see Foreign Trade; Foreign Policy, 
this ch.). The highest priorities of this program are railroads 
and interstate gas pipelines. The capabilities of the various 
components of Turkmenistan's transport system to carry 
freight are indicated by the following percentages: railroads 
37.4 percent, highways 56.1, pipelines 4.4, and internal water- 
ways 2.0. In the early 1990s, air transport accounted for only 
0.02 percent of total freight. 

Railroads 

Turkmenistan inherited from the Soviet Union 2,120 kilo- 
meters of railways, all 1,000-millimeter gauge, a length insuffi- 
cient to serve even the current economy of the republic. In 
addition, it received 13,000 highly depreciated railway cars, 
outdated signaling and communications systems, and deterio- 
rating depots. The Ashgabat line of the Central Asian Railway 
has been especially neglected and poorly administered. In 1993 
the State Railway Administration assumed responsibility for the 
railroad system, and moved immediately to join the Interna- 
tional Union of Railroads. Membership in this organization will 
alleviate the problem of standardization created by Turkmeni- 
stan's wider Soviet-gauge rails and rolling stock, which do not 
match the specifications of non-CIS neighbors. 

The primary railroad line in Turkmenistan is the 
Turkmenbashy-Ashgabat-Charjew Line, which links Turkmeni- 
stan with Uzbekistan and European countries. It was built in 
the 1880s as a military line to facilitate Russian maneuvers in 
the "Great Game" played with the British Empire over domi- 
nance of Central Asia. Other major lines are the Mary-Gushgy 
Line and the Bukhoro-Kerki-Termez Line (via the Charjew 
Line), both of which provide transport to the Afghani border, 



348 



Train station entrance, 
Turkmenbashy 
Courtesy A. James Firth, 
United States 
Department 
of Agriculture 



while smaller branch lines such as the Nebitdag-Vyshka rail- 
road are used to transport oil, workers, and supplies. 

Plans call for building 1,000 kilometers of new rail lines, 
improving signaling and communications, reconstructing 
depots, and computerizing operations. One priority in railroad 
development is the construction or expansion of branch lines 
and links with Turkey via Iran; in the mid-1990s, new lines were 
underway at Saragt, Kerki, Kernay, Kulisol, Gyzylgaya, and 
Gyzyletrek, some of which will be combined and linked to the 
West Kazakstan Line along the Caspian Sea. Efforts also are 
being made to overhaul and acquire rolling stock. 

Roads 

An upgraded highway system is especially important in the 
mountains and deserts of the republic, where only camels pro- 
vide an alternate means of transport. In 1926, the republic had 
5,716 kilometers of roads, 3,310 kilometers of which were 
"camel paths" and the rest "somewhat passable" for wheeled 
transport. By 1975, 9,000 kilometers of roads existed, 6,000 
kilometers of which were paved. By 1990 this number had 
increased dramatically to 23,000 kilometers, of which 15,300 
were paved; concomitant increases in freight and passenger 
traffic strain the system, however. 



349 



Country Studies 

Eastern Turkmenistan is connected with western Turkmeni- 
stan by the Turkmenbashy-Ashgabat-Charjew highway. Other 
important highways are the Charjew-Dashhowuz (520 kilome- 
ters), the Charjew-Kerki (225 kilometers), and the 
Mary-Gushgy. Stable motor vehicle routes to Iran have been 
established, and border-crossing procedures have been simpli- 
fied and regularized. 

Pipelines 

The interstate pipeline system retained its value at the time 
of independence and is a priority of the republic's economic 
development plans. The government has pursued interna- 
tional projects to build gas pipelines through Iran to Turkey, 
through Afghanistan to Pakistan, and through Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and China to Japan. 

Despite Russia's opposition and United States pressure not 
to do so, in August 1994, President Niyazov signed an agree- 
ment with Iran to begin the Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe 
gas pipeline. The pipeline will extend 4,000 kilometers 
through Iran, Turkey, and Bulgaria, with an initial capacity of 
15 billion cubic meters annually, later to be expanded to 28 bil- 
lion cubic meters. The project will cost US$8 billion, of which 
Iran will finance US$3.5 billion, and construction will begin in 
1998. 

After a Japanese delegation held talks in Ashgabat in 1992, 
the Mitsubishi corporation developed plans to build a 6,700- 
kilometer gas pipeline through Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and 
China to the Yellow Sea coast opposite Japan, where a natural 
gas liquefaction plant will be built to convert the gas prior to 
shipment. The plan calls for constructing a pipeline with a 
capacity of 30 billion cubic meters annually at a cost of US$12 
billion. Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan also have 
petitioned the Russian Federation to help them build a new 
725-kilometer gas pipeline through Russia and Ukraine for 
exporting natural gas to Ukraine and Europe. 

Of the two main existing lines, the Shatlik-Khiva line run- 
ning south-north from near Saragt to Khiva connects with a 
pipeline from the Uzbekistan gas field near Bukhoro. Intersect- 
ing this line is the Mary-Ashgabat line running east-west from 
near Mary to Ashgabat. The other main line is the Central 
Asia-Center line running north from Okarem to Nebitdag, 
northwest to the Garabogaz Gulf on the Caspian Sea, and con- 
necting with the main line to Europe through Ukraine. 



350 



Turkmenistan 



Airlines 

Turkmenistan has seven airports, of which four have perma- 
nent-surface runways between 1,200 and 2,500 meters in 
length. The main international airport in Ashgabat includes a 
new terminal complex constructed by companies from Turkey, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Plans 
call for using Boeing aircraft alongside the current stock of 
Aeroflot aircraft belonging to Turkmenistan Air Lines. Current 
routes provide service to China, India, Pakistan, Iran, the 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Slovakia, and 
Italy. The two other international facilities, located at Charjew 
and Dashhowuz, serve mostly flights within Central Asia. Local 
airports also exist at Mary, Nebitdag, and other locales. The 
national administration of Turkmenistan Civil Aviation has 
been admitted as a member of the International Commercial 
Aviation Organization. Membership enables Turkmenistan Air- 
lines to have its routes entered into all major airline computer 
terminals and scheduling references and thus to issue interna- 
tional airline tickets. 

Merchant Marine 

Turkmenistan has a main Caspian Sea port at Turkmenbashy 
and a shipping line running from that port to Astrakhan in the 
Russian Federation on the north shore of the Caspian. How- 
ever, the majority of freight is shipped from Turkmenbashy to 
Baku on the western shore of the Caspian. Other ports are 
Alaja, Okarem, and Chekelen, all of which were slated for 
reconstruction in the mid-1990s. In 1993 Turkmenistan bought 
two ships from Slovakia to use for export from the port at 
Sukhumi in Georgia. They are currently stationed at 
Novorossiysk on the Black Sea coast. 

Telecommunications 

Turkmenistan's Ministry of Communications is the sole sup- 
plier of telecommunications services in Turkmenistan; the 
ministry also operates the postal and special delivery services 
and the delivery of press publications. Because of very low 
state-fixed rates, the ministry's budget is inadequate to perform 
all these services adequately. 

There are two television broadcasting centers, the Orbita sat- 
ellite station in Ashgabat and a second one in Nebitdag. The 
State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting is 



351 



Country Studies 



responsible for both. Through Orbita and Intelsat satellite 
transmissions, broadcasts reach all cities and rural centers. 
Broadcasting centers are linked by landline or microwave to 
other CIS states and Iran. Since 1992, the republic has received 
daily transmissions from Turkey. 

Turkmenistan experiences many problems concerning com- 
munications technology. The telephone network is poorly 
developed. Only 28 percent of households have a telephone, 
and 550 villages lacked telephone service entirely in 1994. 
More than one-third of all subscribers use telephone 
exchanges that are thirty to forty years old and highly depreci- 
ated. Between 1986 and 1991, the number of telephones per 
1,000 outlet accesses increased from 61 to 75, which represents 
140 for urban and 22 for rural citizens. In 1994 there were 
eight main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. 

The Turkish government, working through the private Netas 
company of Turkey, began upgrading Turkmenistan's phone 
system in the early 1990s. The first electronic exchange was 
installed in Ashgabat. Implementation of the Intelsat IBS earth 
station, which will provide international circuit capacity via 
Ankara, is expected to improve the operation of local, 
long-distance, and international networks in the republic. Two 
telex networks provide telex and telegraph services. Only 
twenty international subscribers are linked via Moscow, and a 
few other specialized networks exist. 

Government and Politics 

The post-Soviet government of the Republic of Turkmeni- 
stan retains many of the characteristics and the personnel of 
the communist regime of Soviet Turkmenistan. The govern- 
ment has received substantial international criticism as an 
authoritarian regime centering on the dominant power posi- 
tion of President Saparmyrat Niyazov. Nevertheless, the 1992 
constitution does characterize Turkmenistan as a democracy 
with separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches. 

Centers of Political Power 

In 1994 members of the former Communist Party of Turk- 
menistan continued to fill the majority of government and civic 
leadership posts, and much of the ideologically justified Soviet- 
era political structure remained intact. Besides serving as head 



352 



Turkmenistan 



of the Democratic Party (as the reconstituted Communist Party 
of Turkmenistan is called) and chairman of the advisory Peo- 
ple's Council and the Cabinet of Ministers, Niyazov also 
appoints the procurator general and other officers of the 
courts. In criticizing Turkmenistan's political leadership, 
experts have cited the single-party system, strict censorship, 
repression of political dissent, and the "cult of personality" that 
has formed around President Niyazov. Niyazov's name has been 
given to streets, schools, communal farms, and numerous 
other places; his portrait and sayings receive prominent public 
display; the country's mass media give him extensive exposure 
that always characterizes him in a positive light; and a law 
"Against Insulting the Dignity and Honor of the President" is in 
force. 

At the same time, Western and Russian criticism generally 
has revealed misunderstandings and stereotypes of the political 
and social dynamics of the region that dilute the authority of 
such evaluations, Beneath the surface of the presidential 
image, political life in Turkmenistan is influenced by a combi- 
nation of regional, professional, and tribal factors. Regional 
ties appear to be the strongest of these factors; they are evident 
in the opposing power bases of Ashgabat, center of the govern- 
ment, and Mary, which is the center of a mafia organization 
that controls the narcotics market and illegal trade in a num- 
ber of commodities. Although both areas are settled primarily 
by Turkmen of the Teke tribe, factions in Ashgabat still express 
resentment and distrust of those in Mary for failing to aid the 
fortress of Gokdepe against the 1881 assault that led to Russian 
control of the Turkmen khanates (see Incorporation into Rus- 
sia, this ch.). 

Political behavior also is shaped by the technocratic elites, 
who were trained in Moscow and who can rely on support from 
most of the educated professionals in Ashgabat and other 
urban areas. Most of the elites within the national government 
originate from and are supported by the intelligentsia, which 
also is the source of the few opposition groups in the republic. 

Tribal and other kinship ties rooted in genealogies play a 
much smaller role than presumed by analysts who view Turk- 
men society as "tribal" and therefore not at a sophisticated 
political level. Nonetheless, clan ties often are reflected in pat- 
terns of appointments and networks of power. Regional and 
clan ties have been identified as the bases for political infight- 
ing in the republic. For example, in the early 1990s power 



353 



Country Studies 

bases pitted the Mary district chieftain Gurban Orazov against 
the Ashgabat millionaire and minister of agriculture Payzgeldi 
Meredov, and the Teke clan's hold on power through Niyazov 
conflicted with the Yomud clan's hold on the oil and gas indus- 
try through minister Nazar Soyunov. In July 1994, Niyazov 
removed both Meredov and Soyunov from office on the basis 
of evidence that the two ministers had misappropriated funds 
obtained from the sale of state-owned resources. To correct 
such problems, a Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations was 
formed to handle exports and imports, and a Control and Revi- 
sion Commission was established to review contracts with for- 
eign firms. 

According to a law passed in December 1992, all permanent 
residents of Turkmenistan are accorded citizenship unless they 
renounce that right in writing. Non-residents may become citi- 
zens if they can demonstrate that they have resided in Turk- 
menistan for the past seven years and that they have some 
knowledge of the Turkmen language. Dual citizenship with cer- 
tain other former Soviet republics is permitted. The CIS sum- 
mit held in Ashgabat in December 1993 resulted in an accord 
on dual citizenship between the Russian Federation and Turk- 
menistan, allowing Turkmenistan's 400,000 ethnic Russians to 
achieve that status. 

In May 1992, Turkmenistan became the first newly indepen- 
dent republic in Central Asia to ratify a constitution. According 
to the constitution and to literature printed by the govern- 
ment, Turkmenistan is a democratic, secular, constitutional 
republic based on law and headed by a president. It is also 
termed a "presidential republic," one that is "based on the 
principles of the separation of powers — legislative, executive, 
and judicial — which operate independently, checking and bal- 
ancing one another." 

Government Structure 

The government of Turkmenistan is divided into three 
branches — the executive branch headed by the president, the 
legislative branch consisting of the National Assembly (Milli 
Majlis), and the judicial branch embodied in the Supreme 
Court. A People's Council nominally has the ultimate power to 
oversee the three branches. A Council of Elders exists as an 
advisory body to the government, everyday affairs of which are 
conducted by a Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the presi- 
dent. 



354 



Turkmenistan 



President 

The office of president ( tilrkmenbashi, "Leader of the Turk- 
men") was established in conjunction with the ratification of 
the 1992 constitution. The president functions as head of state 
and government and as commander in chief of the armed 
forces, serving for an elected term of five years. Presidential 
powers include the right to issue edicts having the force of law, 
to appoint and remove state prosecutors and judges, and to dis- 
continue the National Assembly if it has passed two 
no-confidence votes on the sitting government (Cabinet) 
within an eighteen-month period. The government is adminis- 
tered by the Cabinet of Ministers, who are appointed by the 
president with National Assembly approval. 

Niyazov, who was president of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist 
Republic at the time of independence, is a Turkmen of the 
Teke tribe who was born in 1940. Trained as an engineer, Niya- 
zov rose through the ranks of the Communist Party of Turk- 
menistan, reaching the top of the party hierarchy as first 
secretary in 1985. During his tenure, Niyazov remained aloof 
from glasnost and perestroika, the reforms of CPSU First Secre- 
tary Mikhail S. Gorbachev, even terming Gorbachev's program 
"pseudo-reform." When Moscow hard-liners attempted to 
unseat Gorbachev in the coup of August 1991, Niyazov 
refrained from condemning the conspiracy until after its fail- 
ure was certain. After his appointment as president of the Turk- 
men Soviet Socialist Republic in October 1990, Niyazov ran as 
an uncontested candidate in the republic's first presidential 
election in June 1991, winning over 99 percent of the vote. 
From that position, he presided over the declaration of inde- 
pendence in October 1991. The 1992 constitution of the inde- 
pendent Republic of Turkmenistan called for a new 
presidential election, which Niyazov won in June 1992. In Janu- 
ary 1994, a referendum extended his presidency from a five- 
year term to a ten-year term that would end in the year 2002; of 
the 99 percent of the electorate that voted, officially only 212 
voted against the extension. 

Legislative Branch 

The 1992 constitution provides for a legislative body called 
the National Assembly, a body that retains the structure and 
procedures of the Soviet-era Supreme Soviet. The body's fifty 
members are elected directly to five-year terms, and they are 
prohibited from holding other offices during their tenure. The 



355 



Country Studies 



National Assembly is charged with the enactment of criminal 
legislation and approving amendments to the constitution. It 
also ratifies legislative bills introduced by the president, the 
Cabinet of Ministers, and individual members of the National 
Assembly. 

Supreme Court 

Established by the 1992 constitution, the Supreme Court 
comprises twenty-two judges appointed by the president to 
five-year terms. Of the three branches of government, the judi- 
ciary has the fewest powers; its prescribed functions are limited 
to review of laws for constitutionality and decisions concerning 
the judicial codex or Supreme Law 

National Council 

The 1992 constitution also established the National Council 
(Halk Maslahati) to serve as "the highest representative organ 
of popular power." Intended to unite the three branches of 
government, it comprises the president of Turkmenistan; the 
deputies of the National Assembly; members of the Supreme 
Court, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Supreme Economic 
Court; sixty people's representatives elected from the districts 
specifically to the National Council; and officials from scientific 
and cultural organizations. Members of the National Council 
serve for five years without compensation. This body meets at 
the request of the president or the National Assembly, or when 
mandated by a one-third vote of its members. Functions of the 
National Council include advising the president, recommend- 
ing domestic and foreign policy, amending the constitution 
and other laws, ratifying treaties, and declaring war and peace. 
In theory, its powers supersede those of the president, the 
National Assembly, and the Supreme Court. However, the 
council has been described as a kind of "super-congress of 
prominent people" that rubber-stamps decisions made by the 
other national bodies, in most cases the executive. 

Council of Elders 

In addition, the constitution created the Council of Elders, 
which is designed to embody the Turkmen tradition of reliance 
on the advice of senior members of society in matters of impor- 
tance. According to the constitution, the president is bound to 
consult with this body prior to making decisions on both 
domestic and foreign affairs. The Council of Elders also is 



356 



Turkmenistan 



assigned the task of selecting presidential candidates. Its chair- 
man is the president of Turkmenistan. 

Political Parties 

Although the constitution guarantees the right to form polit- 
ical parties, in fact the former Communist Party of Turkmeni- 
stan has retained the political control exercised by its 
predecessor. Opposition parties and other politically active 
groups have remained small and without broad support. 

Democratic Party of Turkmenistan 

At the twenty-fifth congress of the Communist Party of Turk- 
menistan held in December 1991, the party was renamed the 
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, and Niyazov was confirmed 
as its chairman. According to its new program, the Democratic 
Party serves as a "mother party" that dominates political activity 
and yet promotes the activity of a loyal political opposition. Fol- 
lowing a proposal of Niyazov, a party called the Peasant Justice 
Party, composed of regional secretaries of the Democratic 
Party, was registered in 1992 as an opposition party. 

The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan essentially retains 
the apparatus of the former communist party. Party propa- 
ganda aims at explaining the need for preserving stability, civil 
peace, and interethnic accord. Party publications boast that its 
primary organizations operate in every enterprise, organiza- 
tion, and institution, and that its membership includes over 
165,000, whereas critics claim that most citizens hardly are 
aware of the party's existence. 

Opposition Parties 

The 1992 constitution establishes rights concerning freedom 
of religion, the separation of church and state, freedom of 
movement, privacy, and ownership of private property. Both 
the constitution and the 1991 Law on Public Organizations 
guarantee the right to create political parties and other public 
associations that operate within the framework of the constitu- 
tion and its laws. Such activity is restricted by prohibitions of 
parties that "encroach on the health and morals of the people" 
and on the formation of ethnic or religious parties. This provi- 
sion has been used by the government to ban several groups. 

In the mid-1990s, Niyazov described opposition groups as 
lacking both popular support and political programs offering 
constructive alternatives to existing policy. He has cited these 



357 



Country Studies 

qualities in disqualifying groups from eligibility to register as 
opposition parties. Insofar as such groups have the potential to 
promote ethnic or other tensions in society, they may be viewed 
as illegal, hence subject to being banned under the constitu- 
tion. 

Given such an environment, opposition activity in Turkmen- 
istan has been quite restrained. A small opposition group 
called Unity (Agzybirlik), originally registered in 1989, consists 
of intellectuals who describe the party program as oriented 
toward forming a multiparty democratic system on the Turkish 
model. Unity has devoted itself to issues connected with 
national sovereignty and the replacement of the communist 
political legacy. After being banned in January 1990, members 
of Unity founded a second group called the Party for Demo- 
cratic Development, which focused on reforms and political 
issues. That party's increasing criticism of authoritarianism in 
the postindependence government led to its being banned in 
1991. The original Unity group and its offspring party jointly 
publish a newspaper in Moscow called Daynach (Support), dis- 
tribution of which is prohibited in Turkmenistan. In 1991 these 
two opposition groups joined with others in a coalition called 
Conference (Gengesh), aimed at effecting democratic reforms 
in the republic. 

Human Rights 

President Niyazov has stated his support for the democratic 
ideal of a multiparty system and of protection of human rights, 
with the caveat that such rights protect stability, order, and 
social harmony. While acknowledging that his cult of personal- 
ity resembles that of Soviet dictator Joseph V. Stalin, Niyazov 
claims that a strong leader is needed to guide the republic 
through its transition from communism to a democratic form 
of government. 

Although the Niyazov government has received consistent 
criticism from foreign governments and international organi- 
zations such as Helsinki Watch for its restrictive policies toward 
opposition groups, in general the government has not taken 
extreme steps against its political opposition. In 1993 no politi- 
cal prisoners, political executions, or instances of torture or 
other inhumane treatment were reported. The government 
has made conscious efforts to protect equal rights and oppor- 
tunities for groups of citizens it considers benign. Such mea- 
sures have been applied especially in safeguarding the security 



358 



Turkmenistan 



of Russian residents, who receive special attention because they 
offer a considerable body of technical and professional exper- 
tise. 

Nevertheless, government control of the media has been 
quite effective in suppressing domestic criticism of the Niyazov 
regime. In addition, members of opposition groups suffer 
harassment in the form of dismissal from jobs, evictions, unwar- 
ranted detentions, and denial of travel papers. Their rights to 
privacy are violated through telephone tapping, electronic 
eavesdropping, reading of mail, and surveillance. United States 
officials have protested human rights violations by refusing to 
sign aid agreements with Turkmenistan and by advising against 
economic aid and cooperation. 

Foreign Policy 

Turkmenistan has declared "positive neutrality" and "open 
doors" to be the two major components of its foreign policy. 
Positive neutrality is defined as gaining international recogni- 
tion of the republic's independence, agreeing upon mutual 
non-interference in internal affairs, and maintaining neutrality 
in external conflicts. The open- doors policy has been adopted 
to encourage foreign investment and export trade, especially 
through the development of a transport infrastructure. Turk- 
menistan gained membership in the United Nations (UN) in 
early 1992. 

Background 

Pervasive historical and geopolitical factors shape Turkmeni- 
stan's foreign policy. With the removal of the protective Soviet 
"umbrella," the foreign policy tasks facing independent Turk- 
menistan are the establishment of independent national secu- 
rity and economic systems, while coping with the long legacy of 
existence in the empires of tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. 
As of 1996, all of Turkmenistan's gas pipelines went north into 
the Russian Federation or other CIS states, thus subordinating 
sectors of its economic development to that of relatively poor 
countries. Because Turkmenistan lacks a strong military, inde- 
pendence depends on establishing military pacts with Russia 
and on developing balanced diplomatic and economic ties with 
Russia and neighboring countries (see Role of Russia and CIS, 
this ch.). 



359 



Country Studies 



Turkmenistan's geographical location close to conflict-riven 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan also requires a guarded posture 
toward the irredentist and Islamic forces at play in those coun- 
tries. Concern over border security was heightened by an inci- 
dent in October 1993 when two Afghan jets bombed Turkmen 
territory, despite recent talks with Afghan officials aimed at 
ensuring equality and non-interference. 

Turkmenistan's status as an Islamic state also affects Turk- 
menistan's relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although in 
need of the foreign aid and developmental opportunities 
offered by these countries, Turkmenistan's government also 
endeavors to blunt any perceived threats to its secular status 
that arise from Muslim activists. The Turkic identity of the bulk 
of its population thus far has not proven to be a significant fac- 
tor in foreign affairs because Turkmenistan must compete with 
other Central Asian Turkic republics for markets and for closer 
socioeconomic ties with Turkey. 

An important historical factor in current policy is that prior 
to independence the Soviet government conducted Turkmeni- 
stan's foreign affairs. The only involvement of republic officials 
in international relations was in the form of ceremonial con- 
tacts aimed at showcasing Soviet nationality policy by present- 
ing Turkmenistan as a developmental model for Third World 
countries. 

Foreign Relations Issues 

Since independence, Turkmenistan has taken major initia- 
tives by making national security and economic development 
agreements. Security agreements have focused on military 
cooperation with Russia and on border security with Iran and 
Afghanistan. In the economic area, President Niyazov has con- 
centrated on developing gas and oil exports and the pipeline 
transport infrastructure, especially in cooperation with Iran, 
Turkey, and Pakistan. 

A recent transportation dispute underscored the urgency of 
Turkmenistan's finding a new pipeline route by which to send 
its natural gas to Europe through Iran and Turkey. From Feb- 
ruary through September 1992, Turkmenistan was engaged in 
a gas-transport price war with Ukraine that provoked the latter 
to withhold food shipments. In addition, Ukraine refused to 
transship 500 tons of Turkmenistan's cotton to Turkey, prompt- 
ing an ambitious program to build Turkmenistan's railroad 
links with its southern neighbors. 



360 



Turkmenistan 



The United States 

Initial concern over human rights policy delayed United 
States recognition of Turkmenistan's independence until after 
February 1992, when alarms over Iran's ventures in Central 
Asia brought a reevaluation of United States policy. Relations 
declined in September 1993 when the United States cut trade 
credits to Turkmenistan to protest the arrest of four human 
rights activists. Generally, such human rights violations have 
not impeded relations between the two countries, however. 
Alexander Haig, former United States secretary of state, acting 
as consultant to President Niyazov, played a leading role in 
negotiating most-favored-nation trading status for Turkmeni- 
stan in 1993. 

Western Europe 

President Niyazov has visited European countries and 
received European delegations to promote foreign invest- 
ments, diplomatic ties, and applications for membership in 
international aid organizations. During talks with officials of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary) 
in 1993, Niyazov stated that Turkmenistan would welcome 
NATO assistance in the creation of its national armed forces. 
In April 1994, French President Francois Mitterrand visited 
Ashgabat, where he signed agreements on investments, cul- 
tural exchange, and tariffs. At that time, France also allocated 
US$35 million in trade credits for the construction of a presi- 
dential palace. In November 1994, Niyazov toured Austria, 
Romania, and Slovakia to attract oil and gas investments. 

Asian Neighbors 

After the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan has established 
its closest relations with Iran, especially on issues of joint con- 
cern within the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO — 
see Glossary), but also on issues of border security, transport 
cooperation, cultural exchange, and business ventures. In 1993 
the two countries signed a joint statement emphasizing territo- 
rial sovereignty and non-interference in Tajikistan. At the same 
time, Turkmenistan's diplomats conveyed concern over the 
controversial agreement between Iran and Russia to build a 
nuclear power plant near the Caspian Sea and the Turkmeni- 
stan border. 



361 



Country Studies 



In January 1994, Niyazov made an official visit to Tehran, 
and the two countries held a second round of talks in Ashgabat 
in June to create an intergovernmental center for consultation 
and coordination on socioeconomic questions. According to 
bilateral agreements, Iranian specialists will aid in renovating 
the Turkmenbashy Oil Refinery and the Mary Cotton Process- 
ing Plant, building the Turkmenistan-Iran-Europe Gas Pipe- 
line, and constructing the Ashgabat-Tehran, Mary- Mashhad- 
Turkmenbashy, and Gudurol-Gorgan highways. In January 
1996, Niyazov signed agreements with Iran linking the two 
countries' electric power networks, a joint dam on the Hari 
River, and cooperation in oil, gas, and agriculture. A joint state- 
ment expressed concern about Azerbaijan's exploitation of 
Caspian Sea resources, although Turkmenistan generally has 
sided with Azerbaijan and Kazakstan, and against Iran and Rus- 
sia, on resource rights in the Caspian. 

Contrary to initial expectations that Turkey would play a 
"big brother" role in Turkmenistan's social and cultural devel- 
opment following independence, Turkmenistan charts its own 
course in such matters. An example is the adoption of a Latin 
script that owes little if anything to that used for Turkish. How- 
ever, Turkey has played a prominent role in the development 
of Turkmenistan's economic potential. Turkish firms are con- 
structing US$1 billion worth of enterprises, stores, and hotels 
in Turkmenistan. The Turkish Development and Cooperation 
Agency manages a slate of projects in agriculture, civil aviation, 
education, health care, minerals extraction, reconstruction of 
infrastructure, initiation of small enterprises, and construction 
of a complex of mosques and religious schools. Turkish high 
schools and universities are hosting more than 2,000 Turkmen- 
istan! students, and, in 1994, Turkey began daily four-hour tele- 
vision broadcasts to the republic. 

Because of continuing fragmentation of political power in 
neighboring Afghanistan and concern that civil strife in that 
country could threaten the security of its borders, Turkmeni- 
stan's government pursued direct agreements with the north- 
ern Afghan leader General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic 
Uzbek. With the support of Uzbekistan's Karimov regime, Dos- 
tum had carved out an Uzbek domain controlling 600 of the 
850 kilometers along the Afghan-Turkmen border. In July 
1993, President Niyazov discussed border security with officials 
from northern Afghanistan, resulting in the establishment of 
consulates in the Afghan cities of Mazari Sharif and Herat. 



362 



Turkmenistan 



Talks in 1994 focused on building a railroad link and supplying 
electricity to Herat. A direct telephone communications line 
was completed connecting Ashgabat and Mary with Herat. 

Besides initiatives taken under the aegis of the ECO, Turk- 
menistan signed a cooperation agreement with Pakistan in late 
1991 and obtained a promise of US$10 million in credit and 
goods from Pakistan in 1992. The two countries signed memo- 
randa in 1995 for the construction of a gas pipeline from Turk- 
menistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The Bridas 
company of Argentina was engaged to do a feasibility study for 
the pipeline. 

CIS Relations 

Turkmenistan has been hesitant to sign economic agree- 
ments within the CIS framework. Niyazov has criticized the 
weakness of CIS mechanisms and proposed a new CIS structure 
that would be exclusively consultative in nature. As an example 
of its approach, Turkmenistan declined to attend the Surgut 
Conference with Russia and Kazakstan (1994), whose goal was 
to stabilize falling gas and oil output, stating that the domestic 
gas industry was sufficiently stable without CIS investment 
funds. At that time, Russian Federation deputy prime minister 
Aleksandr Shokhin declared that Turkmenistan must decide 
whether it is with the CIS countries or not. Despite such fric- 
tion, Turkmenistan has maintained close bilateral economic 
and military ties with Russia. 

Regional cooperation among Central Asian republics has 
not been as profound as anticipated upon the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. In 1993 the other four Central Asian repub- 
lics accounted for about one-fifth of Turkmenistan's imports 
and exports. Turkmenistan has followed its own path in all 
areas of post-Soviet reform, preferring bilateral to regional 
agreements in the economic sphere; for example, it has agreed 
to supply Kazakstan with electricity in return for grain. The 
decisions of all five republics to switch to Latin-based alphabets 
will not necessarily have the expected result of improving cul- 
tural ties because the romanization of distinct sounds in the 
respective languages will be far from uniform. Fragmentation is 
evident also in the introduction by all five nations of separate 
national currencies. 

Caspian Sea Issues 

An important goal of Turkmenistan's foreign policy is work- 



363 



Country Studies 

ing in international groups to solve a range of issues involving 
the Caspian Sea. That body of water, which affords Turkmeni- 
stan a 500-kilometer coastline with numerous natural 
resources, including oil and fish, is threatened by extreme lev- 
els of pollution, as well as fluctuating water levels. In August 
1993, Turkmenistan! delegates attended a meeting in Moscow 
to discuss the status of international claims to jurisdiction over 
the Caspian Sea and its resources. Treaties between the Soviet 
Union and Iran dating from 1921 and 1940 gave each country 
free navigation and fishing rights within ten miles (sixteen kilo- 
meters) of the entire Caspian coastline, putting other coastal 
nations at a disadvantage. A second issue is the cartel formed 
by Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran to 
control sales of Caspian caviar on the world market as a means 
of preventing individual Caspian Sea states from selling too 
much to obtain hard currency. Thus far, however, the cartel 
lacks an enforcement mechanism. Turkmenistan is a member 
of the Caspian Sea Forum, which includes all the nations bor- 
dering the sea. Until 1995 that organization had not taken con- 
crete action to limit pollution by oil extraction and shipping 
activities of the member countries, however. In late 1994, Turk- 
menistan joined Kazakstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia in forming 
the Caspian Border Patrol force for joint border security (see 
Military Doctrine, this ch.). In 1995 and 1996, friction 
increased among the Caspian states as Iran and Russia exerted 
pressure for the sea's resources to be divided equally among 
the group, a formula that would pervent the other three coun- 
tries from taking advantage of their proximity to rich offshore 
oil deposits. 

National Security 

During the Soviet era, military planners regarded Turkmeni- 
stan as a crucial border region because of its proximity to Iran 
and other strategic areas such as the Persian Gulf and Afghani- 
stan. Consequently, a large number of Soviet army troops were 
stationed in the republic, which was virtually closed to foreign- 
ers. Since independence and the formation of a national 
armed force, Turkmenistan has maintained a posture of neu- 
trality and isolationism, while at the same time pursuing a bilat- 
eral military alliance with the Russian Federation. Russia 
continues to regard Turkmenistan as a key element in its 
sphere of military interests. For that reason, Russia has secured 
agreements for stationing border guards and air defense forces 



364 



Turkmenistan 



in Turkmenistan. Russia also supports the building of the 
national armed forces by providing training for officers and 
sharing force maintenance costs. 

Strategic Considerations 

The 1992 constitution provides that the republic shall main- 
tain armed forces to defend state sovereignty and that military 
service for males is a universal obligation that prevails over 
other constitutional obligations. Turkmenistan's government is 
adamant about the need to develop and maintain strong, 
well-trained, and well-equipped armed forces to defend the 
country's independence. At the same time, it has stated that it 
will maintain a posture of "positive neutrality" in regard to 
national security. 

Under the agreement for shared command, the presidents 
of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation act as joint com- 
manders in chief. By agreement, troops under joint command 
cannot act without the consent of both ministries of defense. In 
Turkmenistan the chief military policy-making body, the 
Supreme Defense Committee, consists of the president, the 
ministers of defense and internal affairs, the chairman of the 
Supreme Court, the procurator general, and the leaders of the 
five provinces. Prior to the creation of the Turkmenistan Minis- 
try of Defense in January 1992, the republic's military establish- 
ment fell under the command of the Turkestan Military 
District of the Soviet armed forces. 

Turkmenistan's dependence on the Russian Federation for 
security against aggressive neighbors, at least until the repub- 
lic's armed forces become a viable deterrent, creates tension 
with the foreign policy goal of remaining as independent as 
possible from Russia. These conflicting national security con- 
siderations explain the Niyazov government's implementation 
of a bilateral military alliance with Russia while at the same 
time refusing to commit itself to substantial participation in 
regional military agreements that possibly would alienate Iran. 

Military Doctrine 

President Niyazov has acknowledged Russia's legitimate mili- 
tary interests in the region, stating that his country's security 
interests can be better served through cooperation with Russia 
than through participation in multinational military organiza- 
tions. Membership in the latter contradicts its foreign policy of 
noninterference, as well as its military doctrine that the princi- 



365 



Country Studies 

pal function of Turkmenistan's army is to protect the country 
from external aggression. Another military doctrine holds that 
local wars, border conflicts, and military buildups in adjacent 
countries are the main source of danger to Turkmenistan. 
Although Turkmenistan has no disputed borders, its doctrine 
is based on concerns about the civil conflicts in Tajikistan and 
the instability in northern Afghanistan, especially after the col- 
lapse of its pro-Soviet regime in 1989, as well as on traditional 
tensions with Iran. On the other hand, Turkmenistan's leader- 
ship completely discounts the fear that Islamic fundamentalism 
would spread from Iran into the republic, a prospect of low 
probability considering that Iranian fundamentalists adhere to 
the Shia branch of Islam, while the state-controlled Islam of 
Turkmenistan belongs to the Sunni branch. Traditional ani- 
mosity between Turkmen and Iranians is also a reason for 
reaching this conclusion (see Religion, this ch.). 

Role of Russia and the CIS 

The Treaty on Joint Measures signed by Russia and Turk- 
menistan in July 1992 provided for the Russian Federation to 
act as guarantor of Turkmenistan's security and made former 
Soviet army units in the republic the basis of the new national 
armed forces. The treaty stipulated that, apart from border 
troops and air force and air defense units remaining under 
Russian control, the entire armed forces would be under joint 
command, which would gradually devolve to exclusive com- 
mand by Turkmenistan over a period of ten years. For a transi- 
tional period of five years, Russia would provide logistical 
support and pay Turkmenistan for the right to maintain special 
installations, while Turkmenistan would bear the costs of hous- 
ing, utilities, and administration. 

More recent agreements between the two countries have 
strengthened their military alliance. In August 1992, accord 
was reached on the deployment of Russian border troops in 
the republic for a five-year period, with an option to renew for 
another five years. In September 1993, Turkmenistan agreed to 
assume all costs of maintaining forces on its soil following a 
five-year period of shared financing. This agreement granted 
Russia the right to maintain air force and air defense systems 
with limited control by Turkmenistan. It addressed the con- 
tinuing majority of Russians in the command structure by per- 
mitting Russian citizens to perform military duty in 
Turkmenistan and by making allowance for the training of 



366 



Turkmenistan 



Turkmenistan! officers in Russian military schools. At the CIS 
summit held in Ashgabat in December 1993, the military alli- 
ance between the two countries was affirmed, and provisions 
were made for the participation of 2,000 Russian officers in 
Turkmenistan in the development of the national armed 
forces. 

Despite the Russian Federation's deep involvement in Turk- 
menistan's military and pressures to do so, the republic has not 
joined the CIS collective security agreement. However, regional 
conflicts have led Turkmenistan to deviate from its posture of 
avoiding multinational commitments. The republic joined 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in drawing up a draft agreement on 
joint border defense along the Amu Darya. In addition, Turk- 
menistan has indicated willingness to cooperate in limited ways 
in a CIS-sponsored Central Asian Zone that would integrate 
military units of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, part of Kyrgyzstan, and 
possibly Turkmenistan, and provide joint response in cases of 
aggression by a southern neighbor against any member. In May 
1994, Turkmenistan became the first Central Asian member 
nation of the Partnership for Peace, the NATO initiative offer- 
ing limited participation in the Western military alliance in 
return for participation in some NATO exercises. As a result, 
Turkmenistan has pursued the possibly of training its officers 
with the military cadre of NATO member nations. The Russian 
monopoly on military training was broken by a 1994 agree- 
ment by which Pakistan would train Turkmenistan! air force 
cadets. 

When the Ministry of Defense was formed, most ethnic 
Turkmen appointees were former communist party and gov- 
ernment officials, illustrating the lack of Turkmen senior offi- 
cers. The first minister of defense, Lieutenant General Danatar 
Kopekov, had been chairman of the Turkmenistan State Secu- 
rity Committee. In 1994 the chief of staff and first deputy min- 
ister of defense was Major General Annamurat Soltanov, a 
career officer who had served in Cuba and Afghanistan; 
another deputy minister of defense, Major General Begdzhan 
Niyazov, had been a law enforcement administrator prior to his 
appointment. Russian commanders included Major General 
Viktor Zavarzin, chief of staff and first deputy commander of 
the Separate Combined-Arms Army of Turkmenistan, and 
commander of the Separate Combined-Arms Army of Turk- 
menistan and deputy minister of defense Lieutenant General 
Nikolay Kormil'tsev. Russian Major General Vladislav Shune- 



367 



Country Studies 



vich served together with Turkmen Major General Akmurad 
Kabulov as joint commanders of the border troops in the Turk- 
men Border Guard. 

Force Structure 

Of the 108,000 uniformed soldiers and officers and 300 
units of the former Soviet armed forces that were in Turkmeni- 
stan in April 1992, nearly 50,000 personnel and thirty units 
were withdrawn or disbanded within the following year. By 
1993 the republic's armed forces comprised around 34,000 
active-duty personnel attached primarily to the army and air 
force. At that point, the reduced force operated 200 military 
units while seventy remained under Russian control. Turned 
over to Turkmenistan's command were one army corps direc- 
torate, two combined arms units stationed at Gushgy and Gyzyl- 
arbat, several air defense and air force aviation units, technical 
support and logistical units, and virtually all the armaments 
and other military property. The armed forces are divided into 
four branches: the army, air force, and border guards. The gov- 
ernment has announced plans to establish a naval force on the 
Caspian Sea. 

Army 

The army, which had been reduced to about 11,000 person- 
nel by 1996, is organized into one corps headquarters, three 
motorized rifle divisions, one artillery brigade, one multiple 
rocket launcher regiment, one antitank regiment, one engi- 
neer brigade, and one independent helicopter squadron. 
There are also signal, reconnaissance, and logistics support 
units. The three motorized rifle divisions are based at Ash- 
gabat, Gushgy, and Gyzylarbat. The army's inventory includes 
about 530 M-72 main battle tanks, 338 armored infantry fight- 
ing vehicles, 543 armored personnel carriers, 345 pieces of 
towed artillery, sixteen self-propelled guns, 114 multiple rocket 
launchers, sixty-three mortars, fifty-four antitank guns, and fifty 
air defense guns. 

Air Force 

Turkmenistan's air force has four regiments with 2,000 men 
and 171 fighter and bomber aircraft, of which sixty-five are Su- 
17s. The main air force base is at Gyzylarbat. In 1994 the orga- 
nization of the air force remained contingent on further nego- 
tiation on disposition and control of former Soviet units. 



368 




Army conscripts pose inside 
a transport aircraft, 
Ashgabat. 
Courtesy A. James Firth, 
United States Department 
of Agriculture 




Pending such negotiation, the Ministry of Defense of the Rus- 
sian Federation maintained one air force and one air defense 
group in Turkmenistan. In the meantime, air force readiness 
was hampered by the resignation of most Russian pilots in the 
early 1990s and a shortage of trained Turkmen pilots. 

Border Guards 

About 5,000 personnel serve in the Turkmenistan Border 
Guard, which is commanded jointly by Turkmenistan and Rus- 
sia. The Border Guard Command was established in 1992 to 
replace the Soviet-era Central Asian Border Troops District of 
the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the Soviet Union. 
The border guards patrol the wild, mountainous Afghan and 
Iranian frontiers, which total 1,750 kilometers and are rated 
the most sensitive borders of the country. The guards have 
small arms and some armored personnel carriers; experts eval- 
uate them as an effective border force. 

Materiel Supply 

In the mid-1990s, Turkmenistan lacked adequate materiel 
and technical support for its armed forces. However, a protocol 
with the Russian Arms Company (Rosvooruzheniye) provided 
for delivery of much-needed arms to Turkmenistan's military 
in 1995-96 in return for natural gas. Under this agreement, 



369 



Country Studies 

Turkmenistan was to supply 6 billion cubic meters of gas annu- 
ally to the Russian Natural Gas Company (Gazprom) for sale to 
industries that will fill arms orders for Turkmenistan. Ros- 
vooruzheniye also was to transfer 30 percent of this revenue to 
hard-currency accounts in Turkmenistan. 

Recruitment and Training 

The 1992 constitution provides for universal conscription of 
males for service in the national armed forces. The period of 
regular service is eighteen months for army draftees and one 
year for those with higher education. Draft deferments from 
active military duty are granted only to individuals involved in 
seasonal animal herding. A presidential decree of July 1992 
allowed two-year alternative service at a state enterprise for 
conscripts in certain categories, but this decree was nullifed in 
December 1994. 

Conditions of service seriously deteriorated in the years 
immediately following independence. Large numbers of Turk- 
men were absent without leave from units outside and within 
Turkmenistan, hazing and fighting on ethnic and regional 
grounds were common among conscripts, instances of insubor- 
dination and failure to comply with orders increased, and rela- 
tions between the Russian officer corps and Turkmen troops 
were strained to the breaking point. In recent years, discipline 
has been strengthened somewhat by improved working condi- 
tions, amnesty for some cases of absence without leave, the 
removal of political organs from the armed services, and 
increased opportunities for service within Turkmenistan. In 
addition, legislation has improved pensions given to career 
personnel in the Ministry of Defense, the Committee for 
National Security, the Border Guard, and the Interior Troops 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, when men reach the age of 
fifty-five and women the age of fifty. 

All of the personnel except officers in the armed forces are 
conscripts, more than 90 percent of whom are Turkmen. By 
contrast, about 95 percent of the officer corps is made up of 
Slavs. After many Russian officers had left Turkmenistan under 
the negative conditions of the early 1990s, others were pre- 
vented from leaving by a September 1993 agreement giving 
Russian citizens the option of fulfilling their military obligation 
in Turkmenistan, swearing allegiance to either state, or trans- 
ferring to any region of Russia after five years of service in 
Turkmenistan. 



370 



Turkmenistan 



Turkmenistani officers are trained in military educational 
establishments of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, 
while Russian officers in Turkmenistan train draftee sergeants 
and specialists. Some limited training is provided in the mili- 
tary faculty established at Turkmenistan State University. Turk- 
menistan has sent about 300 of its officers to training schools in 
Turkey but it declined an offer from Pakistan's general staff to 
provide officer training in Pakistani war colleges. 

Internal Security Forces 

The criminal justice system of Turkmenistan is deeply rooted 
in Soviet institutions and practices. Its Committee for National 
Security, headed by chairman Saparmurad Seidov, retains 
essentially the same functions, operations, and personnel of 
the Soviet-era KGB. As it did in the Soviet period, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs continues to direct the operations of police 
departments and to work closely with the Committee for 
National Security on matters of national security. 

The national police force, estimated to include 25,000 per- 
sonnel, is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. The force is located in cities and settlements through- 
out the country, with garrisons in Ashgabat, Gyzylarbat, and 
Dashhowuz. Police departments do not have an investigative 
function in Turkmenistan; that role is filled by the procurator's 
offices in Ashgabat and other cities (see Criminal Justice, this 
ch.). The police role is confined to routine maintenance of 
public order and to certain administrative tasks such as control- 
ling the internal passport regime, issuing visas for foreign 
travel, and registering foreign guests. 

At the national level, the primary security concerns are pre- 
vention of trafficking in drugs and other illegal commodities, 
and combatting organized and international crime. In Decem- 
ber 1994, Turkmenistan's Committee for National Security and 
the Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service (a succes- 
sor agency to the KGB) signed a five-year agreement for coop- 
eration in state security and mutual protection of the political, 
economic, and technological interests of the two states. 

Criminal Justice 

The 1992 constitution declares that Turkmenistan is a state 
based on the rule of law, and that the constitution is the 
supreme law of the land. As one of the three branches of gov- 
ernment, the judiciary is charged with upholding the constitu- 



371 



Country Studies 



tion and the Supreme Law, as the national codex of civil and 
criminal law is called. The Ministry of Justice oversees the judi- 
cial system, while the Office of the Procurator General is 
responsible for ensuring that investigative agencies and court 
proceedings are in compliance with the constitution and the 
Supreme Law. The president appoints the republic's procura- 
tor general and the procurators in each province, and the proc- 
urator general appoints those for the smallest political 
jurisdictions, the districts and the cities. 

The court system is divided into three levels. At the highest 
level, the Supreme Court consists of twenty-two members, 
including a president and associate judges, and is divided into 
civil, criminal, and military chambers. The Supreme Court 
hears only cases of national importance; it does not function as 
an appeals court. At the next level, appellate courts function as 
courts of appeal in the six provinces and the city of Ashgabat. 
Sixty-one trial courts operate in the districts and in some cities, 
with jurisdiction over civil, criminal, and administrative mat- 
ters. In courts at this level, a panel of judges presides in civil 
and criminal suits, and typically one judge decides administra- 
tive cases. Outside this structure, military courts decide cases 
involving military discipline and crimes committed by and 
against military personnel. Also, the Supreme Economic Court 
performs the same function as the state arbitration court of the 
Soviet period, arbitrating disputes between enterprises and 
state agencies. The constitution stipulates that all judges at all 
levels are appointed by the president to terms of five years, and 
they may be reappointed indefinitely. Enjoying immunity from 
criminal and civil liability for their judicial actions, judges can 
be removed only for cause. 

In 1996, thirteen crimes were punishable by death, but few 
executions were known to have been carried out. Prison riots 
in 1996 revealed that prison administration is corrupt and that 
conditions are overcrowded and squalid. 

Observers of several trends in the administration of justice 
in this court system have concluded that rudimentary elements 
of legal culture are absent in the implementation of legal pro- 
ceedings in Turkmenistan. First, the judiciary is subservient to 
the Ministry of Justice, and it is especially deferential to the 
wishes of the president. Second, because the Office of the Proc- 
urator General fills the roles of grand jury, criminal investiga- 
tor, and public prosecutor, it dominates the judicial process, 
especially criminal proceedings. Third, disregard for due pro- 



372 



Turkmenistan 

cess occurs frequently when higher officials apply pressure to 
judges concerned about reappointment, a practice known as 
"telephone justice." Fourth, the legal system disregards the role 
of lawyers in civil and criminal proceedings, and the Ministry of 
Justice has not permitted an organized bar. Finally, the repub- 
lic's citizenry remains largely ignorant of the procedures and 
issues involved in the nation's legal system. 

The condition of the legal system and international doubts 
about human rights in Turkmenistan are indicators that this 
potentially prosperous former Soviet republic is far from West- 
ern-style democracy, despite the stability its government has 
achieved and the eagerness with which Western investors have 
approached it. Future years will determine whether this is a 
transitional stage of independent democracy, whether libera- 
tion from the Soviet empire has produced a permanently 
authoritarian nation, or whether the independent stance of the 
mid-1990s will yield to closer ties and more economic and mili- 
tary reliance on the Russian Federation. 

* * * 

The social structure of the Turkmen people is studied in The 
Yomut Turkmen by William Irons. Traditional religious practices 
are described in an article by Vladimir Basilov, "Popular Islam 
in Central Asia and Kazakhstan," which appeared in the Journal 
of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs in 1987. Murray Fesh- 
bach and Alfred Friendly, Jr. describe environmental and 
health conditions in Ecocide in the USSR Detailed current infor- 
mation on the economy is provided in country studies by the 
International Monetary Fund (1994), the World Bank (1994), 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Summaries of postinde- 
pendence political events are supplied by Bess Brown in a 
series of articles in 1992 and 1993 issues of RFE/RL Research 
Report. Concise accounts and statistics on Turkmenistan's cur- 
rent national security position are found in Jane's Sentinel 
Regional Security Assessment: Commonwealth of Independent States, 
and further statistics are available in annual issues of The Mili- 
tary Balance. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



373 



Painted design pattern in Khorazm style at nineteenth-century PahLavan- 
Mahmud Mausoleum, Khiva 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Uzbekistan. 
Short Form: Uzbekistan. 
Term for Citizens: Uzbekistani(s). 
Capital: Tashkent. 

Date of Independence: August 31, 1991. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 447,000 square kilometers. 

Topography: About 80 percent flat, desert; mountain ranges 
dominate far southeast and far northeast and traverse middle 
of eastern provinces, east to west. Fergana Valley in northeast 
most fertile region. Few lakes and rivers; shrinking Aral Sea, 
shared with Kazakstan, in northwest. Most of country 
seismically active. 

Climate: Continental; hot summers, cool winters. Annual 
rainfall very sparse in most regions, irrigation needed for 
crops. 

Society 

Population: Approximately 23 million, 1994; growth rate in 
1995, 2.5 percent per year; 1993 population density 48.5 
persons per square kilometer. 

Ethnic Groups: In 1995, Uzbek 71 percent, Russian 8 percent, 
Tajik 5 percent, Kazak 4 percent, Tatar 2 percent, and 
Karakalpak 2 percent. 

Language: Uzbek designated preferred language, required for 
citizenship, but Russian in wide official and commercial use, 
1995. In 1994, Uzbek first language of 74 percent, Russian of 
14 percent, and Tajik of 4 percent. 

Religion: Muslim (mostly Sunni) 88 percent, Russian Ortho- 



377 



Country Studies 

dox 9 percent, about 93,000 Jews. Islam practiced in individ- 
ualized forms; little political Islam although post-Soviet 
religious practice greatly increased. 

Education and Literacy: Literacy 97 percent, 1989. Program to 
restructure Soviet-era system hampered by low budget, poor 
condition of infrastructure, and loss of teachers. Attendance 
compulsory through grade nine. In 1993, 86 percent of 
population ages six to sixteen in regular or vocational school. 
Fifty-three institutions of higher learning active, 1993. 

Health: Universal free health care; some private practices and 
health insurance introduced, early 1990s. Shortages of 
medicine, equipment, and trained personnel. Health crises, 
epidemics caused by high pollution levels, especially in Aral 
Sea region. Infant mortality increased very fast beginning in 
1970s. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): In 1993, US$31 billion, or 
US$1,346 per capita. In 1994 growth rate -4 percent. Cautious 
reform avoided major post-Soviet declines of other Central 
Asian states; strong resource base promises prosperity given 
systemic reform. 

Agriculture: Cotton remains primary crop, requiring heavy 
irrigation; entire system geared for its production. Failure to 
expand grain culture has led to heavy food imports. Other 
crops wheat, oats, corn, barley, rice, fodder crops, fruits, and 
vegetables. 

Industry and Mining: Slow diversification, early 1990s, from 
Soviet-era specialization in cotton-related and mineral- 
processing operations. Heavy industry, centered in northeast, 
mainly petroleum and mineral processing, machinery, ferrous 
metallurgy, chemicals, and electric power. Light industry 
dominated by fabric and food processing. Gold, copper, zinc, 
lead, tungsten, uranium, molybdenum, and fluorospar mined. 

Energy: Large untapped natural gas reserves, small coal and oil 
production; two newly tapped oil fields have high potential. 
Coal mainly in northeastern industrial region. Hydroelectric 
power system well-developed on three major rivers; thermo- 



378 



Uzbekistan 

electric stations burn natural gas or coal. 

Exports: Worth US$3.0 billion in 1994. As in Soviet period, 
dominated by minerals, cotton, cotton-related machinery, 
textiles, and fertilizers. Chief customers remain in Com- 
monwealth of Independent States (CIS): Russia, Kazakstan, 
Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Export licensing 
liberalized 1994, but market expansion slow. 

Imports: Worth US$2.5 billion in 1994. Mostly non-textile 
consumer goods, grain and other foods, machinery, and 
ferrous metals; chief suppliers Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, 
Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan. Import licensing 
discontinued, quotas reduced, 1994. 

Balance of Payments: In 1992, US$107 million deficit. 

Exchange Rate: Provisional currency unit, som, introduced 
November 1993, made permanent July 1994. In 1996, rate 
thirty-five som per US$1. Stabilized and convertibility liber- 
alized 1995; full convertibility promised 1996. 

Inflation: Hyperinflation (1,100 percent) 1993, 270 percent 
1994 after second-half slide of som's value. Government 
control remains on prices of basic commodities and fuels, but 
prices of other items rose very fast after decontrol, 1992 and 
1993. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Tax system reformed with addition of value- 
added and profits tax, beginning 1992; main revenues of 1993 
state budget from value-added tax, corporate income tax, 
cotton marketing, and individual income tax; 1993 state 
budget deficit 200 million rubles, 12 percent of revenue. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways: About 67,000 kilometers paved. Three major roads 
connect Tashkent and Termiz, Samarqand and Charjew, and 
Tashkent and Quqon, respectively. Fergana Ring serves 
industries of the northeast. Highways carry about 25 percent of 
freight traffic. 

Railroads: About 3,500 kilometers of track, much needing 
repair, carry about 75 percent of freight traffic. Main line 



379 



Country Studies 

Transcaspian Railroad connecting Tashkent with Amu Darya. 

Civil Aviation: Nine airports, of which four accommodate 
international flights. Largest airport, at Tashkent, a hub 
linking Central Asia with Western Europe and United States. 

Inland Waterways: Steamship travel on Amu Darya reduced 
because of low water levels. 

Ports: None. 

Pipelines: In 1992, 325 kilometers of Oil pipeline, 2,470 
kilometers of natural gas pipeline. 

Telecommunications: Telephone service available to 7 percent 
of population in 1994. Much outmoded equipment remains in 
service; system expansion slow. Satellite television broadcasts in 
some regions. Radio and television controlled by Ministry of 
Communications. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Constitution, adopted 1992, provides for strong 
presidency, with power to appoint government and dissolve 
legislature. In practice, authoritarian state with all power in 
executive and suppression of dissent. Referendum, 1995, 
extended term of President Islam Karimov to 2000. Local 
government with little autonomy; judiciary ineffective. 

Politics: Successor to Communist Party, People's Democratic 
Party, dominates legislature and government; other major legal 
party, Fatherland Progress Party, has no opposition role; 
opposition parties weak, fragmented, many excluded by 
government and their leaders exiled or jailed. 

Foreign Relations: To avoid domination by Russia, wide 
relations sought, early 1990s. Major goal cooperation among 
Central Asian states, which fear domination by Uzbekistan. 
Free-trade zone with Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and cooperation on 
Aral Sea matters are major steps. Economic and military 
dependence on CIS, especially Russia, continues. Renewed 
economic ties with Iran, Turkey, possible major role in 
Economic Cooperation Organization. Major aid programs 
from United States, Western Europe, mid-1990s. 

International Agreements and Memberships: United Nations 



380 



Uzbekistan 



(UN), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, CIS, and North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation (NATO) Partnership for Peace. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Best-equipped of Central Asian forces. Ground 
forces have 20,400 troops, air force and air defense forces have 
estimated 4,000 troops, border troops about 1,000, National 
Guard about 700. 

Major Military Units: One ground force corps, divided into 
three motorized rifle brigades, one tank regiment, one 
airborne brigade, one engineer brigade, and support units for 
aviation, logistics, and communications. 

Military Budget: 1995 estimate, US$315 million. 

Internal Security: National Security Service continues 
intelligence function of Soviet-era Committee for State Security 
(KGB), with estimated 8,000 troops. Major crime problem 
narcotics sales and transport, inadequately addressed in early 
1990s. Regular police force has about 25,000 troops. Political 
corruption and bribery widespread, including state procurator 
and courts. 



381 



55 



ational boundary 

plic or province 
hdary 

pal capital 

blic or province 
tal 

)0 Kilometers 



45 



55 



200 Miles 



■ 



75 



Bishkek^) 

Sariqamisfi 

KYRGYZSTAN 

fw [ ill 

Xl " 3:Farghona A - 



40 



Republic anc£ 



I 

II 

III 

IV 

V 

VI 

VII 

VIII 

IX 

X 

XI 

XII 

XIII 



Autonc 
of Ka 
Khora^ 
Nawoi 
Bukho 
Samar 
Qashq 
Jizzak 
Surkhc 
Sirdan 
Toshk( 
Namar 
Andijo 
Farghc 



JIKISTAN 



..J 



V PAKISTAN 



35 — 



Figure 13. Uzbekistan: / 



384 



BEFORE THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan was 
the third largest Soviet republic by population and the fourth 
largest in territory. Because it has a population that is more 
than 40 percent of the combined population of the five Central 
Asian states of the former Soviet Union, and because it has rich 
natural resources, many experts believe that Uzbekistan is 
likely to emerge as the dominant new state in Central Asia. But 
Uzbekistan's history also has given rise to serious problems: 
deeply rooted ethnic tensions; serious economic, political, and 
environmental challenges; and an uncertain security and for- 
eign policy environment. Like its neighbors in Central Asia, 
Uzbekistan emerged suddenly from more than sixty years 
within a highly structured, and in many ways protective, politi- 
cal and economic system. In the years following that emer- 
gence, survival has depended on the development of new 
international relationships as well as on solutions to the dilem- 
mas of the Soviet era. By 1996 Uzbekistan showed signs of 
progress in both directions. 

Historical Background 

Uzbekistan, the most populous and arguably the most pow- 
erful state in Central Asia, has a long and magnificent history. 
Located between two rivers — the Amu Darya to the north and 
the Syrdariya to the south — the region that is modern Uzbeki- 
stan has been one of the cradles of world civilization. Some of 
the world's oldest sedentary populations and several of its most 
ancient cities are located here. Beginning at the height of the 
Roman Empire, the region was a crossroads on the transconti- 
nental trade routes between China and the West. Subject to 
constant invasion and to in-migration of nomads from the 
great grasslands to the north, Uzbekistan became a region of 
legendary conquests where various peoples with different tradi- 
tions have consistently had to live together. 

Early History 

The first people known to have occupied Central Asia were 
Iranian nomads who arrived from the northern grasslands of 
what is now Uzbekistan sometime in the first millennium B.C. 
These nomads, who spoke Iranian (see Glossary) dialects, set- 



385 



60 


65 












International boundary 









Republic or province 








boundary 








National capital 






• 


Republic or province 








capital 




KAZAK^TAN 





100 200 Kilometers 









100 200 Miles 



Sariqamisn 



!Aial 
Sea 



\ > jJJrgahch 

TURKMENISTAN ill^X V 



Republic and Provinces 

1 Autonomous Republic 


\ ,V / 

■ Bukhoro ~i 


of Karakalpakstan 




II Khorazm 




III Nawoiy 




IV Bukhoro 




V Samarqand 




VI Qashqadaryo 




VII Jizzakh 




VIII Surkhondaryo 


) 


IX Sirdaryo 


j 


X Toshkent 




XI Namangan 




XII Andijon 




XIII Farghona 





\GulistonlK /<* v rx ^ \ 'Namar 

■ s^A, \ S** * A t Y| ®— r 

J VII > V,^ ^Xlll ,.; c t>„ 



Bishkek $ 

" ~ 

KYRGYZSTAN 

V ; Namangan 



'J VII > Vi- 

'Nawoiy \ Jizzakh 



XII 

Andijon 



TAJIKISTAN 

® 

Dushanbe J / 



AFGHANISTAN 



Boundary representation 

not necessarily authoritative 70 



%w I ilirkistnn: Administrative Divisions, 1996 



384 



Country Studies 

tied in Central Asia and began to build an extensive irrigation 
system along the rivers of the region. At this time, cities such as 
Bukhoro (Bukhara) and Samarqand (Samarkand) began to 
appear as centers of government and culture. By the fifth cen- 
tury B.C., the Bactrian, Soghdian, and Tokharian states domi- 
nated the region. As China began to develop its silk trade with 
the West, Iranian cities took advantage of this commerce by 
becoming centers of trade. Using an extensive network of cities 
and settlements in the province of Mawarannahr (a name 
given the region after the Arab conquest) in Uzbekistan and 
farther east in what is today China's Xinjiang Uygur Auton- 
omous Region, the Soghdian intermediaries became the 
wealthiest of these Iranian merchants. Because of this trade on 
what became known as the Silk Route, Bukhoro and Samar- 
qand eventually became extremely wealthy cities, and at times 
Mawarannahr was one of the most influential and powerful 
Persian (see Glossary) provinces of antiquity. 

The wealth of Mawarannahr was a constant magnet for inva- 
sions from the northern steppes and from China. Numerous 
intraregional wars were fought between Soghdian states and 
the other states in Mawarannahr, and the Persians and the Chi- 
nese were in perpetual conflict over the region. Alexander the 
Great conquered the region in 328 B.C., bringing it briefly 
under the control of his Macedonian Empire. 

In the same centuries, however, the region also was an 
important center of intellectual life and religion. Until the first 
centuries after Christ, the dominant religion in the region was 
Zoroastrianism (see Glossary), but Buddhism, Manichaeism 
(see Glossary), and Christianity also attracted large numbers of 
followers. 

The Early Islamic Period 

The conquest of Central Asia by Islamic Arabs, which was 
completed in the eighth century A.D., brought to the region a 
new religion and culture that continue to be dominant. The 
Arabs first invaded Mawarannahr in the middle of the seventh 
century through sporadic raids during their conquest of Persia. 
Available sources on the Arab conquest suggest that the Sogh- 
dians and other Iranian peoples of Central Asia were unable to 
defend their land against the Arabs because of internal divi- 
sions and the lack of strong indigenous leadership. The Arabs, 
on the other hand, were led by a brilliant general, Qutaybah 
ibn Muslim, and they also were highly motivated by the desire 



386 



Uzbekistan 



to spread their new faith (the official beginning of which was in 
A.D. 622). Because of these factors, the population of 
Mawarannahr was easily conquered. The new religion brought 
by the Arabs spread gradually in the region. The native cul- 
tures, which in some respects already were being displaced by 
Persian influences before the Arabs arrived, were displaced far- 
ther in the ensuing centuries. Nevertheless, the destiny of Cen- 
tral Asia as an Islamic region was firmly established by the Arab 
victory over the Chinese armies in 750 in a battle at the Talas 
River. 

Under Arab rule, Central Asia retained much of its Iranian 
character, remaining an important center of culture and trade 
for centuries after the Arab conquest. However, until the tenth 
century the language of government, literature, and com- 
merce was Arabic. Mawarannahr continued to be an important 
political player in regional affairs, as it had been under various 
Persian dynasties. In fact, the Abbasid Caliphate, which ruled 
the Arab world for five centuries, beginning in 750, was estab- 
lished thanks in great part to assistance from Central Asian sup- 
porters in their struggle against the then-ruling Umayyad 
Caliphate. 

During the height of the Abbasid Caliphate in the eighth 
and the ninth centuries, Central Asia and Mawarannahr experi- 
enced a truly golden age. Bukhoro became one of the leading 
centers of learning, culture, and art in the Muslim world, its 
magnificence rivaling contemporaneous cultural centers such 
as Baghdad, Cairo, and Cordoba. Some of the greatest histori- 
ans, scientists, and geographers in the history of Islamic culture 
were natives of the region. 

As the Abbasid Caliphate began to weaken and local Islamic 
Iranian states emerged as the rulers of Iran and Central Asia, 
the Persian language began to regain its preeminent role in the 
region as the language of literature and government. The rul- 
ers of the eastern section of Iran and of Mawarannahr were 
Persians. Under the Samanids and the Buyids, the rich culture 
of Mawarannahr continued to flourish. 

The Turkification of Mawarannahr 

In the ninth century, the continued influx of nomads from 
the northern steppes brought a new group of people into Cen- 
tral Asia. These people were the Turks who lived in the great 
grasslands stretching from Mongolia to the Caspian Sea. Intro- 
duced mainly as slave soldiers to the Samanid Dynasty, these 



387 



Country Studies 

Turks served in the armies of all the states of the region, 
including the Abbasid army. In the late tenth century, as the 
Samanids began to lose control of Mawarannahr and north- 
eastern Iran, some of these soldiers came to positions of power 
in the government of the region, and eventually they estab- 
lished their own states. With the emergence of a Turkic ruling 
group in the region, other Turkic tribes began to migrate to 
Mawarannahr. 

The first of the Turkic states in the region was the Ghaznavid 
Empire, established in the last years of the tenth century. The 
Ghaznavid state, which ruled lands south of the Amu Darya, 
was able to conquer large areas of Iran, Afghanistan, and 
northern India during the reign of Sultan Mahmud. The domi- 
nance of Ghazna was curtailed, however, when large-scale 
Turkic migrations brought in two new groups of Turks who 
undermined the Ghaznavids. In the east, these Turks were led 
by the Qarakhanids, who conquered the Samanids. Then the 
Seljuk family led Turks into the western part of the region, con- 
quering the Ghaznavid territory of Khorazm (also spelled 
Khorezm and Khwarazm) . 

Attracted by the wealth of Central Asia as were earlier 
groups, the Seljuks dominated a wide area from Asia Minor to 
the western sections of Mawarannahr, in Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Iraq in the eleventh century. The Seljuk Empire then split into 
states ruled by various local Turkic and Iranian rulers. The cul- 
ture and intellectual life of the region continued unaffected by 
such political changes, however. Turkic tribes from the north 
continued to migrate into the region during this period. 

In the late twelfth century, a Turkic leader of Khorazm, 
which is the region south of the Aral Sea, united Khorazm, 
Mawarannahr, and Iran under his rule. Under the rule of the 
Khorazm shah Kutbeddin Muhammad and his son, Muham- 
mad II, Mawarannahr continued to be prosperous and rich. 
However, a new incursion of nomads from the north soon 
changed this situation. This time the invader was Chinggis 
(Genghis) Khan with his Mongol armies. 

The Mongol Period 

The Mongol invasion of Central Asia is one of the turning 
points in the history of the region. That event left imprints that 
were still discernible in the early twentieth century. The Mon- 
gols had such a lasting impact because they established the tra- 



388 



Uzbekistan 



dition that the legitimate ruler of any Central Asian state could 
only be a blood descendant of Chinggis Khan. 

The Mongol conquest of Central Asia, which took place 
from 1219 to 1225, led to a wholesale change in the population 
of Mawarannahr. The conquest quickened the process of 
Turkification in the region because, although the armies of 
Chinggis Khan were led by Mongols, they were made up mostly 
of Turkic tribes that had been incorporated into the Mongol 
armies as the tribes were encountered in the Mongols' south- 
ward sweep. As these armies settled in Mawarannahr, they 
intermixed with the local populations, increasingly making the 
Iranians a minority. Another effect of the Mongol conquest was 
the large-scale damage the warriors inflicted on cities such as 
Bukhoro and on regions such as Khorazm. As the leading prov- 
ince of a wealthy state, Khorazm was treated especially severely. 
The irrigation networks in the region suffered extensive dam- 
age that was not repaired for several generations. 

The Rule of Timur 

Following the death of Chinggis Khan in 1227, his empire 
was divided among his three sons. Despite the potential for 
serious fragmentation, Mongol law maintained orderly succes- 
sion for several more generations, and control of most of 
Mawarannahr stayed in the hands of direct descendants of 
Chaghatai, the second son of Chinggis. Orderly succession, 
prosperity, and internal peace prevailed in the Chaghatai 
lands, and the Mongol Empire as a whole remained strong and 
united. 

In the early fourteenth century, however, as the empire 
began to break up into its constituent parts, the Chaghatai ter- 
ritory also was disrupted as the princes of various tribal groups 
competed for influence. One tribal chieftain, Timur (Tamer- 
lane), emerged from these struggles in the 1380s as the domi- 
nant force in Mawarannahr. Although he was not a descendant 
of Chinggis, Timur became the de facto ruler of Mawarannahr 
and proceeded to conquer all of western Central Asia, Iran, 
Asia Minor, and the southern steppe region north of the Aral 
Sea. He also invaded Russia before dying during an invasion of 
China in 1405. 

Timur initiated the last flowering of Mawarannahr by gather- 
ing in his capital, Samarqand, numerous artisans and scholars 
from the lands he had conquered. By supporting such people, 
Timur imbued his empire with a very rich culture. During 



389 



Country Studies 

Timur's reign and the reigns of his immediate descendants, a 
wide range of religious and palatial construction projects were 
undertaken in Samarqand and other population centers. 
Timur also patronized scientists and artists; his grandson 
Ulugh Beg was one of the world's first great astronomers. It was 
during the Timurid dynasty that Turkish, in the form of the 
Chaghatai dialect, became a literary language in its own right 
in Mawarannahr — although the Timurids also patronized writ- 
ing in Persian. Until then only Persian had been used in the 
region. The greatest Chaghataid writer, Ali Shir Nava'i, was 
active in the city of Herat, now in northwestern Afghanistan, in 
the second half of the fifteenth century. 

The Timurid state quickly broke into two halves after the 
death of Timur. The chronic internal fighting of the Timurids 
attracted the attention of the Uzbek nomadic tribes living to 
the north of the Aral Sea. In 1501 the Uzbeks began a whole- 
sale invasion of Mawarannahr. 

The Uzbek Period 

By 1510 the Uzbeks had completed their conquest of Central 
Asia, including the territory of the present-day Uzbekistan. Of 
the states they established, the most powerful, the Khanate of 
Bukhoro, centered on the city of Bukhoro. The khanate con- 
trolled Mawarannahr, especially the region of Tashkent, the 
Fergana Valley in the east, and northern Afghanistan. A second 
Uzbek state was established in the oasis of Khorazm at the 
mouth of the Amu Darya. The Khanate of Bukhoro was initially 
led by the energetic Shaybanid Dynasty. The Shaybanids com- 
peted against Iran, which was led by the Safavid Dynasty, for the 
rich far-eastern territory of present-day Iran. The struggle with 
Iran also had a religious aspect because the Uzbeks were Sunni 
(see Glossary) Muslims, and Iran was Shia (see Glossary). 

Near the end of the sixteenth century, the Uzbek states of 
Bukhoro and Khorazm began to weaken because of their end- 
less wars against each other and the Persians and because of 
strong competition for the throne among the khans in power 
and their heirs. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
the Shaybanid Dynasty was replaced by thejanid Dynasty. 

Another factor contributing to the weakness of the Uzbek 
khanates in this period was the general decline of trade moving 
through the region. This change had begun in the previous 
century when ocean trade routes were established from 
Europe to India and China, circumventing the Silk Route. As 



390 



Bazaar outside Bibi Khanym Mosque, built by Timur, Samarqand 

Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 

European-dominated ocean transport expanded and some 
trading centers were destroyed, cities such as Bukhoro, Merv, 
and Samarqand in the Khanate of Bukhoro and Khiva and 
Urganch (Urgench) in Khorazm began to steadily decline. 

The Uzbeks' struggle with Iran also led to the cultural isola- 
tion of Central Asia from the rest of the Islamic world. In addi- 
tion to these problems, the struggle with the nomads from the 
northern steppe continued. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Kazak nomads and Mongols continually raided the 
Uzbek khanates, causing widespread damage and disruption. 
In the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Khanate of 
Bukhoro lost the fertile Fergana region, and a new Uzbek kha- 
nate was formed in Quqon. 

Arrival of the Russians 

The following period was one of weakness and disruption, 



391 



Country Studies 



with continuous invasions from Iran and from the north. In 
this period, a new group, the Russians, began to appear on the 
Central Asian scene. As Russian merchants began to expand 
into the grasslands of present-day Kazakstan, they built strong 
trade relations with their counterparts in Tashkent and, to 
some extent, in Khiva. For the Russians, this trade was not rich 
enough to replace the former transcontinental trade, but it 
made the Russians aware of the potential of Central Asia. Rus- 
sian attention also was drawn by the sale of increasingly large 
numbers of Russian slaves to the Central Asians by Kazak and 
Turkmen tribes. Russians kidnapped by nomads in the border 
regions and Russian sailors shipwrecked on the shores of the 
Caspian Sea usually ended up in the slave markets of Bukhoro 
or Khiva. Beginning in the eighteenth century, this situation 
evoked increasing Russian hostility toward the Central Asian 
khanates. 

Meanwhile, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen- 
turies new dynasties led the khanates to a period of recovery. 
Those dynasties were the Qongrats in Khiva, the Manghits in 
Bukhoro, and the Mins in Quqon. These new dynasties estab- 
lished centralized states with standing armies and new irriga- 
tion works. But their rise coincided with the ascendance of 
Russian power in the Kazak steppes and the establishment of a 
British position in Afghanistan. By the early nineteenth cen- 
tury, the region was caught between these two powerful Euro- 
pean competitors, each of which tried to add Central Asia to its 
empire in what came to be known as the Great Game. The Cen- 
tral Asians, who did not realize the dangerous position they 
were in, continued to waste their strength in wars among them- 
selves and in pointless campaigns of conquest. 

The Russian Conquest 

In the nineteenth century, Russian interest in the area 
increased greatly, sparked by nominal concern over British 
designs on Central Asia; by anger over the situation of Russian 
citizens held as slaves; and by the desire to control the trade in 
the region and to establish a secure source of cotton for Russia. 
When the United States Civil War prevented cotton delivery 
from Russia's primary supplier, the southern United States, 
Central Asian cotton assumed much greater importance for 
Russia. 

As soon as the Russian conquest of the Caucasus was com- 
pleted in the late 1850s, therefore, the Russian Ministry of War 



392 



Registan, an architectural monument of the fifteenth-seventeenth 

centuries, Samarqand 
Courtesy Tom Skipper 

began to send military forces against the Central Asian khan- 
ates. Three major population centers of the khanates — Tash- 
kent, Bukhoro, and Samarqand — were captured in 1865, 1867, 
and 1868, respectively. In 1868 the Khanate of Bukhoro signed 
a treaty with Russia making Bukhoro a Russian protectorate. 
Khiva became a Russian protectorate in 1873, and the Quqon 
Khanate finally was incorporated into the Russian Empire, also 
as a protectorate, in 1876. 

By 1876 the entire territory comprising present-day Uzbeki- 
stan either had fallen under direct Russian rule or had become 
a protectorate of Russia. The treaties establishing the protec- 
torates over Bukhoro and Khiva gave Russia control of the for- 
eign relations of these states and gave Russian merchants 
important concessions in foreign trade; the khanates retained 



393 



Country Studies 



control of their own internal affairs. Tashkent and Quqon fell 
directly under a Russian governor general. 

During the first few decades of Russian rule, the daily life of 
the Central Asians did not change greatly. The Russians sub- 
stantially increased cotton production, but otherwise they 
interfered little with the indigenous people. Some Russian set- 
tlements were built next to the established cities of Tashkent 
and Samarqand, but the Russians did not mix with the indige- 
nous populations. The era of Russian rule did produce impor- 
tant social and economic changes for some Uzbeks as a new 
middle class developed and some peasants were affected by the 
increased emphasis on cotton cultivation. 

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, conditions 
began to change as new Russian railroads brought greater 
numbers of Russians into the area. In the 1890s, several revolts, 
which were put down easily, led to increased Russian vigilance 
in the region. The Russians increasingly intruded in the inter- 
nal affairs of the khanates. The only avenue for Uzbek resis- 
tance to Russian rule became the Pan-Turkish movement, also 
known as Jadidism, which had arisen in the 1860s among intel- 
lectuals who sought to preserve indigenous Islamic Central 
Asian culture from Russian encroachment. By 1900 Jadidism 
had developed into the region's first major movement of politi- 
cal resistance. Until the Bolshevik Revolution (see Glossary) of 
1917, the modern, secular ideas of Jadidism faced resistance 
from both the Russians and the Uzbek khans, who had differ- 
ing reasons to fear the movement. 

Prior to the events of 1917, Russian rule had brought some 
industrial development in sectors directly connected with cot- 
ton. Although railroads and cotton-ginning machinery 
advanced, the Central Asian textile industry was slow to 
develop because the cotton crop was shipped to Russia for pro- 
cessing. As the tsarist government expanded the cultivation of 
cotton dramatically, it changed the balance between cotton 
and food production, creating some problems in food supply — 
although in the prerevolutionary period Central Asia remained 
largely self-sufficient in food. This situation was to change dur- 
ing the Soviet period when the Moscow government began a 
ruthless drive for national self-sufficiency in cotton. This policy 
converted almost the entire agricultural economy of Uzbeki- 
stan to cotton production, bringing a series of consequences 
whose negative impact still is felt today in Uzbekistan and other 
republics. 



394 



Uzbekistan 



Entering the Twentieth Century 

By the turn of the twentieth century, the Russian Empire was 
in complete control of Central Asia. The territory of Uzbeki- 
stan was divided into three political groupings: the khanates of 
Bukhoro and Khiva and the Guberniya (Governorate General) 
of Turkestan, the last of which was under direct control of the 
Ministry of War of Russia (see fig. 3). The final decade of the 
twentieth century finds the three regions united under the 
independent and sovereign Republic of Uzbekistan. The inter- 
vening decades were a period of revolution, oppression, mas- 
sive disruptions, and colonial rule. 

After 1900 the khanates continued to enjoy a certain degree 
of autonomy in their internal affairs. However, they ultimately 
were subservient to the Russian governor general in Tashkent, 
who ruled the region in the name of Tsar Nicholas II. The Rus- 
sian Empire exercised direct control over large tracts of terri- 
tory in Central Asia, allowing the khanates to rule a large 
portion of their ancient lands for themselves. In this period, 
large numbers of Russians, attracted by the climate and the 
available land, immigrated into Central Asia. After 1900, 
increased contact with Russian civilization began to have an 
impact on the lives of Central Asians in the larger population 
centers where the Russians settled. 

The Jadidists and Basmachis 

Russian influence was especially strong among certain 
young intellectuals who were the sons of the rich merchant 
classes. Educated in the local Muslim schools, in Russian uni- 
versities, or in Istanbul, these men, who came to be known as 
the Jadidists, tried to learn from Russia and from modernizing 
movements in Istanbul and among the Tatars, and to use this 
knowledge to regain their country's independence. The Jadid- 
ists believed that their society, and even their religion, must be 
reformed and modernized for this goal to be achieved. In 1905 
the unexpected victory of a new Asiatic power in the Russo-Jap- 
anese War and the eruption of revolution in Russia raised the 
hopes of reform factions that Russian rule could be over- 
turned, and a modernization program initiated, in Central 
Asia. The democratic reforms that Russia promised in the wake 
of the revolution gradually faded, however, as the tsarist gov- 
ernment restored authoritarian rule in the decade that fol- 
lowed 1905. Renewed tsarist repression and the reactionary 



395 



Country Studies 



politics of the rulers of Bukhoro and Khiva forced the reform- 
ers underground or into exile. Nevertheless, some of the future 
leaders of Soviet Uzbekistan, including Abdur Rauf Fitrat and 
others, gained valuable revolutionary experience and were 
able to expand their ideological influence in this period. 

In the summer of 1916, a number of settlements in eastern 
Uzbekistan were the sites of violent demonstrations against a 
new Russian decree canceling the Central Asians' immunity to 
conscription for duty in World War I. Reprisals of increasing 
violence ensued, and the struggle spread from Uzbekistan into 
Kyrgvz and Kazak territory. There, Russian confiscation of graz- 
ing land already had created animosity not present in the 
Uzbek population, which was concerned mainly with preserv- 
ing its rights. 

The next opportunity for the Jadidists presented itself in 
1917 with the outbreak of the February and October revolu- 
tions in Russia. In February the revolutionary events in Russia's 
capital, Petrograd (St. Petersburg), were quickly repeated in 
Tashkent, where the tsarist administration of the governor gen- 
eral was overthrown. In its place, a dual system was established, 
combining a provisional government with direct Soviet power 
and completely excluding the native Muslim population from 
power. Indigenous leaders, including some of the Jadidists, 
attempted to set up an autonomous government in the city of 
Quqon in the Fergana Valley, but this attempt was quickly 
crushed. Following the suppression of autonomy in Quqon, 
Jadidists and other loosely connected factions began what was 
called the Basmachi revolt against Soviet rule, which by 1922 
had survived the civil war and was asserting greater power over 
most of Central Asia. For more than a decade, Basmachi guer- 
rilla fighters (that name was a derogatory Slavic term that the 
fighters did not apply to themselves) fiercely resisted the estab- 
lishment of Soviet rule in parts of Central Asia 

However, the majority of Jadidists, including leaders such as 
Fitrat and Faizulla Khojayev, cast their lot with the communists. 
In 1920 Khojayev, who became first secretary of the Communist 
Party of Uzbekistan, assisted communist forces in the capture 
of Bukhoro and Khiva. .After the amir of Bukhoro had joined 
the Basmachi movement, Khojayev became president of the 
newly established Soviet Bukhoran People's Republic. A Peo- 
ple's Republic of Khorazm also was set up in what had been 
Khiva. 



396 



Uzbekistan 



The Basmachi revolt eventually was crushed as the civil war 
in Russia ended and the communists drew away large portions 
of the Central Asian population with promises of local political 
autonomy and the potential economic autonomy of Soviet 
leader Vladimir I. Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP — see 
Glossary). Under these circumstances, large numbers of Cen- 
tral Asians joined the communist party, many gaining high 
positions in the government of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Uzbek SSR), the administrative unit established in 
1924 to include present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The 
indigenous leaders cooperated closely with the communist gov- 
ernment in enforcing policies designed to alter the traditional 
society of the region: the emancipation of women, the redistri- 
bution of land, and mass literacy campaigns. 

The Stalinist Period 

In 1929 the Tajik and Uzbek Soviet socialist republics were 
separated. As Uzbek communist party chief, Khojayev enforced 
the policies of the Soviet government during the collectiviza- 
tion of agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s and, at the 
same time, tried to increase the participation of Uzbeks in the 
government and the party. Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin sus- 
pected the motives of all reformist national leaders in the non- 
Russian republics of the Soviet Union. By the late 1930s, Kho- 
jayev and the entire group that came into high positions in the 
Uzbek Republic had been arrested and executed during the 
Stalinist purges. 

Following the purge of the nationalists, the government and 
party ranks in Uzbekistan were filled with people loyal to the 
Moscow government. Economic policy emphasized the supply 
of cotton to the rest of the Soviet Union, to the exclusion of 
diversified agriculture. During World War II, many industrial 
plants from European Russia were evacuated to Uzbekistan 
and other parts of Central Asia. With the factories came a new 
wave of Russian and other European workers. Because native 
Uzbeks were mostly occupied in the country's agricultural 
regions, the urban concentration of immigrants increasingly 
Russified Tashkent and other large cities. During the war years, 
in addition to the Russians who moved to Uzbekistan, other 
nationalities such as Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and Koreans 
were exiled to the republic because Moscow saw them as sub- 
versive elements in European Russia. 



397 



Country Studies 



Russification and Resistance 

Following the death of Stalin in 1953, the relative relaxation 
of totalitarian control initiated by First Secretary Nikita S. 
Khrushchev (in office 1953-64) brought the rehabilitation of 
some of the Uzbek nationalists who had been purged. More 
Uzbeks began to join the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and 
to assume positions in the government. However, those Uzbeks 
who participated in the regime did so on Russian terms. Rus- 
sian was the language of state, and Russification was the prereq- 
uisite for obtaining a position in the government or the party. 
Those who did not or could not abandon their Uzbek lifestyles 
and identities were excluded from leading roles in official 
Uzbek society. Because of these conditions, Uzbekistan gained 
a reputation as one of the most politically conservative repub- 
lics in the Soviet Union. 

As Uzbeks were beginning to gain leading positions in soci- 
ety, they also were establishing or reviving unofficial networks 
based on regional and clan loyalties. These networks provided 
their members support and often profitable connections 
between them and the state and the party. An extreme example 
of this phenomenon occurred under the leadership of Sharaf 
Rashidov, who was first secretary of the Communist Party of 
Uzbekistan from 1959 to 1982. During his tenure, Rashidov 
brought numerous relatives and associates from his native 
region into government and party leadership positions. The 
individuals who thus became "connected" treated their posi- 
tions as personal fiefdoms to enrich themselves. 

In this way, Rashidov was able to initiate efforts to make 
Uzbekistan less subservient to Moscow. As became apparent 
after his death, Rashidov's strategy had been to remain a loyal 
ally of Leonid I. Brezhnev, leader of the Soviet Union from 
1964 to 1982, by bribing high officials of the central govern- 
ment. With this advantage, the Uzbek government was allowed 
to merely feign compliance with Moscow's demands for 
increasingly higher cotton quotas. 

The 1980s 

During the decade following the death of Rashidov, Moscow 
attempted to regain the central control over Uzbekistan that 
had weakened in the previous decade. In 1986 it was 
announced that almost the entire party and government lead- 
ership of the republic had conspired in falsifying cotton pro- 



398 



Uzbekistan 



duction figures. Eventually, Rashidov himself was also 
implicated (posthumously) together with Yuriy Churbanov, 
Brezhnev's son-in-law. A massive purge of the Uzbek leadership 
was carried out, and corruption trials were conducted by prose- 
cutors brought in from Moscow. In the Soviet Union, Uzbeki- 
stan became synonymous with corruption. The Uzbeks 
themselves felt that the central government had singled them 
out unfairly; in the 1980s, this resentment led to a strengthen- 
ing of Uzbek nationalism. Moscow's policies in Uzbekistan, 
such as the strong emphasis on cotton and attempts to uproot 
Islamic tradition, then came under increasing criticism in Tash- 
kent. 

In 1989 ethnic animosities came to a head in the Fergana 
Valley, where local Meskhetian Turks were assaulted by Uzbeks, 
and in the Kyrgyz city of Osh, where Uzbek and Kyrgyz youth 
clashed. Moscow's response to this violence was a reduction of 
the purges and the appointment of Islam Karimov as first secre- 
tary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. The appointment 
of Karimov, who was not a member of the local party elite, sig- 
nified that Moscow wanted to lessen tensions by appointing an 
outsider who had not been involved in the purges. 

Resentment among Uzbeks continued to smolder, however, 
in the liberalized atmosphere of Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gor- 
bachev's policies of perestroika (see Glossary) and glasnost (see 
Glossary). With the emergence of new opportunities to express 
dissent, Uzbeks expressed their grievances over the cotton 
scandal, the purges, and other long-unspoken resentments. 
These included the environmental situation in the republic, 
recently exposed as a catastrophe as a result of the long empha- 
sis on heavy industry and a relentless pursuit of cotton (see 
Environmental Problems, this ch.). Other grievances included 
discrimination and persecution experienced by Uzbek recruits 
in the Soviet army and the lack of investment in industrial 
development in the republic to provide jobs for the ever- 
increasing population. 

By the late 1980s, some dissenting intellectuals had formed 
political organizations to express their grievances. The most 
important of these, Birlik (Unity), initially advocated the diver- 
sification of agriculture, a program to salvage the desiccated 
Aral Sea, and the declaration of the Uzbek language as the 
state language of the republic. Those issues were chosen partly 
because they were real concerns and partly because they were a 
safe way of expressing broader disaffection with the Uzbek gov- 



399 



Country Studies 



ernment. In their public debate with Birlik, the government 
and party never lost the upper hand. As became especially clear 
after the accession of Karimov as party chief, most Uzbeks, 
especially those outside the cities, still supported the commu- 
nist party and the government. Birlik's intellectual leaders 
never were able to make their appeal to a broad segment of the 
population (see Opposition Parties, this ch.). 

Independence 

The attempted coup against the Gorbachev government by 
disaffected hard-liners in Moscow, which occurred in August 
1991, was a catalyst for independence movements throughout 
the Soviet Union. Despite Uzbekistan's initial hesitancy to 
oppose the coup, the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan declared 
the republic independent on August 31, 1991. In December 
1991, an independence referendum was passed with 98.2 per- 
cent of the popular vote. The same month, a parliament was 
elected and Karimov was chosen the new nation's first presi- 
dent. 

Although Uzbekistan had not sought independence, when 
events brought them to that point, Karimov and his govern- 
ment moved quickly to adapt themselves to the new realities. 
They realized that under the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS — see Glossary), the loose federation proposed to 
replace the Soviet Union, no central government would pro- 
vide the subsidies to which Uzbek governments had become 
accustomed for the previous seventy years. Old economic ties 
would have to be reexamined and new markets and economic 
mechanisms established. Although Uzbekistan as defined by 
the Soviets had never had independent foreign relations, diplo- 
matic relations would have to be established with foreign coun- 
tries quickly. Investment and foreign credits would have to be 
attracted, a formidable challenge in light of Western restric- 
tions on financial aid to nations restricting expression of politi- 
cal dissent. For example, the suppression of internal dissent in 
1992 and 1993 had an unexpectedly chilling effect on foreign 
investment. Uzbekistan's image in the West alternated in the 
ensuing years between an attractive, stable experimental zone 
for investment and a post-Soviet dictatorship whose human 
rights record made financial aid inadvisable. Such alternation 
exerted strong influence on the political and economic for- 
tunes of the new republic in its first five years (see Interna- 
tional Financial Relations, this ch.). 



400 



Uzbekistan 



Physical Environment 

With an area of 447,000 square kilometers (approximately 
the size of France), Uzbekistan stretches 1,425 kilometers from 
west to east and 930 kilometers from north to south. Bordering 
Turkmenistan to the southwest, Kazakstan to the north, and 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to the south and east, Uzbekistan is 
not only one of the larger Central Asian states but also the only 
Central Asian state to border all of the other four. Uzbekistan 
also shares a short border with Afghanistan to the south (see 

% I)- 

Topography and Drainage 

The physical environment of Uzbekistan is diverse, ranging 
from the flat, desert topography that comprises almost 80 per- 
cent of the country's territory to mountain peaks in the east 
reaching about 4,500 meters above sea level. The southeastern 
portion of Uzbekistan is characterized by the foothills of the 
Tian Shan mountains, which rise higher in neighboring Kyr- 
gyzstan and Tajikistan and form a natural border between Cen- 
tral Asia and China. The vast Qizilqum (Turkic for "red 
sand" — Russian spelling Kyzyl Kum) Desert, shared with south- 
ern Kazakstan, dominates the northern lowland portion of 
Uzbekistan (see fig. 2). The most fertile part of Uzbekistan, the 
Fergana Valley, is an area of about 21,440 square kilometers 
directly east of the Qizilqum and surrounded by mountain 
ranges to the north, south, and east. The western end of the 
valley is defined by the course of the Syrdariya, which runs 
across the northeastern sector of Uzbekistan from southern 
Kazakstan into the Qizilqum. Although the Fergana Valley 
receives just 100 to 300 millimeters of rainfall per year, only 
small patches of desert remain in the center and along ridges 
on the periphery of the valley. 

Water resources, which are unevenly distributed, are in short 
supply in most of Uzbekistan. The vast plains that occupy two- 
thirds of Uzbekistan's territory have little water, and there are 
few lakes. The two largest rivers feeding Uzbekistan are the 
Amu Darya and the Syrdariya, which originate in the moun- 
tains of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. These rivers 
form the two main river basins of Central Asia; they are used 
primarily for irrigation, and several artificial canals have been 
built to expand the supply of arable land in the Fergana Valley 
and elsewhere. 



401 



Country Studies 

Another important feature of Uzbekistan's physical environ- 
ment is the significant seismic activity that dominates much of 
the country. Indeed, much of Uzbekistan's capital city, Tash- 
kent, was destroyed in a major earthquake in 1966, and other 
earthquakes have caused significant damage before and since 
the Tashkent disaster. The mountain areas are especially prone 
to earthquakes. 

Climate 

Uzbekistan's climate is classified as continental, with hot 
summers and cool winters. Summer temperatures often surpass 
40°C; winter temperatures average about -23°C, but may fall as 
low as -40°C. Most of the country also is quite arid, with aver- 
age annual rainfall amounting to between 100 and 200 milli- 
meters and occurring mostly in winter and spring. Between 
July and September, little precipitation falls, essentially stop- 
ping the growth of vegetation during that period. 

Environmental Problems 

Despite Uzbekistan's rich and varied natural environment, 
decades of environmental neglect in the Soviet Union have 
combined with skewed economic policies in the Soviet south to 
make Uzbekistan one of the gravest of the CIS's many environ- 
mental crises. The heavy use of agrochemicals, diversion of 
huge amounts of irrigation water from the two rivers that feed 
the region, and the chronic lack of water treatment plants are 
among the factors that have caused health and environmental 
problems on an enormous scale. 

Environmental devastation in Uzbekistan is best exemplified 
by the catastrophe of the Aral Sea. Because of diversion of the 
Amu Darya and Syrdariya for cotton cultivation and other pur- 
poses, what once was the world's fourth largest inland sea has 
shrunk in the past thirty years to only about one-third of its 
1960 volume and less than half its 1960 geographical size. The 
desiccation and salinization of the lake have caused extensive 
storms of salt and dust from the sea's dried bottom, wreaking 
havoc on the region's agriculture and ecosystems and on the 
population's health. Desertification has led to the large-scale 
loss of plant and animal life, loss of arable land, changed cli- 
matic conditions, depleted yields on the cultivated land that 
remains, and destruction of historical and cultural monu- 
ments. Every year, many tons of salts reportedly are carried as 
far as 800 kilometers away. Regional experts assert that salt and 



402 



f I \ 



View of Qizilqum Desert, Daugyztau 
Courtesy Larry Drew 

dust storms from the Aral Sea have raised the level of particu- 
late matter in the earth's atmosphere by more than 5 percent, 
seriously affecting global climate change. 

The Aral Sea disaster is only the most visible indicator of 
environmental decay, however. The Soviet approach to envi- 
ronmental management brought decades of poor water man- 
agement and lack of water or sewage treatment facilities; 
inordinately heavy use of pesticides, herbicides, defoliants, and 
fertilizers in the fields; and construction of industrial enter- 
prises without regard to human or environmental impact. 
Those policies present enormous environmental challenges 
throughout Uzbekistan. 

Water Pollution 

Large-scale use of chemicals for cotton cultivation, ineffi- 



403 



Country Studies 



cient irrigation systems, and poor drainage systems are exam- 
ples of the conditions that led to a high filtration of salinized 
and contaminated water back into the soil. Post-Soviet policies 
have become even more dangerous: in the early 1990s, the 
average application of chemical fertilizers and insecticides 
throughout the Central Asian republics was twentv to twentv- 
five kiloc^rams per hectare, compared with the former average 
of three kilograms per hectare for the entire Soviet Union. As a 
result, the supply of fresh water has received further contami- 
nants. Industrial pollutants also have damaged Uzbekistan's 
water. In the Amu Darya, concentrations of phenol and oil 
products have been measured at far above acceptable health 
standards. In 1989 the minister of health of the Turkmen SSR 
described the Amu Darya as a sewage ditch for industrial and 
agricultural waste substances. Experts who monitored the river 
in 1995 reported even further deterioration. 

In the early 1990s, about 60 percent of pollution control 
funding went to water-related projects, but only about half of 
cities and about one-quarter of villages have sewers. Communal 
water svs terns do not meet health standards: much of the popu- 
lation lacks drinking water systems and must drink water 
straight from contaminated irrigation ditches, canals, or the 
Amu Darya itself. 

According to one report, virtually all the large underground 
fresh-water supplies in Uzbekistan are polluted by industrial 
and chemical wastes. An official in Uzbekistan's Ministry of 
Environment estimated that about half of the country's popula- 
tion lives in regions where the water is severely polluted. The 
government estimated in 1995 that only 230 of the country's 
8.000 industrial enterprises were following pollution control 
standards. 

Air Pollution 

Poor water management and heavy use of agricultural chem- 
icals also have polluted the air. Salt and dust storms and the 
spraving of pesticides and defoliants for the cotton crop have 
led to severe degradation of air quality in rural areas. 

In urban areas, factories and auto emissions are a growing 
threat to air quality. Fewer than half of factory smokestacks in 
Uzbekistan are equipped with filtration devices, and none has 
the capacity* to filter gaseous emissions. In addition, a high per- 
centage of existing filters are defective or out of operation. .Air 
pollution data for Tashkent, Farghona, and Olmaliq show all 



404 



Uzbekistan 



three cities exceeding recommended levels of nitrous dioxide 
and particulates. High levels of heavy metals such as lead, 
nickel, zinc, copper, mercury, and manganese have been found 
in Uzbekistan's atmosphere, mainly from the burning of fossil 
fuels, waste materials, and ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy. 
Especially high concentrations of heavy metals have been 
reported in Toshkent Province and in the southern part of 
Uzbekistan near the Olmaliq Metallurgy Combine. In the mid- 
1990s, Uzbekistan's industrial production, about 60 percent of 
the total for the Central Asian nations excluding Kazakstan, 
also yielded about 60 percent of the total volume of Central 
Asia's emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere. 
Because automobiles are relatively scarce, automotive exhaust 
is a problem only in Tashkent and Farghona. 

Government Environmental Policy 

The government of Uzbekistan has acknowledged the extent 
of the country's environmental problems, and it has made an 
oral commitment to address them. But the governmental struc- 
tures to deal with these problems remain confused and ill 
defined. Old agencies and organizations have been expanded 
to address these questions, and new ones have been created, 
resulting in a bureaucratic web of agencies with no generally 
understood commitment to attack environmental problems 
directly. Various nongovernmental and grassroots environmen- 
tal organizations also have begun to form, some closely tied to 
the current government and others assuming an opposition 
stance. For example, environmental issues were prominent 
points in the original platform of Birlik, the first major opposi- 
tion movement to emerge in Uzbekistan (see The 1980s, this 
ch.). By the mid-1990s, such issues had become a key concern 
of all opposition groups and a cause of growing concern 
among the population as a whole. 

In the first half of the 1990s, many plans were proposed to 
limit or discourage economic practices that damage the envi- 
ronment. Despite discussion of programs to require payments 
for resources (especially water) and to collect fines from heavy 
polluters, however, little has been accomplished. The obstacles 
are a lack of law enforcement in these areas, inconsistent gov- 
ernment economic and environmental planning, corruption, 
and the overwhelming concentration of power in the hands of 
a president who shows little tolerance of grassroots activity (see 
Postindependence Changes, this ch.). 



405 



Country Studies 

International donors and Western assistance agencies have 
devised programs to transfer technology and know-how to 
address these problems (see International Financial Relations, 
this ch.). But the country's environmental problems are pre- 
dominantly the result of abuse and mismanagement of natural 
resources promoted by political and economic priorities. Until 
the political will emerges to regard environmental and health 
problems as a threat not only to the government in power but 
also to the very survival of Uzbekistan, the increasingly grave 
environmental threat will not be addressed effectively. 

Population 

The population of Uzbekistan, estimated in 1994 at about 23 
million, is the largest of the Central Asian republics, compris- 
ing more than 40 percent of their total population. Growing at 
a rapid rate, the population is split by ethnic and regional dif- 
ferences. The Russian component of the population shrank 
steadily in the years after independence. 

Size and Distribution 

Relative to the former Soviet Union as a whole, Uzbekistan is 
still largely rural: roughly 60 percent of Uzbekistan's popula- 
tion lives in rural areas (see Table 3, Appendix). The capital 
city is Tashkent, whose 1990 population was estimated at about 
2.1 million people. Other major cities are Samarqand (popula- 
tion 366,000), Namangan (308,000), Andijon (293,000), 
Bukhoro (224,000), Farghona (200,000), and Quqon 
(182,000). 

The population of Uzbekistan is exceedingly young. In the 
early 1990s, about half the population was under nineteen 
years of age. Experts expected this demographic trend to con- 
tinue for some time because Uzbekistan's population growth 
rate has been quite high for the past century: on the eve of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, only Tajikistan had a higher 
growth rate among the Soviet republics. Between 1897 and 
1991, the population of the region that is now Uzbekistan more 
than quintupled, while the population of the entire territory of 
the former Soviet Union had not quite doubled. In 1991 the 
natural rate of population increase (the birth rate minus the 
death rate) in Uzbekistan was 28.3 per 1,000 — more than four 
dmes that of the Soviet Union as a whole, and an increase from 
ten years earlier (see table 2, Appendix). 



406 




Typical neighborhood in old section of Tashkent 

These characteristics are especially pronounced in the 
Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan (the Uzbek form for 
which is Qoroqalpoghiston Respublikasi), Uzbekistan's west- 
ernmost region. In 1936, as part of Stalin's nationality policy, 
the Karakalpaks (a Turkic Muslim group whose name literally 
means "black hat") were given their own territory in western 
Uzbekistan, which was declared an autonomous Soviet socialist 
republic to define its ethnic differences while maintaining it 
within the republic of Uzbekistan. In 1992 Karakalpakstan 
received republic status within independent Uzbekistan. Since 
that time, the central government in Tashkent has maintained 
pressure and tight economic ties that have kept the republic 
from exerting full independence. 

Today, the population of Karakalpakstan is about 1.3 million 
people who live on a territory of roughly 168,000 square kilo- 
meters. Located in the fertile lower reaches of the Amu Darya 
where the river empties into the Aral Sea, Karakalpakstan has a 



407 



Country Studies 



long history of irrigation agriculture. Currently, however, the 
shrinking of the Aral Sea has made Karakalpakstan one of the 
poorest and most environmentally devastated parts of Uzbeki- 
stan, if not the entire former Soviet Union (see Environmental 
Problems, this ch.). 

Because the population of that region is much younger than 
the national average (according to the 1989 census, nearly 
three-quarters of the population was younger than twenty-nine 
years), the rate of population growth is quite high. In 1991 the 
rate of natural growth in Karakalpakstan was reportedly more 
than thirty births per 1,000 and slightly higher in the republic's 
rural areas. Karakalpakstan is also more rural than Uzbekistan 
as a whole, with some of its administrative regions (rayony; 
sing., rayon) having only villages and no urban centers — an 
unusual situation in a former Soviet republic. 

The growth of Uzbekistan's population was in some part due 
to in-migration from other parts of the former Soviet Union. 
Several waves of Russian and Slavic in-migrants arrived at vari- 
ous times in response to the industrialization of Uzbekistan in 
the early part of the Soviet period, following the evacuations of 
European Russia during World War II, and in the late 1960s to 
help reconstruct Tashkent after the 1966 earthquake. At vari- 
ous other times, non-Uzbeks arrived simply to take advantage 
of opportunities they perceived in Central Asia. Recently, how- 
ever, Uzbekistan has begun to witness a net emigration of its 
European population. This is especially true of Russians, who 
have faced increased discrimination and uncertainty since 
1991 and seek a more secure environment in Russia. Because 
most of Uzbekistan's population growth has been attributable 
to high rates of natural increase, the emigration of Europeans 
is expected to have little impact on the overall size and demo- 
graphic structure of Uzbekistan's population. Demographers 
project that the population, currently growing at about 2.5 per- 
cent per year, will increase by 500,000 to 600,000 annually 
between the mid-1990s and the year 2010. Thus, by the year 
2005 at least 30 million people will live in Uzbekistan. 

High growth rates are expected to give rise to increasingly 
sharp population pressures that will exceed those experienced 
by most other former Soviet republics. Indeed, five of the eight 
most densely populated provinces of the former Soviet 
Union — Andijon, Farghona, Tashkent, Namangan, and 
Khorazm — are located in Uzbekistan, and populations con- 
tinue to grow rapidly in all five. In 1993 the average population 



408 



Uzbekistan 



density of Uzbekistan was about 48.5 inhabitants per square 
kilometer, compared with a ratio of fewer than six inhabitants 
per square kilometer in neighboring Kazakstan. The distribu- 
tion of arable land in 1989 was estimated at only 0.15 hectares 
per person. In the early 1990s, Uzbekistan's population growth 
had an increasingly negative impact on the environment, on 
the economy, and on the potential for increased ethnic ten- 
sion. 

Ethnic Composition 

Population pressures have exacerbated ethnic tensions. In 
1995 about 71 percent of Uzbekistan's population was Uzbek. 
The chief minority groups were Russians (slightly more than 8 
percent), Tajiks (officially almost 5 percent, but believed to be 
much higher), Kazaks (about 4 percent), Tatars (about 2.5 per- 
cent), and Karakalpaks (slightly more than 2 percent) (see 
table 4, Appendix). In the mid-1990s, Uzbekistan was becom- 
ing increasingly homogeneous, as the outflow of Russians and 
other minorities continues to increase and as Uzbeks return 
from other parts of the former Soviet Union. According to 
unofficial data, between 1985 and 1991 the number of nonin- 
digenous individuals in Uzbekistan declined from 2.4 to 1.6 
million. 

The increase in the indigenous population and the emigra- 
tion of Europeans have increased the self-confidence and often 
the self-assertiveness of indigenous Uzbeks, as well as the sense 
of vulnerability among the Russians in Uzbekistan. The Russian 
population, as former "colonizers," was reluctant to learn the 
local language or to adapt to local control in the post-Soviet 
era. In early 1992, public opinion surveys suggested that most 
Russians in Uzbekistan felt more insecure and fearful than they 
had before Uzbek independence. 

The irony of this ethnic situation is that many of these Cen- 
tral Asian ethnic groups in Uzbekistan were artificially created 
and delineated by Soviet fiat in the first place. Before the Bol- 
shevik Revolution, there was little sense of an Uzbek nation- 
hood as such; instead, life was organized around the tribe or 
clan (see Entering the Twentieth Century, this ch.). Until the 
twentieth century, the population of what is today Uzbekistan 
was ruled by the various khans who had conquered the region 
in the sixteenth century. 

But Soviet rule, and the creation of the Uzbek Soviet Social- 
ist Republic in October 1924, ultimately created and solidified 



409 



Country Studies 



a new kind of Uzbek identity. At the same time, the Soviet pol- 
icy of cutting across existing ethnic and linguistic lines in the 
region to create Uzbekistan and the other new republics also 
sowed tension and strife among the Central Asian groups that 
inhabited the region. In particular, the territory of Uzbekistan 
was drawn to include the two main Tajik cultural centers, 
Bukhoro and Samarqand, as well as parts of the Fergana Valley 
to which other ethnic groups could lay claim. This readjust- 
ment of ethnic politics caused animosity and territorial claims 
among Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and others through much of the 
Soviet era, but conflicts grew especially sharp after the collapse 
of central Soviet rule. 

The stresses of the Soviet period were present among 
Uzbekistan's ethnic groups in economic, political, and social 
spheres. An outbreak of violence in the Fergana Valley between 
Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in June 1989 claimed about 100 
lives. That conflict was followed by similar outbreaks of vio- 
lence in other parts of the Fergana Valley and elsewhere. The 
civil conflict in neighboring Tajikistan, which also involves eth- 
nic hostilities, has been perceived in Uzbekistan (and pre- 
sented by the Uzbekistani government) as an external threat 
that could provoke further ethnic conflict within Uzbekistan 
(see Impact of the Civil War, ch. 3). Thousands of Uzbeks living 
in Tajikistan have fled the civil war there and migrated back to 
Uzbekistan, for example, just as tens of thousands of Russians 
and other Slavs have left Uzbekistan for northern Kazakstan or 
Russia. Crimean Tatars, deported to Uzbekistan at the end of 
World War II, are migrating out of Uzbekistan to return to the 
Crimea. 

Two ethnic schisms may play an important role in the future 
of Uzbekistan. The first is the potential interaction of the 
remaining Russians with the Uzbek majority. Historically, this 
relationship has been based on fear, colonial dominance, and a 
vast difference in values and norms between the two popula- 
tions. The second schism is among the Central Asians them- 
selves. The results of a 1993 public opinion survey suggest that 
even at a personal level, the various Central Asian and Muslim 
communities often display as much wariness and animosity 
toward each other as they do toward the Russians in their 
midst. When asked, for example, whom they would not like to 
have as a son- or daughter-in-law, the proportion of Uzbek 
respondents naming Kyrgyz and Kazaks as undesirable was 
about the same as the proportion that named Russians. (About 



410 



Uzbekistan 



10 percent of the Uzbeks said they would like to have a Russian 
son- or daughter-in-law.) And the same patterns were evident 
when respondents were asked about preferred nationalities 
among their neighbors and colleagues at work. Reports 
described an official Uzbekistani government policy of discrim- 
ination against the Tajik minority. 

Other Social Affiliations 

Other social factors also define the identities and loyalties of 
individuals in Uzbekistan and influence their behavior. Often 
regional and clan identities play an important role that super- 
sedes specifically ethnic identification. In the struggle for polit- 
ical control or access to economic resources, for example, 
regional alliances often prevail over ethnic identities. A United 
States expert has identified five regions — the Tashkent region, 
the Fergana Valley, Samarqand and Bukhoro, the northwest 
territories, and the southern region — that have played the role 
of a power base for individuals who rose to the position of first 
secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. Often clan- 
based, these regional allegiances remain important in both the 
politics and the social structure of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. 

Language and Literature 

As with ethnic patterns and boundaries of post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan, the dominant native language, Uzbek, is in many 
ways a creation of the Soviet state. Indeed, until the beginning 
of the Soviet period, the languages spoken among the native 
population presented a colorful and diverse mosaic. Under 
Soviet rule, officially at least, this mosaic was replaced by 
Uzbek, which almost overnight became the official language of 
the Turkic population of the republic. But Russian, which at 
the same time was declared the "international language" of 
Uzbekistan, was favored above even Uzbek in official usage. 
Many Russian words made their way into Uzbek because Rus- 
sian was the language of higher education, government, and 
economic activity throughout the Soviet era. In the 1980s, 
Uzbeks began a strong effort to eliminate the recent Russian 
borrowings from the language. The Latin alphabet was intro- 
duced to begin a gradual process of replacing the Cyrillic 
alphabet. But in the mid-1990s Russian still was widely used in 
official and economic circles. 



411 



Country Studies 



Linguistic Background 

Uzbek is a Turkic language of the Qarluq family, closely 
related to Uyghur and Kazak. Although numerous local dia- 
lects and variations of the language are in use, the Tashkent 
dialect is the basis of the official written language. The dialects 
spoken in the northern and western parts of Uzbekistan have 
strong Turkmen elements because historically many Turkmen 
lived in close proximity to the Uzbeks in those regions. The dia- 
lects in the Fergana Valley near Kyrgyzstan show some Kyrgyz 
influence. Especially in the written dialect, Uzbek also has a 
strong Persian vocabulary element that stems from the histori- 
cal influence of Iranian culture throughout the region (see 
Early History, this ch.). 

Uzbek has a relatively short history as a language distinct 
from other Turkic dialects. Until the establishment of the 
Soviet republic's boundaries in the 1920s, Uzbek was not con- 
sidered a language belonging to a distinct nationality. It was 
simply a Turkic dialect spoken by a certain segment of the 
Turkic population of Central Asia, a segment that also included 
the ruling tribal dynasties of the various states. The regional 
dialects spoken in Uzbekistan today reflect the fact that the 
Turkic population of Southern Central Asia has always been a 
mixture of various Turkic tribal groups (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 
1; Social Structure, ch. 2; Population, ch. 5). When the present- 
day borders among the republics were established in 1929, all 
native peoples living in Uzbekistan (including Tajiks) were reg- 
istered as Uzbeks regardless of their previous ethnic identity. 

Until 1924 the written Turkic language of the region had 
been Chaghatai, a language that had a long and brilliant his- 
tory as a vehicle of literature and culture after its development 
in the Timurid state of Herat in the late fifteenth century. 
Chaghatai also was the common written language of the entire 
region of Central Asia from the Persian border to Eastern 
Turkestan, which was located in today's China. The language 
was written in the Arabic script and had strong Persian ele- 
ments in its grammar and vocabulary. Experts identify the 
Herat writer Ali Shir Nava'i as having played the foremost role 
in making Chaghatai a dominant literary language. 

In modern Uzbekistan, Chaghatai is called Old Uzbek; its 
origin in Herat, which was an enemy state of the Uzbeks, is 
ignored or unknown. Use of the language was continued by the 
Uzbek khanates that conquered the Timurid states. Some early 
Uzbek rulers, such as Mukhammad Shaybani Khan, used 



412 



Uzbekistan 



Chaghatai to produce excellent poetry and prose. The seven- 
teenth-century Khivan ruler Abulgazi Bahadur Khan wrote 
important historical works in Chaghatai. However, all of those 
writers also produced considerable literature in Persian. 
Chaghatai continued in use well into the twentieth century as 
the literary language of Central Asia. Early twentieth-century 
writers such as Fitrat wrote in Chaghatai. 

In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, 
Chaghatai was influenced by the efforts of reformers of the 
Jadidist movement, who wanted to Turkify and unite all of the 
written languages used in the Turkic world into one written 
language (see The Russian Conquest, this ch.). These efforts 
were begun by the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gaspirali (Gasprinskiy 
in Russian), who advocated this cause in his newspaper Terju- 
man (Translator). Gaspirali called on all the Turkic peoples 
(including the Ottoman Turks, the Crimean and Kazan Tatars, 
and the Central Asians) to rid their languages of Arabic, Per- 
sian, and other foreign elements and to standardize their 
orthography and lexicon. Because of this effort, by the early 
1920s the Turkic languages of Central Asia had lost some of the 
Persian influence. 

Influences in the Soviet Period 

Unfortunately for the reformers and their efforts to reform 
the language, following the national delimitation the Soviet 
government began a deliberate policy of separating the Turkic 
languages from each other. Each nationality was given a sepa- 
rate literary language. Often new languages had to be invented 
where no such languages had existed before. This was the case 
for Uzbek, which was declared to be a continuation of 
Chaghatai and a descendant of all of the ancient Turkic lan- 
guages spoken in the region. In the initial stage of reform, in 
1928-30, the Arabic alphabet was abandoned in favor of the 
Latin alphabet. Then in 1940, Cyrillic was made the official 
alphabet with the rationale that sharing the Arabic alphabet 
with Turkey might lead to common literature and hence a 
resumption of the Turkish threat to Russian control in the 
region. 

Because of this artificial reform process, the ancient litera- 
ture of the region became inaccessible to all but specialists. 
Instead, the use of Russian and Russian borrowings into Uzbek 
was strongly encouraged, and the study of Russian became 
compulsory in all schools. The emphasis on the study of Rus- 



413 



Country Studies 

sian varied at various times in the Soviet period. At the height 
of Stalinism (1930s and 1940s), and in the Brezhnev period 
(1964-82), the study of Russian was strongly encouraged. 
Increasingly, Russian became the language of higher education 
and advancement in society, especially after Stalin orchestrated 
the Great Purge of 1937-38, which uprooted much indigenous 
culture in the non-Slavic Soviet republics. The language of the 
military was Russian as well. Those Uzbeks who did not study in 
higher education establishments and had no desire to work for 
the state did not make a great effort to study Russian. As a 
result, such people found their social mobility stifled, and 
males who served in the armed forces suffered discrimination 
and persecution because they could not communicate with 
their superiors. This communication problem was one of the 
reasons for disproportionate numbers of Uzbeks and other 
Central Asians in the noncombat construction battalions of the 
Soviet army. 

Language in the 1 990s 

The official linguistic policy of the Karimov government has 
been that Uzbek is the language of the state, and Russian is the 
second language. Residents of Uzbekistan are required to study 
Uzbek to be eligible for citizenship. Following similar decisions 
in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, in September 1993 Uzbeki- 
stan announced plans to switch its alphabet from Cyrillic, 
which by that time had been in use for more than fifty years, to 
a script based on a modified Latin alphabet similar to that used 
in Turkey. According to plans, the transition will be complete 
by the year 2000. The primary reason for the short deadline is 
the urgent need to communicate with the outside world using 
a more universally understood alphabet. The move also has the 
political significance of signaling Uzbekistan's desire to break 
away from its past reliance on Russia and to limit the influence 
of Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which use the 
Arabic alphabet. A major project is under way to eradicate Rus- 
sian words from the language and replace these words with 
"pure" Turkic words that have been borrowed from what is 
believed to be the ancient Turkic language of Inner Asia. At 
the same time, Uzbekistan's linguistic policies also are moving 
toward the West. In the early 1990s, the study of English has 
become increasingly common, and many policy makers express 
the hope that English will replace Russian as the language of 
international communication in Uzbekistan. 



414 



Uzbekistan 



Literature 

Uzbekistan's literature suffered great damage during the 
Stalinist purges of the 1930s; during that period, nearly every 
talented writer in the republic was purged and executed as an 
enemy of the people. Prior to the purges, Uzbekistan had a 
generation of writers who produced a rich and diverse litera- 
ture, with some using Western genres to deal with important 
issues of the time. With the death of that generation, Uzbek lit- 
erature entered a period of decline in which the surviving writ- 
ers were forced to mouth the party line and write according to 
the formulas of socialist realism. Uzbek writers were able to 
break out of this straitjacket only in the early 1980s. In the 
period of perestroika and glasnost, a group of Uzbek writers led 
the way in establishing the Birlik movement, which countered 
some of the disastrous policies of the Soviet government in 
Uzbekistan. Beginning in the 1980s, the works of these writers 
criticized the central government and other establishment 
groups for the ills of society. 

A critical issue for these writers was the preservation and 
purification of the Uzbek language. To reach that goal, they 
minimized the use of Russian lexicon in their works, and they 
advocated the declaration of Uzbek as the state language of 
Uzbekistan. These efforts were rewarded in 1992, when the 
new national constitution declared the Uzbek language to be 
the state language of the newly independent state. At the same 
time, however, some of these writers found themselves at odds 
with the Karimov regime because of their open criticism of 
post-Soviet policies. 

Religion 

Islam is by far the dominant religious faith in Uzbekistan. In 
the early 1990s, many of the Russians remaining in the republic 
(about 8 percent of the population) were Orthodox Christians. 
An estimated 93,000 Jews also were present. Despite its pre- 
dominance, Islam is far from monolithic, however. Many ver- 
sions of the faith have been practiced in Uzbekistan. The 
conflict of Islamic tradition with various agendas of reform or 
secularization throughout the twentieth century has left the 
outside world with a confused notion of Islamic practices in 
Central Asia. In Uzbekistan the end of Soviet power did not 
bring an upsurge of a fundamentalist version of Islam, as many 



415 



Country Studies 

had predicted, but rather a gradual reacquaintance with the 
precepts of the faith. 

Islam in the Soviet Era 

Soviet authorities did not prohibit the practice of Islam as 
much as they sought to coopt and utilize religion to placate a 
population that often was unaware of the tenets of its faith. 
After its introduction in the seventh century, Islam in many 
ways formed the basis of life in Uzbekistan. The Soviet govern- 
ment encouraged continuation of the role played by Islam in 
secular society. During the Soviet era, Uzbekistan had sixty-five 
registered mosques and as many as 3,000 active mullahs and 
other Muslim clerics. For almost forty years, the Muslim Board 
of Central Asia, the official, Soviet-approved governing agency 
of the Muslim faith in the region, was based in Tashkent. The 
grand mufti who headed the board met with hundreds of for- 
eign delegations each year in his official capacity, and the 
board published a journal on Islamic issues, Muslims of the Soviet 
East. 

However, the Muslims working or participating in any of 
these organizations were carefully screened for political reli- 
ability. Furthermore, as the Uzbekistani government ostensibly 
was promoting Islam with the one hand, it was working hard to 
eradicate it with the other. The government sponsored official 
antireligious campaigns and severe crackdowns on any hint of 
an Islamic movement or network outside of the control of the 
state. 

Moscow's efforts to eradicate and coopt Islam not only 
sharpened differences between Muslims and others. They also 
greatly distorted the understanding of Islam among Uzbeki- 
stan's population and created competing Islamic ideologies 
among the Central Asians themselves. 

The Issue of Fundamentalism 

In light of the role that Islam has played throughout Uzbeki- 
stan's history, many observers expected that Islamic fundamen- 
talism would gain a strong hold after independence brought 
the end of the Soviet Union's official atheism. The expectation 
was that an Islamic country long denied freedom of religious 
practice would undergo a very rapid increase in the expression 
of its dominant faith. President Karimov has justified authori- 
tarian controls over the populations of his and other Central 
Asian countries by the threat of upheavals and instability 



416 



Wedding party at the Summer Palace, a traditional 

stopping place, Bukhoro 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 

caused by growing Islamic political movements, and other Cen- 
tral Asian leaders also have cited this danger. 

In the early 1990s, however, Uzbekistan did not witness a 
surge of Islamic fundamentalism as much as a search to recap- 
ture a history and culture with which few Uzbeks were familiar. 
To be sure, Uzbekistan is witnessing a vast increase in religious 
teaching and interest in Islam. Since 1991, hundreds of 
mosques and religious schools have been built or restored and 
reopened. And some of the Islamic groups and parties that 
have emerged might give leaders pause. 

Mainstream Islam in the 1990s 

For the most part, however, in the first years of indepen- 
dence Uzbekistan is seeing a resurgence of a more secular 



417 



Country Studies 

Islam, and even that movement is in its very early stages. 
According to a public opinion survey conducted in 1994, inter- 
est in Islam is growing rapidly, but personal understanding of 
Islam by Uzbeks remains limited or distorted. For example, 
about half of ethnic Uzbek respondents professed belief in 
Islam when asked to identify their religious faith. Among that 
number, however, knowledge or practice of the main precepts 
of Islam was weak. Despite a reported spread of Islam among 
Uzbekistan's younger population, the survey suggested that 
Islamic belief is still weakest among the younger generations. 
Few respondents showed interest in a form of Islam that would 
participate actively in political issues. Thus, the first years of 
post-Soviet religious freedom seem to have fostered a form of 
Islam related to the Uzbek population more in traditional and 
cultural terms than in religious ones, weakening Karimov's 
claims that a growing widespread fundamentalism poses a 
threat to Uzbekistan's survival. Available information suggests 
that Islam itself would probably not be the root cause of a con- 
flict as much as it would be a vehicle for expressing other griev- 
ances that are far more immediate causes of dissension and 
despair. Experts do not minimize the importance of Islam, 
however. The practice of the Islamic faith is growing in Uzbeki- 
stan, and the politicization of Islam could become a real threat 
in the future. 

Education 

In developing a national education system to replace the 
centralized education prescriptions of Moscow, Uzbekistan has 
encountered severe budgeting shortfalls. The education law of 
1992 began the process of theoretical reform, but the physical 
base has deteriorated, and curriculum revision has been slow. 

Education System 

Education is supervised by two national agencies, the Minis- 
try of People's Education (for primary, secondary, and voca- 
tional education) and the Ministry of Higher Education (for 
postsecondary education). In 1993 Uzbekistan had 9,834 pre- 
school centers, most of which were run by state enterprises for 
the children of their employees. An estimated 35 percent of 
children ages one to six attend such schools, but few rural 
areas have access to preschools. In the early 1990s, enterprises 
began closing schools or transferring them to direct adminis- 



418 



Uzbekistan 



tration of the Ministry of People's Education. A modest govern- 
ment construction program adds about 50,000 new places 
annually — a rate that falls far short of demand. Although 
experts rate most of Uzbekistan's preschools as being in poor 
condition, the government regards them as contributing vitally 
to the nutrition and education of children, especially when 
both parents work, a situation that became increasingly fre- 
quent in the 1990s. 

In 1993 enrollment in regular and vocational schools, which 
covered grades one through eleven (ages six through sixteen), 
was 4.9 million of the estimated 5.7 million children in that 
age-group. Because of funding shortages, in 1993 the period of 
compulsory education was shortened from eleven to nine 
years. The infrastructure problem of schools is most serious at 
the primary and secondary levels; the government categorizes 
50 percent of school buildings as unsuitable, and repair bud- 
gets are inadequate. Construction of new schools has been 
delayed because the boards of capital construction of the two 
education ministries do not have direct control over contractor 
pricing or construction practices at local levels. School nutri- 
tional levels often are below state standards; an estimated 50 
percent of students do not receive a hot meal. In 1992 about 
5,300 of Uzbekistan's 8,500 schools had double shifts; because 
most of these schools were rural, this situation affected only 25 
percent of students, however. 

In 1993 an estimated 220,000 students were in vocational 
training programs, with about 100,000 students graduating 
annually from 440 schools. Working in close cooperation with 
local employers, the schools choose from 260 trades to offer 
instruction conforming with industrial needs. In the post- 
Soviet era, vocational curricula were modified to accommodate 
an upsurge in light industry. Experts agree that, as the national 
economy diversifies and expands, the vocational program must 
expand its coverage of key industries and streamline its organi- 
zation, which suffered disorientation in its transition from the 
rigid Soviet system. 

In 1992 some 321,700 students were enrolled in institutions 
of higher learning; of those, about 43 percent were in evening 
or correspondence courses. The enrollment represented about 
19 percent of the seventeen to twenty age-group, a decrease 
from the more than 23 percent reported in 1990. In 1992 
enrollment declined because an entrance examination was 
used for the first time, Russian emigration continued, and the 



419 



Country Studies 



economy's demand for college graduates fell. Experts pre- 
dicted that the government would restrict admittance levels 
until its policies succeed in expanding the economy. Fifty-three 
institutions of higher learning, many with productive research 
programs, were active in 1993. Higher education is hindered, 
however, by a shortage of laboratories, libraries, computers and 
data banks, and publishing facilities to disseminate research 
findings. 

The state higher education system includes three universi- 
ties, located at Nukus, Samarqand, and Tashkent. Tashkent 
State University, which has 19,300 students and 1,480 teachers, 
is the largest university in Central Asia; it has sixteen full 
departments, including three devoted to philology and one to 
Asian studies. Some twenty research institutes offer courses in 
specialized areas of medicine, veterinary science, and industry 
and technology. Another thirty institutes of higher learning 
offer postsecondary studies in medicine, agriculture, teaching, 
engineering, industrial technology, music, theater, economics, 
law, pharmacy, and political science; seventeen of the latter cat- 
egory are located in Tashkent. 

Curriculum 

In the early 1990s, the greatest controversy in curriculum 
policy was which language should be used for teaching in state 
schools. In 1992 Uzbek and the other Central Asian languages 
were made the official languages of instruction, meaning that 
Uzbek schools might use any of five Central Asian languages or 
Russian as their primary language. Uzbek and Russian lan- 
guage courses are taught in all schools. After independence, a 
new emphasis was placed on courses in Uzbek history and cul- 
ture and on increasing the short supply of textbooks in Uzbek 
in many fields. For a time, the Karimov regime closed Samar- 
qand University, which taught in Tajik, as part of a broader 
crackdown on the country's Tajik minority. 

The expansion of curricula, including the addition of 
courses in French, Arabic, and English, has placed new stress 
on a limited supply of teachers and materials. In the mid-1990s, 
a major curriculum reform was underway to support the post- 
Soviet economic and social transformation. Among the 
changes identified by Western experts are a more commercial 
approach to the mathematics curriculum, more emphasis in 
economics courses on the relationship of capital to labor, more 
emphasis in social science courses on individual responsibility 



420 



Uzbekistan 



for the environment, and the addition of entirely new subjects 
such as business management. Because such changes involve 
new materials and a new pedagogical approach by staff, the 
reform period is estimated at ten to fifteen years. 

Instruction 

In the early 1990s, the thirty-six technical schools and six 
teacher colleges produced about 20,000 new teachers annually 
for the primary and secondary levels, and another 20,000 for 
higher education. In 1993 the ratio of staff to students was 1 to 
12 in preschool institutions, 1 to 11.5 in primary and secondary 
schools, 1 to 12 in vocational schools, and 1 to 6.8 in institu- 
tions of higher education. The range of these ratios indicates 
that Uzbekistan prepares too many teachers for the needs of 
the existing student population, but experts do not consider 
the existing staff adequately trained to deal with upcoming cur- 
riculum changes and with the need to teach in Uzbek. 

Experts have noted that the teacher training program must 
be reduced to concentrate government funds on a few high- 
quality research and training centers. Such a shift would free 
resources for material support, salaries, and administrative and 
supervisory personnel, all in short supply in the mid-1990s. 
Currently, teachers for preschool and grades one through four 
are trained at technical schools; those for grades five through 
eleven must train at the university level. The technical school 
program is five years beginning after grade nine, and the uni- 
versity program is four years beginning after grade eleven. 
Both programs combine pedagogical and general courses. 

In the early 1990s, the government made significant 
improvements in teacher salaries and benefits. Many top teach- 
ers were lost to other sectors, however, because salaries still 
were not competitive with those elsewhere in the economy. In 
higher education, salaries were competitive with those in other 
occupations in Uzbekistan but not with those on the interna- 
tional teaching market. 

Health 

As Uzbekistan struggled to revise its Soviet-era health care 
system, the physical condition of its population was exacer- 
bated by severe environmental conditions that were inherited 
from the Soviet period and were not addressed effectively in 
the first years of independence. Key health indicators showed a 



421 



Country Studies 

correlation between the high level of air and water pollution 
and health problems (see table 5, Appendix). 

Health Care System 

In the mid-1990s, Uzbekistan continued a health care system 
in which all hospitals and clinics were state owned and all med- 
ical personnel were government employees. Although health 
care ostensibly was free of change, this rarely was the case in 
practice. In the early 1990s, some private medical practices 
have supplemented state facilities to a small extent. In 1993 
Uzbekistan undertook a program of privatization that began 
with the introduction of health insurance and continued with 
the gradual privatization of health care facilities, which is opti- 
mistically projected at about three years. Under the new pro- 
gram, the government would require private health facility 
owners to maintain the same standards as state facilities and to 
offer minimum free health care for the indigent. In the first 
few years of the program, however, only pharmacies and small 
clinics were privatized. Plans for 1995 called for privatizing 
twenty-four dental clinics and twelve prenatal clinics. In 1995 
no plan provided for government divestiture of medium-sized 
health care facilities. 

The government disburses its funds through the national 
Ministry of Health, through the health agencies of local and 
province governments, and through specialized facilities serv- 
ing ministries and state enterprises. Treatment in the last two 
categories is generally better than in general state facilities 
because staff salaries and work conditions are better. As in the 
Soviet system, special facilities exist for top political, cultural, 
and scientific dignitaries. In 1994 some US$79 million, or 11.1 
percent of the annual budget, was allocated for health care. Of 
that amount, about 60 percent went to state hospitals, 30 per- 
cent to outpatient clinics, and less than 6 percent to medical 
research. 

Despite marked growth throughout the Soviet era, the pub- 
lic health care system in Uzbekistan is not equipped to deal 
with the special problems of a population long exposed to high 
levels of pollutants or with other health problems. Although 
the numbers of hospitals and doctors grew dramatically under 
Soviet rule — from almost no doctors in 1917 to 35.5 doctors 
per 10,000 population and to 1,388 hospitals and clinics per 
10,000 population in 1991 — the increasing incidence of serious 



422 



Uzbekistan 



disease raises questions about the effectiveness of care by these 
doctors and their facilities. 

In 1993 a total of 16.8 million patients were treated, of whom 
4.8 million were treated in hospitals and about 275,000 in out- 
patient clinics — meaning that the vast majority of patients 
received treatment only at home. Experts predicted that this 
trend would continue until the level of care in government 
facilities improved substantially. 

Among the serious problems plaguing health care delivery 
are the extremely short supply of vaccines and medicines in 
hospitals; the generally poor quality of medical training; and 
corruption in the medical profession, which exacerbates the 
negative impact of changes in the system for the average 
patient and diverts treatment to favored private patients. 
According to a 1995 private study, the state system provided less 
than 20 percent of needed medicine and less than 40 percent 
of needed medical care, and budget constraints limited salaries 
for medical professionals. In 1990 the percentage of children 
receiving vaccines for diphtheria, pertussis, measles, and polio 
averaged between 80 and 90 percent. That statistic fell sharply 
in the first years of independence; for example, in 1993 fewer 
than half the needed doses of measles vaccine were adminis- 
tered. 

The Ministry of Health has recognized that Uzbekistan has a 
serious narcotics addiction problem; illicit drug use reportedly 
stabilized between 1994 and 1996. The seven substance abuse 
rehabilitation clinics treat both alcoholism and narcotics 
abuse. The Ministry of Health has identified the following as its 
priorities, should expansion of services become possible: 
improvement of maternal and infant health care, prevention of 
the spread of infectious disease, and improvement of environ- 
mental conditions leading to health problems. In 1995 Uzbeki- 
stan was receiving aid from the United States Agency for 
International Development (AID), the United Nations Chil- 
dren's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) for improving infant and maternal health care and for 
storage and distribution of vaccines. 

Health Conditions 

According to experts, the most immediate impact of the 
environmental situation in Uzbekistan is on the health condi- 
tion of the population (see Environmental Problems, this ch.). 
Although it is difficult to establish a direct cause and effect 



423 



Country Studies 

between environmental problems and their apparent conse- 
quences, the cumulative impact of these environmental prob- 
lems in Uzbekistan appears to have been devastating. 
Frequently cited in Uzbekistan's press are increasing occur- 
rences of typhoid, paratyphoid, and hepatitis from contami- 
nated drinking water; rising rates of intestinal disease and 
cancers; and increased frequency of anemia, dystrophy, chol- 
era, dysentery, and a host of other illnesses. One Russian spe- 
cialist includes among the ailments "lag in physical 
development," especially among children. According to this 
observer, sixty-nine of every 100 adults in the Aral Sea region 
are deemed to be "incurably ill." In 1990 life expectancy for 
males in all of Uzbekistan was sixty-four years, and for females, 
seventy years. The average life span in some villages near the 
Aral Sea in Karakalpakstan, however, is estimated at thirty-eight 
years. 

In the early 1990s, only an estimated 30 percent of women in 
Uzbekistan practiced contraception of any kind. The most fre- 
quently used method was the intrauterine device, distribution 
of which began in a government program introduced in 1991. 
In 1991 the average fertility rate was 4.1 children per woman, 
but about 200,000 of the women in the childbearing age range 
have ten or more children. 

Infant mortality increased by as much as 49 percent between 
1970 and 1986 to an average of 46.2 deaths per 1,000 live 
births. In 1990 the average rate of mortality before age one for 
the enure country was sixty-five deaths per 1,000 live births. In 
the mid-1990s, official data estimated the level of infant mortal- 
ity in parts of Karakalpakstan at 110 per 1,000 live births; unof- 
ficial estimates put the level at twice that figure. In 1992 the 
national maternal mortality rate was 65.3 per 100,000 live 
births, with considerably higher rates in some regions. 

According to the WHO, Uzbekistan reported one case of 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) in 1992, one in 
1993, and none in 1994. No treatment centers or AIDS 
research projects are known to exist in Uzbekistan. 

The Economy 

Chief among the causes of dissension and despair in Uzbeki- 
stan is the country's economic situation. According to United 
Nations (UN) figures, in 1994 Uzbekistan was one of the poor- 
est of the developed countries in the world, with the average 
monthly wage less than US$50. But vast natural resources sug- 



424 



Uzbekistan 



gest the potential for Uzbekistan to become one of the most 
prosperous countries in Central Asia, provided the necessary 
reforms can be made to unleash that potential. At the end of 
the Soviet era, Uzbekistan was rated as one of the least industri- 
alized Soviet republics. Government reform, with the theoreti- 
cal goal of achieving a market economy, moved cautiously and 
unevenly in the directions of industrialization and market 
reform in the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s, signs indicated a 
more serious reform effort (see table 6, Appendix). 

Mineral Resources 

One of Uzbekistan's most abundant and strategic resources 
is gold. Before 1992, Uzbekistan accounted for about one-third 
of Soviet gold production, at a time when the Soviet Union 
ranked third in world gold production. The Muruntau Gold 
Mine, about 400 kilometers northwest of Tashkent in the Qiz- 
ilqum Desert, is estimated to be the largest gold mine in the 
world, and other gold reserves are located in the Chadaq area 
of the Fergana Valley, on the southern slopes of the Qurama 
Mountains. In 1992, a reported 80 tons of gold were mined in 
Uzbekistan, making it the eighth largest producer of gold in 
the world. Fluorospar, the most important source of fluorine, is 
mined at Tuytepa between Olmaliq and Tashkent. In the 
region of Olmaliq, southeast of Tashkent, are deposits of cop- 
per, zinc, lead, tungsten, and molybdenum that are used in the 
well-developed metallurgical processing industries centered in 
northeastern Uzbekistan. Uranium is mined and processed on 
the slopes of the Chatkal and Qurama ranges that surround 
the Fergana Valley. 

Energy 

Uzbekistan is also rich in energy resources, although it was a 
net importer of fuels and primary energy throughout the 
Soviet period. The republic was the third largest producer of 
natural gas in the former Soviet Union behind Russia and 
Turkmenistan, producing more than 10 percent of the union's 
natural gas in the 1980s. In 1992 Uzbekistan produced 42.8 bil- 
lion cubic meters of natural gas; although this output was used 
mostly within the republic in the Soviet period, pipelines to 
Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and Russia exported increasing amounts 
of natural gas to those countries in the early 1990s. Gas 
reserves are estimated at more than 1 trillion cubic meters. 
Deposits are concentrated mainly in Qashqadaryo Province in 



425 



Country Studies 



the southeast and near Bukhoro in the south-central region. 
Bukhoro gas is used to fuel local thermoelectric power plants. 
The biggest gas deposit, Boyangora-Gadzhak, was discovered in 
southeastern Surkhondaryo Province in the 1970s. 

Uzbekistan also has small coal reserves, located mainly near 
Angren, east of Tashkent. In 1990 the total coal yield was 6 mil- 
lion tons. Oil production has likewise been small; Uzbekistan 
has relied on Russia and Kazakstan for most of its supply. Oil 
production was 3.3 million tons in 1992. But the discovery in 
1994 of the Mingbulak oil field in the far northeastern prov- 
ince of Namangan may ultimately dwarf Uzbekistan's other 
energy resources. Experts have speculated that Mingbulak may 
prove to be one of the world's most productive oil fields. 
Located in the central basin of the Fergana Valley, the deposits 
could produce hundreds of millions of dollars worth of oil in 
the late 1990s. Qoqdumalaq in western Uzbekistan also has 
rich oil and natural gas deposits, reportedly containing hun- 
dreds of millions of tons of oil. 

The coal deposits on the Angren River east of Tashkent and 
the natural gas deposits near Bukhoro are prime fuels for 
Uzbekistan's thermoelectric power plants. The well-developed 
hydroelectric power generating system utilizes the Syrdariya, 
Naryn, and Chirchiq rivers, all of which arise to the east in the 
mountains of Kyrgyzstan. Agreements with Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, through which the Syrdariya also flows, ensure a 
continued water flow for Uzbek power plants. 

Agriculture 

Uzbekistan has the advantages of a warm climate, a long 
growing season, and plentiful sources of water for irrigation. In 
the Soviet period, those conditions offered high and reliable 
yields of crops with specialized requirements. Soviet agricul- 
tural policy applied Uzbekistan's favorable conditions mainly to 
cotton cultivation. As Uzbekistan became a net exporter of cot- 
ton and a narrow range of other agricultural products, how- 
ever, it required large-scale imports of grain and other foods 
that were not grown in sufficient quantities in domestic fields. 

Organization of Agriculture 

In the last decades of Soviet rule, the private agricultural sec- 
tor produced about 25 percent of total farm output almost 
exclusively on the small private plots of collective and state 
farmers and nonagricultural households (the maximum pri- 



426 



Uzbekistan 



vate landholding was one-half hectare). In the early 1990s, 
Uzbekistan's agriculture still was dominated by collective and 
state farms, of which 2,108 were in operation in 1991. Because 
of this domination, average farm size was more than 24,000 
hectares, and the average number of workers per farm was 
more than 1,100 in 1990. More than 99 percent of the value of 
agricultural production comes from irrigated land (see table 
21, Appendix). 

Economic Structure of Agriculture 

Uzbekistan's economy depends heavily on agricultural pro- 
duction. As late as 1992, roughly 40 percent of its net material 
product (NMP — see Glossary) was in agriculture, although 
only about 10 percent of the country's land area was cultivated. 
Cotton accounts for 40 percent of the gross value of agricul- 
tural production. But with such a small percentage of land 
available for farming, the single-minded development of irri- 
gated agriculture, without regard to consumption of water or 
other natural resources, has had adverse effects such as heavy 
salinization, erosion, and waterlogging of agricultural soils, 
which inevitably have limited the land's productivity. According 
to the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, for 
example, after expansion of agricultural land under irrigation 
at a rate of more than 2 percent per year between 1965 and 
1986, conditions attributed to poor water management had 
caused more than 3.4 million hectares to be taken out of pro- 
duction in the Aral Sea Basin alone. According to other 
reports, about 44 percent of the irrigated land in Uzbekistan 
today is strongly salinated. The regions of Uzbekistan most seri- 
ously affected by salinization are the provinces of Syrdariya, 
Bukhoro, Khorazm, andjizzakh and the Karakalpakstan 
Republic (see fig. 13). Throughout the 1980s, agricultural 
investments rose steadily, but net losses rose at an even faster 
rate. 

Cotton 

Uzbekistan's main agricultural resource has long been its 
"white gold," the vast amounts of cotton growing on its terri- 
tory. Uzbekistan always was the chief cotton-growing region of 
the Soviet Union, accounting for 61 percent of total Soviet pro- 
duction; in the mid-1990s it ranks as the fourth largest pro- 
ducer of cotton in the world and the world's third largest 
cotton exporter. In 1991 Uzbekistan's cotton yield was more 



427 



Country Studies 



than 4.6 million tons, of which more than 80 percent was classi- 
fied in the top two quality grades. In 1987 roughly 40 percent 
of the workforce and more than half of all irrigated land in 
Uzbekistan — more than 2 million hectares — were devoted to 
cotton. 

Other Crops 

In light of increasing water shortages in Central Asia and the 
end of the Soviet distribution system that guaranteed food 
imports, government leaders have proposed reducing cotton 
cultivation in favor of grain and other food plants to feed an 
increasingly impoverished population. In fact, between 1987 
and 1991 land planted to cotton decreased by 16 percent, 
mainly in favor of grains and fruits and vegetables. But Uzbeki- 
stan's short-term needs for hard currency make dramatic 
declines in cotton cultivation unrealistic. Likewise, Uzbeki- 
stan's entire existing agricultural infrastructure — irrigation sys- 
tems, configuration of fields, allocation and type of farm 
machinery, and other characteristics — is geared toward cotton 
production; shifting to other crops would require a massive 
overhaul of the agricultural system and a risk that policy mak- 
ers have not wished to take in the early years of independence. 
Under these circumstances, continued commitment to cotton 
is seen as a good base for longer-term development and diversi- 
fication. 

In 1991 Uzbekistan's main agricultural products, aside from 
cotton, were grains (primarily wheat, oats, corn, barley, and 
rice), fodder crops, and fruits and vegetables (primarily pota- 
toes, tomatoes, grapes, and apples). That year 41 percent of 
cultivated land was devoted to cotton, 32 percent to grains, 11 
percent to fruits, 4 percent to vegetables, and 12 percent to 
other crops. In the early 1990s, Uzbekistan produced the larg- 
est volume of fruits and vegetables among the nations of the 
former Soviet Union. Because Uzbekistan's yield per hectare of 
noncotton crops is consistently below that for other countries 
with similar growing conditions, experts believe that productiv- 
ity can be improved significantly. 

Industry 

Uzbekistan's industrial sector accounted for 33 percent of its 
NMP in 1991. Despite some efforts to diversify its industrial 
base, industry remains dominated by raw materials extraction 
and processing, most of which is connected with cotton pro- 



428 



Woman harvesting cotton, 
Zarafshon River Valley 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 




duction and minerals (see table 22, Appendix). As illustrated 
especially by the domestic oil industry, in the Soviet era indus- 
trial production generally lagged behind consumption, making 
Uzbekistan a net importer of many industrial products. Under 
the difficult economic conditions caused by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union's system of allocations and interdependence of 
republics, this situation has worsened. In 1993 total manufac- 
turing had decreased by 1 percent from its 1990 level, and min- 
ing output had decreased by more than 8 percent (see table 6, 
Appendix) . 

Heavy Industry 

The Tashkent region, in the northeastern "peninsula" adja- 
cent to the Fergana Valley, accounts for about one-third of the 
industrial output of Uzbekistan, with agricultural machinery 
the most important product. The city is the nucleus of an 
industrial region that was established near mineral and hydro- 
electric resources stretching across northeastern Uzbekistan 
from the Syrdariya in the west to the easternmost point of the 
nation. Electricity for the industries of the region comes from 
small hydroelectric stations along the Chirchiq River and from 
a gas-fired local power station. 

Uzbekistan's most productive heavy industries have been 
extraction of natural gas and oil; oil refining; mining and min- 



429 



Country Studies 



eral processing; machine building, especially equipment for 
cotton cultivation and the textile industry; coal mining; and 
the ferrous metallurgy, chemical, and electrical power indus- 
tries. The chemical manufacturing industry focuses primarily 
on the production of fertilizer. 

Two oil refineries in Uzbekistan, located at Farghona and 
Amtiari, have a combined capacity of 173,000 barrels per day. 
Other centers of the processing industries include Angren (for 
coal), Bekobod (steel), Olmaliq (copper, zinc, and molybde- 
num), Zarafshon (gold), and Yangiobod (uranium). The 
Uzbek fertilizer industry was established at Chirchiq, northeast 
of Tashkent, near Samarqand, and at several sites in the Fer- 
gana Basin. Uzbekistan is the largest producer of machinery 
for all phases of cotton cultivation and processing, as well as for 
irrigation, in the former Soviet Union. The machine building 
industry is centered at Tashkent, Chirchiq, Samarqand, and 
Andijon in the east, and at Nukus in Karakalpakstan. 

Light Industry 

The predominant light industries are primary processing of 
cotton, wool, and silk into fabric for export, and food process- 
ing. In 1989 light industry accounted for 27.1 percent of indus- 
trial production; that category was completely dominated by 
two sectors, textiles (18.2 percent) and agricultural food pro- 
cessing (8.9 percent). The nature of the Uzbek textile industry 
in the mid-1990s reflects the Soviet allotment to Uzbekistan of 
primary textile processing rather than production of finished 
products. Food processing has diversified to some degree; the 
industry specializes in production of dried apricots, raisins, and 
peaches. Other products are cottonseed oil for cooking, wine, 
and tobacco. 

Labor Force 

The swelling of the working-age population has led to high 
rates of unemployment and underemployment (see Popula- 
tion, this ch.). At the same time, despite relatively high average 
levels of education in the population, the shortage of skilled 
personnel in Uzbekistan is also a major constraint to future 
development (see Education, this ch.). Russians and other 
nonindigenous workers traditionally were concentrated in the 
heavy industrial sectors, including mining and heavy manufac- 
turing. With the independence of Uzbekistan and the outbreak 
of violence in several parts of Central Asia, many of these 



430 



Uzbekistan 



skilled personnel left the country in the early 1990s. In 1990 as 
many as 90 percent of personnel in Uzbekistan's electric power 
stations were Russians. Because Russian emigration caused a 
shortage of skilled technicians, by 1994 half of the power gen- 
erating units of the Syrdariya Hydroelectric Power Station had 
been shut down, and the newly constructed Novoangrenskiy 
Thermoelectric Power Station could not go on line because 
there was nobody to operate it. In the mid-1990s, training pro- 
grams were preparing skilled indigenous cadres in these and 
other industrial sectors, but the shortfall has had a strong 
impact. 

Postcommunist Economic Reform 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan faced seri- 
ous economic challenges: the breakdown of central planning 
from Moscow and the end of a reliable, if limited, system of 
interrepublican trade and payments mechanisms; production 
inefficiencies; the prevalence of monopolies; declining produc- 
tivity; and loss of the significant subsidies and payments that 
had come from Moscow. All these changes signaled that funda- 
mental reform would be necessary if the economy of Uzbeki- 
stan were to continue to be viable. 

Traditionally a raw materials supplier for the rest of the 
Soviet Union, Uzbekistan saw its economy hard hit by the 
breakdown of the highly integrated Soviet economy. Factories 
in Uzbekistan could not get the raw materials they needed to 
diversify the national economy, and the end of subsidies from 
Moscow was exacerbated by concurrent declines in world 
prices for Uzbekistan's two major export commodities, gold 
and cotton. 

Structural and Legal Reform 

From the time of independence, Uzbekistan's political lead- 
ers have made verbal commitments to developing a market- 
based economy, but they have proceeded cautiously in that 
direction. The first few years were characterized mainly by false 
starts that left little fundamental change. The initial stages of 
reform, instituted in 1992, were partial price liberalization, uni- 
fication of foreign-exchange markets, new taxes, removal of 
import tariffs, and privatization of small shops and residential 
housing. Laws passed in 1992 provided for property and land 
ownership, banking, and privatization. Modernization of the 
tax system began in 1992; the first steps were a value-added tax 



481 



Country Studies 



(VAT — see Glossary) and a profits tax designed to replace 
income from the tax structure of the Soviet period. 

In its first effort at price liberalization in 1992 and 1993, the 
government maintained some control on all prices and full 
control on the prices of basic consumer goods and energy. A 
wide range of legislation set new conditions for property and 
land ownership, banking, and privatization — fundamental con- 
ditions for establishing a market economy — but in general 
these provisions were limited, and they often were not 
enforced. International financial institutions initially were 
encouraged to believe that structural adjustments would be 
made in the national economy to accommodate international 
investment, but later such promises were rescinded. In 1994 
the government maintained control of levels of production, 
investment, and trade, just as Moscow had done in the Soviet 
era. Several agencies, most notably the State Committee for 
Forecasting and Statistics, the State Association for Contracts 
and Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and 
the Ministry of Finance, inherited responsibility for planning, 
finance, procurement, and distribution from the Soviet central 
state system. Economic policy making remains based on a 
national economic plan that sets production and consumption 
targets. State-owned enterprises remain in virtually all sectors 
of the economy. In 1994 no laws had established standards for 
bankruptcy, collateral, or contracts. But by 1995 Uzbekistan 
had made some significant movement toward reform, which 
experts interpreted as a possible harbinger of wider-ranging 
changes in the second half of the decade. 

Privatization 

Privatization of the large state industrial and agricultural 
enterprises, which dominated the economy in the Soviet era, 
proceeded very slowly in the early 1990s. The initial stage of 
privatization, which began in September 1992, targeted the 
housing, retail trade and services, and light industry sectors to 
promote the supply of consumer goods. 

Beginning with the 1991 Law on Privatization, a number of 
laws and decrees have provided the policy framework for fur- 
ther privatization. A state privatization agency, established in 
1992, set a goal of moving 10 to 15 percent of state economic 
assets into private hands by the end of 1993. Movement in that 
direction was slow in 1992, however, with only about 350 small 
shops being privatized. In the same period, housing was priva- 



432 



Central outdoor market, Samarqand 
Courtesy Tom Skipper 

tized at a somewhat faster pace by outright transfers or low-cost 
sales of state housing properties. By 1994 about 20,000 firms in 
small industry, trade, and services had been transferred from 
state ownership to the ownership of managers and employees 
of the firms. Nearly all such transfers were through the issu- 
ance of joint-stock shares or by direct sale. 

Agricultural privatization, which began in 1990, has moved 
faster. Since the state began distributing free parcels of land 
that could be inherited but not sold, the number of peasant 
farms has risen dramatically (cotton-growing lands were 
excluded from this process). Between January 1991 and April 
1993, the number of private farms rose from 1,358 to 5,800, 
promising a significant new contribution from private farms to 
Uzbekistan's overall agricultural output (see Agriculture, this 
ch.). Another government program, initiated in 1993, transfers 
unprofitable state farms to cooperative ownership. A law per- 



433 



Country Studies 

mitting the transfer of privately owned land was planned for 

1995. 

In the mid-1990s, the role of the state was gradually reduced 
in the productive sectors, except for energy, public utilities, 
and gold. The government's privatization program for 1994-95 
emphasized the sale of large and medium-sized state-owned 
construction, manufacturing, and transportation enterprises. A 
set of guidelines for large-scale privatization, which went into 
effect in March 1994, contained several contradictory provi- 
sions that required clarification, and privatization also was 
slowed by the need to change the monopoly structure of state- 
owned enterprises before sale. 

In mid-1995, the government reported that 69 percent of 
enterprises (46,900 of 67,700) had been privatized. Most firms 
in that category are relatively small, however, and all heavy 
industry remained in state ownership at that stage. Although 
the government has promised accelerated privatization of 
larger firms, experts did not expect the slow pace to improve in 
the late 1990s. 

Currency Reform 

According to some experts, a turning point came in late 
1993 after Uzbekistan and Kazakstan were expelled from the 
ruble zone (see Glossary), in which Uzbekistan had remained 
with vague plans to adopt an independent national currency at 
some time in the future. Following the example of Kyrgyzstan, 
which already had created its own currency the previous May, 
in November 1993 Uzbekistan issued an interim som coupon. 
The permanent currency unit, the som, went into effect in the 
summer of 1994 (for value of the som — see Glossary). The 
introduction of the som was followed by an improving domes- 
tic economic situation, including some progress toward eco- 
nomic stabilization and structural reform. Beginning in late 
1994, the national economy achieved substantial price liberal- 
ization, a reduction in subsidies, elimination of state orders on 
most commodities, and some freeing of state controls in the 
agricultural sector. In 1994 the som was one of the weaker new 
currencies in Central Asia; it lost two-thirds of its value in the 
second half of 1994. By the end of the year, however, inflation 
had leveled off, and the free-market exchange rate of the som 
stabilized by January 1995. In July 1995, the government 
announced plans to make the som fully convertible by the end 



434 



Uzbekistan 



of the year. At the beginning of 1996, the som's value was thirty- 
six to US$1. 

Banking and Finance 

Uzbekistan began a movement toward a two-tier banking sys- 
tem under the old Soviet regime. The new structure, which was 
ratified by the Banking Law of 1991, has a government-owned 
Central Bank wielding control over a range of joint-stock sec- 
toral banks specializing in agricultural or industrial enterprise, 
the Savings Bank (Sberbank), and some twenty commercial 
banks. The Central Bank is charged with establishing national 
monetary policy, issuing currency, and operating the national 
payment system. In performing these operations, the Central 
Bank manipulates as much as 70 percent of deposits in the 
more than 1,800 branches of the Savings Bank (all of which are 
state owned) for its own reserve requirements. A National Bank 
for Foreign Economic Affairs, established in 1991 as a joint- 
stock commercial bank, conducts international financial 
exchanges on behalf of the government. The national bank 
holds Uzbekistan's foreign currency reserves; in 1993 it was 
converted from its initial status to a state bank. 

In the mid-1990s, the banking structure in Uzbekistan was 
limited to only a handful of primarily state-owned banks, and, 
compared with Western banking systems, the commercial 
banking system was still in its infancy. But the establishment in 
the spring of 1995 of Uzbekistan's first Western-style banking 
operation — a joint venture between Mees Pierson of the Neth- 
erlands and other international and Uzbekistani partners — 
suggests that this sector, too, may have prospects for change. 
The Uzbekistan International Bank that would result from the 
new joint venture is intended primarily to finance trade and 
industrial projects. The bank is to be based in Tashkent, with 
50 percent of ownership shares in Western hands. If successful, 
this and other similar ventures may reward policy makers' cau- 
tious approach to reform by establishing an infrastructure 
from which economic growth can begin. 

International Financial Relations 

Foreign trade traditionally has provided Uzbekistan with 
supplies of needed foodstuffs, including grain, and industrial 
raw materials, whereas Uzbekistan exported primarily nonfer- 
rous metals and cotton. On the eve of independence, Uzbeki- 
stan was a net importer, with roughly 22 percent of total 



435 



Country Studies 



domestic consumption composed of imports, and with exports 
accounting for 18 percent of production. 

Trade Reform in the 1990s 

Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, foreign trade was 
heavily dependent on the Russian Republic. In the 1980s, more 
than 80 percent of Uzbekistan's foreign trade was within the 
Soviet Union, with Russia accounting for half of imports and 
almost 60 percent of exports. The other Central Asian repub- 
lics accounted for another quarter of Uzbekistan's total foreign 
trade. Even interrepublican trade was directed through Mos- 
cow and organized in the interests of centralized planning 
goals. 

In the early 1990s, the Soviet-era pattern of exported and 
imported products remained approximately the same: nearly 
all ferrous metals and machinery, except that relating to the 
cotton industry, plus about 40 percent of consumer goods and 
processed foods, were imported. A significant aspect of the 
trade balance was that a single item, grain, accounted for 45 
percent of imports in the early 1990s, as the republic imported 
about 75 percent of the grain it consumed. Traditionally strong 
exports are basic metals, cotton-related machinery, textiles, 
agricultural and aviation equipment, fertilizers, and cotton. 

In 1993 about 80 percent of foreign trade, with both former 
Soviet and other partners, was on the basis of bilateral agree- 
ments (see table 23, Appendix). In the early 1990s, such agree- 
ments were heavily regulated by quotas, licenses, and 
distribution controls. In 1993 and 1994, however, the list of 
commodities requiring export licenses was cut in half, import 
licensing virtually ended, and the use of fixed quotas was cut by 
two-thirds. Plans called for adoption of a unified system of 
licenses and quotas in 1995. Private barter agreements with 
partners in the former Soviet Union became illegal in 1993; 
they were replaced by agreements based on international 
prices. In 1994 the government eliminated its tax on foreign- 
currency earnings. 

In 1993 Uzbekistan's current accounts foreign trade deficit 
rose to 9.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary), increasing from 3.1 percent in 1992; at that point, the 
deficit was financed mainly through transactions backed by the 
country's gold supply and by bilateral trade credits — measures 
not sustainable over the long term. Since independence, 
Uzbekistan has made aggressive efforts to expand foreign trade 



436 



Uzbekistan 



and to diversify its trading partners (see Foreign Relations, this 
ch.). Expansion of trade relations beyond the contiguous states 
of the former Soviet Union has been hindered, however, by 
Uzbekistan's landlocked position and the complexity of mov- 
ing goods overland through several countries to reach custom- 
ers (see Transportation, this ch.). 

Foreign Investment 

Although limited, the foreign investment law adopted in 
mid-1991 was a first step in promoting foreign contacts. For- 
eign investment, which moved quite cautiously in the early 
1990s, expanded significantly in 1994 and 1995. By 1995 a vari- 
ety of United States and foreign companies were investing in 
Uzbekistan. The United States Stan Cornelius Enterprises, for 
example, helped cap an oil well blowout at the Mingbulak oil 
field in March 1992, and the company has subsequently estab- 
lished a joint venture with the Uzbekistan State Oil Company 
(Uzbekneft) to develop the oil field and explore and develop 
other oil reserves in the country. The directors of the joint ven- 
ture expect the Mingbulak Field to remain productive for 
twelve to twenty years. Likewise, the Colorado-based Newmont 
Mining Company has established a joint venture valued at 
roughly US$75 million with the Nawoiy Mining and Metallurgi- 
cal Combine and the State Committee for Geology and Min- 
eral Resources of Uzbekistan to produce gold at the Muruntau 
mine. A production rate of eleven tons per year was envisioned 
at the time the project was financed by a consortium of fifteen 
British banks. 

The United States firm Bateman Engineering also is working 
in the gold sector, and various South Korean, Japanese, Turk- 
ish, German, British, and other companies are investing in a 
wide range of industrial and extraction operations including 
oil, sugar, cotton and woolen cloth production, tourism, pro- 
duction of automobiles, trucks, and aircraft, and production of 
medical equipment and ballpoint pens. 

There are some significant barriers to investment. Uzbeki- 
stan's landlocked location makes commerce more difficult for 
potential investors. And, despite new legislation concerning 
such areas as tax holidays, repatriation of profits, and tax incen- 
tives, the investment climate for foreign companies remains 
problematic. The Karimov regime is relatively stable, but highly 
bureaucratic and centralized control, lack of infrastructure, 
and corruption remain major structural impediments that 



437 



Country Studies 

have prevented many joint ventures from getting off the 
ground. Small and medium-sized foreign firms are discouraged 
by persistent corruption among the lower-level officials with 
whom they must deal; larger companies such as Newmont Min- 
ing are able to deal directly with top-level politicians. Enter- 
prise taxation rates vary widely, but the rate for joint ventures 
with more than 30 percent foreign backing is 10 percent. Five- 
year tax exemptions are granted to such firms in specific areas. 
AW firms must pay a 40 percent social insurance tax to fund the 
state's welfare and unemployment programs. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Uzbekistan inherited Soviet-era methodology and systems in 
both its transportation and telecommunications networks. 
That legacy has meant a gradual process of reorientating lines 
whose configuration was determined by Uzbekistan's need for 
a primary connection with the Russian Republic of the Soviet 
Union. 

Transportation 

The Soviet legacy included a relatively solid transportation 
and communications infrastructure in Uzbekistan, at least rela- 
tive to other less developed countries. The landlocked position 
of the country determines Uzbekistan's transportation needs, 
especially as commercial ties are sought with more distant part- 
ners in the post-Soviet era. On the eve of independence in 
1991, Uzbekistan could boast an extensive railway and road 
network that connected all parts of the country. Rail transport 
is the major means of freight transport within Uzbekistan, but 
the country has an extensive road network as well. On the eve 
of independence, Uzbekistan had close to 3,500 kilometers of 
rail lines and nearly 80,000 kilometers of roads. Most cities and 
urban settlements in Uzbekistan also provided local transporta- 
tion networks. In 1991, some seventy-three of 123 urban settle- 
ments offered their citizens internal bus transport, and more 
than 100 offered transport on trolley lines. Although the struc- 
ture of national transportation is regarded as adequate, much 
transportation equipment and application technology is of 
1950s and 1960s vintage (see fig. 14) . 

Railroads 

In 1990 railroads carried about 75 percent of Uzbekistan's 



438 



national boundary 
)nal capital 
jlated place 
oad 
j 

00 Kilometers 



200 Miles 



Muy 



Sariqamisfi 










LIIKISTA 















Figure 14. Uzbekistan: 



440 



Uzbekistan 



freight, excluding materials carried by pipeline. In 1993 the 
rail system included about 3,500 kilometers of track, of which 
270 kilometers were electrified. More than 600 mainline 
engines served the system. However, an estimated 1,000 kilo- 
meters of track require rehabilitation, and 40 percent of the 
locomotive fleet has exceeded its service life. 

Because the main line connecting Uzbekistan with the Black 
Sea crosses the Turkmenistan border twice, the withdrawal of 
the latter country from the Central Asia rail system in 1992 cut 
that line (which also must pass through Kazakstan and Russia) 
into several parts. The segments now are alternately controlled 
by the Turkmenistan! or the Uzbekistani national railroad 
authorities. The Transcaspian Railroad between the Amu 
Darya in the southwest and Tashkent in the northeast is the 
main transportation route within Uzbekistan, connecting 
Bukhoro and Samarqand in the south with the capital city in 
the northeast. The Transcaspian line also has two major spurs 
to other parts of the country. One spur runs southeast from 
Kagan, near Bukhoro, through Qarshi to Termiz, reaching the 
southeastern oases of the Qashqadaryo and Surkhondaryo val- 
leys. The second spur branches from the main Samarqand- 
Tashkent line east of Jizzakh, passing northward to serve the 
Fergana Valley cities of Angren, Andijon, Farghona, and 
Namangan. 

In the Fergana Valley, a number of short spurs reach the 
local mining centers of that region. The Kazalinsk line goes 
northwest from Tashkent, across Kazakstan and into Russia; its 
main role is moving cotton to the Russian mills. Especially for 
natural gas, a pipeline network also is well developed, linking 
Uzbekistan to the neighboring Central Asian countries and to 
the central regions of the former European Soviet Union and 
the Urals. The share of the railroads in passenger transporta- 
tion is much more modest than that in freight transportation; 
in 1990 less than one-third of passenger kilometers was traveled 
on the rails. 

Roads 

The road network in Uzbekistan includes approximately 
67,000 kilometers of surfaced roads and an additional 11,000 
kilometers of unsurfaced roads. At a density of about six kilo- 
meters per 1,000 inhabitants, the network is about twice as 
dense as the average for the entire Soviet Union in 1991 and 
about the same density as the current average for East Euro- 



441 



A 



f Muynoqy & 

^anqamisn % is 
■KuCi S/\\ Nukus 



KAZAKSTAN 





International boundary 




National capital 


• 


Populated place 




Railroad 






+ 


Airport 





100 200 Kilometers 





100 200 Miles 



^ Urganch 



TURKMENISTAN 




r S KYRGYZSTAN 



4- 

Tashkent/ 



Bukhoro ^ ) U — - ^-w^.. ^■•<~ r \ 

\Samarqand 1 x <P> 

Wr-> TAJIKISTAN * 



IRAN 



AFGHANISTAN 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 14. Uzbekistan: Transportation System, 1996 



440 



Country Studies 

pean countries. (Density by territory is about half that of East- 
ern Europe.) 

The highway system carries about one-fourth of freight traf- 
fic and about two-thirds of all passenger traffic (of which the 
bulk is accounted for by bus lines.) The three major stretches 
of highway are the Great Uzbek Highway, which links Tashkent 
and Termiz in the far southeast; the Zarafshon Highway 
between Samarqand and Charjew in northeastern Turkmeni- 
stan; and the connector road between Tashkent and Quqon. 
The Samarqand-Charjew route connects with a road that 
roughly parallels the northwestward course of the Syrdariya 
along the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan border, passing through 
Urganch and Nukus before ending at Muynoq, just south of 
the Aral Sea. The Fergana Ring connects industries and major 
settlements in the Fergana Valley. 

Air Travel 

In 1993 Uzbekistan had nine civilian airports, of which four 
were large enough to land international passenger jets. Tash- 
kent's Yuzhnyy Airport, the largest in the country, now serves as 
a major air link for the other former republics of the Soviet 
Union with South Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as a major 
hub linking Central Asia with Western Europe and the United 
States. The addition of Tashkent to the flight routes of Ger- 
many's national airline, Lufthansa, greatly increased this role, 
and Uzbekistan's own airline, Uzbekistan Airways, flies from 
Tashkent and Samarqand to major cities in Western Europe 
and the Middle East. In 1994 its fleet included about 400 
former Soviet aircraft, including the Yakovlev 40, Antonov 24, 
Tupolev 154, Ilyushin 62, 76, and 86, and two French Airbus 
A310-200s. 

Transportation Policy 

Because of the country's long political isolation from its his- 
torical trading partners to the south, Uzbekistan's transporta- 
tion infrastructure, aside from air transport, is largely designed 
to tie the region to Russia. The only rail outlets are northward. 
Uzbekistan's nearest rail-connected ports are in St. Petersburg, 
3,500 kilometers to the northwest; the Black Sea ports, 3,000 
kilometers to the west; and Vladivostok and the main Chinese 
ports, 5,000 kilometers to the northeast and east, respectively. 
Moscow is 3,500 kilometers away. Such distances add signifi- 
cantly to export prices. For example, the transportation of one 



442 



Uzbekistan 



ton of cotton sold in Western Europe adds as much as US$175 
to the selling price. Land routes to potential customers rely on 
the stability and the transport system reliability of the several 
countries through which Uzbekistani goods must pass. Because 
of these conditions, transportation planners have emphasized 
the availability of alternative routes and modes, relying mainly 
on roads and railroads. To improve versatility, in 1993 the 
national airline signed intergovernmental treaties with China, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, India, Israel, Pakistan, and 
Turkey. 

Connections with the Iranian rail system and with the Paki- 
stani highway system are in the long-term planning stage. 
Under discussion is a series of rail links that would connect 
Central Asia's rail network with those of the region's southern 
neighbors. Rail and road links planned with China through 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan also will expand Uzbekistan's reach 
and help to gradually reverse the influence of Soviet-era com- 
mercial patterns on the configuration of Uzbekistan's transpor- 
tation network. 

Telecommunications 

The Soviet-era telecommunications system was centralized, 
with Moscow acting as the hub for routing international com- 
munications. Investment in this system was generally low 
throughout the Soviet era, leaving the republics with low-qual- 
ity equipment and service that have deteriorated further in the 
first years of independence. In the early 1990s, the installation 
of new lines dropped significantly in Uzbekistan. Recognizing 
the vital role of telecommunications in any modernization pro- 
cess, the government has sought international investment in 
updating its systems. 

Structure 

Beginning in 1992, the Ministry of Communications has had 
responsibility for all modes of telecommunications, plus postal 
service and all print and broadcast media. Its purview also 
extends to construction and some manufacturing operations. 
Its Uzbekistan Telecommunications Administration (Uzbek- 
telecom) includes fourteen enterprises, one in each of the 
country's thirteen regions plus one in Tashkent. Some twenty- 
six other communications enterprises are controlled directly. A 
planning enterprise is in charge of reconfiguring the transmis- 
sion facilities designed by Soviet authorities for broadcast 



443 



Country Studies 



across the entire Soviet Union. Many of the Soviet system's 
technical operations, such as frequency control and interna- 
tional connections, were centered in Moscow, meaning that 
Uzbekistani broadcast personnel have had to absorb all those 
functions without the expertise to manage all the technical 
aspects of an independent national broadcast system. Long- 
term plans call for decreased involvement by the ministry and 
decentralization, with the operation gradually turned over to 
private enterprises. 

Service System 

In 1994 Uzbekistan's telephone system served about 1.46 
million customers, or about 7 percent of the population. Of 
that number, 1.12 million were in urban areas and 340,000 
were rural customers; 1.08 million were residential customers 
and 380,000 were businesses. The official waiting list for tele- 
phone installation included 360,000 individuals, not counting 
an estimated 1 million who had not registered but required ser- 
vice. Average waiting time was three to five years. Of the 1.86 
million lines existing in 1994, nearly all were manufactured in 
the former Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe. An estimated 
20 percent of urban lines used switching equipment that no 
longer was in production, and about half of those lines were at 
least twenty years old. Because of these conditions, lack of 
spare parts is an increasing source of customer dissatisfaction 
and faulty service. Installation efficiency dropped significantly 
in the early 1990s. For example, in Tashkent in 1987 some 
42,500 new telephones were installed; in 1992 only 9,000 new 
telephones were installed, although requests increased to 
50,000 that year. In the mid-1990s, the Ministry of Communica- 
tions lacked the technology to install digital telephone technol- 
ogy. Tashkent is the hub for international telephone 
connections. In 1993 nearly 90 percent of international calls 
passed through that city (only about 0.03 percent of total calls 
made in Uzbekistan were international) . 

In 1993 the Ministry of Communications purchased an Intel- 
sat A satellite earth station and made agreements with several 
Western firms to establish thirty stations of international televi- 
sion broadcast programming from Japan, Southeast Asia, the 
United States (in cooperation with American Telephone and 
Telegraph), Western Europe (through Germany), and Paki- 
stan. The satellite broadcasts were available, however, only in 
targeted locations such as large hotels and government offices. 



444 



Central post office, telephone, and telegraph office, Tashkent 

In 1995 a Turkish satellite began relaying communications to 
Azerbaijan and all the Central Asian states. In 1994 negotia- 
tions among ten regional countries discussed installation of an 
11,000-kilometer fiber-optic link between Europe and Asia, 
which would terminate in Tashkent and provide access to all 
the Central Asian states. 

Government and Politics 

The movement toward economic reform in Uzbekistan has 
not been matched by movement toward democratic reform. 
The government of Uzbekistan has instead tightened its grip 
since independence, cracking down increasingly on opposition 
groups, curbing basic human rights, and making little attempt 
to develop democratic political norms and practices. Although 
the names have changed, the institutions of government 
remain similar to those that existed before the breakup of the 



445 



Country Studies 



Soviet Union. The government has justified its restraint of per- 
sonal liberty and freedom of speech by emphasizing the need 
for stability and a gradual approach to change during the tran- 
sitional period, citing the conflict and chaos in the other 
former republics (most convincingly, neighboring Tajikistan). 
This approach has found credence among a large share of 
Uzbekistan's population, although such a position may not be 
sustainable in the long run. 

Postindependence Changes 

Despite the trappings of institutional change, the first years 
of independence saw more resistance than acceptance of the 
institutional changes required for democratic reform to take 
hold. Whatever initial movement toward democracy existed in 
Uzbekistan in the early days of independence seems to have 
been overcome by the inertia of the remaining Soviet-style 
strong centralized leadership. 

In the Soviet era, Uzbekistan organized its government and 
its local communist party in conformity with the structure pre- 
scribed for all the republics. The Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) occupied the central position in ruling 
the country. The party provided both the guidance and the 
personnel for the government structure. The system was strictly 
bureaucratic: every level of government and every governmen- 
tal body found its mirror image in the party. The tool used by 
the CPSU to control the bureaucracy was the system of nomen- 
klatura, a list of sensitive jobs in the government and other 
important organizations that could be filled only with party 
approval. The nomenklatura defined the Soviet elite, and the 
people on the list invariably were members of the CPSU. 

Following the failure of the coup against the Gorbachev gov- 
ernment in Moscow in August 1991, Uzbekistan's Supreme 
Soviet declared the independence of the republic, henceforth 
to be known as the Republic of Uzbekistan. At the same time, 
the Communist Party of Uzbekistan voted to cut its ties with the 
CPSU; three months later, it changed its name to the People's 
Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU), but the party leader- 
ship, under President Islam Karimov, remained in place. Inde- 
pendence brought a series of institutional changes, but the 
substance of governance in Uzbekistan changed much less dra- 
matically. 

On December 21, 1991, together with the leaders of ten 
other Soviet republics, Karimov agreed to dissolve the Soviet 



446 



Uzbekistan 



Union and form the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS — see Glossary), of which Uzbekistan became a charter 
member according to the Alma-Ata Declaration. Shortly there- 
after, Karimov was elected president of independent Uzbeki- 
stan in the new country's first contested election. Karimov drew 
86 percent of the vote against opposition candidate Moham- 
med Salikh, whose showing experts praised in view of charges 
that the election had been rigged. The major opposition party, 
Birlik, had been refused registration as an official party in time 
for the election. 

In 1992 the PDPU retained the dominant position in the 
executive and legislative branches of government that the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan had enjoyed. All true opposi- 
tion groups were repressed and physically discouraged. Birlik, 
the original opposition party formed by intellectuals in 1989, 
was banned for allegedly subversive activities, establishing the 
Karimov regime's dominant rationalization for increased 
authoritarianism: Islamic fundamentalism threatened to over- 
throw the secular state and establish an Islamic regime similar 
to that in Iran. The constitution ratified in December 1992 
reaffirmed that Uzbekistan is a secular state. Although the con- 
stitution prescribed a new form of legislature, the PDPU-domi- 
nated Supreme Soviet remained in office for nearly two years 
until the first parliamentary election, which took place in 
December 1994 and January 1995. 

In 1993 Karimov's concern about the spread of Islamic fun- 
damentalism spurred Uzbekistan's participation in the multi- 
national CIS peacekeeping force sent to quell the civil war in 
nearby Tajikistan — a force that remained in place three years 
later because of continuing hostilities. Meanwhile, in 1993 and 
1994 continued repression by the Karimov regime brought 
strong criticism from international human rights organiza- 
tions. In March 1995, Karimov took another step in the same 
direction by securing a 99 percent majority in a referendum on 
extending his term as president from the prescribed next elec- 
tion in 1997 to 2000. In early 1995, Karimov announced a new 
policy of toleration for opposition parties and coalitions, 
apparently in response to the need to improve Uzbekistan's 
international commercial position. A few new parties were reg- 
istered in 1995, although the degree of their opposition to the 
government was doubtful, and some imprisonments of opposi- 
tion political figures continued. 



447 



Country Studies 

The parliamentary election, the first held under the new 
constitution's guarantee of universal suffrage to all citizens 
eighteen years of age or older, excluded all parties except the 
PDPU and the progovernment Progress of the Fatherland 
Party, despite earlier promises that all parties would be free to 
participate. The new, 250-seat parliament, called the Oly Majlis 
or Supreme Soviet, included only sixty-nine candidates run- 
ning for the PDPU, but an estimated 120 more deputies were 
PDPU members technically nominated to represent local coun- 
cils rather than the PDPU. The result was that Karimov's solid 
majority continued after the new parliament went into office. 

The Constitution 

From the beginning of his presidency, Karimov remained 
committed in words to instituting democratic reforms. A new 
constitution was adopted by the legislature in December 1992. 
Officially it creates a separation of powers among a strong pres- 
idency, the Oly Majlis, and a judiciary. In practice, however, 
these changes have been largely cosmetic. Uzbekistan remains 
among the most authoritarian states in Central Asia. Although 
the language of the new constitution includes many demo- 
cratic features, it can be superseded by executive decrees and 
legislation, and often constitutional law simply is ignored. 

The president, who is directly elected to a five-year term that 
can be repeated once, is the head of state and is granted 
supreme executive power by the constitution. As commander 
in chief of the armed forces, the president also may declare a 
state of emergency or of war. The president is empowered to 
appoint the prime minister and full cabinet of ministers and 
the judges of the three national courts, subject to the approval 
of the Oly Majlis, and to appoint all members of lower courts. 
The president also has the power to dissolve the parliament, in 
effect negating the Oly Majlis's veto power over presidential 
nominations in a power struggle situation. 

Deputies to the unicameral Oly Majlis, the highest legislative 
body, are elected to five-year terms. The body may be dismissed 
by the president with the concurrence of the Constitutional 
Court; because that court is subject to presidential appoint- 
ment, the dismissal clause weights the balance of power heavily 
toward the executive branch. The Oly Majlis enacts legislation, 
which may be initiated by the president, within the parliament, 
by the high courts, by the procurator general (highest law 
enforcement official in the country), or by the government of 



448 



Uzbekistan 



the Autonomous Province of Karakalpakstan. Besides legisla- 
tion, international treaties, presidential decrees, and states of 
emergency also must be ratified by the Oly Majlis. 

The national judiciary includes the Supreme Court, the 
Constitutional Court, and the High Economic Court. Lower 
court systems exist at the regional, district, and town levels. 
Judges at all levels are appointed by the president and 
approved by the Oly Majlis. Nominally independent of the 
other branches of government, the courts remain under com- 
plete control of the executive branch. As in the system of the 
Soviet era, the procurator general and his regional and local 
equivalents are both the state's chief prosecuting officials and 
the chief investigators of criminal cases, a configuration that 
limits the pretrial rights of defendants. 

Local Government 

The country is divided into twelve provinces (wiloyatlar, 
sing., wiloyat), one autonomous republic (the Karakalpakstan 
Republic), 156 regions, and 123 cities. In Uzbekistan's system 
of strong central government, local government has little inde- 
pendence. The chief executive of each province and of Tash- 
kent is the hakim, who is appointed by the president. Although 
these appointments must be confirmed by local legislative bod- 
ies that are elected by popular vote, the power of the president 
is dominant. The Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan also 
officially elects its own legislature; the chairman of the legisla- 
ture serves as the republic's head of state and as a deputy chair- 
man of the national parliament. But in the autonomous 
republic, too, government officials are generally powerless 
against Tashkent. Indeed, Karakalpak officials often are not 
included even in meetings of heads of state to discuss the fate 
of the Aral Sea, which is located within Karakalpakstan. 

Opposition Parties 

Through the early 1990s, the government's stated goal of 
creating a multiparty democracy in Uzbekistan went unreal- 
ized. When independence was gained, the Communist Party of 
Uzbekistan was officially banned, but its successor, the PDPU, 
assumed the personnel, structure, and political domination of 
its predecessor. Since forcing out a small number of deputies 
from opposition parties, PDP members have complete control 
of the Supreme Soviet, and most members of other govern- 
ment bodies also are PDP members. The only other legal party 



449 



Country Studies 



in Uzbekistan, the Progress of the Fatherland Party, was created 
by a key adviser to President Karimov, ostensibly to give the 
country a semblance of a multiparty system; but it differs little 
in substance from the PDP. 

Of the several legitimate opposition parties that emerged in 
Uzbekistan before the collapse of the Soviet Union, none has 
been able to meet the official registration requirements that 
the government created to maintain control and exclude them 
from the public arena. The first opposition party, Birlik, was 
created in 1989, primarily by intellectuals and writers under 
the leadership of the writer Abdurakhim Pulatov (see The 
1980s, this ch.). The movement attempted to draw attention to 
problems ranging from environmental and social concerns to 
economic challenges, and to participate in their solution. The 
main weakness of Birlik was that it never was able to present a 
united front to the government. Soon after the party's estab- 
lishment, a group of Birlik leaders left to set up a political 
party, Erk (Freedom), under the leadership of Mohammed 
Salikh. The Uzbek government was able to exploit the disunity 
of the opposition and eventually to undermine their position. 
Following the establishment of independent Uzbekistan, the 
Karimov regime was able to suppress both Birlik and Erk. Both 
parties were banned officially; Erk was reinstated in 1994. 

Other parties include the Movement for Democratic 
Reforms, the Islamic Rebirth Party (banned by the government 
in 1992), the Humaneness and Charity group, and the Uzbeki- 
stan Movement. A former prime minister (1990-91) and vice 
president (1991) of Uzbekistan, Shukrullo Mirsaidov, created a 
new party, Adolat (Justice) in December 1994. Like Birlik and 
Erk, the new party calls for liberal economic reforms, political 
pluralism, and a secular society, but experts describe its opposi- 
tion to the government as quite moderate. Nevertheless, Ado- 
lat has not been able to operate freely. 

In 1995 opposition parties continued to be divided among 
themselves, further diluting their potential effectiveness, and 
many of the leaders have been either imprisoned or exiled. In 
mid-1995, Mohammed Salikh was in Germany; Abdurakhim 
Pulatov was in exile in Turkey; and his brother Abdumannob 
Pulatov, also active in the opposition and a victim of brutal gov- 
ernment oppression, took refuge in the United States. 

The Media 

Despite the fact that the constitution explicitly bans censor- 



450 




Library and reception rooms of Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet, Tashkent 

ship, press censorship is routine. In 1992 twelve daily newspa- 
pers, with a total circulation of 452,000, were published. In 
1993 the government required all periodicals to register, and 
the applications of all independent titles were denied. In early 
1996, no independent press had emerged, and all forms of 
information dissemination were monitored closely. The largest 
daily newspapers were Khalk Suzi (People's World), the organ 
of the Oly Majlis; Narodnoye Slovo, a Russian-language govern- 
ment daily; Pravda Vostoka, an organ of the Oly Majlis and the 
cabinet, in Russian; and Uzbekiston Adabiyoti va San'ati (Uzbeki- 
stan Literature and Art), the organ of the Union of Writers of 
Uzbekistan. The only news agency was the government-con- 
trolled Uzbekistan Telegraph Agency (UzTAG). 

Human Rights 

Despite extensive constitutional protections, the Karimov 



451 



Country Studies 

government has actively suppressed the rights of political 
movements, continues to ban unsanctioned public meetings 
and demonstrations, and continues to arrest opposition figures 
on fabricated charges. The atmosphere of repression reduces 
constructive opposition and freedom of expression, and con- 
tinues to distort the political process, even when institutional 
changes have been made. In the mid-1990s, legislation estab- 
lished significant rights for independent trade unions, separate 
from the government, and enhanced individual rights; but 
enforcement is uneven, and the role of the state security ser- 
vices remains central (see Internal Security, this ch.). 

Amnesty International, the Human Rights Watch, and the 
United States Department of State consistently have identified 
the human rights record of Uzbekistan as among the worst in 
the former Soviet Union. With the exception of sporadic liber- 
alization, all opposition movements and independent media 
are essentially banned in Uzbekistan. The early 1990s were 
characterized by arrests and beatings of opposition figures on 
fabricated charges. For example, one prominent Uzbek, Ibra- 
him Bureyev, was arrested in 1994 after announcing plans to 
form a new opposition party. After reportedly being freed just 
before the March referendum, Bureyev shortly thereafter was 
arrested again on a charge of possessing illegal firearms and 
drugs. In April 1995, fewer than two weeks after the referen- 
dum extending President Karimov's term, six dissidents were 
sentenced to prison for distributing the party newspaper of Erk 
and inciting the overthrow of Karimov. Members of opposition 
groups have been harassed by Uzbekistan's secret police as far 
away as Moscow. 

Foreign Relations 

Uzbekistan's location, bordering the volatile Middle East, as 
well as its rich natural resources and commercial potential, 
thrust it into the international arena almost immediately upon 
gaining independence. During the early 1990s, wariness of 
renewed Russian control led Uzbekistan increasingly to seek 
ties with other countries. Indeed, little over a year after inde- 
pendence, Uzbekistan had been recognized by 120 countries 
and had opened or planned to open thirty-nine foreign embas- 
sies. Experts believed that in this situation Uzbekistan would 
turn first to neighboring countries such as Iran and Turkey. 
Although the cultural kinship and proximity of those countries 
has encouraged closer relations, Uzbekistan also has shown 



452 



Uzbekistan 



eagerness to work with a range of partners to create a complex 
web of interrelationships that includes its immediate Central 
Asian neighbors, Russia and other nations of the CIS, and the 
immediate Middle Eastern world, with the goal of becoming an 
integral part of the international community on its own terms. 

Central Asian States 

Chief among Uzbekistan's foreign policy challenges is estab- 
lishing relations with the other Central Asian states, which at 
the beginning of the 1990s still were simply neighboring 
administrative units in the same country. The ties that emerged 
between Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian states in the 
first years of independence are a combination of competition 
and cooperation. 

Because they have similar economic structures defined by a 
focus on raw material extraction and cotton and by the need to 
divide scarce resources such as water among them, the inher- 
ent competition among them contains the potential for enor- 
mous strife. This condition was emphasized, for example, in 
May 1993, when Uzbekistan halted the flow of natural gas to 
Kyrgyzstan in response to that country's introduction of a new 
currency. 

The potential for strife is exacerbated by the perception of 
the other Central Asian states that Uzbekistan seeks to play a 
dominant role in the region. As the only Central Asian state 
bordering on all the others, Uzbekistan is well placed geo- 
graphically to become the dominant power in the region. And 
Uzbekistan has done little to contradict the notion that it has 
historically based claims on the other Central Asian states: as 
the historical center of the Quqon and Bukhoro khanates, for 
example, Uzbekistan believes that it can claim parts of Kyr- 
gyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakstan. Uzbekistan's large and 
relatively homogeneous population provides it a distinct advan- 
tage in exerting control over other republics. Uzbeks also con- 
stitute a significant percentage of the populations of the other 
Central Asian states. For example, roughly one-fourth of Tajiki- 
stan's population is Uzbek, and large numbers of Uzbeks popu- 
late southern Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakstan. And 
Uzbekistan's active role in aiding the communist government 
of Imomali Rahmonov to defeat its opposition in the long- 
standing civil war in Tajikistan has demonstrated that it is well 
prepared to use its own armed forces — which are the best 
armed in Central Asia — to promote its own strategic interests 



453 



Country Studies 



(see The Armed Forces, this ch.). The government of Uzbeki- 
stan already has declared its right to intervene to protect 
Uzbeks living outside its borders. 

At the same time, however, economic and political exigen- 
cies have also required close cooperation between Uzbekistan 
and the other Central Asian states. The near collapse of their 
respective economies and the need to reduce their economic 
dependence on Russia have also encouraged ties among the 
Central Asian republics, including Uzbekistan. Isolated from 
Moscow in some ways and manipulated by Moscow in others, 
Uzbekistan has found it especially advantageous to enhance 
relations with Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. In January 1994, fol- 
lowing their formal departure from the ruble zone in Novem- 
ber 1993, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan agreed to create their own 
economic zone to allow for free circulation of goods, services, 
and capital within the two republics and to coordinate policies 
on credit and finance, budgets, taxes, customs duties, and cur- 
rency until the year 2000. Although many other former repub- 
lics had made similar statements of intent, this marked the first 
firm economic agreement between two former republics 
within the CIS. 

Since its signing, this agreement has expanded its coverage 
for the two charter nations and by the addition of a third signa- 
tory, Kyrgyzstan. In April 1994, the agreement was extended 
among all three former republics to abolish all customs con- 
trols; and in July 1994, the leaders of the three states met in 
Almaty to agree to a program of greater economic integration 
in what they have identified as their "Unified Economic Space." 
This agreement produced the first steps toward a modicum of 
institutional change, such as the creation of a Central Asian 
Bank and an interstate council to formalize bilateral ties. It also 
marked a commitment for further expansion of direct ties. 

Renewed cooperation between Uzbekistan and the other 
Central Asian states also has been evidenced in areas such as 
joint efforts to address the Aral Sea problem. For some time 
even before the breakup of the Soviet Union, conferences and 
declarations by leaders in Central Asia had called for more 
cooperation among the five Central Asian republics to resolve 
the problem of the Aral Sea and regional use of water 
resources. In December 1992, with World Bank (see Glossary) 
support, President Karimov took the lead in proposing the cre- 
ation of a strong, unified interstate organization to resolve the 
problems of the Aral Sea. The heads of state of all of the Cen- 



454 



Uzbekistan 



tral Asian republics have met several times to coordinate activi- 
ties, and all members pledged roughly 1 percent of their 
respective GDPs toward an Aral Sea fund. Although compli- 
ance has varied, this type of constructive and unified approach 
to a mutual problem remained theoretical in the early 1990s. 

Russia and the CIS 

Equally unclear is the long-term direction of Uzbekistan's 
relations with Russia. Having had independence thrust upon 
them by events in Moscow in 1991, the new Central Asian 
states, Uzbekistan among them, pressed to become "founding 
members" of the CIS on December 21, 1991. It was clear that 
none of the countries in that group could soon disentangle the 
complex of economic and military links that connected them 
with the Slavic members of the new CIS, and especially with 
Russia. In Uzbekistan's case, this limitation was characterized 
mainly by the significant Russian population in Uzbekistan (at 
that time, nearly 2 million people in a population of 22 mil- 
lion), by certain common interests in the region, and by the 
close entanglement of the Uzbek economy with the Russian, 
with the former more dependent on the latter. 

Since achieving independence, Uzbekistan's foreign policy 
toward Russia has fluctuated widely between cooperation and 
public condemnation of Russia for exacerbating Uzbekistan's 
internal problems. Serious irritants in the relationship have 
been Russia's demand that Uzbekistan deposit a large portion 
of its gold reserves in the Russian Central Bank in order to 
remain in the ruble zone (which became a primary rationale 
for Uzbekistan's introduction of its own national currency in 
1993) and Russia's strong pressure to provide Russians in 
Uzbekistan with dual citizenship. In 1994 and 1995, a trend 
within Russia toward reasserting more control over the regions 
that Russian foreign policy makers characterize as the "near 
abroad," boosted by the seeming dominance of conservative 
forces in this area in Moscow, has only compounded Uzbeki- 
stan's wariness of relations with Russia. 

In its period of post-Soviet transformation, Uzbekistan also 
has found it advantageous to preserve existing links with Russia 
and the other former Soviet republics. For that pragmatic rea- 
son, since the beginning of 1994 Uzbekistan has made particu- 
lar efforts to improve relations with the other CIS countries. 
Between 1993 and early 1996, regional cooperation was most 
visible in Tajikistan, where Uzbekistani troops fought alongside 



455 



Country Studies 



Russian troops, largely because of the two countries' shared 
emphasis on Islamic fundamentalism as an ostensible threat to 
Central Asia and to Russia's southern border. And 1994 and 
1995 saw increased efforts to widen economic ties with Russia 
and the other CIS states. Economic and trade treaties have 
been signed with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyr- 
gyzstan, and Kazakstan, and collective security and/or military 
agreements have been signed with Russia, Armenia, and other 
Central Asian states. Largely because of its important role in 
Uzbekistan's national security, Russia has retained the role of 
preferred partner in nonmilitary treaties as well (see External 
Security Conditions, this ch.). 

The Middle East and Pakistan 

Because of Uzbekistan's long historical and cultural ties to 
the Persian, Turkish, and Arab worlds, its immediate neighbors 
to the south — Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey — were the natural 
direction for expanded foreign relations. Although cultural 
relations with formerly dominant Iran and Turkey ended with 
the Soviet Revolution in 1917, Uzbekistan's relations with its 
southern neighbors increased dramatically after indepen- 
dence. Iran and Turkey have been especially active in pursuing 
economic projects and social, cultural, and diplomatic initia- 
tives in Uzbekistan. Turkey was the first country to recognize 
Uzbekistan and among the first to open an embassy in Tash- 
kent. The Turks made early commitments for expansion of 
trade and cooperation, including the promise to fund 2,000 
scholarships for Uzbek students to study in Turkey. Uzbekistan 
also has been the recipient of most of the US$700 million in 
credits that Turkey has given the new Central Asian states. 

Although initially apprehensive about the spread of an Ira- 
nian-style Islamic fundamentalist movement in Central Asia, 
Uzbekistan also has found mutual economic interests with 
Iran, and the two have pursued overland links and other joint 
ventures. Relations with Pakistan have followed suit, with par- 
ticular commercial interest in hydroelectric power, gas pipe- 
lines, and other projects. And a meeting of the heads of state of 
Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in Turkmenistan in early 1995 
underscored the continuing interest of those countries in the 
Central Asian region as a whole. 

One forum that has emerged as a potentially important 
structure for cooperation among these countries has been the 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO — see Glossary), a 



456 



Uzbekistan 



loose regional economic organization to foster trade and coop- 
eration among its members in the Middle East and South Asia. 
Although during its almost two decades of existence ECO has 
achieved little concrete economic cooperation, in November 
1992 the inclusion of the five new Central Asian states, Afghan- 
istan, and Azerbaijan brought significant efforts to reinvigorate 
the organization. At a meeting in Quetta, Pakistan, in February 
1993, an ambitious plan was announced to create a new 
regional economic bloc among ECO's members by the year 
2000. The plan calls for expanding ties in all economic sectors, 
in training, and in tourism; setting up an effective transporta- 
tion infrastructure; and ultimately abolishing restrictions limit- 
ing the free flow of people and commodities. Energy trade also 
is to be expanded through the laying of oil and gas pipelines 
and power transmission lines throughout the region. Given 
ECO's past performance, however, in 1996 the potential for ful- 
fillment of such plans was quite unclear. 

Trade and cooperation agreements have also been signed 
with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other Middle Eastern states. 
The pragmatic rather than religious background of such 
endeavors is underscored by Uzbekistan's rapidly expanding 
ties with Israel, a nation that shares none of the history and cul- 
ture of Uzbekistan. Following a visit of Israeli Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres to Uzbekistan in July 1994, Israel and Uzbekistan 
signed agreements expanding commercial relations, protect- 
ing foreign investments and the development of business ties, 
aviation links, and tourism. In the early 1990s, Israel's long par- 
ticipation in Uzbekistani irrigation projects has been supple- 
mented by aid projects in health care, industry, and the two 
countries' common battle against radical Islamic groups. 

China 

China also has sought to develop relations with Central Asia. 
This was highlighted in May 1994, by the visit of the Chinese 
premier, Li Peng, to Tashkent. Since 1991 China has become 
the second largest trading partner in Central Asia after Russia. 
During Li Peng's visit, Uzbekistan and China signed four agree- 
ments designed to increase trade, including the granting of a 
Chinese loan to Uzbekistan, the establishment of air freight 
transport between the two countries, and the Chinese purchase 
of Uzbekistani cotton and metals. The two countries also 
agreed to settle all territorial disputes through negotiation, and 
they found common territory in their desire to reform their 



457 



Country Studies 



economies without relinquishing strict political control. At the 
same time, however, policy makers in Uzbekistan also view 
China as one of Uzbekistan's chief potential threats, requiring 
the same kind of balanced approach as that adopted toward 
Russia. Indeed, despite the large volume of trade between 
China and Central Asia, China is lowest on the list of desired 
trading partners and international donors among Uzbekistan's 
population. In a 1993 survey, only about 3 percent of respon- 
dents believed that China is a desirable source of foreign finan- 
cial assistance. 

Western Europe and Japan 

In the first four years of independence, the West occupied 
an increasing place in Uzbekistan's foreign policy. As relations 
with its immediate neighbors have been expanding, pragmatic 
geopolitical and economic considerations have come to domi- 
nate ethnic and religious identities as motivations for policy 
decisions. This approach has increased the interest of the 
Uzbekistani government in expanding ties with the West and 
with Japan. 

In the early 1990s, Uzbekistan became a member of the 
United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — see Glossary), the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE — see Glossary), the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and a number of other 
international organizations. In that context, Uzbekistan is the 
beneficiary of several aid projects of varying magnitudes. The 
World Bank has designed missions and projects totaling hun- 
dreds of millions of dollars for such programs as the Cotton 
Sub-Sector Development Program to improve farm productiv- 
ity, income, and international cotton marketing conditions and 
a program to address the problems of the Aral Sea. In April 
1995, the World Bank allocated US$160 million in credit to 
Uzbekistan. In February 1995, the IMF approved a loan to sup- 
port the Uzbekistani government's macroeconomic stabiliza- 
tion and systemic reform program. The first installment of the 
loan, roughly US$75 million, will be funded over a ten-year 
period; the second installment is to follow six months later, 
provided the government's macroeconomic stabilization pro- 
gram is being implemented. The European Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development (EBRD) likewise approved several 
million dollars for projects in Uzbekistan. These signs of 



458 



World Bank offices, Tashkent 
Courtesy KS. Sangam Iyer 



greater involvement by the international community in Uzbeki- 
stan are largely stimulated by the political stability that the gov- 
ernment has been able to maintain and in disregard of the 
human rights record, but many investors still are cautious. 

The United States 

The United States recognized Uzbekistan as an independent 
state in December 1991; diplomatic relations were established 
in February 1992, following a visit by Secretary of State James 
Baker to the republic, and the United States opened an 
embassy in Tashkent the following month. During 1992, a vari- 
ety of United States aid programs were launched. Operation 
Provide Hope delivered an estimated US$6 million of food and 
medical supplies for emergency relief of civilians affected by 
the Tajik civil war; the Peace Corps sent its first group of about 



459 



Country Studies 

fifty volunteers to Uzbekistan; an agreement with the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) began encouraging 
United States private investment in Uzbekistan by providing 
direct loans and loan guarantees and helping to match projects 
with potential investors; and humanitarian and technical assis- 
tance began to move to a wide range of recipients. In 1993 the 
United States granted Uzbekistan most-favored-nation trade 
status, which went into force in January 1994. In March 1994, a 
bilateral assistance agreement and an open lands agreement 
were signed. In 1995 a variety of investment and other treaties 
were under discussion, and several United States non-govern- 
mental organizations were initiating joint projects throughout 
Uzbekistan. 

In the first two years of Uzbekistan's independence, the 
United States provided roughly US$17 million in humanitarian 
assistance andUS$13 million in technical assistance. For a time, 
continued human rights violations in Uzbekistan led to signifi- 
cant restrictions in the bilateral relationship, and Uzbekistan 
received significantly less United States assistance than many of 
the other former Soviet republics. Because Uzbekistan was slow 
to adopt fundamental economic reforms, nonhumanitarian 
United States assistance was largely restricted to programs that 
support the building of democratic institutions and market 
reform. By the end of 1995, however, United States-Uzbekistan 
relations were improving, and significantly more bilateral eco- 
nomic activity was expected in 1996. 

National Security 

As it declared independence, Uzbekistan found itself in a 
much better national security position than did many other 
Soviet republics. In 1992 Uzbekistan took over much of the 
command structure and armaments of the Turkestan Military 
District, which was headquartered in Tashkent as the defense 
organization of the region of Central Asia under the Soviet sys- 
tem. With the abolition of that district the same year and a sub- 
sequent reduction and localization of military forces, 
Uzbekistan quickly built its own military establishment, which 
featured a gradually decreasing Slavic contingent in its officer 
corps. That inheritance from the Soviet era has enabled post- 
Soviet Uzbekistan to assume a role as an important military 
player in Central Asia and as the successor to Russia as the chief 
security force in the region. Following independence, Uzbeki- 
stan accepted all of the relevant arms control obligations that 



460 



Uzbekistan 



had been assumed by the former Soviet Union, and it has 
acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnu- 
clear state. 

External Security Conditions 

Although its forces are small by international standards, 
Uzbekistan is rated as the strongest military power among the 
five Central Asian nations. In 1992 the Karimov regime sent 
military forces to Tajikistan to support forces of the old-guard 
communist Tajik government struggling to regain political 
power and oust the coalition government that had replaced 
them. Karimov's policy toward Tajikistan was to use military 
force in maintaining a similarly authoritarian regime to the 
immediate east. Although Tajikistan's civil war has had occa- 
sional destabilizing effects in parts of Uzbekistan, paramilitary 
Tajikistani oppositionist forces have not been strong enough to 
confront Uzbekistan's regular army. In the early 1990s, small- 
scale fighting occurred periodically between Tajikistani and 
Uzbekistani forces in the Fergana Valley. 

In the mid-1990s, no military threat to Uzbekistan existed. 
An area of territorial contention is the Osh region at the far 
eastern end of the Fergana Valley where Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 
clashed violently in 1990 (see Recent History, ch. 2). The 
Uzbeks have used the minority Uzbek population in Osh as a 
reason to demand autonomous status for the Osh region; the 
Kyrgyz fear that such a change would lead to incorporating the 
region into Uzbekistan. The primary role of the Uzbekistan 
Armed Forces is believed to be maintaining internal security. 
This is possible because Uzbekistan remains protected by Rus- 
sia under most conditions of external threat. 

As defined in the 1992 Law on Defense, Uzbekistan's mili- 
tary doctrine is strictly defensive, with no territorial ambitions 
against any other state. Although its policy on the presence of 
CIS or Russian weapons has not been stated clearly, Uzbeki- 
stan's overall military doctrine does not permit strategic weap- 
ons in the inventory of the Uzbekistani armed forces. 
Battlefield chemical weapons, believed to have been in the 
republic during the Soviet period, allegedly have been 
returned to the Russian Federation. In 1994 Uzbekistan, like 
most of the other former Soviet republics, became a member 
of the Partnership for Peace program of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary), providing the 
basis for some joint military exercises with Western forces. 



461 



Country Studies 



Background of Military Development 

One week after independence was declared in August 1991, 
Uzbekistan established a Ministry for Defense Affairs. The first 
minister of defense was charged with negotiating with the 
Soviet Union the future disposition of Soviet military units in 
Uzbekistan. In enforcing its independent status in military mat- 
ters, a primary consideration was abolishing the Soviet Union's 
recruitment of Uzbekistani citizens for service in other parts of 
the union and abroad. For this purpose, a Department of Mili- 
tary Mobilization was established. In early 1992, when interna- 
tional interest in a joint CIS force waned, the Ministry for 
Defense Affairs of Uzbekistan took over the Tashkent head- 
quarters of the former Soviet Turkestan Military District. The 
ministry also assumed jurisdiction over the approximately 
60,000 Soviet military troops in Uzbekistan, with the exception 
of those remaining under the designation "strategic forces of 
the Joint CIS Command." In the same period, the Supreme 
Soviet approved laws establishing national defense procedures, 
conditions for military service, social and legal welfare of ser- 
vice personnel, and the legal status of CIS strategic forces. 

A presidential decree in March 1992 declared the number of 
former Soviet troops in Uzbekistan to exceed strategic require- 
ments and the financial resources of Uzbekistan. With the sub- 
sequent abolition of the Turkestan Military District, Uzbekistan 
established a Ministry of Defense, replacing the Ministry for 
Defense Affairs. The CIS Tashkent Agreement of May 15, 1992, 
distributed former Soviet troops and equipment among the 
former republics in which they were stationed. Among the 
units that Uzbekistan inherited by that agreement were a 
fighter-bomber regiment at Chirchiq, an engineer brigade, and 
an airborne brigade at Farghona. 

For the first two years, the command structure of the new 
force was dominated by the Russians and other Slav officers 
who had been in command in 1992. In 1992 some 85 percent 
of officers and ten of fifteen generals were Slavs. In the first 
year, Karimov appointed Uzbeks to the positions of assistant 
minister of defense and chief of staff, and a Russian veteran of 
the Afghan War to the position of commander of the Rapid 
Reaction Forces. Lieutenant General Rustam Akhmedov, an 
Uzbek, has been minister of defense since the establishment of 
the ministry. In 1993 Uzbekistan nationalized the three former 
Soviet military schools in Tashkent. 



462 



Uzbekistan 



The Armed Forces 

The president of Uzbekistan is the commander in chief of 
the armed forces, and he has authority to appoint and dismiss 
all senior commanders. The minister of defense and the chief 
of staff have operational and administrative control. Since early 
1992, President Karimov has exercised his supreme authority 
in making appointments and in the application of military 
power. The staff structure of the armed forces retains the con- 
figuration of the Turkestan Military District. The structure 
includes an Operational and Mobilization Organization Direc- 
torate and departments of intelligence, signals, transport, CIS 
affairs, aviation, air defense, and missile troops and artillery. In 
1996 total military strength was estimated at about 25,000. The 
armed forces are divided into four main components: ground 
defense forces, air force, air defense, and national guard. 

Army 

The ground defense forces, largest of the four branches, 
numbered 20,400 troops in 1996, of which about 30 percent 
were professional soldiers serving by contract and the remain- 
der were conscripts. The forces are divided into an army corps 
of three motorized rifle brigades, one tank regiment, one engi- 
neer brigade, one artillery brigade, two artillery regiments, one 
airborne brigade, and aviation, logistics, and communications 
support units. The ground forces' primary mission is to con- 
duct rapid-reaction operations in cooperation with other 
branches. Combined headquarters are at Tashkent; the head- 
quarters of the 360th Motor Rifle Division is at Termiz, and 
that of the Airmobile Division is at Farghona. (Although the 
force structure provides for no division-level units, they are des- 
ignated as such for the purpose of assigning headquarters.) 

In 1996 Uzbekistan's active arsenal of conventional military 
equipment included 179 main battle tanks; 383 armored per- 
sonnel carriers and infantry vehicles; 323 artillery pieces; forty- 
five surface-to-air missiles; and fifteen antitank guns. 

Air Force and Air Defense 

A treaty signed in March 1994 by Russia and Uzbekistan 
defines the terms of Russian assistance in training, allocation of 
air fields, communications, and information on air space and 
air defense installations. In 1995 almost all personnel in 
Uzbekistan's air force were ethnic Russians. The Chirchiq 



463 



Country Studies 

Fighter Bomber Regiment, taken over in the initial phase of 
nationalization of former Soviet installations, has since been 
scaled down by eliminating older aircraft, with the goal of 
reaching a force of 100 fixed-wing aircraft and thirty-two armed 
helicopters. According to the Soviet structure still in place, sep- 
arate air and air defense forces operate in support of ground 
forces; air force doctrine conforms with Soviet doctrine. Some 
thirteen air bases are active. 

In 1994 Uzbekistan's inventory of aircraft was still in the pro- 
cess of reduction to meet treaty requirements. At that stage, the 
air force was reported to have two types of interceptor jet, 
twenty of the outmoded MiG-21 and thirty of the more sophis- 
ticated MiG-29. For close air support, forty MiG-27s (founda- 
tion of the Chirchiq regiment) and ten Su-l7Ms were 
operational. Twenty An-2 light transport planes, six An-12BP 
transports, and ten An-26 transports made up the air force's 
transport fleet. Training aircraft included twenty L-39C 
advanced trainers and an unknown number of Yak-52 basic 
trainers. Six Mi-8P/T transport helicopters were available. The 
air defense system consisted of twenty operational Nudelman 
9K31 low-altitude surface-to-air missiles, which in 1994 were 
controlled by two Russian air defense regiments deployed 
along the Afghan border. 

National Guard 

The National Guard was created immediately after indepen- 
dence (August 1991) as an internal security force under the 
direct command of the president, to replace the Soviet Inter- 
nal Troops that had provided internal security until that time. 
Although plans called for a force of 1,000 troops including a 
ceremonial guard company, a special purpose detachment, 
and a motorized rifle regiment, reports indicate that only one 
battalion of the motorized rifle regiment had been formed in 
1994. The National Guard forces in Tashkent, thought to num- 
ber about 700, moved under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Internal Security in 1994. 

Border Guards 

The Uzbekistan Border Troop Command was established in 
March 1992, on the basis of the former Soviet Central Asian 
Border Troops District. In 1994 the Frontier Guard, as it is also 
called, came under the control of the Ministry of Internal 
Security. The force, comprising about 1,000 troops in 1996, is 



464 



Uzbekistan 



under the command of a deputy chairman of the National 
Security Committee, which formerly was the Uzbekistan Com- 
mittee for State Security (KGB). The Frontier Guard works 
closely with the Russian Border Troops Command under the 
terms of a 1992 agreement that provides for Russian training of 
all Uzbekistani border troops and joint control of the Afghan 
border. 

Military Training 

Three major Soviet-built training facilities are the founda- 
tion of the military training program. The General Weapons 
Command Academy in Tashkent trains noncommissioned offi- 
cers (NCOs); the Military Driving Academy in Samarqand is a 
transport school; and the Chirchiq Tank School trains armor 
units. In 1993 all three schools were stripped of the Soviet-style 
honorific names they bore during the Soviet period. Plans call 
for expansion of the three schools. Bilateral agreements with 
Russia and Turkey also provide for training of Uzbekistani 
troops in those countries. For aircraft training, Uzbekistan 
retains some Aero L-39C Albatross turbofan trainers and pis- 
ton-engine Yak-52 basic trainers that had been used by the 
Soviet-era air force reserves. 

Internal Security 

Uzbekistan defines its most important security concerns not 
only in terms of the potential for military conflict, but also in 
terms of domestic threats. Primary among those threats are the 
destabilizing effects of trafficking in narcotics and weapons 
into and across Uzbekistani territory. Although the govern- 
ment has recognized the dangers of such activities to society, 
enforcement often is stymied by corruption in law enforce- 
ment agencies. 

Narcotics 

With an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 hectares of domestic 
opium poppy grown annually, Uzbekistan's society long has 
been exposed to the availability of domestic narcotics as well as 
to the influx of drugs across the border from Afghanistan 
(often byway of Tajikistan). Since independence, border secu- 
rity with Afghanistan and among the former Soviet Central 
Asian republics has become more lax, intensifying the external 
source problem. Uzbekistan is centrally located in its region, 
and the transportation systems through Tashkent make that 



465 



Country Studies 



city an attractive hub for narcotics movement from the Central 
Asian fields to destinations in Western Europe and elsewhere 
in the CIS. 

In 1992 and 1993. shipments of thirteen and fourteen tons 
of hashish were intercepted in Uzbekistan on their way to the 
Netherlands. Increasingly in the 1990s, drug sales have been 
linked to arms sales and the funding of armed groups in neigh- 
boring Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Drug-related crime has 
risen significantly in Uzbekistan during this period. Uzbeki- 
stan! authorities have identified syndicates from Georgia, Azer- 
baijan, and other countries active in the Tashkent drug trade. 

Domestic drug use has risen sharply in the 1990s as well. In 
1994 the Ministry of Health listed 12,000 registered addicts, 
estimating that the actual number of addicts was likely about 
44,000. Opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in Samar- 
qand and along the border with Tajikistan, mainly confined to 
small plots and raised for domestic consumption. Cannabis, 
which grows wild, is also increasingly in use. In 1995 govern- 
ment authorities recognized domestic narcotics processing as a 
problem for the first time when they seized several kilograms of 
locally made heroin. 

To deal with this threat, three agencies — the National Secu- 
rity Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Cus- 
toms Committee — share jurisdiction, although in practice their 
respective roles often are ill-defined. The international com- 
munity has sought to provide technical and other assistance to 
Uzbekistan in this matter. In 1995 Uzbekistan established a 
National Commission on Drug Control to improve coordina- 
tion and public awareness. A new criminal code includes 
tougher penalties for drug-related crimes, including a possible 
death penalty for drug dealers. The government's eradication 
program, which targeted only small areas of cultivation in the 
early 1990s, expanded significantly in 1995, and drug-related 
arrests more than doubled over 1994. In 1992 the United 
States government, recognizing Central Asia as a potential 
route for large-scale narcotics transport, began urging all five 
Central Asian nations to make drug control a priority of 
national policy. The United States has channeled most of its 
narcotics aid to Central Asia through the UN Drug Control 
Program, whose programs for drug-control intelligence centers 
and canine narcotics detection squads were being adopted in 
Uzbekistan in 1996. In 1995 Uzbekistan signed a bilateral coun- 
ternarcotics cooperation agreement with Turkey and acceded 



466 



Uzbekistan 



to the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 

Law Enforcement and Crime 

The Uzbekistani police force is estimated to number about 
25,000 individuals trained according to Soviet standards. The 
United States Department of Justice has begun a program to 
train the force in Western techniques. Interaction also has 
been expanded with the National Security Service, the chief 
intelligence agency, which still is mainly staffed by former KGB 
personnel. About 8,000 paramilitary troops are believed avail- 
able to the National Security Service. 

But these efforts are expected to have little impact on the 
widespread and deeply entrenched organized crime and cor- 
ruption throughout Uzbekistan, especially in the law enforce- 
ment community itself. According to experts, the government 
corruption scandals that attracted international attention in 
the 1980s were symptomatic of a high degree of corruption 
endemic in the system. In a society of tremendous economic 
shortage and tight political control from the top down, the gov- 
ernment and criminal world become intertwined. Citizens rou- 
tinely have been required to pay bribes for all common 
services. More than two-thirds of respondents in a recent sur- 
vey of Uzbekistan's citizens stated that bribes are absolutely 
necessary to receive services that nominally are available to all. 
These bribes often involve enormous sums of money: in 1993 
admission to a prestigious institution of higher learning, while 
technically free, commonly cost nearly 1 million Russian 
rubles, or more than twice the average annual salary in Uzbeki- 
stan in 1993. 

Narcotics and weapons trafficking are only an extension of 
this system, widely viewed as sustained and supported by law 
enforcement and government officials themselves. In the same 
survey, a majority of Uzbekistanis stated that bribery occurs 
routinely in the police department, in the courts, and in the 
office of the state procurator, the chief prosecutor in the 
national judicial system. About 25 percent of police surveyed 
agreed that other officers were involved in the sale of drugs or 
taking bribes. 

The condition of the internal security system is an indicator 
that progress remains to be made in Uzbekistan's journey out 
of Soviet-style governance. In the first five years of indepen- 
dence, efforts to establish profitable relations with the rest of 



467 



Country Studies 

the world (and especially the West) have been hindered by a 
preoccupation with maintaining the political status quo. How- 
ever, by the mid-1990s Uzbekistan began to take advantage of 
its considerable assets. Uzbekistan does not suffer from poor 
natural resources or hostile neighboring countries; its mineral 
resources are bountiful, and Russia continues to watch over its 
former provinces in Central Asia. According to government 
rhetoric, market reforms and expanding international trade 
will make the nation prosperous — beginning in 1995, an 
improved human rights record and more favorable investment 
conditions supplemented the country's political stability in 
attracting foreign trade and fostering at least the beginning of 
democratic institutions. 

* * * 

For historical background on Uzbekistan, three books are 
especially useful: Elizabeth E. Bacon's Central Asians under Rus- 
sian Rule, Edward Allworth's Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian 
Rule, and Vasilii V. Bartol'd's Turkestan Down to the Mongol Inva- 
sion. James Critchlow's Nationalism in Uzbekistan provides useful 
background on the development of nationalism among the 
elites of Uzbekistan during the Soviet period, and William Fier- 
man's Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation covers social 
issues and the development of Islam. For information on envi- 
ronmental issues in Uzbekistan, Murray Feshbach and Alfred 
Friendly, Jr.' s Ecocide in the USSR and Philip R. Pryde's Environ- 
mental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics are 
useful sources. 

For a discussion of economic issues, the World Bank country 
studies and the weekly Business Eastern Europe, published by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, provide the most current infor- 
mation. Nancy Lubin's Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central 
Asia provides a detailed description of the background to the 
development of corruption and organized crime. The quar- 
terly journal Central Asian Monitor and the daily reports of the 
Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) provide the most cur- 
rent information regarding events in Central Asia. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



468 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Central Asia: Demographic Indicators, 1989-93 

3 Central Asia: Population Distribution, 1989-92 

4 Central Asia: Ethnic Composition, Selected Years, 1989-94 

5 Central Asia: Incidence of Selected Diseases and Mortality, 

1989- 91 

6 Central Asia: Percentage Change in Major Economic Indica- 

tors, 1992-93 and 1993-94 

7 Kazakstan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992-94 

8 Kazakstan: Production of Principal Industrial Products, 

1991- 93 

9 Kazakstan: Structure of Employment, 1990-92 

10 Central Asia: Cost of Living, 1990-93 

11 Kazakstan: Foreign Trade with Selected Countries, 1992-94 

12 Central Asia: Military Budgets and Personnel, 1992-95 

13 Kyrgyzstan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992- 94 

14 Kyrgyzstan: Production of Principal Industrial Products, 

1991- 94 

15 Kyrgyzstan: Foreign Trade with Selected Countries, 1992-94 

16 Tajikistan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992- 94 

17 Tajikistan: Foreign Trade with Selected Countries, 1992-94 

18 Turkmenistan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992-94 

19 Turkmenistan: Production of Principal Industrial Products, 

1990- 92 

20 Turkmenistan: Trade with Republics of the Former Soviet 

Union, 1990-92 

21 Uzbekistan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992-94 

22 Uzbekistan: Production of Principal Industrial Products, 

1991- 93 

23 Uzbekistan: Foreign Trade with Selected Countries, 1992-94 



469 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 




U.U4 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 




0.62 


miles 


Hectares 


2.47 


acres 




0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 




0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204.0 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 




and add 32 





471 



Country Studies 



3 



t 



■ pa 

8 



2 2 
2 2 

r-I 0» 

SO 



o ^ 



CO r-H 



U5 ij *j 



a a q 



j 3 s s 



er er 

c c c 

fS 5 £3 



3 3 3 
a a a. 



CO CM CO 

s s s 



2o £o So 
ie in us 



III 

tC tfi " 
< < 0. 



2. 



c 

P 

£ 

o . 

£ 22 

c 1* 

•2 § 

g 1 



CQ Z 



472 



Appendix 



3 
&, 




OO 


o 




z> 


CM 
CM 


o> 


00 


<n 

CM 








oq. 


a>_ 






O 


oo" 




oo" 


iff 


k£) 




oT 


o 



m 00 r- ' CO CM O CM lO 00 
OOOOTiOOOoOoOOO 

j> oo »f) o> ct> o> i> i> 



O, 00. 
00* CM 



oO © CM 



CM LO CM t> 

H f If) Ofl H 

00 00 t> 



O CM I> <£> I> CM 
oO <o 00 O i— i o 
if) if) i— i O) r> i— i 



,_ h h iK) (N ON W h 



oO 
00 


oo 
oo 


t> 


OO 
00 


0) 


OO 

l> 


en 


© 
if) 


00 
CM 


OO 


OO 


t> 




CM 






t> 


CM 






CM* 


cm" 


cm" 











© © 
CM O 
O © 



t> © © 

it) CO t> 

in in 

oo" oo" 



if) © lO 00 i— I OO 
h h O ^ H) M 
^ r-i tO CM 00 © 



«j ra — , 

s a 

g ^ 2 
III 

Ih U U 
P P P 



bo . 

d 

u 

I "g 



*> • ■ u 

| : : 4 

£ © ^ "3 

T3 oO © T3 

5 Q Q S 



So So So 

«3 «3 U3 



Q- 

1) 

Q 



c 

D 

| 

c T 

o © 

•s ^ 

CJ Of 



473 



Country Studies 



Table 4. Central Asia: Ethnic Composition, Selected Years, 1989-94 
(in percentages) 



Country and Ethnic Group 


1989 


1991 


1993 


1994 


Kazakstan 










Kazak 


39.7 


41.9 


43.2 


44.3 




37.8 


37.0 


36.5 


35.8 




5.4 


5.2 


5.2 


5.1 




5.8 


4.7 


4.1 


3.6 


Uzbek 


2.0 


2.1 


2.2 


2.2 




2.0 


2.0 


2.0 


2.0 


Rvrevzstan 










Kyrerz 


52.4 


n.a. 1 


56.5 


n.a. 


Russian 


21.5 


n.a. 


18.8 


n.a. 


Uzbek 


12.9 


n.a. 


12.9 


n.a. 


Ukrainian 


2.5 


n.a. 


2.1 


n.a. 




2.4 


n.a. 


1.0 


n.a. 


Tajikistan 












62.3 


63.8 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Uzbek 


23.5 


24.0 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Russian 


7.6 


6.5 


n.a. 


n.a. 




1.4 


1.4 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Turkmenistan 










Turkmen 


72.0 


n.a. 


73.3 


n.a. 


Russian 


9.8 


n.a. 


9.5 


n.a. 


Uzbek 


9.0 


n.a. 


9.0 


n.a. 




2.0 


n.a. 


2.5 


n.a. 


Uzbekistan 










Uzbek 


71.4 


73.0 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Russian 


8.3 


7.7 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Tajik 


4.7 


4.8 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Kazak 


4.1 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 




2.4 


2.3 


n.a. 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1994, 2, London, 1994, 
1679; TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2, London, 1995, 1679, 1735, 1823, 
2950, 3070, 3363; United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact- 
book 1994, Washington, 1994, 210, 222, 385, 403, 420; and 1995 Britannica Book 
of the Year, Chicago, 1995, 726, 746. 



474 



Appendix 



Table 5. Central Asia: Incidence of Selected Diseases and Mortality, 

1989-91 





Kazakstan 


Kyrgyzstan 


Tajikistan 


Turkmenistan 


Uzbekistan 


Viral hepatitis 1 . . . 


465.6 


710.8 


918.3 


735.1 


1,074.5 




289.9 


219.0 


163.1 


203.0 


169.2 


Tuberculosis 2 .... 


65.8 


53.3 


44.4 


63.6 


46.1 


Maternal 

mortality 3 .... 


53.1 


42.7 


38.9 


55.2 


42.8 


Infant 

mortality 4 .... 


27.1 


29.6 


40.0 


46.6 


35.8 



1 Per 100,000 population in 1989. 

2 Per 100,000 population in 1990. 

3 Deaths per 100,000 live births in 1991. 

4 Deaths per 1,000 live births in 1989. 



Source: Based on information from Christopher M. Davis, "Health Care Crisis: The 
Former Soviet Union," KFE/RL Research Report [Munich] , 2, No. 40, October 8, 
1993, 36. 



Table 6. Central Asia: Percentage Change in Major Economic 
Indicators, 1992-93 and 1993-94 



GDP 1 Industrial Output Agricultural Output 

Country 1992-93 1993-94 1992-93 1993-94 1992-93 1993-94 



Kazakstan -12 -26 -17 -28 -3 -23 

Kyrgyzstan -13 -25 -24 -25 -8 -17 

Tajikistan -21 -12 -20 -31 -4 -26 

Turkmenistan ...... 8 -24 6 -24 9 -2 

Uzbekistan -3-4-4 1 13 



GDP — gross domestic product. 

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Hand- 
book of International Economic Statistics 1995, Washington, 1995, 52. 



475 



Country Studies 



Table 7. Kazakstan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992-94 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 1992 1993 1994 



Wheat 18,285 11,585 9,052 

Barley 8,511 7,149 5,497 

Potatoes 2,570 2,295 1,950 

Oats 727 802 822 

Tomatoes 380 320 300 

Rice 467 403 283 

Rye 524 835 264 

Watermelons 250 202 250 

Corn 370 355 233 

Sugar beets 1,276 925 169 

Millet 447 233 130 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2, London, 1996, 
1811. 



Table 8. Kazakstan: Production of Principal Industrial Products, 

1991-93 

(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated) 



Product 


1991 


1992 


1993 


Coke 


3,711 


3,404 


3,300 




40 


37 


39 


Crude steel 


6,754 


6,337 


n.a. 1 


Electric power (in millions of kilowatt-hours) .... 


87,379 


86,128 


79,174 




325,461 


248,708 


n.a. 


Footwear (in thousands of pairs) 


36,464 


35,410 


n.a. 


Margarine 


71 


48 


n.a. 


Pig iron 


5,226 


4,952 


4,666 


Rubber tires (in thousands) 


2,633 


3,029 


2,899 


Sulfuric acid 


3,151 


2,815 


2,349 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2, London, 1996, 
1811. 



476 



Appendix 



Table 9. Kazakstan: Structure of Employment, 1990-92 
(in thousands of workers) 



Sector 


1990 


1991 


1992 




1,686 


1,715 


1,762 


Mining and quarrying 


235 


251 


257 




1,247 


1,218 


1,160 




833 


690 


681 


Trade, restaurants, and hotels 


470 


461 


437 




704 


700 


665 


Community, social, and personal services 


1,867 


1,901 


1,906 




66 


73 


83 


Other activities 


690 


736 


662 


TOTAL 


7,798 


7,745 


7,613 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book, 1995, 2, London, 1995, 
1736. 



Table 10. Central Asia: Cost of Living, 1990-93 



Country and Category 


1990 


1991 


1992 


1993 


Kazakstan 1 










Food 


n.a 2 


4.7 


100 


2,297 


Clothing 


n.a. 


4.7 


100 


1,606 


Rent 


n.a. 


n.a. 


100 


16,258 


Average for all items 


n.a. 


3.3 


100 


2,265 


Kyrgyzstan (all items) 3 


100 


185.0 


954.0 


n.a. 


Tajikistan 4 










Food 


101.8 


194.4 


1,450.5 


n.a. 


Alcoholic beverages 


100.6 


163.4 


1,152.1 


n.a. 


Average for all items 


104.0 


193.0 


1,153.9 


n.a. 


Turkmenistan (all items) 4 


104.2 


202.5 


592.9 


n.a. 


Uzbekistan (all items) 3 


100 


205.0 


627.7 


951.1 



1 Base year 1992=100. 

2 n.a. — not available. 

3 Base year 1990=100. 

4 Base year 1989=100. 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2, London, 1995, 
1737, 1825, 2952, 3071, 3364. 



477 



Country Studies 



Table 11. Kazakstan: Foreign Trade with Selected Countries, 1992- 

94 

1992 1993 1994 



Imports 

Former Soviet Union 1 

Armenia 

Azerbaijan 

Belarus 

Estonia 

Georgia 

Kyrgyzstan 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Moldova 

Russia 

Tajikistan 

Turkmenistan .... 

Ukraine 

Uzbekistan 

Exports 

Former Soviet Union 1 

Armenia 

Azerbaijan 

Belarus 

Estonia 

Georgia 

Kyrgyzstan 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Moldova 

Russia 

Tajikistan 

Turkmenistan .... 

Ukraine 

Uzbekistan 

Imports 

Other countries 2 

Austria 

China 

Czech Republic 3 . . 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Hungary 



0.1 


0.1 


0.0 


1.1 


0.6 


0.8 


4.6 


3.0 


1.9 


0.1 


0.3 


0.0 


0.3 


0.4 


0.1 


3.2 


1.3 


0.9 


0.1 


0.5 


0.2 


0.3 


0.7 


0.1 


0.2 


0.8 


0.1 


72.4 


70.9 


89.3 


0.9 


0.5 


0.2 


9 ^ 

A. O 


4.7 


0.1 


10.5 


7.3 


3.6 


3.7 


9.0 


2.6 


0.1 


0.0 


0.0 


1.7 


•J. A 


2.0 


2.7 


5.0 


2.6 


0.1 


0.0 


0.1 


ft i 

W. 1 


ft 9 

U.A 


0.0 


9 f; 
A.O 


9 ft 

A.O 


9 9 

A* A 


n ft 


n 9 

V/.A 


1 9 

l.A 


u.o 


ft K 
\J.D 




ft ft 

U.3 


ft A 
U.4 


ft 1 
U.I 


71.0 


69.7 




1.2 


1.4 


0.6 


3.3 


2.1 


0.7 


9.7 


8.1 


5.2 


6.5 


6.9 


5.3 


30 


21 


16 


213 


80 


46 


4 


48 


n.a.' 


25 


5 


4 


7 


9 


21 


19 


76 


125 


27 


23 


14 



478 



Appendix 



Table 11. (Continued) Kazakstan: Foreign Trade with Selected 
Countries, 1992-94 





1992 


1993 


1994 


Italy 


30 


21 


37 




Id 


1 Q 

lo 


4U 




5 


lo 


1 7 
1 / 




23 


19 


17 







3o 




Exports 








Other Countries 2 










OOO 




ouy 




1 


Z 1 






1 1 


13 


10 




1 ft 
lo 


99 


Q 

y 




23/ 


1 79 
1 /Z 


oc 
OD 




oU 


iy 


14 




43 


9 


1 


France 


19 


7 


5 


Germany 


123 


131 


65 


Hungary 


21 


3 / 


12 


Italy 


40 


84 


24 




AQ 


3 / 


31 




i ft 


99 


a 
o 


Korea Republic of 


12 


46 


22 


Netherlands 


52 


49 


42 


Poland 


49 


37 


13 


Slovakia 3 


80 


30 


11 


Sweden 


150 


91 


5 




104 


175 


345 




16 


56 


40 


United Kingdom 


26 


97 


87 


United States 


101 


145 


121 



Percentage of total trade with former Soviet republics. 

2 In millions of United States dollars. 

3 1992 amounts for Czechoslovakia; 1993 and 1994 amounts divided between Czech Republic and Slovakia. 

4 n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1995, 152-54. 



479 



Country Studies 



Table 12. Central Asia: Military Budgets and Personnel, 1992-95 
(budgets in millions of United States dollars) 

Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Kazakstan 

Budget 1,600 707 450 297 

Personnel 63.000 1 44,000 40,000 40,000 

Kyrgyzstan 

Budget 47 51 57 13 

Personnel 8.000 1 12,000 12,000 12,000 

Tajikistan 

Budget 107 110 115 67 

Personnel 6.000 1 3,000 3,000 3,000 

Turkmenistan 

Budget 114 143 153 61 

Personnel 34.000 1 28.000 1 28.000 1 11.000 1 

Uzbekistan 

Budget 420 390 375 315 

Personnel 15.000 1 40,000 39,000 25,000 

1 Under joint control with Russian Federation. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1993-1994, London, 1993, 
140, 144-45; The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 156-57, 162-63; 
The Military Balance, 1995-1996, London, 1995, 160-61, 165-67; and The 
Worldwide Directory of Defense Authorities 1996, 2, Bethesda, 1996. 



480 



Appendix 



Table 13. Kyrgyzstan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992-94 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 1992 1993 1994 



Wheat 634 863 611 

Barley 582 539 300 

Potatoes 362 291 288 

Tomatoes 201 150 160 

Corn 281 184 120 

Sugar beets 135 207 110 

Apples . 75 69 65 

Tobacco, leaf 56 60 58 

Cotton seed 34 38 40 

Cabbage 61 32 35 

Grapes 31 30 28 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2, London, 1996, 
1900. 



Table 14. Kyrgyzstan: Production of Principal Industrial Products, 

1991-94 



Product 1991 1992 1993 1994 



Carpets (in thousands of 

square meters) 1,661 1,701 1,609 1,083 

Cement (in thousands of tons) 1,320 1,095 672 426 

Electric power (in millions of 

kilowatt-hours) 14,170 11,890 11,200 12,900 

Fabric (in thousands of square 

meters) 142,778 123,781 89,138 62,144 

Footwear (in thousands of 

pairs) 9,504 5,343 3,528 1,631 

Trucks 23,600 14,800 5,000 200 

Washing machines 209,400 94,000 76,800 17,100 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2, London, 1995, 
1824; and TheEuropa World Yearbook 1996, 2, London, 1996, 1900. 



481 



Country Studies 



Table 15. Kyrgyzstan: Foreign Trade with Selected Countries, 1992- 

94 

1992 1993 1994 



Imports 

Former Soviet Union 1 

Armenia 

Azerbaijan 

Belarus 

Estonia 

Georgia 

Kazakstan 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Moldova 

Russia 

Tajikistan 

Turkmenistan .... 

Ukraine 

Uzbekistan 

Exports 

Former Soviet Union 1 

Armenia 

Azerbaijan 

Belarus 

Estonia 

Georgia 

Kazakstan 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Moldova 

Russia 

Tajikistan 

Turkmenistan .... 

Ukraine 

Uzbekistan 

Imports 

Other countries 3 

Belgium 

China 

Czech Republic 4 . . 

France 

Germany 

Hungary 

Italy 



0.1 


0.1 


0.0 


0.5 


0.6 


0.3 


1.5 


0.9 


1.2 


0.0 


■ 2 

n.a. 


n.a. 


0.4 


0.2 


0.1 


23.3 




28.0 


0.2 


n.a. 


n.a. 


0.3 


n.a. 


n.a. 


0.5 


0.1 


0.0 


4y.U 


A*l 1 

4/.1 


99 A 

33.4 


U. / 


0.4 


0.5 


6.1 


2.1 


4.8 


8.1 




1.4 


y.i 


1 /.3 


9f» O 


0.2 


0.0 


0.0 


u.y 


1 A 

1.4 


n 7 
U. / 


3.0 


2.0 


1.7 


0.2 


n.a. 


n.a. 


0.4 


0.1 


0.1 


22.4 


29.0 


42.9 


0.3 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1.5 


n.a. 


n.a. 


0.6 


0.4 


0.2 


39.1 


45.8 


26.0 


1.4 


2.5 


1.4 


2.4 


3.5 


3.4 


17.3 


5.7 


4.0 


10.4 


9.6 


19.6 


n.a. 


4.8 


n.a. 


16.3 


18.6 


11.0 


3.3 


5.4 


0.0 


6.3 


3.0 


1.8 


n.a. 


3.0 


6.8 


3.7 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1.8 


0.7 


0.9 



482 



Appendix 



Table 15. ( Continued) Kyrgyzstan: Foreign Trade with Selected 
Countries, 1992-94 





1992 


1993 


1994 


J a p an 


u.z 


0.1 


A. < 


Korea, Republic of 


0.7 


0.2 


4.0 




n.a. 


0.1 


1.8 




0.2 


8.8 


15.0 




3.3 


2.7 


1.0 




u.u 


0.1 


i.O 




n.a. 


U.3 






9 A 

3.4 


A C 




Exports 








Other countries 3 










i n 
l.U 


3. 1 






28 


59.1 


56.1 


France 


6.8 


0.0 


2.2 


Italy 


0.5 


0.4 


1.8 


Japan 


2.7 


0.0 


0.0 


Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 


3.4 


0.2 


0.6 


Poland 


0.3 


2.6 


3.9 


Sweden 


1.5 


1.1 


n.a. 


Turkey 


1.8 


1.1 


2.4 


United Kingdom 


11.6 


30.0 


29.5 



1 Percentage of total trade with former Soviet republics. 

2 n.a. — not available. 

3 In millions of United States dollars. 

4 1992 amounts for Czechoslovakia; 1993 and 1994 amounts divided between Czech Republic and Slovakia. 

Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1995, 288-90. 



483 



Country Studies 



Table 16. Tajikistan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992-94 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 


1992 


1993 


1994 


Vege tables 


679 


552 


490 




415 


382 


401 


Wheat 


170 


175 


165 


Fruits and berries 


181 


135 


140 


Cotton lint 


126 


150 


135 


Watermelons 


136 


107 


105 


Grapes 


100 


88 


85 


Barley 


42 


32 


34 


Corn 


32 


34 


23 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2, London, 1996, 
3077. 



Table 17. Tajikistan: Foreign Trade with Selected Countries, 1992- 

94 



1992 1993 1994 



Imports 

Former Soviet Union 



Armenia 


0.2 


0.0 


0.1 


Azerbaijan 


1.1 


0.5 


0.1 


Belarus 


2.8 


3.4 


0.5 


Estonia 


0.3 


0.1 


0.3 


Georgia 


0.2 


0.2 


0.2 


Kazakstan 


12.2 


32.9 


13.2 


Kyrgyzstan 


2.0 


1.1 


0.4 




0.6 


0.5 


0.4 


Lithuania 


0.7 


2.2 


5.5 


Moldova 


0.3 


0.2 


0.0 


Russia 


46.7 


42.1 


24.4 


Turkmenistan 


14.5 


13.1 


15.9 


Ukraine 


7.3 


2.2 


5.5 




11.0 


32.9 


33.5 



Exports 

Former Soviet Union 1 

Armenia 0.4 0.0 0.0 



484 



Appendix 



Table 17. ( Continued) Tajikistan: Foreign Trade with Selected 
Countries, 1992-94 





1992 


1993 


1994 


Azerbaijan 


3.9 


0.9 


0.1 


Belarus 


4.1 


5.6 


2.8 






0.1 


0.5 


Georgia 


0.1 


0.0 


0.0 


Kazakstan 


14.7 


13.7 


9.2 




O 9 


3.D 


l.O 


Latvia 


0.8 


6.1 


3.1 


Lithuania 


0.2 


3.8 


12.4 






O Q 

z.o 


1 9 

1.3 


Russia 


47.5 


52.6 


42.0 






2.9 


l.O 


Ukraine 


11.7 


4.2 


4.6 


Uzbekistan 


8.9 


17.0 


20.6 


Imports 








Other countries^ 










n „ 3 


1 9 
13 


i ft 

1U 


Belgium 


n.a. 


28 


23 






to 


9 






11 


1 


Netherlands 


n.a. 


165 


16 






34 


9 


Switzerland 


n.a. 


4 


98 






c 
D 


1*7 
1 / 






c 
O 


Do 


United States 


n.a. 


33 


32 


Exports 








Other countries'* 












lz 


1 / 






19 


30 






10 


18 




n.a. 


1 


13 






22 


11 




n.a. 


143 


148 




n.a. 


19 


1 




n.a. 


1 


45 




n.a. 


2 


30 






24 


27 



Percentage of total trade with former Soviet republics. 
In millions of United States dollars, 
n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1995, 471-73. 



485 



Country Studies 



Table 18. Turkmenistan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992-94 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 1992 1993 1994 



Wheat 368 502 1,063 

Cottonseed 822 721 830 

Cotton lint 390 402 403 

Corn... 147 202 252 

Melons and squash 180 248 250 

Tomatoes 133 150 200 

Rice 64 88 149 

Grapes 91 79 147 

Barley 124 197 108 

Onions 71 98 100 



Source: Based on information from The Eur op a World Year Book 1996, 2, London, 1996, 
3201. 



Table 19. Turkmenistan: Production of Principal Industrial Products, 

1990-92 

(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated) 



Product 


1990 


1991 


1992 


Carpets and rugs (in thousands of square meters) .... 


1,288 


1,384 


1,070 


Cement 


1,085 


904 


1,051 




416 


420 


437 


Diesel oil 


1,573 


2,236 


1,942 


Electric power (in millions of kilowatt-hours) 


16,637 


14,915 


13,136 


Gasoline 


773 


814 


1,031 




1,218 


1,991 


1,667 


Kerosene 


110 


98 


327 


Vegetable oil 


105 


104 


85 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2, London, 1995, 
3071. 



486 



Appendix 



Table 20. Turkmenistan: Trade with Republics of the Former Soviet 

Union, 1990-92 
(in percentages of total trade with former Soviet republics) 

1990 1991 1992 

Imports 

Armenia n.a. 1 n.a. 0.4 

Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. 8.5 

Belarus 3.6 3.6 4.1 

Estonia 2.9 2.9 n.a. 

Georgia n.a. n.a. n.a. 

Kazakstan 4.0 4.0 11.8 

Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. 1.4 

Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. 

Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 

Moldova n.a. n.a. 0.0 

Russia 41.8 41.8 35.1 

Tajikistan n.a. n.a. 4.3 

Ukraine 15.6 15.6 4.6 

Uzbekistan 5.7 5.7 8.1 

Exports 

Armenia n.a. 2.3 1.6 

Azerbaijan n.a. 3.9 4.3 

Belarus 2.1 1.9 0.6 

Estonia 2.3 2.4 0.5 

Georgia n.a. 6.7 7.5 

Kazakstan 2.6 8.1 12.8 

Kyrgyzstan n.a. 3.1 0.5 

Latvia n.a. n.a. 0.7 

Lithuania n.a. n.a. 0.2 

Moldova n.a. 5.8 1.0 

Russia 49.8 21.0 10.0 

Tajikistan n.a. 6.5 1.2 

Ukraine 7.4 17.5 49.4 

Uzbekistan 27.8 17.0 9.7 

1 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1995, 503. 



487 



Country Studies 



Table 21. Uzbekistan: Production of Principal Agricultural Crops, 

1992-94 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 1992 1993 1994 



Vegetables 1 4,244 3,500 3,737 

Cottonseed 2,452 2,537 2,380 

Wheat 964 876 1,200 

Potatoes 365 463 562 

Fruit 701 520 555 

Rice 539 545 544 

Grapes 439 480 450 

Barley 361 292 340 

Corn 367 404 200 



Includes melons and squash. 

Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2, London, 1996, 
3501. 



Table 22. Uzbekistan: Production of Principal Industrial Products, 

1991-93 

(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated) 



Product 


1991 


1992 


1993 




6,191 


5,935 


5,277 


Cotton fabric 


392 


482 


370 


Electric power (in millions of kilowatt-hours) 


54,164 


50,911 


49,272 


Footwear (in thousands of pairs) 


45,400 


39,200 


39,500 


Insecticides 


35 


28 


32 


Mineral fertilizers 


1,660 


1,361 


1,273 




20 


16 


13 


Plastics 


142 


115 


53 


Refrigerators and freezers (in thousands of units). . . 


212 


84 


77 


Tractors (in thousands of units) 


21 


17 


8 



Source: Based on information from TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2, London, 1996, 
3501. 



488 



Appendix 



Table 23. Uzbekistan: Foreign Trade with Selected Countries, 1992- 

94 

1992 1993 1994 



Imports 

Former Soviet Union 1 





0.1 


0.2 


0.1 


Azerbaijan 


0.4 


0.0 


0.0 


Belarus 


5.8 


2.1 


0.7 


Estonia 


0.1 


0.1 


0.0 


Georgia 


0.3 


0.1 


0.0 


Kazakstan 


....... 12.2 


17.2 


11.0 


Kyrgyzstan 


3.4 


1.5 


1.6 


Latvia 


0.2 


0.5 


0.4 


Lithuania 


0.5 


0.3 


1.1 


Moldova 


0.3 


0.1 


0.1 


Russia 


52.9 


58.9 


55.0 


Tajikistan ■ 


33.2 


1.3 


18.9 


Turkmenistan 


7.0 


11.3 


6.0 


Ukraine 


13.6 


6.5 


5.1 


>rts 








)rmer Soviet Union 1 








Armenia 


0.2 


0.2 


0.1 




0.9 


0.0 


0.0 




3.5 


3.1 


1.9 


Estonia 


0.9 


0.1 


0.0 




0.3 


0.1 


0.0 




11.2 


16.9 


17.3 




3.7 


2.8 


3.7 




0.6 


0.1 


0.4 




1.4 


0.8 


0.7 




2.0 


0.2 


0.1 




53.1 


55.5 


42.8 




3.0 


6.0 


19.0 




5.3 


6.6 


5.0 


>rts 








ther countries 2 










5 


19 


24 




15 


11 


27 




31 


13 


15 




67 


35 


88 


Former Czechoslovakia 3 


17 


5 


16 




5 


14 


11 




28 


56 


164 




12 


21 


61 



489 



Country Studies 



Table 23. ( Continued) Uzbekistan: Foreign Trade with Selected 
Countries, 1992-94 





1992 


1993 


1994 






27 


24 




1 


9 


26 




9 




£9 


Poland 


15 


44 


17 




i-i 


20 


12 


Switzerland 


196 


226 


321 








bo 


United Kingdom 


14 


10 


18 




21 


32 


95 


Exports 


















A 


10 


n.a. 




9Q 


1 9 
14 


42 




112 


46 


8 




A (\ 


i a*7 
13/ 


11 
1 1 




39 


1 9 


i 
i 




C\A 




on 
3Z 


Hungary 


52 


30 


2 


Italy 


11 


17 


26 


Korea, Republic of 


3 


55 


41 


Netherlands 


20 


38 


153 


Switzerland 


16 


72 


224 


Turkey 


77 


41 


42 


United Kingdom 


117 


134 


175 


United States 


38 


44 


21 



Percentage of total trade with former Soviet republics. 

2 In millions of United States dollars. 

3 For 1993 and 1994, figures of Czech Republic and Slovakia are combined. 

4 n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1995, 578-80. 



490 



Bibliography 



Chapter 1 

Adshead, Samuel Adrian M. Central Asia in World History. New 

York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 
Akiner, Shirin. Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union: An Historical 

and Statistical Handbook. New York: Kegan Paul International, 

1986. 

Akiner, Shirin, ed. Economic and Political Trends in Central Asia. 
New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1992. 

Allworth, Edward, ed. Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 

Allworth, Edward, ed. Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical 
Perspectives. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994. 

Bachmann, Berta. Memories of Kazakhstan: A Report on the Life 
Experiences of a German Woman in Russia. Lincoln, Nebraska: 
American History Society, 1983. 

Bacon, Elizabeth E. Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in 
Culture Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980. 

Banuazizi, Ali, and Myron Weiner, eds. The New Geopolitics of 
Central Asia and Its Borderlands. Bloomington: Indiana Uni- 
versity Press, 1994. 

Bilan du Monde: VAnnee economique et sociale 1995. Ed., Jacques- 
Francois Simon. Paris: Le Monde, 1996. 

Blank, Stephen. "Energy, Economics, and Security in Central 
Asia: Russia and Its Rivals," Central Asian Survey, 14, No. 3, 
1995, 373-406. 

Bradley, Catherine. Kazakhstan. Brookfield, Connecticut: Mill- 
brook Press, 1992. 

Brezhnev, Leonid. Virgin Lands: Two Years in Kazakhstan, 1954- 
55. Tarrytown, New York: Elsevier Science, 1982. 

Broxup, Marie. "Islam in Central Asia since Gorbachev," Asian 
Affairs [London], 18, October 1987, 283-93. 

Carrere D'Encausse, Helene. Islam and the Russian Empire: 
Reform and Revolution in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989. 

"Central Asia," Current History, 93, April 1994, 145-86. 



491 



Country Studies 



Dave, Bhavna. "Kazakhstan Staggers under Its Nuclear Bur- 
den, " Transition, November 17, 1995, 12-13. 

Dave, Bhavna. "A New Parliament Consolidates Presidential 
Authority," Transition, March 22, 1996, 33-37. 

Davis, Christopher M. "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet 
Union," EFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 40, Octo- 
ber 8, 1993, 35-43. 

Dawisha, Karen, and Bruce Parrott. Russia and the New States of 
Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval. Port Chester, New York: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1994. 

Deweese, Devin. Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden 
Horde. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1994. 

Diuk, Nadia, and Adrian Karatnycky. The Hidden Nations: The 
People Challenge the Soviet Union. Fairfield, Newjersey: William 
Morrow, 1990. 

Dorian, James P. "The Kazakh Oil Industry: A Potential Critical 
Role in Central Asia," Energy Policy, 22, August 1994, 685-98. 

Eickelman, Dale F., ed. Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions 
in Cross-Cultural Analysis. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1993. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1993, 2. London: Europa, 1993. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1994, 2. London: Europa, 1994. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2. London: Europa, 1995. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2. London: Europa, 1996. 

Evans, John L. Russia and the Khanates of Central Asia to 1865. 
New York: Associated Faculty Press, 1982. 

Ferdinand, Peter. The New States of Central Asia and Their Neigh- 
bours. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 

Fierman, William, ed. Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transforma- 
tion Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991. 

Forsythe, Rosemarie. "The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia," Adelphi Papers, 300, May 1996, whole issue. 

Fuller, Graham. Central Asia: The New Geopolitics. Santa Monica, 
California: Rand, 1992. 

Fuller, Graham. "Central Asia: The Quest for Identity," Current 
History, 93, April 1994, 145-49. 

Fuller, Graham. "The Emergence of Central Asia," Foreign Pol- 
icy, Spring 1990, 49-67. 



492 



Bibliography 



Ghorban, Narsi. "The Role of the Multinational Oil Companies 
in the Development of Oil and Gas Resources in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus," Iranian Journal of International 
Affairs, 5, Spring 1993, 1-15. 

Gross, Jo-Ann, ed. Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity 
and Change. Durham: Duke University Press, 1992. 

Haghayeghi, Mehrdad. Islam and Politics in Central Asia. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 

Janabel, Jiger. "When National Ambition Conflicts with Reality: 
Studies on Kazakhstan's Ethnic Relations," Central Asian Sur- 
vey, 15, No. 1, March 1996, 5-22. 

Malik, Hafeez, ed. Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future 
Prospects. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. Central Asia and the World: Kazakh- 
stan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 

Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, ed. Central Asia and the Caucasus after the 
Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1994. 

The Military Balance 1992-1993. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1992. 

The Military Balance 1993-1994. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1993. 

The Military Balance 1994-1995. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1994. 

The Military Balance 1995-1996. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1995. 

1995 Britannica Book of the Year. Chicago: 1995. 

Olcott, Martha Brill. "Central Asia's Islamic Awakening," Cur- 
rent History, 93, April 1994, 150-54. 

Olcott, Martha Brill. Central Asia' s New States: Independence, For- 
eign Policy, and Regional Security. Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996. 

Olcott, Martha Brill. The Kazakhs. 2d ed. Studies of Nationali- 
ties in the USSR. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1995. 

Paksoy, H.B., ed. Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History. 

Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 
PlanEcon. Review and Outlook for the Former Soviet Republics. 

Washington: 1995. 



493 



Country Studies 



Pomfret, Richard. The Economies of Central Asia. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995. 

Potter, William C. "The 'Sapphire' File: Lessons for Interna- 
tional Nonproliferation Cooperation," Transition, 1, Novem- 
ber 17, 1995, 14-19. 

Ro'i, Yaacov, ed. Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: 
Frank Cass, 1995. 

Rumer, Boris Z. Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment. " Bos- 
ton: Unwin Hyman, 1989. 

Rywkin, Michael. Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia. 
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990. 

The Statesman's Year-Booh 1992-1993. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. 

The Statesman's Year-Book 1993-1994. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

The Statesman's Year-Book 1994-1995. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 

The Statesman' s Year-Book 1995-1996. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 

Undeland, Charles, and Nicholas Piatt. The Central Asian Repub- 
lics: Fragments of Empire, Magnets of Wealth. New York: Asia 
Society, 1994. 

United Nations. Department for Economic and Social Infor- 
mation and Policy Analysis. Demographic Yearbook 1993. New 
York: 1995. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Handbook of Interna- 
tional Economic Statistics 1995. Washington: GPO, 1995. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Kazakhstan: An Eco- 
nomic Profile. Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Infor- 
mation Service, 1993. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Fa ctbook 

1994. Washington: GPO, 1994. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 

1995. Washington: GPO, 1995. 

United States. Department of State. Bureau of International 
Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Strategy Report March 

1996. Washington: GPO, 1996. 

WEFA Group. Eurasia Economic Outlook, February 1996. Eddys- 
tone, Pennsylvania: 1996. 



494 



Bibliography 



Wixman, Ronald. Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook. 

Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1984. 
World Bank. Kazakhstan: Agricultural Sector Review. Washington: 

1994. 

World Bank. Kazakhstan: The Transition to a Market Economy. 
Washington: 1993. 

World Bank. Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former USSR 
Washington: 1995. 

World Radio TV Handbook 1996. Ed., Andrew G. Sennitt. Amster- 
dam: Billboard, 1996. 

Worldwide Directory of Defense Authorities 1996, 1. Ed., Kenneth 
Gause. Bethesda, Maryland: Worldwide Government Direc- 
tories, 1996. 

(Various issues of the following publications also were used 
in the preparation of this chapter: Christian Science Monitor, For- 
eign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eur- 
asia; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS Report: 
Environment and World Health (before August 1995, FBIS Report: 
Environment); Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]; 
Jamestown Foundation, Monitor and Prism; New York Times; 
Transition; and Washington Post.) 

Chapter 2 

Adshead, Samuel Adrian M. Central Asia in World History. New 

York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 
Akchurin, Marat. "Soviet Muslims: Seeking Reform, Not Revo- 
lution," World and I, 6, October 1991, 86-93. 
Akiner, Shirin. Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union: An Historical 

and Statistical Handbook. New York: Routledge, 1986. 
Akiner, Shirin, ed. Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, 

an Historical Overview. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994. 
Akiner, Shirin, ed. Economic and Political Trends in Central Asia. 

New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1992. 
Allworth, Edward, ed. Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule. 

Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 
Alptekin, Erkin. "Chinese Policy in Eastern Turkestan," Institute 

of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal, 13, January 1992, 185-95. 
Andreyev, Nikolai. "Central Asia: From Marx to Mohammed," 

New Times International [Moscow], No. 39, 1992, 19-22. 



495 



Country Studies 



Andreyev, Nikolai. "What Future for Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Turk- 
menia?" Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 44, July 22, 1992, 
8-11. 

Aziz, Sartaj. "The Rediscovery of Central Asia," Economics Review 
[Karachi], 23, June 1992, 15-17. 

Baldick, Julian. Imaginary Muslims: The Uwaysi Sufis of Central 
Asia. Irvington: New York University Press, 1994. 

Banuazizi, Ali, and Myron Weiner, eds. The New Geopolitics of 
Central Asia and Its Borderlands. Bloomington: Indiana Uni- 
versity Press, 1994. 

Baumann, Robert F. Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1993. 

Bourdeaux, Michael, ed. The Politics of Religion in Russia and the 
New States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 

Brown, Bess. "Central Asia: The First Year of Unexpected State- 
hood," RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 1, January 1, 

1993, 25-36. 

Brown, Bess. "Three Central Asian States Form Economic 
Union," RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 3, No. 11, April 1, 

1994, 33-35. 

"Central Asia: Five-State Commonwealth Set Up," Current Digest 
of the Post-Soviet Press, 45, February 3, 1993, 1-8. 

"Central Asia: Patterns of Change, Past, Present, and Future," 
Harvard International Report, 15, Spring 1993, 6-12. 

Clark, Susan L. Security in Russia and Eurasia: The New National 
Militaries and Emerging Defense Policies. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1995. 

Davis, Christopher M. "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet 
Union," RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 40, Octo- 
ber 8, 1993, 35-43. 

Dawisha, A. I., and Karen Dawisha, eds. The Foreign Policy Interests 
of Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 

Dawisha, Karen, and Bruce Parrott. Russia and the New States of 
Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval Port Chester, New York: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1994. 

Deweese, Devin. Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden 
Horde. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1994. 



496 



Bibliography 



Dienes, Leslie. "Economic Geographic Relations in the Post- 
Soviet Republics," Post-Soviet Geography, 34, October 1993, 
497-529. 

Diller, Daniel C, ed. Russia and the Independent States. Washing- 
ton: Congressional Quarterly, 1993. 

Doolotaliyev, S. "Some Issues in the Development of the Sary- 
Dzhaz Mining Industrial Center, Kirghiz SSR," Sovetskaya 
Geografiya, 30, May 1989, 371-4. 

Eickelman, Dale R, ed. Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions 
in Gross-Cultural Analysis. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1993. 

Elebayeva, Aynur B. "The Osh Incident: Problems for 
Research," Post-Soviet Geography, 33, February 1992, 78-86. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1994, 2. London: Europa, 1994. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2. London: Europa, 1995. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2. London: Europa, 1996. 

Evans, John L. Russia and the Khanates of Central Asia to 1865. 
New York: Associated Faculty Press, 1982. 

Ferdinand, Peter. The New States of Central Asia and Their Neigh- 
bors. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 

Fierman, William, ed. Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transforma- 
tion. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991. 

Fuller, Graham. Central Asia: The New Geopolitics. Santa Monica, 
California: Rand, 1992. 

Furtado, Charles F., and Henry R. Huttenback, eds. "The Ex- 
Soviet Nationalities Without Gorbachev," Nationalities Papers, 
20, Fall 1992, 1-124. 

Gleason, Gregory. "The Political Economy of Dependency 
under Socialism: The Asian Republics in the USSR," Studies 
in Comparative Communism, 24, December 1991, 335-53. 

Goron, Leonard, and Alex Pravda, eds. Who's Who in Russia and 
the New States. London: LB. Tauris, 1993. 

Gross, Jo-Ann, ed. Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity 
and Change. Durham: Duke University Press, 1992. 

Haghayeghi, Mehrdad. Islam and Politics in Central Asia. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 

Henze, Paul B. Whither Turkestan? Santa Monica, California: 
Rand, 1992. 

Hostler, Charles Warren. The Turks of Central Asia. Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 1993. 



497 



Country Studies 



Kaiser, Robert J. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the 
USSR Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 

Karasik, Theodore. Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Future Persian 
Gulf Security. Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1993. 

Kedzie, Christopher R. Stumbling Blocks and Stepping Stones: The 
Crossing from Soviet Domination to Self Rule in the Republics of 
Central Asia. Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1994. 

Landau, Jacob M. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. 

Lipski, Andrei. "The Community of Central Asia: Inside or Out- 
side the CIS?" International Affairs [Moscow], October 1993, 
51-5. 

Maier, Frith. Trekking in Russia and Central Asia: A Traveler's 
Guide. Seattle: Mountaineers Books, 1994. 

Malik, Hafeez, ed. Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future 
Prospects. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. Central Asia and the World: Kazakh- 
stan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 

Manz, Beatrice F., ed. Central Asia in Historical Perspective. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994. 

Martin, Keith. "Environment: Central Asia's Forgotten Trag- 
edy," RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 3, No. 29, July 29, 
1994, 35-48. 

Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, ed. Central Asia and the Caucasus after the 

Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics. Gainesville: 

University Press of Florida, 1994. 
Migranyan, Andranik. "Russia and the Near Abroad," Current 

Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 47, March 9, 1994, 1-4 and March 

16, 1994, 6-11. 

The Military Balance 1993-1994. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1993. 

The Military Balance 1994-1995. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1994. 

The Military Balance 1995-1996. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1995. 

Naumkin, Vitaly. State, Religion, and Society in Central Asia: A Post- 
Soviet Critique. London: Ithaca Press, 1993. 



498 



Bibliography 



Olcott, Martha Brill. Central Asia' s New States: Independence, For- 
eign Policy, and Regional Security. Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996. 

Paksoy, G.B., ed. Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History. 
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 

Pilkington, John. "Kyrgyzstan: A Tale of Two Journeys," Geo- 
graphical Magazine, 65, April 1993, 8-12. 

Pipes, Daniel. "The Politics of the 'Rip Van Winkel' States: The 
Southern Tier States of the Ex-Soviet Union Have Moved the 
Borders of the Middle East North," Middle East Insight, 10, 
November-December 1993, 30-40. 

PlanEcon. Review and Outlook for the Former Soviet Republics. 
Washington: 1995. 

Pryde, Ian. "Kyrgyzstan: Secularism vs. Islam," World Today, 48, 
November 1992, 208-11. 

Pryde, Ian. "Kyrgyzstan: The Trials of Independence, "Journal of 
Democracy, 5, January 1994, 109-20. 

Rashid, Ahmed. The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or National- 
ism! Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994. 

Ro'i, Yaacov, ed. Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: 
Frank Cass, 1995. 

Rotor, Igor. "Kyrgyzstan: Capitalist Experiment in Central 
Asia," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 44, April 8, 1992, 4- 
5. 

Rumer, Boris Z. Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment. " Win- 
chester, Massachusetts: Unwin Hyman, 1990. 

Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin, eds. 
The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former 
Soviet Republics. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 

Shome, Parthasarathi, and Julio Escolano. "The State of Tax 
Policy in the Central Asian and Transcaucasian Newly Inde- 
pendent States," Bulletin of International Fiscal Documentation, 
48, April 1994, 159-66. 

Shukurov, E., ed. Discovery of Kyrghyzstan. Bishkek: International 
Foundation "A Discovery of Kyrghyzstan," 1993. 

Sparks, John. Realms of the Russian Bear: A Natural History of Rus- 
sia and the Central Asian Republics. Waltham, Massachusetts: 
Little Brown, 1992. 

Starr, S. Frederick, ed. The Legacy of History in Russia and the New 
States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 



499 



Country Studies 



The Statesman's Year-Book 1993-1994. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 

York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 
The Statesman's Year-Book 1994-1995. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 

York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 
The Statesman's Year-Book 1995-1996. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 

York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 
Szporluk, Roman, ed. National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia 

and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: M.E. 

Sharpe, 1994. 

Thomas, Paul. The Central Asian States: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan. Brookfield, Connecticut: Mill- 
brook Press, 1992. 

United Nations. Department for Economic and Social Infor- 
mation and Policy Analysis. Demographic Yearbook 1994. New 
York: 1996. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Handbook of Interna- 
tional Economic Statistics 1995. Washington: GPO, 1995. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 
1994. Washington: GPO, 1994. 

United States. Department of State. Bureau of International 
Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Strategy Report March 
1996. Washington: GPO, 1996. 

WEFA Group. Eurasia Economic Outlook February 1996. Eddys- 
tone, Pennsylvania: 1996. 

Wixman, Ronald. Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook. 
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1984. 

World Bank. Kyrgyzstan: Social Protection in a Reforming Economy. 
Washington: 1993. 

World Bank. Kyrgyzstan: The Transition to a Market Economy. 
Washington: 1993. 

World Bank. Kyrgyz Republic: Agricultural Sector Review. Washing- 
ton: 1995. 

World Bank. Kyrgyz Republic: Economic Report. Washington: 1994. 
World Bank. Kyrgyz Republic: Energy Sector Review. Washington: 
1995. 

World Bank. Kyrgyz Republic: National Environmental Action Plan. 

Washington: 1995. 
World Bank. Kyrgyz Republic: Poverty Assessment and Strategy. 

Washington: 1995. 



500 



Bibliography 



World Bank. Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former USSR 
Washington: 1995. 

World Radio TV Handbook 1996. Ed., Andrew G. Sennitt. Amster- 
dam: Billboard, 1996. 

Worldwide Directory of Defense Authorities, 1996, 1. Ed., Kenneth 
Gause. Bethesda, Maryland: Worldwide Government Direc- 
tories, 1996. 

(Various issues of the following periodicals also were used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Christian Science Monitor, For- 
eign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eur- 
asia; Jamestown Foundation, Monitor and Prism; Keesing's Record 
of World Events [Cambridge]; New York Times; Transition; and 
Washington Post. ) 

Chapter 3 

Akademiya nauk SSSR. Institut etnografii. SotsiaV no-kuV turnyy 

oblik sovetskikh natsiy (The Social-Cultural Aspect of the 

Soviet Nations). Moscow: Nauka, 1986. 
Akademiya nauk Tadzhikskoy SSR. Istoriya tadzhikskogo naroda 

(A History of the Tajik People), 3. Moscow: Nauka, 1965. 
Akademiya nauk Tadzhikskoy SSR. Tadzhikistan: priroda i resursy 

(Tajikistan: Nature and Resources). Dushanbe: Donish, 

1982. 

Akademiya nauk Tadzhikskoy SSR. Tadzhikskaya Sovetskaya Sotsi- 

alisticheskaya Respublika (The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic) . 

Ed., M.S. Asimov. Dushanbe: 1974. 
Allworth, Edward, ed. Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule. 

New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 
Allworth, Edward, ed. The Nationality Question in Soviet Central 

Asia. New York: Praeger, 1973. 
Amnesty International. Tadzhikistan. London: 1993. 
Andreyev, M.S. "Po etnografii tadzhikov: Nekotoryye svedeniya" 

(On the Ethnography of the Tajiks: Some Information). 

Pages 151-77 in Tadzhikistan. Tashkent: Obshchestvo dlya 

izucheniya Tadzhikistana i iranskikh narodnostey za yego 

predelami, 1925. 
Atkin, Muriel. "Islamic Assertiveness and the Waning of the 

Old Soviet Order," Nationalities Papers, 20, No. 1, Spring 

1992, 55-72. 



501 



Country Studies 



Atkin, Muriel. "Religious, National, and Other Identities in 
Central Asia." Pages 46-72 in Jo Ann Gross, ed., Muslims in 
Central Asia. Durham: Duke University Press, 1992. 

Atkin, Muriel. The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan. Phila- 
delphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989. 

Atkin, Muriel. "The Survival of Islam in Soviet Tajikistan," Mid- 
dle East Journal, 43, No. 4, Autumn 1989, 605-18. 

Atkin, Muriel. "Tajikistan: Ancient Heritage, New Politics." 
Pages 361-83 in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., Nation 
and Politics in the Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1993. 

Bacon, Elizabeth. Central Asians under Russian Rule. Ithaca: Cor- 
nell University Press, 1980. 

Bartol'd, Vasilii Vladimirovich. Histoire des Turcs d'Asie centrale. 
Trans., M. Donskis. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1977. 

Bartol'd, Vasilii Vladimirovich. Turkestan Down to the Mongol 
Invasion. London: Lazac, 1968. 

Becker, Seymour. "National Consciousness and the Politics of 
the Bukharan People's Counciliar Republic." Pages 159-67 
in Edward Allworth, ed., The Nationality Question in Soviet Cen- 
tral Asia. New York: Praeger, 1973. 

Becker, Seymour. Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara 
and Khiva, 1865-1924. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1968. 

Bourdeaux, Michael, ed. The Politics of Religion in Russia and the 
New States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 

Bremmer, Ian, and Ray Taras, eds. Nation and Politics in the 
Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 

Canfield, Robert L., ed. Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 

Carrere d'Encausse, Helene. Reforme et revolution chez les Musul- 
mans de I'Empire russe. Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1966. 

Corbin, Henry. "Nasir-i Khusrau and Iranian Isma'ilism." Pages 
520-42 in Richard N. Frye, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran, 
4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 

Davis, Christopher M. "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet 
Union," WE/RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 40, Octo- 
ber 8, 1993, 35-43. 



502 



Bibliography 



Drobizheva, L.M. "Kul'tura i mezhnatsional'yye otnosheniya v 
SSSR" (Culture and Inter-national Relations in the USSR), 
Voprosy istorii [Moscow], 1979, No. 11, 3-15. 

Dzharylgasimova, R.Sh., and L.S. Tolstova, eds. Etnicheskiye prot- 
sessy u natsional'nykh grupp Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana (Ethnic 
Processes in the National Groups of Central Asia and Kazak- 
stan). Moscow: Nauka, 1980. 

Entsiklopediyai sovetii Tojik (Soviet Tajik Encyclopedia). Dus- 
hanbe: Sarredaktsiyai ilmii entsiklopediyai sovetii Tojik, 
1978-1987. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1994, 2. London: Europa, 1994. 
TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2. London: Europa, 1995. 
TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2. London: Europa, 1996. 
Fedorova, T.I. Gowda Tadzhikistana i problemy rosta i razvitiya 

(Cities of Tajikistan and Problems of Growth and Develop- 
ment). Dushanbe: Irfon, 1981. 
Feshbach, Murray, and Alfred Friendly, Jr. Ecocide in the USSR: 

Health and Nature under Siege. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 
The FirstBook [sic] of Demographics for the Republics of the Former 

Soviet Union, 1951-1990. Shady Side, Maryland: New World 

Demographics, 1992. 
Freidin, Gregory. "Coup II," The New Republic, 205, No. 16, 

October 14, 1991, 16-18. 
Frye, Richard N. Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement. Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1965. 
Frye, Richard N. "The Samanids." Pages 136-61 in Richard N. 

Frye, The Cambridge History of Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1975. 
Frye, Richard N., ed. The Cambridge History of Iran. Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
Gleason, Gregory. "The Struggle for Control over Water in 

Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective Action." 

RFE/RL Report on the USSR [Munich], 3, No. 25, June 21, 

1991, 11-19. 

Gretsky, Sergei. "Civil War in Tajikistan and Its International 
Repercussions," Critique, Spring 1995, 3-24. 

Gretsky, Sergei. "Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda," Central Asia Moni- 
tor, 1994, No. 1, 16-24. 

Gretsky, Sergei. "Russia and Tajikistan." Pages 231-51 in A.Z. 
Rubinstein and O.M. Smolansky, eds. Regional Power Rivalries 



503 



Country Studies 



in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Armonk, New 

York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 
Grousset, Rene. The Empire of the Steppes. Trans., N. Walford. 

New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970. 
Hambly, Gavin, ed. Central Asia. New York: Delacorte Press, 

1969. 

Helsinki Watch. Conflict in the Soviet Union. New York: Human 

Rights Watch, 1991. 
Hitchins, Keith. "Modern Tajik Literature." Pages 454—75 in E. 

Yarshater, ed., Persian Literature. Albany: Bibliotheca Persica, 

1988. 

Hooson, David. The Soviet Union: People and Regions. Belmont, 

California: Wadsworth, 1966. 
Istoriya kul'turnogo stroiteV stva v Tadzhikistane, 1917-1977 gg 

(The History of Cultural Construction in Tajikistan, 1917- 

1977, 2.) Dushanbe: Donish, 1983. 
Karasik, Theodore, ed. USSR Facts and Figures Annual 1992. 

Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1992. 
Kojaoglu, T. "The Existence of a Bukharan Nationality in the 

Recent Past." Pages 151-8 in Edward Allworth, ed., The 

Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia. New York: Praeger, 

1973. 

"Konflikt na granitse Kirgizii i Tadzhikistana" (Conflict on the 
Border of Kyrgyzia and Tajikistan), Turkestan [Ashgabat], 
1990, No. 1,5. 

Korsunskiy, L. "Podzemnyy atomnyy gulag deystvuyet" (An 
Underground Atomic Gulag Is in Operation). Stolitsa [Mos- 
cow] 1992, No. 35, 22-6. 

Krader, Lawrence. Peoples of Central Asia. Uralic and Altaic 
Series, No. 26. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963. 

The Military Balance 1993-1994. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1993. 

The Military Balance 1994-1995. London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1994. 

The Military Balance 1995-1996. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1995. 

Monogarova, L.F. "Evolyutsiya natsional'nogo samosoznaniya 
pripamirskikh narodnostey" (The Evolution of National Self- 
Awareness of the Pamiri Peoples). Pages 125-35 in 



504 



Bibliography 



Etnicheskiye protsessy u natsional'nykh grupp Sredney Azii i Kaza- 

khstana. Moscow: Nauka, 1980. 
Nahaylo, Bohdan, and Viktor Swoboda. Soviet Disunion. New 

York: The Free Press, 1990. 
"Natsional'nyy vopros i mezhnatsionarnyye otnosheniya v 

SSSR: Istoriya i sovrernennost'" (The National Question and 

Inter-national Relations in the USSR: History and the 

Present). Voprosy istorii, 1989, No. 5, 3-97. 
1995 Britannica Book of the Year. Chicago: 1995. 
Olcott, Martha Brill. "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in 

Turkestan 1918-1924," Soviet Studies, 33, No. 3, July 1981, 

352-69. 

Park, A.G. Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927. New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1957. 
Pierce, Richard A. Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917. Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1960. 
Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa. Russia and Nationalism in Central 

Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

Press, 1970. 

Rubinstein, Alvin Z., and Oles M. Smolansky, eds. Regional 
Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran. 
Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 

Rubin, Barry M. "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan," Survival, 
35, No. 4, Winter 1993-1994, 71-91. 

Rumer, Boris Z. Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment. " Bos- 
ton: Unwin Hyman, 1989. 

"Russia: World Drugs Capital?" The Economist Foreign Report, 
April 27, 1995, 3-4. 

Sharipov, I. Zakonomernosti formirovaniya sotsialisticheskikh obsh- 
chestvennykh otnosheniy v Tadzhikistane (The Regularity of the 
Formation of Socialist Social Relations in Tajikistan). Dush- 
anbe: Donish, 1983. 

Shukurov, Maksud Rakhmatullayevich. Kul'turnaya zhizn' 
Tadzhikistana (The Cultural Life of Tajikistan). Dushanbe: 
Irfon, 1980. 

Simon, Gerhard. Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities 
in the Soviet Union. Trans., K. Forster and O. Forster. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1991. 

Smirnov, Yu. "Strannyy Islam" (Strange Islam), Pamir, No. 2, 
1988, 104-25. 



505 



Country Studies 



Soviet Union. Central Statistical Administration. Chislennost' i 
sostav naseleniy SSSR (Size and Composition of the Popula- 
tions of the USSR). Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1984. 

Soviet Union. State Committee on Statistics. Chislennost' nase- 
leniya soyuznykh respublik po gorodskim poseleniyam i rayonam 
(Size of the Population of the Union Republics by Urban 
Settlement and District). Moscow: Informatsionno-izda- 
tel'skiy tsentr Goskomstata SSSR, 1991. 

Soviet Union. State Committee on Statistics. Demograficheskiy 
yezhegodnik SSSR 1990 (Demographic Yearbook of the USSR 
1990). Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1990. 

Soviet Union. State Committee on Statistics. Soyuznyye respubliki: 
Osnovnyye ekonomicheskiye i sotsial'nyye pokazateli (The Union 
Republics: Basic Economic and Social Indicators). Moscow: 
Informatsionno-izdatel'skiy tsentr Goskomstata SSSR, 1991. 

The Statesman's Year-Book 1994-1995. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 

The Statesman's Year-Book 1995-1996. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 

Symon, L. "Tadzhikistan: A Developing Country in the Soviet 
Union," Asian Affairs, 61, pt. 3, October 1974, 249-56. 

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "Causes and Consequences of the 
Civil War," Central Asia Monitor, 1993, No. 1, 10-14. 

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "The 'Tajik Spring' of 1992," Central 
Asia Monitor, No. 2, 1993, 21-9. 

Tadzhikistan. Tashkent: Obshchestvo dlya izucheniya Tadzhiki- 
stana i iranskikh narodnostey za yego predelami, 1925. 

Tajik SSR. Supreme Soviet. Presidium. "Soobshcheniye komissii 
Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta Tadzhikskoy SSR po 
proverke sobytiy 12-14 fevralya 1990 g. v Dushanbe" (Report 
of the Commission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the Tajik SSR on Examining the Events of February 12- 
14, 1990, in Dushanbe), Sogdiana [Dushanbe], 1990. No. 3, 
entire issue. 

United Nations. Department for Economic and Social Infor- 
mation and Policy Analysis. Demographic Yearbook 1993. New 
York: 1995. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 
1994. Washington: GPO, 1994. 



506 



Bibliography 



United States. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe. Report on the Helsinki Commission Visit to 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine. Washington: GPO, 1992. 

United States. Congress. 103d, 2d Session. House of Represen- 
tatives. Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the 
Middle East. Prepared testimony of Holly Burkhalter of 
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Sept. 22, 1994. Washington: 
GPO, 1994. 

United States. Congress. 103d, 2d Session. House of Represen- 
tatives. Subcommittee on International Security, Interna- 
tional Operations, and Human Rights. Testimony from 
Pamela B. Cohen, National President, and Micah H. Nafta- 
lin, National Director of the Union of Councils, April 26, 
1994. Washington: GPO, 1994. 

United States. Department of State. Bureau of International 
Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Strategy Report March 
1996. Washington: GPO, 1996. 

Veselovskiy, Vladimir Glebovich, et al. Arkhitektura sovetskogo 
Tadzhikistana (The Architecture of Soviet Tajikistan). Mos- 
cow: Stroyizdat, 1987. 

Vinnikov, Ya. R. "Natsional'nyye i etnograficheskiye gruppy 
Sredney Azii po dannym etnicheskoy statistiki" (The 
National and Ethnographic Groups of Central Asia Accord- 
ing to Ethnic Statistical Data). Pages 11-42 in R. Sh. Dzharyl- 
gasimova and L.S. Tolstova, eds., Etnicheskiye protsessy u 
natsional 1 nykh grupp Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana. Moscow: 
Nauka, 1980. 

Wheeler, Geoffrey. The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia. New 
York: Praeger, 1964. 

World Bank. Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former USSR. 
Washington: 1995. 

World Radio TV Handbook 1996. Ed., Andrew G. Sennitt. Amster- 
dam: Billboard: 1996. 

Worldwide Directory of Defense Authorities, 2. Ed., Kenneth Gause. 
Bethesda, Maryland: Worldwide Government Directories, 
1996. 

Wright, R. "Report from Turkestan," New Yorker, April 6, 1992, 
53-75. 



507 



Country Studies 

Yarshater, Ehsan, ed. Persian Literature. Albany: Bibliotheca Per- 
sica, 1988. 

(Various issues of the following periodicals also were used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Central Asia Monitor, Christian 
Science Monitor, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press; Daily Tele- 
graph; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Cen- 
tral Asia; Financial Times [London]; Guardian [London]; 
Izvestiya [Moscow]; Jane's Intelligence Review [Coulsdon, United 
Kingdom]; Literaturnaya gazeta [Moscow]; Los Angeles Times; 
Manchester Guardian Weekly [London] ; Le Monde [Paris] ; Moscow 
News [Moscow]; New York Times; Nezavisimay a gazeta [Moscow]; 
Pravda [Moscow]; RFE/RL Daily Report [Munich]; RFE/RL 
Research Report [Munich]; Times [London]; Tojikistoni Shuravi 
[Dushanbe] ; Tojikistoni Soveti [Dushanbe] ; Transition; and Wash- 
ington Post.) 

Chapter 4 

Ahmed, Akbar, and David Hart, eds. Islam in Tribal Societies. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. 

Allworth, Edward, ed. Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 

Anderson, John. 'Authoritarian Political Development in Cen- 
tral Asia: The Case of Turkmenistan," Central Asian Survey 
[Abingdon, United Kingdom], 14, No. 4, 1995, 509-28. 

Bacon, Elizabeth. Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in 
Culture Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980. 

Bartol'd, Vasilii Vladimirovich. "A History of the Turkman Peo- 
ple (An Outline)." Pages 73-170 in Four Studies on the History 
of Central Asia III. Trans., V. and T. Minorsky. Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1962. 

Barylski, Robert V. "The Caucasus, Central Asia, and the 
Near-Abroad Syndrome," Central Asia Monitor, No. 4, 1993, 
31. 

Basilov, Vladimir Nikolayevich. "Honor Groups in Traditional 
Turkmenian Society." Pages 220-43 in Akbar Ahmed and 
David Hart, eds., Islam in Tribal Societies. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1984. 

Basilov, Vladimir Nikolayevich. "Popular Islam in Central Asia 
and Kazakhstan," Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority 



508 



Bibliography 



Affairs, 8, No. 1, 1987, 7-17. 

Batalden, Stephen K., and Sandra L. Batalden. The Newly Inde- 
pendent States of Eurasia: Handbook of Former Soviet Republics. 
Phoenix: Oryx, 1993. 

Becker, Seymour. Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara 
and Khiva, 1865-1924. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1968. 

Bennigsen, Alexandre. Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the 
Soviet Union. London: Hurst, 1985. 

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and S. Enders Wimbush. Muslims of the 
Soviet Empire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. 

Berdi Murat, Aman. "Turkmenistan and the Turkmen." Pages 
262-82 in Zev Katz, ed., Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities. 
New York: Free Press, 1975. 

Bregel, Yuriy. "The Peoples of Southern Turkmenistan and 
Khorasan in the 17th and 18th Centuries," Central Asian 
Review, 8, No. 3, 1960, 264-72. 

Bregel, Yuriy. "Nomadic and Sedentary Elements among the 
Turkmens," Central Asiatic Journal, 25, Nos. 1-2, 1981, 5-37. 

Canfield, Robert, ed. Turco-Persia in Historical Perspective. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 

Chalidze, F. "Aral Sea Crisis: A Legacy of Soviet Rule," Central 
Asia Monitor, 1992, No. 1, 30-34. 

Clark, Susan L. "The Central Asian States: Defining Security 
Priorities and Developing Military Forces." Pages 177-206 in 
Michael Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakh- 
stan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 

Commonwealth of Independent States. Statistical Committee. 
Strany-chleny Sodruzhestva nezavisimykh gosudarstv: Statisticheskiy 
yezhegodnik (The Member Nations of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States: A Statistical Yearbook). Moscow: Finans- 
ovyy inzhiniring, 1992. 

Davis, Christopher M. "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet 
Union," RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 40, Octo- 
ber 8, 1993, 35-43. 

Demidov, Sergey Mikhaylovich. Istoriya religioznykh verovaniy nar- 
odov Turkmenistana (A History of the Religious Faiths of 
Turkmenistan). Ashgabat: Ylym, 1990. 



509 



Country Studies 



Durdyyev, Marat, and Shukhrat Kadyrov. Turkmeny mira (Turk- 
men of the World). Ashgabat: Kharp, 1991. 

Dzhikiyev, Ata. Ocherki proiskhozhdeniya i formirovaniya turkmen- 
skogo naroda v epokhu srednovekov'ya (Essays on the Origin and 
Formation of the Turkmen People in the Middle Ages). Ash- 
gabat: Ylym, 1991. 

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Central Asian Republics. London: 1994. 

Ellis, C.H. The Trans Caspian Episode, 1918-1919. London: 
Hutchinson, 1963. 

Encyclopedia Iranica, 5. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda, 1990. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1993, 2. London: Europa, 1993. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1994, 2. London: Europa, 1994. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2. London: Europa, 1995. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2. London: Europa, 1996. 

Farmayan, Hafez. "Turkoman Identity and Presence in Iran," 
Iran, 4, Summer 1981, 45-63. 

Feldman, Walter. "Interpreting the Poetry of Makhtumquli." 
Pages 167-89 in Jo-Ann Gross, ed., Muslims in Central Asia: 
Expressions of Identity and Change. Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1992. 

Feshbach, Murray, and Alfred Friendly, Jr. Ecocide in the USSR: 
Health and Nature under Siege. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 

Friedman, L. "Ethnic and National Composition of Population 
in Newly Independent Countries of the Middle East and 
Caucasus," Central Asia Today, 1993, No. 1, 56-60. 

Geldiyev, B., S.P. .Tokarev, and T. Sakhatliyev. Razvitiye promy- 
shlennosti Turkmenistana za 50 let (The Development of Indus- 
try in Turkmenistan over 50 Years). Ashgabat: 
Turkmenistan, 1974. 

Gleason, Gregory. "Central Asia: Land Reform and the Ethnic 
Factor," RFE /RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 3, 1993, 28- 
33. 

Gleason, Gregory. An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peo- 
ples. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1992. 

Goetz, Roland, and Uwe Halbach. Informationen uber eine unbe- 
kannte Republik, I-II. Berichte des Bundesinstituts fur ostwis- 
senschaftliche und internationale Studien. Cologne: 1995. 

Howard, G. "The Caspian Oil and Gas Oasis: Turkmenistan," 
Russian Oil and Gas Guide, 3, No. 1, 1994, 54-58. 



510 



Bibliography 



International Monetary Fund. Economic Review: Turkmenistan. 
Washington: 1992. 

International Monetary Fund. Turkmenistan. Washington: 1994. 

Irons, William. "The Turkmen of Iran: A Brief Research 
Report," Iranian Studies, 2, Winter 1969, 27-38. 

Irons, William. The Yomut Turkmen: A Study of Social Organization 
among a Central Asian Turkic-Speaking Population. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1975. 

Istoriya Turkmenskoy SSR (History of the Turkmen SSR). Ash- 
gabat: Akademiya nauk Turkmenskoy SSR, 1957. 

Jane's Sentinel Regional Security Assessment: Commonwealth of Inde- 
pendent States. Ed., Paul Beaver. Coulsdon, United Kingdom: 
Jane's Information Group, 1994. 

Kaiser, Robert J. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the 
USSR Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 

Katz, Zev, ed. Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities. New York: 
Free Press, 1975. 

Keller, S. "Islam in Soviet Central Asia, 1917-1930: Soviet Policy 
and the Struggle for Control," Central Asian Survey [Abing- 
don, United Kingdom], 11, No. 1, 1992, 25-50. 

Khrushchev, Anatoliy Timofeyevich, and O.D. Chuvilkin. 
"Resursy gaza gosudarstv Tsentral'noy Azii: Ekonomiko- 
geograficheskiye aspekty" (Gas Resources of the States of 
Central Asia: Economic-Geographic Aspects), Vestnik Mos- 
kovskogo universiteta: Geografiya [Moscow], 1994, No. 4, 51-57. 

Kirpichenko, V. "Khozyaystvennyye svyazi stran-chlenov SNG" 
(Economic Relations of CIS Member States). Ekonomist 
[Moscow], 1993, No. 4, 53-62. 

Krader, Lawrence. Peoples of Central Asia. Uralic and Altaic 
Series, No. 26. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1963. 

Maksudov, Sergey. "On Infant Mortality in Turkmenistan," Cen- 
tral Asia Monitor, 1992, No. 1, 26-30. 

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. Central Asia and the World: Kazakh- 
stan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 

Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, ed. Central Asia and the Caucasus after the 
Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1994. 

Micklin, Phillip P. The Water Management Crisis in Soviet Central 
Asia. The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European 



511 



Country Studies 



Studies, No. 905. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1992. 

The Military Balance 1993-1994. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1993. 

The Military Balance 1994-1995. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1994. 

The Military Balance 1995-1996. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1995. 

Narody mira: Etnograficheskiye ocherki (Peoples of the World: Eth- 
nographic Sketches). Moscow: Nauka, 1963. 

Nichol, James, and Leah Titerence. "Turkmenistan: Basic 
Facts," CRS Report for Congress. Washington: Library of Cong- 
gress, Congressional Research Services, March 16, 1993. 

1995 Britannica Book of the Year. Chicago: 1995. 

Nissman, David B. "Iran and Soviet Islam: The Azerbaijan and 
Turkmen SSRs," Central Asia Survey [Abingdon, United King- 
dom] , 2, No. 4, 1983, 45-60. 

PlanEcon. Review and Outlook for the Former Soviet Republics. 
Washington: 1995. 

Plyshevskiy, B. "Ekonomicheskoye polozheniye gosudarstv 
SNG" (The Economic Situation of the CIS States) , Ekonomist 
[Moscow], 1993, No. 4, 63-75. 

Polyakov, Sergey Petrovich. Etnicheskaya istoriya severo-zapadnoy 
Turkmenii v sredniye veka (The Ethnic History of Northwest 
Turkmenia in the Middle Ages). Ashgabat: 1973. 

Rashid, Ahmed. The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or National- 
ism! Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994. 

Saray, Mehmet. The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism: A Study of 
the Turkmen People and Their Incorporation into the Russian 
Empire. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 1989. 

Simon, Gerhard. Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities 
in the Soviet Union. Trans., K. Forster and O. Forster. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1991. 

Sizov, Andrey Yevgen'ye-vich. "Ekonomika Rossii i drugikh stran 
SNG v nachale 90-kh ^odov" (The Economy of Russia and 
the Other Countries of the CIS at the Beginning of the 
1990s). Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya 
[Moscow], 1993, No. 7, 20-29. 

The Statesman's Year-Book 1995-1996. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 



512 



Bibliography 



Subtelny, E. "The Cult of Holy Places: Religious Practices 
among Soviet Muslims," Middle East Journal, 43, No. 4, 1989, 
593-604. 

Turkmenenforschung (Research on the Turkmen), 1-15. Ham- 
burg and Berlin: Reinhold Schletzer Verlag, 1979-93. 

Tyson, David, and Larry Clark. Turkmen: Language Competencies 
for Peace Corps Volunteers in Turkmenistan. Washington: GPO, 
1994. 

United Nations. Department for Economic and Social Infor- 
mation and Policy Analysis. Demographic Yearbook 1993. New 
York: 1995. 

United States. Agency for International Development. Center 
for Health Information. USAID Health Profile: Turkmenistan. 
Arlington, Virginia: USAID, 1992. 

United States. Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. Inter- 
national Narcotics Strategy Report March 1996. Washington: 
GPO, 1996. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Handbook of Interna- 
tional Economic Statistics 1992. Washington: GPO, 1992. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Handbook of Interna- 
tional Economic Statistics 1995. Washington: GPO, 1995. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Piecing Together Cen- 
tral Asia: A Look at Key Leaders. Washington: GPO, 1993. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Turkmenistan: An 
Economic Profile. Springfield, Virginia: National Technical 
Information Service, 1993. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 

1994. Washington: GPO, 1994. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 

1995. Washington: GPO, 1995. 

United States. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe. Human Rights and Democratization in the 
Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. Washington: 
GPO, 1993. 

United States. Department of Agriculture. Economic Research 
Service. Former USSR: Agriculture and Trade Report 1991. Wash- 
ington: GPO, 1992. 

United States. Department of Agriculture. Economic Research 
Service. Former USSR: Agriculture and Trade Report 1992. Wash- 
ington: GPO, 1993. 



513 



Country Studies 

United States. Department of Commerce. Business Informa- 
tion Service for the Newly Independent States. Commercial 
Overview of Turkmenistan. Washington: 1993. 

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1993. (Report submitted to United States 
Congress, 103d, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs, and Senate, Committee on For- 
eign Relations.) Washington: GPO, 1994. 

WEFA Group. Eurasia Economic Outlook, February 1996. Eddys- 
tone, Pennsylvania: 1996. 

Wheeler, Geoffrey. The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia. New 
York: Praeger, 1964. 

Wolfson, Zeev. "Central Asian Environment: A Dead End," 
Environmental Policy Review, 4, No. 1, January 1990, 29-46. 

World Bank. Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former USSR. 
Washington: 1995. 

World Bank. Turkmenistan. World Bank Country Study. Wash- 
ington: 1994. 

World Radio TV Handbook 1996. Ed., Andrew G. Sennitt. Amster- 
dam: Billboard, 1996. 

Yekayev, Orazpolat. Turkmenistan i turkmeny v kontse XV-pervoy 
polovineXWv (Turkmenistan and the Turkmen at the End of 
the Fifteenth-First Half of the Sixteenth Centuries). Ash- 
gabat: Ylym, 1981. 

(Various issues of the following periodicals also were used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report: Central Eurasia; Jamestown Foundation, 
Monitor, RFE/RL Research Report [Munich]; Transition; and Wash- 
ington Post.) 

Chapter 5 

Abduvakhitov, Abdujabar. "Independent Uzbekistan: A Muslim 
Community in Development." Pages 293-306 in Michael 
Bourdeaux, ed., The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New 
States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 

Akbarzadeh, Shahram. "Nation Building in Uzbekistan," Cen- 
tral Asian Survey [Abingdon, United Kingdom], 15, March 
1996, 23-32. 



514 



Bibliography 



Alikhanov, B. B., and S. S. Tursunov, Ekonomicheskiye problemy 
okhrany okruzhayushchey sredy v usloviyakh Uzbekistana (Eco- 
nomic Problems of Environmental Protection in the Condi- 
tions of Uzbekistan). Tashkent: State Committee on 
Hydrology, 1990. 

Allworth, Edward, ed. Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 

Azv'yalova, L.V., O.A. Agafonova, and L.A. Semakina. 
Zagryazneniye atmosfery Sredney Azii tyazhelymi metallami (Atmo- 
spheric Pollution by Heavy Metals in Central Asia). Tash- 
kent: State Committee on Hydrology, 1991. 

Bacon, Elizabeth E. Central Asians under Russian Rule. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1980. 

Banuazizi, Ali, and Myron Weiner, eds. The New Geopolitics of 
Central Asia and Its Borderlands. Bloomington: Indiana Uni- 
versity Press, 1994. 

Bartol'd, Vasilii Vladimirovich. Turkestan Down to the Mongol 
Invasion. London: Luzac, 1968. 

Bohr, Annette. "Health Catastrophe in Karakalpakstan," Report 
on the USSR [Munich], ljuly 21, 1989, 37-38. 

Bourdeaux, Michael, ed. The Politics of Religion in Russia and the 
New States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 

Brown, Bess. "National Security and Military Issues in Central 
Asia." Pages 234—52 in Bruce Parrott, ed., State Building and 
Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 

Brown, Bess. "Three Central Asian States Form Economic 
Union," RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 3, No. 13, April 1, 
1994, 33-35. 

Carlisle, Donald S. "Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: 
From Stalin to Gorbachev." Pages 93-130 in William Fier- 
man, Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1991. 

Colton, Timothy J., and Robert C. Tucker, eds. Patterns in Post- 
Soviet Leadership. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 

Critchlow, James. Nationalism in Uzbekistan. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1991. 

Dannreuther, Roland. Creating New States in Central Asia. Adel- 
phi Paper No. 288. London: Brassey's for International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1994. 



515 



Country Studies 



Davis, Christopher M. "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet 
Union," RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 40, Octo- 
ber 8, 1993, 35-43. 

Drobizheva, Leokadia, et al., eds. Ethics Conflict in the Post-Soviet 
World: Case Studies and Analysis. Armonk, New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1996. 

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan [London], No. 1, 
1996. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1993, 2. London: Europa, 1993. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1994, 2. London: Europa, 1994. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1995, 2. London: Europa, 1995. 

TheEuropa World Year Book 1996, 2. London: Europa, 1996. 

Fane, Daria. "Ethnicity and Regionalism in Uzbekistan: Main- 
taining Stability Through Authoritarian Control." Pages 271- 
302 in Leokadia Drobizheva, et al., eds. Ethnic Conflict in the 
Post- Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis. Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. 

Ferdinand, Peter, ed. The New States of Central Asia and Their 
Neighbors. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1994. 

Feshbach, Murray, and Alfred Friendly, Jr. Ecocide in the USSR: 
Health and Nature under Siege. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 

Fierman, William. "Independence and the Declining Priority 
of Language Law Implementation in Uzbekistan." Pages 
205-30 in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Lega- 
cies. London: Frank Cass, 1995. 

Fierman, William, ed. Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transforma- 
tion. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991. 

Hale, Henry. "Islam, State-building, and Uzbekistan Foreign 
Policy," Pages 136-72 in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, 
eds., The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 

Henley, John S., and George B. Assaf. "Re-Integrating the Cen- 
tral Asian Republics into the World Economy," Inter economics, 
30, September-October 1995, 235-45. 

Horton, Scott, and Tatiana Geller. "Investing in Uzbekistan's 
Natural Resources Sector," Central Asia Monitor, 1996, No. 1, 
25-35. 



516 



Bibliography 



Horton, Scott, and Tatiana Geller. "Secured Transactions in 
Uzbekistan," Central Asia Monitor, 1996, No. 2, 21-7. 

Institute for National Strategic Studies. Strategic Assessment 
1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition. Washington: GPO, 
1995. 

Karpat, Kemal. "The Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States, 
Turkey, and Iran," OS CE Bulletin, 3, No. 1, Winter 1994-95, 
17-30. 

Konyukhov, V.G. Ekohgicheskaya obstanovka v Uzbekistanskoy SSR 
i mery po yeye uluchsheniyu (The Ecological Situation in the 
Uzbek SSR and Measures to Improve It). Tashkent: State 
Committee on Environmental Protection, 1990. 

Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights. Freedom of Associa- 
tion Project. Karimov's Way: Freedom of Association and Assembly 
in Uzbekistan. Briefing Paper No. 1. New York: 1994. 

Lubin, Nancy. Central Asians Take Stock. Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1995. 

Lubin, Nancy. "Islam and Ethnic Identity in Central Asia: A 
View from Below." Pages 53-70 in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., Muslim 
Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: Frank Cass, 1995. 

Lubin, Nancy. Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An 
Uneasy Compromise. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985. 

Lubin, Nancy. "Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: The 
Views of the Led." Pages 217-34 in Timothy J. Colton and 
Robert C. Tucker, eds., Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 

Lubin, Nancy. "Uzbekistan." Pages 289-306 in Philip R. Pryde, 
ed., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet 
Republics. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 

Lubin, Nancy. "Uzbekistan: The Challenges Ahead," Middle East 
Journal, 43, No. 4, Autumn 1989, 619-34. 

Micklin, Philip. "The Aral Sea Crisis: Introduction to the Spe- 
cial Issue," Post-Soviet Geography, 33, No. 5, May 1992, 269-82. 

Nichol, James. "Central Asia's New States: Political Develop- 
ments and Implications for U.S. Interests," CRS Issue Brief, 
July 31, 1996. 

Nichol, James. "Uzbekistan: Basic Facts," CRS Report for Congress, 

May 28, 1996. 
1995 Britannica Book of the Year. Chicago: 1995. 



517 



Country Studies 



Olcott, Martha Brill. Central Asia' s New States: Independence, For- 
eign Policy, and Regional Security. Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996. 

Olcott, Martha Brill. "The Myth of Tsentral'naia Aziia'," Orbis, 
38, No. 3, Summer 1995, 549-66. 

Polat, Abdumannob. "Uzbekistan: Does the Government Want 
a Dialogue with the Opposition," Caspian Crossroads, Winter 
1995, 26-28. 

Posner, Michael. Human Rights and Legal Issues in Uzbekistan. 

New York: Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, 1993. 
Pryde, Philip R., ed. Environmental Resources and Constraints in 

the Former Soviet Republics. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 

1995. 

Ro'i, Yaacov, ed. Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: 
Frank Cass, 1995. 

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. "The Geopolitical Pull on Russia," Orbis, 
38, No. 3, Summer 1995, 567-84. 

Rumer, Boris Z. Soviet Central Asia: A "Tragic Experiment. " Bos- 
ton: Unwin Hyman, 1989. 

Sagers, Matthew J. "News Notes," Post-Soviet Geography, 33, No. 3, 
1992, 190. 

Staar, S. Frederick. "Making Eurasia Stable," Foreign Affairs, 75, 

January-February 1996, 80-92. 
The Statesman's Year-Book 1993-1994. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

The Statesman's Year-Book 1994-1995. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 

The Statesman' s Year-Book 1995-1996. Ed., Brian Hunter. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 

United Nations. Department for Economic and Social Infor- 
mation and Policy Analysis. Demographic Yearbook 1993. New 
York, 1995. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Handbook of Interna- 
tional Economic Statistics 1995. Washington: GPO, 1995. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Fa ctbook 
1994. Washington: GPO, 1994. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Uzbekistan: An Eco- 
nomic Profile. Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Infor- 
mation Service, 1993. 



518 



Bibliography 



United States. Department of State. Bureau of International 
Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Strategy Report March 
1996. Washington: GPO, 1996. 

"Uzbekistan," Central Asia Monitor, 1996, No. 3, entire issue. 

Uzbekistan. State Committee on Projections and Statistics. 
Chislennost', sostav i dvizheniye naseleniya Respubliki Uzbekistan 
(The Size, Composition, and Movement of the Population of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan). Tashkent: 1992. 

Uzbekistan. State Committee on Projections and Statistics. 
Okhrana zdorov'ya v respublike Uzbekistana (Health Protection 
in the Republic of Uzbekistan). Tashkent: 1991. 

Vaisman, Demian. "Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Politi- 
cal Life of Uzbekistan." Pages 105-22 in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., 
Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: Frank Cass, 
1995. 

World Bank. Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former USSR 
Washington: 1995. 

World Bank. Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform. Wash- 
ington: 1993. 

World Radio TV Handbook 1996. Ed., Andrew G. Sennitt. Amster- 
dam: Billboard, 1996. 

(Various issues of the following periodicals also were used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Central Asian Monitor, Christian 
Science Monitor, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report: Central Eurasia; Jamestown Foundation, Monitor and 
Prism; New York Times; Transition; and Washington Post.) 



519 



Glossary 



Bolshevik Revolution — Coup organized by Vladimir I. Lenin 
and carried out by the Bolshevik radical group of the Rus- 
sian Social Democratic Labor Party to overthrow the Provi- 
sional Government of Russia in November 1917. Also 
known as the October Revolution. 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Official desig- 
nation of the former republics of the Soviet Union that 
remained loosely federated in economic and security mat- 
ters after the Soviet Union disbanded as a unified state in 
1991. Members in 1996 were Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty — An agreement 
signed in 1990 by members of the Warsaw Pact and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — q.v.) to 
establish parity in conventional weapons between the two 
organizations from the Atlantic to the Urals. Included a 
strict system of inspections and information exchange. In 
1995 Russia requested exemptions for forces stationed in 
the Caucasus region, and substantial changes were negoti- 
ated by the thirty signatory nations in 1997. 

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) — Established in 
1985, an economic union of Islamic countries to promote 
regional cooperation in trade, transportation, communi- 
cations, culture, and overall economic development. Mem- 
bers in 1996 were Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, the 
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. 

glasnost — Russian term, literally meaning "public voicing." 
Applied in the Soviet Union beginning in 1987 to official 
permission for public discussion of issues and public 
access to information, initially intended as a means for the 
regime of Mikhail S. Gorbachev to publicize the need for 
political and economic reform. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and 
services produced exclusively within a nation's domestic 
economy, in contrast to the gross national product 
(GNP — q.v.). Normally computed over one-year periods. 



521 



Country Studies 

gross national product (GNP) — The total value of goods and 
services produced within a country's borders and the 
income received from abroad by residents, minus pay- 
ments remitted abroad by nonresidents. Normally com- 
puted over one-year periods. 

hard currency — National currencies that are freely convertible 
and traded on international currency markets. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, a specialized agency affiliated 
with the United Nations and responsible for stabilizing 
international exchange rates and payments. Its main func- 
tion is to provide loans to its members (including industri- 
alized and developing countries) when they experience 
balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently 
have conditions that require substantial internal economic 
adjustments by the recipients, most of which are develop- 
ing countries. 

Iranian — Linguistically, a subgroup of the Indo-Iranian branch 
of Indo-European languages, which in modern times 
includes Persian (q.v.) — the most widely used — Pushtu, 
Kurdish (q.v.) dialects, and Ossetic. In the Middle Iranian 
stage of the group's development (third century B.C. to 
tenth century A.D.), the chief languages were Parthian, 
Pahlavi (middle Persian), and Soghdian. 

Kurdish — Term referring to a mainly Muslim people speaking 
an Indo-European language similar to Persian. Kurds con- 
stitute significant minorities in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, with 
smaller groups in Armenia and Syria. Despite interna- 
tional proposals in response to minority persecution, 
never united in a single state. 

manat — Beginning in 1993, national currency of Turkmeni- 
stan. Inflation rapid in 1994 and 1995. In January 1996, 
official rate 200 per US$1. 

Manichaeism — A dualistic religious movement founded in Per- 
sia, third century A.D., incorporating elements of Chris- 
tianity and Iranian and Indian religions. 

net material product (NMP) — In countries having centrally 
planned economies, the official measure of the value of 
goods and services produced within the country. Roughly 
equivalent to the gross national product (q.v.), NMP is 
based on constant prices and does not account for depre- 
ciation. 

New Economic Policy (Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika — 



522 



Glossary 



NEP) — Instituted in 1921 by Vladimir I. Lenin, program 
allowing peasants in the Soviet Union to sell produce on 
an open market and small enterprises to be privately 
owned and operated. Officially ended in 1929 with 
enforcement of national central planning of all economic 
activities. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — During the post- 
war period until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the primary collective defense agreement of the 
Western powers against the military presence of the War- 
saw Pact nations in Europe. Founded in 1949. Its military 
and administrative structure remained intact after 1991, 
but early in 1994 the Partnership for Peace offered partial 
membership to all former Warsaw Pact nations and former 
republics of the Soviet Union. 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) — Beginning in 1995, the name of the former 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). Established in 1972 as an international forum for 
negotiation, the organization consisted of fifty-three mem- 
ber nations in 1996, including all European countries. The 
Charter of Paris (1990) changed the CSCE from an ad hoc 
forum to an organization with permanent institutions. In 
1992 the CSCE took on new roles in conflict mediation, 
including crises in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus 
region, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Beginning in 1994, Russia 
advocated CSCE/OSCE as the chief European peacekeep- 
ing agency in preference to possible NATO expansion. 

perestroika — Russian term meaning "restructuring." Applied in 
the late 1980s to an official Soviet program of revitalization 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the 
economy, and the society by adjusting economic, social, 
and political mechanisms in the central planning system. 
Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as 
leader of the Soviet Union. 

Persian — As a language, a member of the Iranian subgroup in 
the Indo-European language family. The official language 
of modern Iran and spoken widely in Afghanistan. Middle 
Persian (Pahlavi) was used between the third century B.C. 
and the ninth century A.D. and was the official language 
of the Sassanid Empire that ruled parts of Central Asia 
from the third century to the sixth century A.D. Modern 
Persian is called Farsi by native speakers. 



523 



Country Studies 



ruble — Currency of the Soviet Union; then, beginning in 1992, 
of Russia. In February 1997, the exchange rate was 5,670 
rubles to US$1. 

ruble zone — Currency exchange arrangement by which 
former republics of the Soviet Union continued using the 
ruble as their national currency, forcing dependence on 
Russian currency valuations and economic developments 
elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(q.v.). In 1993 all Central Asian republics except Tajikistan 
established national currencies independent of the ruble. 

Shia — The smaller of the two great divisions of Islam, support- 
ing the claims of Ali to leadership of the Muslim commu- 
nity, in opposition to the Sunni (q.v.) view of succession to 
Muslim leadership — the issue causing the central schism 
within Islam. 

som — Beginning in 1993, currency of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbeki- 
stan. In 1996 average exchange rate of Uzbekistani som 
was thirty-five to US$1; of Kyrgyzstani som, eleven to US$1. 

Sunni — The larger of the two fundamental divisions of Islam, 
opposed to the Shia (q.v.) on the issue of succession to 
Muslim leadership. 

Tajikistani ruble — Beginning in 1995, currency of Tajikistan. In 
January 1996, exchange rate 284 rubles per US$1. 

tenge — Beginning in 1993, currency of Kazakstan. In January 
1996, exchange rate sixty-four tenge to US$1. 

value-added tax (VAT) — A tax applied to the additional value 
created at a given stage of production and calculated as a 
percentage of the difference between the product value at 
that stage and the cost of all materials and services pur- 
chased or introduced as inputs. 

World Bank — Informal name for a group of four affiliated 
international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA); the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC); and the Multilateral Invest- 
ment Guaranty Agency (MIGA). The four institutions are 
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe 
their capital for credit and investment in developing coun- 
tries; each institution has a specialized agenda for aiding 
economic growth in target countries. To participate in the 
World Bank group, member states first must belong to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 

World Trade Organization (WTO) — Established 1995 as suc- 



524 



Glossary 



cessor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), aimed at liberalizing and securing international 
trade. Formed in the Uruguay Round of trade negotia- 
tions, the WTO had 115 member nations in 1996, and fif- 
teen others applied WTO rules to their trade policies. 
Administered by a general council, trade dispute negotia- 
tion panel, and secretariat. 
Zoroastrianism — Religion founded in the sixth century B.C. by 
the Iranian prophet Zoroaster. With monotheistic and 
dualistic aspects, it influenced subsequently founded reli- 
gions, including Christianity and Islam. Now practiced 
most widely by Persian immigrants in India. 



525 



Index 



Abbasid Caliphate, 387 

Abdullojanov, Abdumalik, 271, 275; as 

prime minister of Tajikistan, 269 
abortion: in Kazakstan, 28; rates, 28-29 
Abu Ali ibn Sino Institute of Medicine 

(Tajikistan), 246 
ABV (Almaty Business News) , 82 
Academy of Sciences (Tajikistan), 242, 

276 

Academy of Sciences (Turkmenistan), 
309 

Achaemenid Empire, 207 
Achak, Turkmenistan: natural gas depos- 
its in, 334 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS): in Kazakstan, 40; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 144; in Tajikistan, 249; in 
Uzbekistan, 424 
Adalat political group (Kyrgyzstan), 113 
Adolat (Justice) party (Uzbekistan), 450 
Adygine clan (Kyrgyzstan), 132-33 
Afghanistan: borders with, 1, 282, 287, 
305, 362, 369, 464, 465; Britain in, 
392; civil war in, 282; ethnic groups in, 
234, 311, 317; joint ventures with 
Tajikistan, 261; pipeline from Turk- 
menistan, 347, 350; refugees in, 232, 
281; relations with, 277, 281-82, 362- 
63; Salor tribes in, 304; as security 
threat to Turkmenistan, 360, 362-63; 
Soviet occupation of, 281; and Tajiki- 
stan, 209, 277, 281-82; Tajiks in, 281; 
trade routes through, xl 
Against Insulting the Dignity and Honor 
of the President (law, Turkmenistan), 
353 

Agip (company), 52, 55 

Agricultural and Industrial Bank (Agro- 

prombank) (Kazakstan) , 61 
Agricultural and Industrial Bank (Agro- 

prombank) (Kyrgyzstan) , 159 
agricultural inputs, 330; for cotton, 332; 

fertilizer, 153; shortages of, 251 
agricultural production: declines in, 259; 

in Kazakstan, 17, 46, 58; in Kyrgyzstan, 



xlvii, 152; in Tajikistan, 250-51, 258, 
259; in Turkmenistan, 330 
agricultural products (see also under indi- 
vidual crops): cannabis, 96, 190, 466; 
commercial crops, 152; cotton, xxxii, 
lvi, lvii, lviii, 113, 152, 216, 250, 330, 
426, 427, 428; export of, 153; failures 
of, 46; fodder, 428; food crops, 152, 
250, 330, 333, 428; fruit, 333, 428; 
grain, lvii, 250, 330, 333, 428; import 
of, 259; marketing and distribution of, 
330; opium poppies, 96, 190, 465, 466; 
rice, 215; root crops, 250; subsistence 
crops, 153; value of, 427; vegetables, 
lvii, 428 

agricultural reform, xxxix; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 330 

agricultural regions in Kyrgyzstan, 150- 
51 

agricultural resources, xxxi 

agriculture (Kazakstan), 45-46; area 
under cultivation, 45-46; debt in, 48; 
and dust storms, 22-23; forced collec- 
tivization of, 15, 18; foreign invest- 
ment in, 64; under Soviets, xxxv, 11, 
16; wages in, 63; work force in, 45, 57 

agriculture (Kyrgyzstan), 128, 148, 150- 
54; employment in, 148; government 
control of, 150; income from, 151; 
investment in, 160; irrigation in, xl, 
123; as percentage of net material 
product, 148; under Soviet Union, 
xxxv; water consumption by, 123 

agriculture (Tajikistan), xxxi, xxxii, 205, 
220, 250-52; chemicals used in, 223; 
employment in, 231, 256; forced col- 
lectivization of, xxxv, 216, 235; irriga- 
tion in, xl, 224; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 45; as percentage 
of net material product, 250; privatiza- 
tion of, 259; under Russian rule, 211; 
under Soviet rule, xxxv, 215, 216; 
water used in, 224, 253 

agriculture (Turkmenistan), 330-33, 
339; chemicals used in, 310-11; 



527 



Country Studies 



employment in, 327, 329, 336; forced 
collectivization of, xxxv, 306; irriga- 
tion for, xl, liv, 330-32; loans for, 341; 
as percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, liv, 329; privatization of, 330; pro- 
ductivity in, 338; Soviet legacy in, 330; 
under Soviet Union, xxxv; state con- 
trol of, liv; structure of, 330; transpor- 
tation in, 330; wages in, 337 

agriculture (Uzbekistan) , xxxi, xxxii, lvii, 
lviii, 426-28; chemicals used in, 403-4; 
diversification of, 399; economic 
structure of, 427; forced collectiviza- 
tion of, xxxv, 397; irrigation in, xl, lvii, 
426, 427; organization of, 426-27; 
privatization in, 433; Soviet legacy in, 
426-27; under Soviet Union, xxxv 

Agroprombank. See Agricultural and 
Industrial Bank 

Ahal Province, Turkmenistan: cotton in, 
332 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 

syn drome 
Ami, Sadriddin, 242 

airlines: in Kyrgyzstan, 167; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 351; in Uzbekistan, 442 

airports: at Almaty, xlix, 70, 167, 180; at 
Ashgabat, 351; at Bishkek, 167, 180; at 
Charjew, 351; at Dashhowuz, 351; at 
Dushanbe, li, 266; at Mary, 351; at 
Nebitdag, 351; at Osh, 167; at Tash- 
kent, 442 

air transportation: in Kazakstan, 70; in 
Kyrgyzstan, 167; in Tajikistan, 266; in 
Turkmenistan, 348; in Uzbekistan, 442 

Aitmatov, Chingiz, 135 

Akayev, Askar, xli, xlvi; background of, 
114; opposition to, 170, 173; powers 
of, 109, 116; rise of, 114-16; support 
for Gorbachev, 115; travel by, 179 

Akayev family (Kyrgyzstan): corruption 
in, 169 

Akayev government (Kyrgyzstan), xlvi; 
economy under, 116; powers of, xli, 
xlviii, 116; reform under, xlvi, xlviii, 
116; resignation of, 171; scandals 
under, 116, 117 
Akhmedov, Rustam, 462 
Alaja, Turkmenistan: port of, 351 
Alamedin hydroelectric plant (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 156 
Alash Orda (Horde of Alash) , 15 



Alash party (Kazakstan), 31, 78; activities 
of, 82 

Alay Mountain Range, 119, 219, 220 

alcoholic beverages: production in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 154 

alcoholism: in Kazakstan, 41; in Uzbeki- 
stan, 423 

Alexander the Great, 207, 386 

Al-Farabi University (Kazakstan), 37 

Alimzhanov, Anuar, 35 

Ali Shir Nava'i, 390 

al-Kashgari, Mahmud, 302 

All Arms Command School (Kazakstan), 
90 

Alma-Ata. See Almaty 

Alma-Ata Declaration (1991), 20, 447 

Almaty (Alma-Ata) , Kazakstan , xliii; eth- 
nic groups in, 27; pollution in, 23 

Almaty Province, Kazakstan: death rate 
in, 26 

Altay Mountain Range, 21 

aluminum (Tajikistan): employment, 
257; export of, 262, 264; production, 1, 
253, 254, 257; quality, 254 

Amnesty International, 277, 452 

Amtiari, Uzbekistan: oil refinery at, 430 

Amu Darya (river), 219, 220, 308-9; 
demands on, 22, 224, 309, 402; pollu- 
tion of, 404 

Anatolia: Oghuz Turks in, 302 

Andijon, Uzbekistan: industry in, 430; 
population in, 406 

Andijon Province, Uzbekistan: popula- 
tion in, 408 

Angren, Uzbekistan: industry in, 430 

Anti-Monopoly and Pricing Committee 
(Kyrgyzstan), 162 

antimony (Kyrgyzstan), xlvi, 148, 149, 
150 

anti-Semitism, 79 

Aqmola, Kazakstan, xliii; industry in, 47; 

universities in, 37 
Aqtobe, Kazakstan: industry in, 47 
Arabic alphabet, 233, 237, 318, 412, 413 
Arabic language: as official language, 

387 

Arabs: conquests by, xxxii, 12, 386-87 
Aral Sea, 21, 124-25; desiccation of, xl- 
xli, lvii, lviii, 22, 124, 224, 309, 310, 
402, 408; pollution of, 41, 224; salin- 
ization of, 46, 402; salvage program 
for, 124-25, 310, 399, 454-55 



528 



Index 



Aral'sk, Kazakstan, 22 
archaeological research (Kyrgyzstan) , 
110 

Argentina: Turkmenistan's trade with, 
345 

armed forces (Kazakstan): air force, 88; 
army, 88; autonomy, xxxi, 88-90; 
bases, 88; border troops, 89-90; com- 
mand structure, 88; creation of, 87- 
90; desertion from, 90; discipline, 90; 
force structure, 88-89; headquarters, 
88, 90; human rights abuses by, 90; 
infrastructure, 90-92; materiel, 88-89, 
91-92; navy, 88; officers, 89; peace- 
keeping role of, 90; personnel, 88-89; 
recruitment, 90; Russians in, 89; train- 
ing, 89, 90 

armed forces (Kyrgyzstan), 184-88: air 
defense force, 187; air force, 148, 187, 
188; army, 184-85, 187; bases, 148, 
187; border troops, 186, 187; com- 
mander in chief, 186; command struc- 
ture, 186-87; desertion from, 184, 
187; ethnic distribution in, 187; head- 
quarters, 187; materiel, 186, 187; offic- 
ers, 184, 185, 187; personnel 184, 185, 
187; training, 187-88 

armed forces (Tajikistan), 285-86: army, 
liii, 285; personnel, 286; private, 283- 
84; rebellion in, 285-86 

armed forces (Turkmenistan), 364—71: 
air defense force, 366; air force, 366, 
368-69; army, 368; autonomy of, xxxi; 
bases, 368; commander in chief, 355, 
365; conditions in, 370; conscription, 
370; ethnic distribution, 370; materiel, 

368, 369-70; missions of, 366; officers, 

369, 371; organization, 368-69; per- 
sonnel, 368; recruitment, 370-71; ser- 
vice in, 365, 370; strategic considera- 
tions, 365; structure, 368-71; training, 
366-67, 370-71 

armed forces (Uzbekistan), lix-lx, 180, 
463-65: air defense force, 463-64; air 
force, 180, 463-64; army, 180, 463; 
autonomy, xxxi; bases, 464; com- 
mander in chief, 448, 463; command 
structure, 462; conscription, 463; 
development of, 460, 462; downsizing, 
464; ethnic groups in, lx, 463; head- 
quarters, 463; intervention by, 453-54; 
language, 414; materiel, 461, 464; mis- 



sions of, 461, 463; officers, 462; orga- 
nization, 463; personnel, lx, 463; 
Soviet legacy, 460; in Tajikistan civil 
war, 279, 461; training, 462, 465 
Armenia: economic agreements with 
Tajikistan, 264; security agreements 
with Uzbekistan, 456; as Soviet repub- 
lic, 213; trade with, lv; war, with Azer- 
baijan, 86 

Armenian Apostolic (Gregorian) 
Church, 241 

Armenians: in Tajikistan, 234, 241 

arts: ballet, 243; constraints on, 242; 
employment in, 57, 336; films, 135, 
243, 280; funding for, 135; in Kazak- 
stan, 57; in Kyrgyzstan, 135; opera, 
243; purges in, 415; under Soviet rule, 
242, 243, 415; in Tajikistan, 241-43, 
280; under Timur, 389-90; traditional, 
335-36; in Turkmenistan, 313, 335-36 

Asaba (Banner) Party (Kyrgyzstan), 175 

Asaba (newspaper), 177 

Asanbayev, Yerik, 73 

Asanov, Karishal, 82 

Ashar (Help) Party (Kyrgyzstan), 175 

Ashgabat, Turkmenistan: airport, lvi, 
351; climate, 308; politics in, 353; pop- 
ulation of, 312 

Asia Minor: conquered by Timur, 389 

Asian Development Bank: aid from, 125; 
Kyrgyzstan in, 179 

Atabashin hydroelectric plant (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 156 

Ata-Meken (Fatherland) Party (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 118, 175 

Atrek River, 309 

Atyrau (Gur'yev), Kazakstan: established, 

14; universities in, 37 
Austria: Tajikistan's joint ventures with, 

261; Turkmenistan's relations with, 

361 

avalanches (Kyrgyzstan), 120 
Azat (Freedom) party (Kazakstan), 78- 
79 

Azerbaijan: in Caspian Border Patrol, 
364; in Caspian States Cooperation 
Organization, 347; in caviar cartel, 
364; Oghuz Turks in, 302; payments to 
Turkmenistan by, 344; pipeline from, 
69; as Soviet republic, 213; trade route 
through, xl; Turkmenistan's trade 
with, 344; Uzbekistan's economic rela- 



529 



Country Studies 



tions with, 456; war with Armenia, 86 
Azerbaijani people: in Kazakstan, 27; in 

Turkmenistan, 319 
Az i la (book) , 35 
Azimov, Yahyo, li 

Azimov government (Tajikistan): eco- 
nomic policy of, li 



Bactrian people, 206; relations, with 
China, 207 

Bactrian state, 386 

Bahais: in Tajikistan, 241 

Bain sulu, (folk tale) , 34 

Baker, James, 116, 282, 346, 459 

Balkhash, Lake, 21 

ballet (Tajikistan), 243 

Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment (Kyrgyzstan), 159-60 

banking (see also credit; foreign 
exchange): interest rates in, 340-41; 
international partnerships in, 61, 262; 
limitations on, 160; in Kazakstan, xliii, 
60-62, 86; in Kyrgyzstan, 159-60; regu- 
lations, 61, 341; restructuring of, 60, 
61; scandals in, 61; in Tajikistan, 260; 
in Turkmenistan, 340; in Uzbekistan, 
431,432,435 

Banking Law (1991) (Uzbekistan), 435 

banks: central, 60, 159, 271, 340, 435; 
commercial, 61, 159, 260, 340, 435; 
foreign, 61; functions of, 61; in Kazak- 
stan, 60-61; in Kyrgyzstan, 159-60; 
loan policies of, 159, 341; savings, 340, 
435; state-owned, 61, 340; in Tajiki- 
stan, 260; trade, 340; in Turkmenistan, 
340-41; in Uzbekistan, 435 

Baptists: in Tajikistan, 241 

Basic Foreign Investment Law (1991) 
(Kyrgyzstan), 162-63 

Basmachi Rebellion, 214-15, 306, 396; 
conciliatory measures, 214-15; deaths 
in, 306; defeat of, 214, 397; refugees 
from, 214; revival of, 216; support for, 
215 

Bateman Engineering, 437 
Baykonur, Kazakstan: spaceport at, 47, 
92 

Behzed Museum of History, Regional 

Studies, and Art (Tajikistan), 243 
Bekobod, Uzbekistan: industry in, 430 
Belarus (see also Belorussia): in commer- 



cial confederation, xlv; in customs 
union, xl, xlvii; economic ties with, xl, 
264; Kazakstan 's security cooperation 
with, 94; Kazakstan's trade with, 65; in 
Lisbon Protocol, 83; in Tashkent 
Agreement, 115 

Belarusian people: in Kazakstan, 27; in 
Tajikistan, 234 

Belorussia: as Soviet republic, 213 

Birlik (Unity) Party (Uzbekistan), 399- 
400, 415; banned, 447; created, 450; in 
elections, 447; platform of, 399, 405 

Birshtein, Boris, 169 

birth control: availability of, 28, 29, 226; 
encouraged, 226-28; in Kazakstan, 
28-29; opposition to, 226; in Tajiki- 
stan, 226; in Uzbekistan, 424; use of, 
29 

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 116, 128; industries 
in, 155; roads to, 166; shantytowns 
around, 128 

Bishkek Military School, 187, 188 

Bishkek Railway Department, 1 65 

Bishkek Stock Exchange, 159 

Bolshevik Revolution (1917), 112, 212- 
13 

Border Guard (Turkmenistan), 368, 369; 
pensions in, 370 

Border Troop Command (Uzbekistan), 
464-65; number of personnel in, 464 

border troops (Kyrgyzstan), 186 

border troops (Russia), 278, 284-85, 
465; drug trafficking by, 288; missions 
of, 185, 287, 366, 465; number of per- 
sonnel in, 285; reorganization of, 285 

Border Troops Command (Kazakstan), 
89 

Border Troops Command (Kyrgyzstan), 
187 

Border Troops School (Kazakstan) , 90 

Boyangora-Gadzhak gas field (Uzbeki- 
stan), 426 

Brezhnev, Leonid I., 217 

Bridas (company), 347, 363 

Britain: and Afghanistan, 392; Kazak- 
stan's investment from, 63; Tajikistan's 
economic relations with, 260; Uzbeki- 
stan's trade with, 443 

British Airways, 266 

British Export Credit Agency, lvi 

British Gas, 52, 55 

Buddhism, 207, 386; expansion of, 207 



530 



Index 



budget deficit: in Kazakstan, xliii, 62; in 
Kyrgyzstan, xlvii; in Tajikistan, li; in 
Turkmenistan, 340, 342; in Uzbeki- 
stan, lvii, lviii 

Buguu warrior clan (Kyrgyzstan), 132 

Bukhara. See Bukhoro 

Bukhoro (Bukhara), Uzbekistan, xxxii, 
lvii, 207; as cultural center, 208, 386, 
387; damage to, 389; decline of, 391; 
population in, 406 

Bukhoro Khanate, 209, 304, 390; agricul- 
ture in, 211; attempted coup in, 213; 
decline of, 391; Russian rule of, 210, 
211, 393, 395; under Soviet Union, 
396; Turkmen military support for, 
304 

Bukhoro Province, Uzbekistan: saliniza- 

tion in, 427 
Bulgaria: pipeline through, 350 
Bureyev, Ibrahim, 452 
Butia-Kapital Fund (Kazakstan), 60 

Cabinet of Ministers (Turkmenistan), 

353, 354, 355 
Came co. See Canadian Metals Company 
Canada: joint ventures with Kyrgyzstan, 

xlvii; joint ventures with Tajikistan, 

261 

Canadian Metals Company (Cameco), 
149-50, 163; scandal, 169 

canals: in Turkmenistan, 309; in Uzbeki- 
stan, 401 

Caspian Border Patrol, 364 

Caspian Sea, 21; cooperation on, 362, 
363-64; expansion of, 23; fishing in, 
363; natural gas reserves in, lv, 334; oil 
deposits in, 51, 363; pollution in, 363 

Caspian Sea Forum, 364 

Caspian States Cooperation Organiza- 
tion, 347 

Catholics, Roman: in Kazakstan, 30; in 

Tajikistan, 241 
Caucasus: Russian conquest of, 392 
censorship: attempted, 82, 176; in Kazak- 
stan, 81, 82; in Kyrgyzstan, 176; in 
Tajikistan, 267; in Turkmenistan, 353; 
in Uzbekistan, 450-51 
Center for Analysis (Kyrgyzstan), 186 
Central Asian-American Enterprise 

Fund, 262 
Central Asian Bank, 454 



Central Asian Economic Union, xlvi, li, 
lvi; activities of, xlvi; established, xlvi; 
Kazakstan in, xlvi, lix; Kyrgyzstan in, 
xlvipclix, lix; mutual security assistance 
in, xlvi; treaty of, lx; Uzbekistan in, 
xlvi, lix 

Central Asian Free Trade Zone, 165 
Central Asian Integrated System, 157 
Central Asian peacekeeping battalion: 

exercises, lx; Kyrgyzstan in, xlix; 

Uzbekistan in, lix-lx 
Central Asian Railway, 348 
Central Bank of Kazakstan, xliii, 60 
Central Bank of Uzbekistan, 435 
Central Police Force (Kyrgyzstan), 188 
Chaghatai, 389 

Chaghatai language, 318, 412-13; alpha- 
bet of, 318,412; publications in, 318 

Chan Young Bang, 84 

Charjew, Turkmenistan: airport at, 351; 
population of, 312 

Charjew Province, Turkmenistan: cot- 
ton in, 332 

Chatyr-K61 (lake), 120 

Chechens (Uzbekistan) , 397 

Chekelen, Turkmenistan: oil field at, 
334; port of, 351 

chemicals: exports of, 65, 343, 345, 436; 
imports of, 343; processing of, 252, 
253, 257; production of, 253; tariffs 
on, 345 

chemicals industry: employment in, 256, 
257; in Kazakstan, 65; in Tajikistan, 
252, 253, 256, 257; in Turkmenistan, 
335; in Uzbekistan, 430 

Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 183 

Chevron oil: investment in Kazakstan by, 
xliii, 19, 51, 52, 64 

children: allowances for, 43, 145, 146, 
147, 328-29; birth defects of, 223, 224, 
249; day care for, 28, 230; health care 
for, 38-39, 40-41, 326, 423; mortality 
rate of, 223; nutrition of, 249; prisons 
for, 95 

China: claim to Pamir region, 207; influ- 
ences by, 206, 207; international rela- 
tions of, 207; Kyrgyz invasions of, 110; 
Kyrgyz relations with, 111; refugees in, 
112; Salor tribes in, 304; trade with, 
110, 385, 386; wars of, 386 

China, People's Republic of: aid to 
Uzbekistan, 457; antinarcotics agree- 



531 



Country Studies 



ments with Kazakstan, 97; borders 
with, xlii, 1, 185; economic relations 
with Tajikistan, 260; ethnic groups in, 
24, 126, 234, 311; influences in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 181; joint ventures with Tajiki- 
stan, 261; merchants from, xlix; 
nuclear testing by, 85; pipeline 
through, 347, 350; relations with, 12, 
84-85, 181, 282-83, 457-58; as secu- 
rity threat to Uzbekistan, 458; territo- 
rial claims of, 282; trade with, 65, 84- 
85, 163, 181, 182, 345, 457; transporta- 
tion to, xl, 443 
China, Republic of (Taiwan), 84 
Chinese people: entrepreneurial activi- 
ties of, 85, 181 
Chinggis (Genghis) Khan (see also under 
Mongols): film biography of, 135; 
invasion by, 13, 388 
Chirchiq, Uzbekistan: industry in, 430 
Chirchiq River: hydroelectric plant on, 
426 

Christianity (see also under individual 

denominations), 386; Nestorian, 207 
Churbanov, Yuriy, 399 
Chu River, 119 

Chu Valley (Kyrgyzstan): agriculture in, 
96, 97, 150; population distribution in, 
127-28; society in, 128 

Chyngyshev, Tursunbek: as prime minis- 
ter of Kyrgyzstan, 169 

CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent 
States 

citizenship: dual, 33, 80, 83, 278, 354, 
455; in Kazakstan, 26, 33, 80; of Rus- 
sians, 33, 80, 83, 278, 354, 455; in 
Turkmenistan, 354 
Civic Contract Party (Kazakstan) , 79 
civil service (Tajikistan), 215, 256 
civil war (Tajikistan), li-lii, 206, 269-70, 
410; causes of, 218, 267; clan rivalries 
in, xli, li, 269; damage from, 1; deaths 
in, 225, 274; economic impact of, 249- 
50, 253, 259; escape from, 232; ethnic 
conflicts in, 236, 410; impact on indus- 
try, 254; internal security in, 286; 
intervention in, lii, lix, 87, 181, 279, 
280-81, 283, 284, 447, 453, 461; out- 
break of, 218, 269; peace talks in, lii, 
270, 280-81, 283; refugees from, 232, 
280; Russian troops in, lii 
clans (see also hordes): genealogy of, 133; 



groupings of, 132; history of, 133; in 
Kazakstan, 29-30; in Kyrgyzstan, 132- 
33; membership in, 133; Oghuz, 302; 
origins of, 13; and political power, xli, 
110, 117, 398, 411; rivalries among, 
xli, li, 269; in Tajikistan, 269; territo- 
ries of, 29; in Turkmenistan, 314; in 
Uzbekistan, 398, 411 

climate: influences on, 120; of Kazak- 
stan, 22; of Kyrgyzstan, 120; precipita- 
tion, 22, 120, 223, 308, 401, 402; of 
Tajikistan, 223; of Turkmenistan, 308; 
temperatures, 22, 120, 223, 308, 402; 
of Uzbekistan, 402 

coal: consumption, 55; deposits, xlii, xlvi, 
11, 48, 55, 149, 155, 255, 426; explora- 
tion, 156; exports of, 55; imports of, 
255-56; industry, 55, 430; in Kazak- 
stan, xlii, 11, 44, 48, 55-56, 156; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, xlvi, 148, 149; production, 55, 
155; in Tajikistan, 249, 255-56; in 
Uzbekistan, 426, 430 

collective farms. See farms, collective 

Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance 

commerce: modernization of laws 
regarding, Iv-lvi 

Commercial Bank of Kyrgyzstan, 159 

Committee for National Security (Turk- 
menistan), 371; pensions in, 370 

Committee for State Security (KGB) 
(Tajikistan), 286 

Committee of National Security (Tajiki- 
stan), 286 

Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) (see also Russia; Soviet Union): 
armed forces of, 87, 462; border 
troops, 90; collective security agree- 
ment, 367; commercial treaties with 
Uzbekistan, lx-lxi; currency in, 64; 
economic ties of Tajikistan with, 263- 
64; expansion, 20; formed, 115, 277, 
447; intervention in Tajikistan's civil 
war, lii, lix, 283; members of, 115, 455; 
military cooperation with, 366-68; 
peacekeeping force, 87, 279, 284, 288, 
447; relations with, 86-87, 363, 453, 
455-56; support for, xlv, xlvi, 12; 
Tajikistan in, 218, 268, 277; trade with, 
55, 64, 65 

communications. See telecommunica- 
tions 



532 



Index 



communist parties, local, xxxv 
Communist Party of Bukhoro, 214 
Communist Party of Kazakstan, 78; first 

secretaries of, 16; outlawed, 20, 78; 

purges of, 17; reinstated, 78 
Communist Party of Kyrgyzia (CPK), 

113, 118 

Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, 174 
Communist Party of Tajikistan, 273-74; 

membership in, 273, 274; purges in, 

216, 273; Russians in, 216, 235, 273; 

suspended, 274; Tajiks in, 216 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 

(CPSU), 115, 214, 446; nationalities 

policy of, 306 
Communist Party of Turkmenistan: 

former members in government, 352 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 446, 

449; membership in, 397, 398 
Communist Youth League (Komsomol), 

273-74 

Concord Party (Kyrgyzstan), 175 
Conference (Gengesh) coalition (Turk- 
menistan), 358 
Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (CSCE): Kazakstan in, 
83; in Tajikistan peace talks, 270 
conscription, military, 15, 283 
Constitutional Council (Kazakstan) , 95 
Constitutional Court (Kazakstan), 74, 

94; dissolved, xliv, 94-95 
Constitutional Court (Tajikistan), 272 
Constitutional Court (Uzbekistan), 449 
constitution of Kazakstan, xliv, 71-72; 
adopted, 72; Council of Ministers 
under, 11, 72; distribution of power in, 
xliv, 11; drafted, 72; languages under, 
72; legislature under, 72; media under, 
81; political parties under, 11-12, 31; 
president under, 72; prime minister 
under, 11, 72; religion under, 31; 
rights under, 72, 94; women under, 28 
constitution of Kyrgyzstan , 117-18, 169- 
70; adopted, 117; draft of, 117; execu- 
tive under, 169-70; human rights 
under, 178; judiciary under, 170; lan- 
guage under, 117, 118; parliament 
under, 169; president under, 118; 
property under, 118; religion under, 
117, 118, 137 
constitution of Tajikistan, 270-71; 
adopted, 271; executive under, liii, 



271; human rights under, liii, 271; 
judiciary under, 271, 288; legislature 
under, liii, 271-72; president under, 
271 ; property rights under, 271 

constitution of Turkmenistan: criminal 
justice under, 371; political parties 
under, 357; rights under, 339, 357; 
separation of powers under, 352 

constitution of Uzbekistan, 448-49; 
human rights under, lx; judiciary 
under, 448; legislature under, 448; 
president under, 448; religion under, 
447; separation of powers under, 448 

construction: of dams, 124, 226; decline 
in Tajikistan, 258-59; employment in, 
57, 326; of housing, 43, 112; invest- 
ment in Kyrgyzstan, 159-60; of irriga- 
tion, 386; of mosques in Kazakstan, 86; 
as percentage of Turkmenistan's gross 
domestic product, 335; as percentage 
of Tajikistan's net material product, 
253; of pipelines, xliii, xliv; privatiza- 
tion in Uzbekistan, 434; of railroads, 
305; of roads, 112; of schools in 
Uzbekistan, 419 

consumer goods: durable, 328; imports 
of, 63, 85, 436; in Kazakstan, 85; in 
Kyrgyzstan, 154; prices of, 432; pro- 
duction of, xlvii, 154; shortages of, 
xxxii, 257, 279, 326, 327; in Tajikistan, 
256, 257; in Turkmenistan, 326, 327; 
in Uzbekistan, 432, 436 

consumer price index: in Tajikistan, 258 

Contagious Disease Association (Kazak- 
stan), 40 

Control and Revision Commission 

(Turkmenistan), 354 
Cooperative Alliance (Turkmenistan), 

330 

Coordination Council for Combating 
AIDS (Kazakstan), 40 

corruption, xli; in Akayev family, 169; in 
commerce, xlvii; in government, xlvii, 
96, 116, 117, 159, 164, 169, 188, 190, 
288, 438; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvii, 116, 117, 
118, 159, 164, 169, 175, 188, 190; in 
police force, 95, 465; in politics, 175; 
in prisons, 95, 372; in Tajikistan, 288; 
in Turkmenistan, 372; in Uzbekistan, 
398-99, 405 

Cossacks, 14, 79 

cotton, xxxii; area planted to, 332; 



533 



Country Studies 



employment in, 428; and environmen- 
tal problems, 223, 311, 402; export of, 
xxxix, 1, lviii, 163, 180, 262, 264, 330, 
343, 344, 345, 436, 457; inputs, 332; 
investment in, 437; irrigation of, 224, 
250, 332, 402, 428; in Kazakstan, 46; in 
Kyrgyzstan, 113, 163; overreliance on, 

250, 252; prices, 332, 344, 431; pro- 
cessing, 211, 252, 332, 428-29, 430; 
production, 46, 113, 211, 216, 250, 

251 , 252, 263, 332, 394, 426, 428; qual- 
ity 344; under Russian rule, 211, 392, 
394; Soviet demand for, xxxv, 213, 
215, 397, 398; in Tajikistan, xxxii, 1, 
210, 223, 250, 251; in Turkmenistan, 
xxxii, lvi, 330, 332, 343; in Uzbekistan, 
xxxii, lviii, 394, 397, 398-99, 426, 427- 
28, 430, 437; value of, 427 

Cotton Sub-Sector Development Pro- 
gram, 458 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 

(Comecon) , 38 
Council of Elders (Turkmenistan), 354, 

356-57 

Council of Higher Education, 323 
Council of Ministers (Kazakstan): 
changes in, xliv; under constitution, 
72; ethnic distribution in, 77; mem- 
bers of, 73; resignation of, 77; role in 
economic policy 7 , xliii 
Council of Ministers (Kyrgyzstan), 1 70— 
71 

Council of Ministers (Tajikistan), 271 
coup d'etat: against amir of Bukhoro, 
213; against Gorbachev, 20, 115, 218, 
267, 274, 307, 355, 400 
courts: in Kazakstan, 74, 94-95; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 170, 191-92; military, 272, 
372; in Tajikistan, 354, 356, 371-72; in 
Turkmenistan, 354, 356, 371-72; in 
Uzbekistan, 449 
CPK. See Communist Party of Kyrgyzia 
CPSU. See Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union 

credit {see also banking): agricultural, 
153-54, 345; in Kazakstan, 61; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 153-54 

crime: drug-related, 190, 466; economic, 
xlii; in Kazakstan, xli-xlii, 95-96; in 
Kyrgyzstan, xli-xlii, 118, 184, 188, 
189-90, 192; organized, xlii, 288, 353; 
by police, 95; rate, xli-xlii, 95, 96, 192; 



solving of, 96; in Tajikistan, xlii, 287- 
88; in Turkmenistan, xlii, 353, 372; in 
Uzbekistan, xlii, 467; white-collar, xli, 
188 

Crimean Tatars. See Tatars, Crimean 

criminal justice system {see also courts): 
death penalty in, 277, 372; defendants' 
rights in, 94, 191; Soviet legacy, 371; in 
Tajikistan, 288-89; in Turkmenistan, 
371-73; in Uzbekistan, lix, 467-68 

CSCE. See Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 

culture: influences on, 35, 206; in Kazak- 
stan, 33-36; popular, 36; in Tajikistan, 
206, 241-43 

currency: in Commonwealth of Indepen- 
dent States, 64; devaluation of, xliii, lv, 
434; exchange rate of, xliv, xlvii, lviii, 
159, 261, 341, 434-35; of Kazakstan, 
xxxix-xl, xliii, xliv, 62-63; of Kyr- 
gyzstan, xxxix-xl, xlvii, 161; introduc- 
tion of new, xxxix-xl, 62, 161, 260, 
327, 333, 340, 341, 434, 455; reform, 
434-35; reserves, 342; of Tajikistan, 
xxxix-xl, 260; of Turkmenistan, 
xxxix-xl, lv, 327, 333, 341, 363; of 
Uzbekistan, xxxix-xl, lviii, 434-35, 455 

customs union: of Belarus, Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, xl, xlvii, li, lix, 
183 

Cyrillic alphabet, 233, 318, 411, 413 
Czechoslovakia: joint ventures with 

Tajikistan, 261 
Czech Republic: trade with Kazakstan, 

65 



Daewoo: investment by, li, lix 

dams: flooding for construction of, 124, 

226, 254; in Kyrgyzstan, 124, 156; 

objections to, 254; in Tajikistan, 220, 

226, 253, 254-55; in Turkmenistan, 

309, 362 
Darya-ye Panj. SegPanj River 
Dashhowuz, Turkmenistan: airport at, 

351; climate in, 308; population of, 

312 

Dashhowuz Province, Turkmenistan: cot- 
ton in, 332 
Dashti-Kipchak, 13 
day care (Kazakstan), 28 
Daynach (Support) (newspaper) , 358 



534 



Index 



DDK. See Democratic Movement of Kyr- 
gyzstan 

defense industry: declines in, 154; 

employment in, 47; in Kazakstan, 47, 

91; in Kyrgyzstan, 148, 154, 183 
defense policy (Kyrgyzstan), 184-86. 
deforestation: in Kyrgyzstan, 120, 125 
Delo No (newspaper) , 1 76, 1 77 
Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan 

(DDK), 114, 169, 175 
Democratic Party (Tajikistan), 275 
Democratic Party (Turkmenistan), 353, 

357; influence of, 357 
Democratic Progress Party (Kazakstan), 

79 

demonstrations. Apolitical demonstra- 
tions 

desertification: in Kazakstan, 23; in Turk- 
menistan, 309-10; in Uzbekistan, 402 

deserts: in Kazakstan, xxxi, 21; in Turk- 
menistan, xxxi, 308; in Uzbekistan, 
401 

diet: in Kazakstan, 41; in Kyrgyzstan, 
133-34, 144-45; in schools in Uzbeki- 
stan, 419; in Tajikistan, 257, 258; in 
Turkmenistan, 325 

divorce: grounds for, 231-32; rates of, 
232; in Tajikistan, 231-32; in Turk- 
menistan, 316, 317 

Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 362 

drainage: of Kazakstan, 21; of Kyr- 
gyzstan, 119; of Tajikistan, 219-23; of 
Turkmenistan, 308-9; of Uzbekistan, 
401-2 

drugs. See narcotics 

Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 215; airport at, li; 
divorce in, 232; ethnic groups in, 235; 
growth of, 229; housing in, 232; popu- 
lation in, 228; population density in, 
226; in Russian Civil War, 229 

dust storms, 22-23, 403, 404 

Dzhuchi Khan, 111 



earthquakes: forecasting techniques, 
282; in Kyrgyzstan, 120; in Tajikistan, 
220; in Turkmenistan, 307-8; in 
Uzbekistan, 402 

East Kazakstan Province. See Shygys 
Qazaqstan 

Eastern Europe: trade with Turkmeni- 
stan, 342 



Eastpac, 347 

EBRD. See European Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development 

ECO. See Economic Cooperation Orga- 
nization 

Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO), xxxvi; Kazakstan in, xxxvi, 31, 
86; Kyrgyzstan in, xxxvi, 179; Tajiki- 
stan in, xxxvi, 283; Turkmenistan in, 
xxxvi, 361; Uzbekistan in, xxxvi, 456- 
57 

economic policy: of Kazakstan, xliii; of 
Tajikistan, li; of Uzbekistan, 432 

economic reform: in Kyrgyzstan, xlvii, 
xlviii, 109, 157-59; pace of, 157; resis- 
tance to, xlviii; in Tajikistan, li, 260; in 
Turkmenistan, 338; in Uzbekistan, lvii, 
lix, 431-35 

education (Kazakstan) (see also schools) , 
xxxii, 36-38; compulsory, 36; deterio- 
ration of, lxi; employment in, 57; free, 
36; funding, 37; language of instruc- 
tion in, 33, 36; private, 36; reform of, 
36, 37; technical, 37; wages in, 63; of 
workers, 57 

education (Kyrgyzstan) (see abo schools), 
xxxii, 138-41; access to, 139; compul- 
sory, 138, 140; curriculum, 140-41; 
deterioration of, lxi; funding, 1 39; lan- 
guage of instruction in, 140-41; of 
men, 140; reforms in, xlix, 138, 140; 
Soviet legacy in, 138; stages in, 140; 
textbooks in, 140-41; vocational, 140; 
of women, 140 

education (Tajikistan) (see also schools) , 
xxxii, 1, 205, 243-46; completion of, 
244; deterioration of, lxi; historical 
development of, 243-44; language of 
instruction in, 244-45; of men, 243; of 
military personnel, liii; public, 244; 
quality of, 244; under Russian rule, 
211; Soviet influence on, 1, 243-44; of 
women, 243 

education (Turkmenistan) (see also 
schools), xxxii, lxi, 321-23; comple- 
tion of, 321, 337; compulsory, 321; 
curriculum, 313, 322-23; deteriora- 
tion of, lxi; employment in, 326, 336; 
fees for, 321; language of instruction 
in, 314, 323; modifications in, 322; 
proper conduct, 313; system of, 322; 
tracks in, 321-22; of women, 336-37 



535 



Country Studies 



education (Uzbekistan) {see also 
schools), xxxii, 418-21; budgets for, 
421; compulsory, 419; curriculum, 
419, 420-21; deterioration of, lxi; 
instruction in, 421; language of 
instruction in, 420; reform of, 418, 
420-21; system of, 418-20 

education, higher: admissions, 323; 
enrollment in, 36, 37, 246, 323, 419- 
20; graduates of, 244, 321; in Kazak- 
stan, 36, 37; in Kyrgyzstan, 140, 141; 
languages of instruction in, 141; 
length of study in, 323; private, 141; 
programs in, 37; in Russia, 37; in 
Tajikistan, 244, 246; in Turkmenistan, 
321, 323, 337; in Ukraine, 37; in 
Uzbekistan, 419-20; women in, 323 

Egypt: financial aid from, 30, 86 

Ekibastuz coal field (Kazakstan), 44, 55 

Ekspress K (newspaper) , 81 

elections (Kazakstan), 17; fairness of, 74, 
76, 83; parliamentary (1990), 19; par- 
liamentary (1994), 76-77; parliamen- 
tary (1995), xlv, 73-74; postponed, 72; 
presidential (1991), 20; presidential 
(1995), xliv 

elections (Kyrgyzstan): fairness of, 169, 
172; parliamentary (1990), 168; par- 
liamentary (1995), 172; presidential 

(1990) , 114; presidential (1991), 115; 
presidential (1995) , xlviii, 171 

elections (Tajikistan): irregularities in, 
218, 271, 272; parliamentary (1990), 
268, 271; parliamentary (1995), 272; 
presidential (1991), 268, 271; presi- 
dential (1994), liii, 218 

elections (Turkmenistan): presidential 

(1991) , 355; presidential (1992), 355 
elections (Uzbekistan): irregularities in, 

lx, 447; parliamentary (1994-95), lx, 
447, 448; presidential (1991), lx, 400, 
447 

electric power, 256; access to, 229; barter 
of, 156, 345; consumption of, 156; dis- 
tribution of, 156; export of, 163, 335, 
345; fuels for, 426; generation, 51, 55, 
154, 156; grids, xl, 56, 362; hydro-, xlvi, 
56, 109, 124, 148, 156, 157, 220, 249, 
253, 254, 255, 426, 429, 456; for indus- 
try, 55, 429; investment in, 160; in 
Kazakstan, xliv, 51, 55, 56; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 109, 148, 154, 156, 160; man- 



agement of, 109; nuclear, 361; 
potential in Kyrgyzstan, 157; promo- 
tion of, 156; shortages, xliv, 156; in 
Tajikistan, 254; thermo-, 55, 56, 156, 
426, 429; in Turkmenistan, 335, 338, 
345, 362; in Uzbekistan, 429, 430 

Elf-Aquitaine: energy exploration in 
Kazakstan, 51 

employment: in agriculture, 45, 57, 148, 
231, 256, 327, 329, 336, 428; in the 
arts, 57, 336; in construction, 57, 326; 
in education, 57, 326, 336; ethnic dis- 
tribution in, 57; in forestry, 57; in 
health care, 57, 256, 326, 336; in 
industry, 47, 57, 256, 257, 326, 336; 
job creation for, xlviii; in Kazakstan, 
45, 57; in Kyrgyzstan, xlviii; of men, 
231; in science, 326; in services sector, 
57, 256, 326; by state, 57, 148, 256, 
326-27, 329, 336; in Tajikistan, 230, 
231; in telecommunications, 57, 148, 
336; in transportation, 57, 148, 256, 
336; in Turkmenistan, 326-27, 336; in 
Uzbekistan, 428, 430-31; of women, 
57, 231 

energy industry: in Kazakstan, xlii, 11, 
48-56; in Kyrgyzstan, 155-57; in Tajiki- 
stan, 254-56; in Turkmenistan, liv, 
339, 362; in Uzbekistan, 425-26 

energy resources {see also electricity; see 
also under individual energy sources): 
consumption of, 155-56; exported, 
65, 156-57, 256; imported, xlvi, xlix, li, 
56, 256, 264; in Kazakstan, 48-56, 65; 
in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, xlix, 148; prices of, 
432; shortages of, 154; in Tajikistan, li, 
256; in Uzbekistan, lvii, 256, 425-26, 
434 

English language: broadcasts in, 71, 168; 
as language of instruction, 323; publi- 
cations in, 177; teaching of, 141, 322; 
in Turkmenistan, 318; in Uzbekistan, 
414 

Environmental Fund (Turkmenistan), 

309 

environmental organizations (Uzbeki- 
stan), 405 

environmental problems: from agricul- 
tural chemicals, 223, 310-11, 403-4; 
avalanches, 120; deforestation, 120, 
125; desertification, 23, 309-10; 
impact on agriculture, 22; impact on 



536 



Index 



health, 23, 41, 248, 249, 310, 324-25, 
402, 423-24; impact of irrigation on, 

123, 224, 427; in Kazakstan, 22-24; in 
Kyrgyzstan, 120-25; overgrazing, 120, 

124, 125, 153, 310; in Tajikistan, 223- 
25; in Turkmenistan, 309-11; in 
Uzbekistan, 402-6 

Erk (Freedom) party (Kyrgyzstan), 118 
Erk (Freedom) party (Uzbekistan), 450 
Erkin Kyrgyzstan (Freedom for Kyr- 
gyzstan) Party, 175 
Erkin Party (Kyrgyzstan), 118 
Erkin Too /Svobodnye gory (newspaper), 
177 

Ernst and Young, 61 

ErSain (folk tale), 34 

Er Targyn (folk tale) , 34 

Ertis River. See Irtysh River 

Esil River. See Ishim River 

ethnic groups (see also minorities; see also 
under individual groups): in armed 
forces, lx; balance of power among, 
xlvi; conflicts among, 79, 113-14, 225, 
236, 399, 410; denned, 233, 409-10; 
discrimination against, 237, 279; iden- 
tities in, 233-34; integration of, 312; 
interaction among, 12; in Kazakstan, 
11,12, 27-28, 82, 317; in Kyrgyzstan, 
xlvi, 113-14, 119, 126-27, 130; and the 
media, 82; stereotyping of, xxxvi; in 
Tajikistan, 206-7, 225, 233-36; tradi- 
tions of, 130-32; in Uzbekistan, 399, 
409-11 

Ethnographic Museum of the Academy 
of Sciences (Tajikistan), 243 

Euro-Asian Union, 86, 93, 182 

European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD): assistance 
from, lvi, 168, 266, 458; Kyrgyzstan in, 
179; loans from, lxi 

exchange rate: in Kazakstan, xliv; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, xlvii, 159; in Tajikistan, 260- 
61; in Turkmenistan, 341; in Uzbeki- 
stan, lviii, 434-35 

exports (see also under individual prod- 
ucts): of aluminum, 1, 264; to Asia, 344; 
of chemicals, 343; of coal, 55; to Com- 
monwealth of Independent States, 
263; of cotton, 1, lviii, 163, 180, 264, 
330, 343, 344, 345, 435; of crops, 153; 
of energy, xlix, 156-57, 163, 335, 345; 
of food, 163, 343; of gold, 180; by 



Kazakstan, 51, 64, 65; by Kyrgyzstan, 
163; of metals, 435; to Mexico, 344; of 
minerals, 342; of narcotics, 190; of nat- 
ural gas, xxxix, xl, lv, 180, 344; of oil, 
51; to Russia, 64, 343; shipping of, 
442-43; by Tajikistan, 261, 262, 263; 
tariffs on, 344-45; taxes on, 164; of 
textiles, 261; by Turkmenistan, lv, 330, 
342, 359; by Uzbekistan, lviii, 435, 436, 
442-43; of water, 150 



families: budgets of, 162; child allow- 
ances for, 43; extended, 231, 316; in 
Kazakstan, 28, 43; in Kyrgyzstan, 134, 
162; and political power, 110, 117; size 
of, 226, 231, 316; structure of, 230-32; 
in Tajikistan, 226, 230-32; in Turk- 
menistan, 314-17 

family planning. See birth control 

famine, xxxv; deaths from, 213; in Kazak- 
stan, 15; in Turkestan, 213 

Farghona, Uzbekistan: air pollution in, 
404-5; population in, 406 

Farghona Province, Uzbekistan: oil refin- 
ery at, 430; population in, 408 

Farmatsiya (company), 39 

farmers: credits in Kyrgyzstan, 153-54 

farms, collective: employment in, 230, 
329, 336; income of, 151; in Kazak- 
stan, 46; in Kyrgyzstan, 150, 151, 153; 
privatization of, 150, 151, 153, 251; in 
Tajikistan, 251; tribal affiliation in, 
315; in Turkmenistan, 315, 329, 330; 
in Uzbekistan, 427 

farms, private: in Tajikistan, 260; in Turk- 
menistan, 339; in Uzbekistan, 426-27, 
433 

farms, state: income of, 151; in Kazak- 
stan, 46, 60; in Kyrgyzstan, 150, 151, 
153; privatization of, 60, 150, 151, 153; 
tribal affiliation in, 315; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 315, 330; in Uzbekistan, 427 
Farsi. See Persian language 
Fatherland Party. SeeAta-Meken 
Fedchenko Glacier, 220; climate of, 223 
Federation of Independent Labor 

Unions (Kyrgyzstan), 147 
Fergana oil and natural gas complex 

(Kyrgyzstan), 149, 157 
Fergana Ring, 442 

Fergana Valley, 220; agriculture in, 150, 



537 



Country Studies 



211; control of, xlvi; demographics of, 
127; elevation of, 119, 220; ethnic con- 
flict in, 127, 399, 461; ethnic distribu- 
tion in, 127; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 119; 
land in, xlvi; pipeline in, 441; popula- 
tion distribution in, 127; society in, 
128; in Tajikistan, xlvi, 211, 220, 223; 
temperatures in, 120, 223; transporta- 
tion in, 441; in Uzbekistan, xlvi, 399, 
401 , 441; water in, xxxix 

feudalism: development of, 111 

film making, 135, 243 

finance: in Kazakstan, 60-62; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, xlviii, 159-60; restructuring 
of, 60; in Uzbekistan, lviii, 431, 432, 
434-35 

fine arts, 135 

Finland: trade with Turkmenistan, 343 
Firdavsi State Library (Tajikistan), 242 
fishing: cooperation agreements, 347, 
363; in Kazakstan, 46; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 330, 363 
Fitrat, Abdur Rauf, 396, 41 3 
flooding: for dam construction, 124, 

226, 254; danger of, 124 
food: aid, 280, 282; availability of, 153, 
161; consumption of, 257; exports of, 
163, 343; imports of, 85, 250, 264, 343, 
426, 435, 436; in Kazakstan, 33, 85; in 
Kyrgyzstan, 144-45, 153; prices, 63, 
144, 162; processing, 155, 253, 256, 
335, 430; production, 394; rationing, 
257, 258; self-sufficiency in, 150, 250; 
shortages of, 213, 257, 326, 327; subsi- 
dies, li, 328, 338; symbolic value of, 33; 
in Tajikistan, 250, 257; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 326, 328, 335; in Uzbekistan, 426, 
428, 436 

forced settlement: in Kazakstan, 45; in 
Tajikistan, 225, 226, 254-55 

foreign assistance: for the arts, 135; from 
Asian Development Bank, 125; from 
Britain, lvi; from China, 457; from 
Egypt, 30, 86; from European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment, lvi, lxi, 458; from France, 361; 
for health care, 39, 457; from Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, xliv, li, lviii, lxi, 
24, 458; from Iran, 39, 86, 262, 280; 
from Italy, 135; to Kazakstan, xliv, 24, 
30, 39, 84, 86; from Kuwait, 320; from 
Kyrgyzstan, 278-79; to Kyrgyzstan, 



110, 124, 125, 135, 178, 179, 187; from 
Oman, 86; from Russia, 110, 187; from 
Saudi Arabia, 30, 320; from Switzer- 
land, 125; to Tajikistan, li, 278-79, 
282; from Turkey, 30, 321, 456; to 
Turkmenistan, lvi, 310; from United 
Nations, 124, 423; from the United 
States, lxi, 24, 282, 423, 459; to Uzbeki- 
stan, lxi, 400, 406, 423, 456, 457, 458, 
459; from World Bank, xli, li, 24, 124, 
125, 310, 458; from World Health 
Organization, 423 

foreign debt: of Kyrgyzstan, xlvii, 161; 
repayment of, xlvii; of Tajikistan, 264; 
of Turkmenistan, lvi 

foreign economic relations: with Arme- 
nia, 456; with Azerbaijan, 456; with 
Iran, 346-47; of Kazakstan, 63-65; of 
Kyrgyzstan, 162-65; with Russia, 346, 
456; of Tajikistan, 261-64; with Tur- 
key, 346; of Turkmenistan, 346-48; 
with Ukraine, 456; of Uzbekistan, 435- 
38,456 

foreign exchange {see also banking): in 
Kazakstan, 61; in Uzbekistan, 431 

Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia): 
cooperation with, 371 

foreign investment (Kazakstan), xxxi, 
xliii, 63-64, 84; from Britain, 63; in 
energy, 51, 55; from France, 64; incen- 
tives, 64; in natural resources, 45; by 
Paris Club, 64; from United States, 63 

foreign investment (Kyrgyzstan), xlvii, 
162-63; incentives, 163; in mining, 
xlvi; in telecommunications, 165, 168 

foreign investment (Tajikistan) , 1 

foreign investment (Turkmenistan), 
xxxi, lvi, 301, 345-46; amount of, lvi; 
encouraged, 359, 361; laws on, 346; 
from Turkey, 362 

foreign investment (Uzbekistan) , xxxi, 
lviii, 437-38; attempts to attract, lx, 
400, 432, 443; barriers to, 437-38; 
from Germany, lx, 437; incentives for, 
437, 438; from United States, lviii, 437, 
460 

foreign policy: of Kazakstan, xliv, xlv, 83- 
87; of Kyrgyzstan, xlix; of Tajikistan, 
liii; of Turkmenistan, lvi, 359-64; of 
Uzbekistan, 455 

foreign relations (Kazakstan), 83; in 
Central Asia, 12; with China, 12, 84- 



538 



Index 



85; with Commonwealth of Indepen- 
dent States, 86; financial, 63-65; with 
Iran, 86; with Russia, xlv, 12, 86; with 
Turkey, 84, 86; with Uzbekistan, lix 

foreign relations (Kyrgyzstan) , 178-83; 
with China, 181-82; with Kazakstan, 
180; with Russia, 182-83; with Tajiki- 
stan, 181; with Uzbekistan, lix, 180 

foreign relations (Tajikistan), 277-83; 
with Afghanistan, 261, 277, 281-82; 
with Austria, 261; with Canada, 261; 
with China, 261, 282-83; with Czecho- 
slovakia, 261; with former Soviet 
republics, 277-79; with Iran, 277, 280- 
81; with Israel, 261; with Italy, 261; 
with Kyrgyzstan, 278; with Pakistan, 
277, 282; under Soviet Union, 277; 
with Turkey, 277; with United States, 
277, 282; with Uzbekistan, lix, 278, 
279 

foreign relations (Turkmenistan), 359- 
60; with Asian neighbors, 361-63; with 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States, 363; with Iran, lvi, 360, 361-62; 
with Russia, lvi, 363; with Saudi Ara- 
bia, 360; with Ukraine, 360; with 
United States, 361; with Uzbekistan, 
lvi-lvii, lix; with Western Europe, 361 

foreign relations (Uzbekistan), 452-60; 
in Central Asia, lix, 453-55; with 
China, 457-58; with Commonwealth 
of Independent States, 453, 455-56; 
establishment of, 400; with Iran, 452, 
456; with Japan, 458; with Pakistan, 
456; with Russia, lx, 453, 455-56; with 
Tajikistan, 455; with Turkey, 452, 456; 
with United States, 459-60; with West- 
ern Europe, 458-59 

forestry: employment in Kazakstan, 57 

For Kazakstan's Future (political group), 
78 

France: aid to Turkmenistan, 361; invest- 
ment in Kazakstan, 63-64; trade with 
Turkmenistan, 343 

Freedom Party (Kyrgyzstan), 175 

free economic zones: in Kyrgyzstan, 163 

free-trade zone, 86-87; Kazakstan in, 87; 
Kyrgyzstan in, 87; Uzbekistan in, 87 

French language: study of, 141 

Frontier Guard. See Border Troop Com- 
mand (Uzbekistan) 

Frunze, Kyrgyzstan, 113 



Frunze, Mikhail, 213 

Frunze Military Academy, 188 

Garagum Canal (Turkmenistan), 331- 
32; leakage of, 309 

Garagum Desert, 308; expansion of, 309 

gasoline (see also oil): imports of, 165-66; 
in Kyrgyzstan, 166; shortages of, 166 

Gaspirali, Ismail, 413 

Gasprinskiy, Ismail. See Gaspirali, Ismail 

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 

Gazprom. See Russian Natural Gas Com- 
pany 

GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT), 165 
General Staff (Kyrgyzstan), 186-87 
Genghis Khan. &#Chinggis Khan 
Georgia: economic relations with Tajiki- 
stan, 264; payments to Turkmenistan, 
344; pipeline through, 52; trade with 
Turkmenistan, 343, 344; as Soviet 
republic, 213 
German language: broadcasts in, 71, 

168,236, 266; study of, 141 
German people: emigration of, lxi, 127, 
232, 259; immigration of, 128; in 
Kazakstan, 16, 27; in Kyrgyzstan, 126; 
as majority, 27; as minority, xxxv, 1; in 
Tajikistan, 1, 234, 259; as technocrats, 
259; in Uzbekistan, lxi 
Germany: investment by, li, lx; repatria- 
tion to, 127; trade with, 65, 342, 443 
Ghafurov, Bobojon, 217 
Ghaznavid Empire, 388 
Gidromet. See Hydrometeorological 

Administration 
Gisor Mountains. S^Hisor Mountains 
glaciers, 119, 220 
glasnost, 306, 313, 399 
GNP. See gross national product 
Gokdepe: Russian capture of, 305 
gold, xxxv; deposits, 149-50; exports of, 
180; investment in, 163; in Kazakstan, 
xliii, 44; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, xlvii, 109, 
149, 163, 169; mining, xliii, xlvii, 44, 
149, 254, 261, 425, 430; prices, 431; 
production, 44, 150, 425, 437; process- 
ing, 261; scandal, 169, 176, 177; in 
Tajikistan, 1, 249, 254; in Uzbekistan, 



539 



Country Studies 



lvii, 425, 434 

Golden Horde, 13, 111 

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 16; decline of, 20; 
reforms proposed by, 17, 113, 306, 
399; support for, 18, 19, 20, 115 

Gorbachev government (1985-91): air- 
ing of grievances under, xxxv; 
attempted coup against, 20, 115, 218, 
307, 400; reforms of, 217-18; religion 
under, 240 

Gorchakov Circular (1863), 14 

Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Prov- 
ince, Tajikistan, liii, 273; autonomy of, 
275; China's claim to, 282; judiciary 
in, 272; population density in, 226 

Gosbank. See Soviet State Bank 

Gosbank (Turkmenistan), 340 

Goskomgeologiya. See State Geological 
Commission 

Goskompriroda. See State Committee on 
Environmental Protection 

government (Kazakstan), 71-83; reve- 
nues, 62; structure of, 72-75 

government (Kyrgyzstan) , 168-74; cor- 
ruption in, 169, 188, 190; reorganiza- 
tion of, xlviii; structure of, 1 70-74 

government (Tajikistan), 267-73; coali- 
tion, 269; corruption in, 288; drug 
trafficking by, 288; revenues, 259; Rus- 
sians in, 278; structure of, 270-73 

government (Turkmenistan): role of, in 
economy, lv; structure of, 354-57 

government (Uzbekistan): corruption 
in, 438, 467; economic controls by, 
434 

government, local: in Kazakstan, 74-75; 
in Kyrgyzstan, xlviii, 173-74; in Tajiki- 
stan, 272-73; in Turkmenistan, 372; in 
Uzbekistan, 449 

government spending (Kazakstan): on 
health care, 38 

government spending (Turkmenistan): 
on health care, 324; on pensions, 328; 
on subsidies, 328 

government spending (Uzbekistan): on 
health care, 422 

Governorate General of Turkestan. See 
Guberniya of Turkestan 

grain: farming, 46, 428; imports of, 426, 
436; in Kazakstan, 46; production, 
330; shortages of, 213; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 330, 333; in Uzbekistan, 426, 428, 



436 

Great Horde, 13; controlled by Russians, 
14; domination by, 29; territory of, 29 

Great Purge (1937-38), 216, 414 

Great Retreat, 14 

Great Uzbek Highway, 442 

Greco-Bactrian kingdom, 207 

gross domestic product (GDP): decline, 
58; growth, xliv, xlvii, lviii; in Kazak- 
stan, xliv, xliii, 38, 43, 44, 45, 51, 58, 
62; in Kyrgyzstan, xxxi, xlvii, 145, 147, 
154, 164; in Tajikistan, xxxi, li, 258, 
259; in Turkmenistan, xxxi, liv, lv, lviii, 
329, 334, 335, 342; in Uzbekistan, 
xxxi, lviii, 436 

gross national product (GNP): of Kyr- 
gyzstan, 128, 160 

Guberniya (Governorate General) of 
Turkestan. See Turkestan, Guberniya 
of 

Gurogly (folktale), 313 
Guryev. S<eeAtyrau 

Haig, Alexander, 346, 361 
Hal Maslahati. See National Council 
Han Dynasty, 207 
Hari River: dam on, 362 
Hawuz Khan Reservoir (Turkmenistan), 
331 

health: and birth defects, 223, 224; and 
depletion of Aral Sea, xli; employment 
in, 326; and environmental problems, 
41, 223, 310, 402, 421-22, 423-24; in 
Kazakstan, 38-42; in Kyrgyzstan, 141— 
45; Soviet legacy in, 142; in Tajikistan, 
246-49; in Turkmenistan, 324-26; in 
Uzbekistan, 421-24; of women, 28 

health care (Kazakstan), 38-39; availabil- 
ity of medications, 38-39, 85; for chil- 
dren, 38-39, 40-41; fees for, 38; 
funding for, 38, 39; insurance for, 39; 
private, 39; for women, 28 

health care (Kyrgyzstan), 142-44; avail- 
ability of medications, 143-44; insur- 
ance for, 144; reforms in, xlix; 
shortages in, 142; Soviet legacy in, 142 

health care (Tajikistan), 205, 246-48; 
availability of medications, 247-48, 
264, 282; privatization of, 248; quality 
of, 246, 249; for women, 228 

health care (Turkmenistan), 324-25; 



540 



Index 



availability of, 324; availability of medi- 
cations, 324, 325; funding for, 324; 
problems in, 324; structure of, 324 

health care (Uzbekistan), 421-23; aid 
for, 457; budget for, 422; for children, 
423; insurance for, 422; number of 
patients, 423; privatization of, 422; 
problems in, 423 

health care professionals: emigration of, 
143, 247; in Kazakstan, 38, 57; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 142; number of, 38, 230, 247, 
324, 422; salaries of, 38, 63, 142-43; 
strikes by, 38; in Tajikistan, 230, 246- 
47, 256; training of, 324; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 324, 336 

health conditions: in Kazakstan, 40-42; 
in Kyrgyzstan, 144-45; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 324-26 

health facilities: geographic distribution 
of, 142; in Kazakstan, 38; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 142; number of, 38, 142, 230, 
422; privatization of, 422; quality of, 
247; in Tajikistan, 230, 246; in Turk- 
menistan, 324 

Helsinki Watch, 288, 358 

High Economic Court (Uzbekistan), 449 

Hindukush Hydroelectric Station (Turk- 
menistan) , 335 

Hisor (Gisor) Mountains, 219 

holidays: in Kazakstan, 31; in Kyrgyzstan, 
138; in Turkmenistan, 313 

Horde of Alash. S^Alash Orda 

hordes (see also under individual hordes), 
13-14 

House of National Representatives (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 172 

housing: construction, 43, 112; invest- 
ment in, 160; in Kazakstan, 34, 42-43, 
58; in Kyrgyzstan, 112, 133, 160; priva- 
tization of, 42, 58; in rural areas, 327; 
shortages, 42-43, 232, 258; space, 327; 
in Tajikistan, 232, 258; traditional, 34; 
in Turkmenistan, 327-28; in urban 
areas, 327; utilities in, 327 

Housing-93 project (Tajikistan) , 258 

Humaneness and Charity group 
(Uzbekistan), 450 

human rights: abuses, 276-77, 288, 348, 
359, 445, 460; guarantees of, 72; in 
Kazakstan, 82-83; in Kyrgyzstan, 178; 
in Tajikistan, liii, 276-77, 288; in Turk- 
menistan, 358-59, 445, 447; in Uzbeki- 



stan, 445-46, 451-52, 460 
Human Rights Watch, 452 
Huns, 110 

Hydrometeorological Administration 

(Gidromet) (Kyrgyzstan), 125 
hyperinflation, 62, 161, 333 

IBRD. S&e International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development 
Ichkilik clan, 133 

IMF. ^International Monetary Fund 
imports: of agricultural products, 259; of 
chemicals, 343; of coal, 255-56; of 
consumer goods, 63; cost of, 160-61; 
of energy, 264; from Finland, 343; of 
food, 264, 343, 426, 435; from France, 
343; of gas, 56, 155, 156, 254, 255-56; 
from Italy, 343; by Kazakstan, 56, 63, 
65; by Kyrgyzstan, 155, 160; of machin- 
ery, 343; of medicine, 264; of oil, 56, 
155, 254, 255-56; from Russia, 56, 
160-61, 343; by Tajikistan, 255-56, 
259; of textiles, 343; by Turkmenistan, 
lv, 342, 343; by Uzbekistan, 429, 435- 
36 

income distribution: in Kyrgyzstan, 153 

independence: of Kazakstan, 11, 20; of 
Kyrgyzstan, 109, 114, 115; of Tajiki- 
stan, 218, 267; of Turkmenistan, 306- 
7; of Uzbekistan, 400, 446 

India: trade routes through, 443 

Industrial and Construction Bank 
(Promstroybank) (Kyrgyzstan), 159 

industrial development: in Kazakstan, 
44; in Kyrgyzstan, 155; under Soviet 
Union, 44, 229; in Tajikistan, 205, 229, 
252-53; in Uzbekistan, 457 

industrial infrastructure: in Kazakstan, 
12; Soviet legacy, xlii, xlvi 

industrial production: declines in, 154- 
55, 259; increases in, 329; in Kazak- 
stan, 47-48, 58; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvii, 
154-55; in Tajikistan, 253, 258, 259; in 
Turkmenistan, 329, 333 

industry (see also under individual indus- 
tries): conversion of, xlvi; debt in, 48; 
employment in, 57, 230, 256, 326, 336; 
energy consumption by, 55, 429; eth- 
nic distribution in, 252; foreign invest- 
ment in, lix, 64; geographic 
distribution of, 47; inputs for, xxxii; in 



541 



Country Studies 



Kazakstan, xlii, xliii, 11,12, 15, 44, 46- 
48, 58, 63, 64, 65; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 
148, 154-55; outputs of, xxxii; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, liv, 
154; as percentage of net material 
product, 148, 253, 428; pollution by, 
23, 42, 224, 325, 404; privatization of, 
259; Russian labor in, xl, 397; Soviet 
legacy, 333; under Soviets, xlii, 1, 11, 
15; structure of, 47, 333; in Tajikistan, 
1, 230, 235, 252-54, 259; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 333-36, 337; in Uzbekistan, lix, 
397, 428-36; wages in, 63, 337; in 
World War II, 235, 252 

infant mortality: in Kazakstan, 23, 40; in 
Tajikistan, 223-24; in Turkmenistan, 
310, 326; in Uzbekistan, 424 

inflation {see also hyperinflation), xxxii; 
attempts to reduce, xliii, 161-62, 259; 
in Kazakstan, xliii, xliv, 43, 62; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, xlvii; projected, xliv; rate of, 
xliii, xlvii, 1; in Tajikistan, 1, 259; in 
Turkmenistan, lv; in Uzbekistan, lvii, 
lviii, 434 

infrastructure: deterioration of, xliii, li, 
11; economic, xl; in Kazakstan, 11; 
Soviet legacy, xl, xlii, 1, 11; in Tajiki- 
stan, li 

Institute for Desert Studies (Turkmeni- 
stan), 310 

Institute for Strategic Studies (Kazak- 
stan), 90, 93 

intelligentsia: in Turkmenistan, 314, 353 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 

internal security: in Kazakstan, 82-83, 
93-97; in Kyrgyzstan, 184, 188-92; in 
Tajikistan, 286-89; in Turkmenistan, 
371; in Uzbekistan, 464, 465-68 

International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) , 283 

International Commercial Aviation 
Organization, 351 

International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 288 

International Criminal Police Organiza- 
tion (Interpol), 94 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
157; aid from, xliv, li, 24, 348; Kyr- 
gyzstan in, 179; loans from, lviii, lxi, 
458; and new currency, 161; Tajikistan 
in, 283; technical assistance from, 61; 



Uzbekistan in, 458 

International Telecommunications Sat- 
ellite Corporation (Intelsat), 71, 444 

International Union of Railroads, 348 

Interregional Investigative Unit (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 190 

Interrepublican Memorandum of 
Understanding (1991), 341 

Iran: aid from, 39, 86, 261-62, 280; 
antinarcotics agreement with Kazak- 
stan, 97; border with Turkmenistan, 
369; broadcasts from, 266, 280; in Cas- 
pian States Cooperation Organiza- 
tion, 347; in caviar cartel, 364; 
conquered by Timur, 389; economic 
embargo of, xliv; economic relations 
with, 260, 261-62, 346-47; ethnic 
groups in, 311, 317-18; exports from 
Tajikistan, 262; influences in Tajiki- 
stan, 206; languages of, 385; nomads 
from, 385-86; nuclear sales to, xlv; oil 
shipped to, xliv; pipeline through, 
347, 350, 360, 362; rail line to, xl, liv, 
443; relations with, lvi, lxi, 86, 179, 
277, 280, 360, 361-62, 456; in Tajiki- 
stan peace talks, 270, 280-82; Turk- 
menistan's trade with, 345 

iron: in Kyrgyzstan, 149; in Tajikistan, 
249 

irrigation, xl; area under, 331; construc- 
tion of, 386; damage to, 389; environ- 
mental damage from, 22, 123, 309, 
331, 404, 427; expansion of, 216; in 
Kazakstan, 22, 46; in Kyrgyzstan, 151; 
management of, 330-31; in Tajiki- 
stan, 216, 219, 220, 224, 249, 250, 255; 
in Turkmenistan, liv, 308, 309, 329-30, 
330-32; in Uzbekistan, lvii, lviii, 386, 
389, 392, 401, 404, 427, 428, 457 

Irrigation Institute (Turkmenistan), 331 

Irtysh (Ertis) River, 21; transportation 
on, 70 

Ishim (Esil) River, 21 

Iskandarov, Akbarsho: as acting presi- 
dent of Tajikistan, 269 

Islam: campaigns against, 416; conver- 
sion to, 13, 30, 208, 387; fear of 
extremist, 239, 241, 268, 278, 279, 280, 
282-83, 286, 366, 416-17, 447, 456, 
457; folk, 240, 320; historical, 30, 319- 
20; identification with, 239; influence 
of, 136; introduction of, xxxii, 12, 33, 



542 



Index 



136, 237, 319; in Kazakstan, 30-31, 33; 
in Kyrgyzstan, 128-29, 136; in politics, 
xxxvi, xli, 241; resurgence of, 19, 239- 
40, 280, 417-18; role of, xxxvi, 241, 
321; under Soviet Union, 237-39, 416; 
and the state, 30-31, 137, 240, 241, 
313; status of, 117; structure of, 319- 
20; in Tajikistan, 237-41; tolerance of, 
240; in Turkmenistan, 313, 320-21; in 
Uzbekistan, 415-18; variations in, 136 
Islam, Shia, 319, 390; Ismaili, 238 
Islam, Sufi, 240, 319; Naqshbandiyya, 
240 

Islam, Sunni, xxxvi, 30, 238, 319, 390 
Islamic Development Bank: Kazakstan 

in, xliv; Kyrgyzstan in, 179 
Islamic judges, 320 

Islamic Rebirth Party, Hi, 274-75; 
banned, 275, 450; membership of, 
274, 275; organized, 241, 274 

Israel: airline agreement with Uzbeki- 
stan, 443; Akayev's visit to, 179; Tajiki- 
stan's joint ventures with, 261; 
Uzbekistan's trade agreements with, 
457 

Italy: Tajikistan's joint ventures with, 261; 
trade with, 65, 343, 345 



Jadidists, 21 1 , 396; language reform of, 
413; platform of, 395; schools of, 211; 
in Uzbekistan, 394, 395, 396 

Jalal-Abad Province, Kyrgyzstan: agricul- 
ture in, 150; industries in, 155; scan- 
dals in, 116 

Janid Dynasty, 390 

Janyl-myrza, 134 

Japan: Akayev's visit to, 179; pipeline to, 
69-70, 347, 350; television programs 
in Uzbekistan, 444; trade credits from, 
64, 345; Uzbekistan's relations with, 
458 

Jews: emigration of, lxi, 232; in Kazak- 
stan, 30; in Tajikistan, 234, 238, 241, 
247; in Uzbekistan, lxi 

Jizzakh Province, Uzbekistan: saliniza- 
tion in, 427 

Jogorku Kenesh. See parliament (Kyr- 
gyzstan) 

joint-stock companies: in Kazakstan, 60; 
in Kyrgyzstan, 158; shares in, 158; in 
Turkmenistan, 339-40 



joint ventures: with Afghan companies, 
163, 261; with Argentine companies, 
347; with Austrian companies, 261; 
with British companies, 437; with 
Canadian companies, xlvii, 149-50, 
261; with Chinese companies, 163, 
261; with Czechoslovak companies, 
261; with Dutch companies, 347, 435; 
with German companies, 437; with 
Israeli companies, 261; with Italian 
companies, 261; with Japanese compa- 
nies, 437; in Kazakstan, 52, 64; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, xlvii, 149-50, 163; number of, 
163; with Portuguese companies, 266; 
with Russian companies, 163; with 
South Korean companies, 437; in 
Tajikistan, 1, li, 261; with Turkish com- 
panies, xlvii, 163, 346, 437; in Turk- 
menistan, lv-lvi, 346, 347; with United 
Arab Emirates companies, 1, 347; with 
United States companies, 163, 346, 
347, 437; in Uzbekistan, 437 

Jordan: Uzbekistan's trade agreements 
with, 457 

journalists: arrested, 277; attacks on, 
176, 276 

judges: appointment of, xlviii, 74, 172; 
eligibility of, 172; in Kazakstan, 74; in 
Kyrgyzstan, xlviii, 172; in Tajikistan, 
272, 288; tenure of, 172; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 356, 372; in Uzbekistan, 449 

Jumagulov, Apas: as prime minister of 
Kyrgyzstan, 169, 183 

Jumagulov government (Kyrgyzstan), 
169 

Jumgar Khanate, 111 

Jumhuriyat (Republic) (newspaper) , 276 

Kabulov, Akmurad, 368 
Kalmurzayev, Sarybay, 77 
Kalmyk people: invasion by, 14, 111 
Karachaganak gas field (Kazakstan), 55 
Karagiye, 21 

Karakalpak people, 407; in Uzbekistan, 
409 

Karakalpakstan, Autonomous Republic 
of (Uzbekistan): area, 407; industry, 
430; infant mortality, 424; population, 
407, 408, salinization conditions, 427 

Karakitai people, 13 

Karakorum Highway, 166, 181 



543 



Country Studies 



Kara-Kyrghyz Autonomous Region, 112 

Kara Shor, 308 

Karavan (newspaper), 82 

Karimov, Islam, xli; election of, lx, 400, 
447; as first secretary, 399, 446 

Karimov government (Uzbekistan): pow- 
ers of, xli 

Kasimov, Kenisary. SeeKene, Khan 

Kasym, Khan, 13 

Kazak Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic: created, 15 

Kazak language: alphabet of, 32, 363; 
broadcasts in, 71; history of, 32; influ- 
ences on, 130; as language of instruc- 
tion, 33, 36-37, 323; limitations of, 
32-33; and national identity, 32, 130; 
as official language, 17, 18, 32, 33, 72; 
speakers of, 32 

Kazak muftiate, 31 

Kazak people: ancestors of, xxxii; area 
of, xlii; ethnic conflicts with, 27; geo- 
graphic distribution of, 24, 27, 409; in 
government, 19, 74; hordes of, 13-14; 
invasions by, 391; in Kazakstan, xlii, 
11, 24, 27; and Kyrgyz people, 129; 
land of, xxxv; languages of, 32; as mili- 
tary officers, 89; as minority, xxxv, 16, 
27; nationalism of, 17, 19; origins of, 
13; in parliament, xlv; in rebellion of 
1916, 112; relations with Russians, 12, 
14; religion of, xxxvi, 30; in Russia, 
xlii; in Turkmenistan, 311; in universi- 
ties, 38 

Kazakstan AIDS Prevention and Control 
Dispensary, 40 

Kazakstan Airlines, 70 

Kazakstan Committee for State Security 
(KGB) , 89 

Kazakstan Railways, 69 

Kazakstan River Fleet Industrial Associa- 
tion (Kazrechmorflot), 70 

Kazakstan State Property Committee, 58 

Kazakstan State Radio and Television 
Company, 71 

Kazakstanskaya pravda (newspaper), 81 

Kazhegeldin, Akezhan, xlv; ethnic back- 
ground of, 29; as prime minister of 
Kazakstan, 73, 76 

Kazrechmorflot. See Kazakstan River 
Fleet Industrial Association 

Kemine, Mammetveli, 318 

Kene, Khan (Kenisary Kasimov), 14 



Khalk Suzi (People's Weekly) (newspa- 
per), 451 

Khan, Abulgazi Bahadur, 413 

Khan, Mukhammad Shaybani, 412 

khanates, xxxii, 13 

Khan Tengri Mountain, 21 

Khatlon Province, Tajikistan (see also 
Kulob Province; Qurghonteppa Prov- 
ince), 273; population density in, 226 

Khayr.Abul, 13, 14 

Khayrulloyev, Sherali, 284 

Khiva, lvii; decline of, 391 

Khiva Khanate, 304; Russian subjuga- 
tion of, 305, 393, 395; Turkmen mili- 
tary support for, 304 

Khojayev, Faizulla, 396; executed, 397 

Khorasanli language, 318 

Khorazm Province, Uzbekistan: popula- 
tion in, 408; salinization in, 427 

Khorazm state, 13, 390; damage to, 389; 
decline of, 391; under Soviet Union, 
396 

Khorezm state. See Khorazm state 

Khorugh-Osh road, 181 

Khovar news agency, 276 

Khrushchev, Nikita S., 217; agriculture 
under, 16; rehabilitations under, 398; 
religion under, 238 

Khudonazarov, Davlat, 268 

Khujand, Tajikistan, 207, 210; popula- 
tion in, 228 

Khujand Province, Tajikistan: popula- 
tion density in, 225 

Khwarazm state. See Khorazm state 

Kimak people, 13 

Kipchak people, 13 

Kipchak Steppe, 13 

Kiz-Jibek (folk tale), 34 

Koblandy-batir (folk tale) , 34 

Kofarnihon River, 220 

Kokand Khanate. SeeQucpn Khanate 

Kolbin, Gennadiy: as first secretary, 16; 
reforms under, 1 7 

Kommunist Tadzhikistana (Tajikistan 
Communist) (newspaper) , 276 

Komsomol. See Communist Youth 
League 

Kopekov, Danatar, 367 

Kopetdag Mountain Range, 307; climate 
in, 308 

Korea, Republic of (South Korea), 84 
Korean people: emigration of, lxi; in 



544 



Index 



Tajikistan, 234; in Uzbekistan, lxi, 397 
KorkutAta (folk tale), 313 
Kormil'tsev, Nikolay, 367 
Koturdepe oil field (Turkmenistan), 334 
Kozy Korpesh (folk tale) , 34 
Krasnovodsk, Turkmenistan (see also 

Turkmenbashy): founded, 305 
Krasnovodsk Plateau, 308 
Kugitang Mountain Range, 307 
Kulob, Tajikistan: population in, 228 
Kulob Province, Tajikistan ( see also Khat- 

lon Province), 273; population density 

in, 226 
Kulov, Feliks, 186 

Kumtor, Kyrgyzstan: gold mine at, xlvii 

Kunayev, Dinmukhamed: ethnic back- 
ground of, 29; as first secretary, 16, 17 

Kurdish people: in Turkmenistan, 319 

Kiirp-Say Hydroelectric Plant (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 156 

Kushan people, 207 

Kushan realm, 207 

Kutbeddin Muhammad, 388 

Kut Bilim (newspaper) , 1 77 

Kyrgyz: etymology of, 129 

Kyrgyzaltyn (Kyrgyzstan Gold) (govern- 
ment agency), 150 

Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic: created, 
112 

Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist 

Republic: created, 15 
Kyrgyzgas. See Kyrgyzstan Natural Gas 

Administration 
Kyrgyz Guusu (newspaper), 177 
Kyrgyz Khanate, 110; trade by, 110 
Kyrgyz language: alphabet of, 130, 363; 
broadcasts in, 266; influences on, 130, 
412; as language of instruction, 140, 
141, 244; native speakers of, 130; as 
official language, 114, 117, 130; publi- 
cations in, 112, 177; radio broadcasts 
in, 236; written, 130 
Kyrgyz people, xlvi; ancestors of, xxxii, 
129; and ethnic conflict, 236, 399, 410; 
ethnic identity of, 129, 130-32; feudal- 
ism under, 111; geographic distribu- 
tion of, 119, 126, 127, 128, 234; history 
of, 110; invasions by, 110, 111; and 
Kazak people, 129; in Kyrgyzstan, 126, 
128; land of, xxxv; marriage of, 130- 
32; as minority, xxxv; under Mongols, 
111; nomads, 112; protection for, 111; 



under Quqon Khanate, 111; in rebel- 
lion of 1916, 112; as refugees, 112; 
religion of, xxxvi; in rural areas, 128; 
in Tajikistan, 127, 234; Turkification 
of, 129; in urban areas, 128; in Uzbeki- 
stan, 127; wars of, 111 
Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic: created, 
109 

Kyrgyzstan Chronicle (newspaper), 177 
Kyrgyzstan Communist Party, 174 
Kyrgyzstan Gold. See Kyrgyzaltyn 
Kyrgyzstan National Energy Holding 

Company, 156 
Kyrgyzstan Natural Gas Administration 

(Kyrgyzgas), 156 
Kyrgyzstan Radio, 168 
Kyrgyzstan Stock Exchange, xlviii 
Kyrgyzstan Television, 168 
Kymyzuryndyk summer festival, 31 
Kyzyl Kum Desert. See Qizilqum Desert 
Kyzyl-Suu River, 220 

labor, forced: in Kyrgyzstan, 112 

labor force. See work force 

labor unions: in Turkmenistan, 338 

Lad (Harmony) Party (Kazakstan), 79 

Lahuti, Abu'l-Qasem, 242 

lakes: in Kyrgyzstan, 119-20; in Tajiki- 
stan, 223 

La"li Badakhshon (party) , 275 

land: disputes, 113, 278; distribution of, 
113, 151; erosion of, 23, 124; under 
hydroelectric dams, 124, 226, 254; in 
Kazakstan, 42, 60; in Kyrgyzstan, 113, 
117, 151-52, 153; management, 124; 
overgrazing of, 120, 124, 125, 153, 
310; ownership, 117, 152; privatization 
of, xxxix, 42, 60, 151-52, 339, 432, 
434; reform, 151-52, 153; Russian 
appropriation of, xxxv, liv, 14-15, 112; 
salinization of, 124, 224, 309-10, 404, 
427; shortages, 124; in Tajikistan, 278; 
tenure, 153 

land, arable, xl, 155; area of, 151, 250; 
disputes over, 278; distribution of, 
409, 427; irrigation of, xl, 151, 224; in 
Kyrgyzstan, 151-52; in Tajikistan, 205, 
250; in Uzbekistan, 409, 427 

land area: of Central Asia, xxxi; under 
irrigation, 331; of Kazakstan, xxxi, xlii, 
11, 20; of Kyrgyzstan, xxxi, 118-19 



545 



Country Studies 



language (see also under individual lan- 
guages): in Kazakstan, xlii, 17, 18, 32- 
33, 72, 83; in Kyrgyzstan, 112, 114, 
117, 129-30, 140-41, 183; of instruc- 
tion, 33, 36, 140-41; Iranian, 385; offi- 
cial, liii, 17, 114, 183, 398; of Oghuz, 
302; Russian, 183; in Tajikistan, 1, liii; 
teaching, 17; of Turkmen, 302; in 
Uzbekistan, 398,411-15 
Larmag Energy (Netherlands) , 347 
Latin alphabet, 233, 318, 363, 411, 413, 
414 

Law on Defense (1992) (Uzbekistan), 
461 

Law on Foreign Investments (1994) 
(Kazakstan), 64 

Law on Freedom of Conscience and on 
Religious Organizations (1991) (Turk- 
menistan), 321 

Law on Military Service (Kyrgyzstan), 
184 

Law on Privatization (1994) (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 158 

Law on Privatization (1991) (Uzbeki- 
stan), 432 

Law on Public Organizations (1991) 

(Turkmenistan) , 357 
Lay of Igor's Campaign, 35 
Lebanon: Kyrgyzstan's relations with, 

179 

legislative branch (Kazakstan) (see also 

parliament), 73-74; elections for, 73- 

74; houses of, 73; legislation in, 74 
legislative branch (Kyrgyzstan) (see also 

parliament), 171-72 
legislative branch (Tajikistan) (see also 

parliament) , 271-72 
legislative branch (Turkmenistan) (see 

also parliament) , 355-56 
legislative branch (Uzbekistan) (see also 

parliament) , 448-49 
Legislative House (Kyrgyzstan), 171 
Lenin, Vladimir I., 397 
Leninabad. See Leninobod 
Leninobod, 207; housing shortage in, 

258 

Leninobod Province, Tajikistan, 273 
Lesser Horde, 14; controlled by Rus- 
sians, 14; Russifi cation of, 29; territory 
of, 29 

libraries: in Tajikistan, 242 

Libya: nuclear sales from Kazakstan, xlv 



Li Kwan Yew, 84 
Li Peng, 457 

literacy rate, xxxii; in Kyrgyzstan, 112, 
138; of men, 243; in Tajikistan, 225, 
243; in Turkmenistan, 321; of women, 
243 

literature: Kazak, 34; in Tajikistan, 242; 
in Turkmenistan, 313; in Uzbekistan, 
415 

livestock: customs regarding, 33-34; in 
Kazakstan, 33; in Kyrgyzstan, 152; 
overgrazing by, 120, 124, 125, 153, 
310; sheep, 330; in Turkmenistan, 330 

living standards: decline in, 326, 327; in 
Kyrgyzstan, 145; in rural areas, 229, 
326, 327; in Tajikistan, 225, 229, 232, 
250, 257-58; in Turkmenistan, liv, 
326-28, 338; in urban areas, 326, 327 

Lohuti, Abdulqosim. SeeLahuti, Abu'l- 
Qasem 

LUKoil (Russia), 52 

Luk'yanov, Valentin, 187 



machine-building industry: in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 155; in Tajikistan, 252; in 
Turkmenistan, 335 

machinery: exports of, 436; imports of, 
343, 436; in Uzbekistan, 429, 430, 436 

Magtymguly, 318 

Mahkamov, Kahar: resignation of, 218 

Mahmud, Sultan, 388 

Majlis (Kazakstan): elections for, 73-74; 

members of, 73; political parties in, 

xlv, 73 
Manas (folk epic), 132 
Manchus: invasions by, 111 
Manghits, 392 

Mangyshlak Peninsula (Kazakstan): oil 
deposits in, 51 

Manichaeism, 207, 386 

manufacturing: employment in, 57; 
privatization of, 434; in Kazakstan, 57; 
in Uzbekistan, 429, 434 

marketization, 340, 432 

marriage: arranged, 315, 316; bride- 
price in, 231, 316; importance of, 231; 
interethnic, 130-32; in Kyrgyzstan, 
130-32, 134; polygamous, 231; in 
Tajikistan, 231; in Turkmenistan, 315; 
underage, 231; women in, 231 

Mary, Turkmenistan: airport at, 351; nat- 



546 



Index 



ural gas deposits in, 334; politics in, 

353; population of, 312 
Mary Province, Turkmenistan: cotton in, 

332, 362; natural gas in, 334 
Mary Thermoelectric Power Station 

(Turkmenistan), 335 
Masaliyev, Absamat, 174; resignation of, 

114 

Massey-Ferguson: investment by, lix 

materiel: air force, 187; army, 187; of 
Kazakstan, 88-89, 91-92; of Kyr- 
gyzstan, 186, 187; nuclear, xlv, 23, 83- 
84, 92; of Russia, 284; trafficking in, 
465, 466, 467; of Turkmenistan, 369- 
70; of Uzbekistan, 461 

Mawarannahr, 386-90; Arab invasion of, 
386-87; golden age of, 387, 389-90; 
Turkification of, 387-88, 389; Uzbek 
invasion of, 390 

media: censorship of, 81, 176, 267, 451; 
freedom of, 81, 109, 175-76; influ- 
ences on, 81; in Kazakstan, 81-82; in 
Kyrgyzstan, 109, 175-77; restrictions 
on, lx, 242, 359; in Tajikistan, 242, 
276; in Turkmenistan, 359; in Uzbeki- 
stan, lx, 443, 450-51 

Mees Pierson, 435 

men: employment of, 231; as head of 
household, 134; in Kyrgyzstan, 134; 
life expectancy of, 248, 325; literacy 
rate of, 243; retirement age of, 328; in 
Tajikistan, 243, 248 
merchant marine (Turkmenistan) , 351 
mercury: in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 149, 150; in 

Tajikistan, 249 
Meredov, Payzgeldi, 354 
Merv city-state, 303; decline of, 391 
Meskhetian Turks, 236; ethnic conflicts 
by, 410 

metals: exports of, 65, 436, 457; imports 
of, 436 

middle class: in Uzbekistan, 394 
Middle Horde, 13-14; controlled by Rus- 
sians, 14; Russification of, 29; territory 
of, 29 

migration: controls on, xlix, 27; from 
Kazakstan, xlii, 26, 91; to Kazakstan, 
xlix, 26, 27; from Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 127, 
143, 154, 183, 184, 185; to Kyrgyzstan, 
xlix; reasons for, 232; from Tajikistan, 
xlix, 1, liii-liv, 225, 232-33, 254, 257, 
259; to Tajikistan, 228; from Turkmen- 



istan, 312, 369; to Turkmenistan, 312; 
from Uzbekistan, lxi, 409, 410, 431; to 
Uzbekistan, xlix, 385, 395, 408 

Military Academy of the General Staff 
(Kazakstan), 89 

military cooperation: among Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, xlvi; of 
Kazakstan with Russia, 93, 456; of 
Uzbekistan with Armenia, 456 

Military Court (Tajikistan) , 272 

military doctrine: of Kazakstan, 92-93; of 
Turkmenistan, 365-66; of Uzbekistan, 
461 

military infrastructure: in Kazakstan, 90- 
92; Soviet legacy, 91 

military officers: in Kazakstan, 89; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 187; Russian, 89, 184, 185, 
187, 369, 370, 462; shortage in Tajiki- 
stan, liii; in Turkmenistan, 369, 371; in 
Uzbekistan, 462 

military service: conscription for, 212, 
283; exemptions from, 212 

military training: by Pakistan, 367; by 
Russia, 465; for Uzbekistan, 465 

militia. See police 

Milli Majlis. See parliament (Turkmeni- 
stan) 

minerals, xxxii; export of, 342; in Kazak- 
stan, 44; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 109, 148, 
149, 150, 163, 169; in Tajikistan, 1, 205, 
249, 254; in Turkmenistan, lv, 329, 
342; in Uzbekistan, lvii, 425, 429-30, 
434 

Mingbulak oil field (Uzbekistan), 426, 
437 

mining: of coal, 55, 430; of gold, xliii, 
xlvii, 44, 149, 254, 261, 425; in Kazak- 
stan, xliii, 44, 55; in Kyrgyzstan, 112, 
124, 192; output, 429; pollution by, 
124, 125; in Tajikistan, 254; of ura- 
nium, 192, 254, 425; in Uzbekistan, 
425,429-30 

Ministry for Defense Affairs (Uzbeki- 
stan), 462; Department of Military 
Mobilization, 462 

Ministry of Agriculture (Turkmenistan): 
Commercial Center, 330 

Ministry of Agriculture and Food (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 152, 171 

Ministry of Communications (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 168, 171 

Ministry of Communications (Turkmeni- 



547 



Country Studies 



stan), 351 

Ministry of Communications (Uzbeki- 
stan) , 443-44 
Ministry of Construction and Housing 

(Kazakstan), 66 
Ministry of Culture (Kyrgyzstan) , 171 
Ministry of Defense (Kazakstan) , 93 
Ministry of Defense (Kyrgyzstan), 171, 
186 

Ministry of Defense (Russia) , 286 
Ministry of Defense (Tajikistan), 278 
Ministry of Defense (Turkmenistan), 

365; ethnic distribution in, 367; pen- 
sions in, 370 
Ministry of Defense (Uzbekistan), 462 
Ministry of Ecology and Bioresources 

(Kazakstan), 24 
Ministry of Economy (Kyrgyzstan), 171 
Ministry of Economy, Finance, and 

Banking (Turkmenistan), 338, 341; 

Department of State Property and 

Privatization, 339 
Ministry of Education (Kyrgyzstan), 138, 

171 

Ministry of Education (Tajikistan), 243 
Ministry of Education (Turkmenistan), 

322 

Ministry of Environmental Protection 

(Tajikistan), 224 
Ministry of Finance (Kyrgyzstan), 171 
Ministry of Finance (Uzbekistan), 432 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kyrgyzstan) , 

171 

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 

(Turkmenistan), 354 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 

(Uzbekistan) , 432 
Ministry of Health (Kazakstan) , 97 
Ministry of Health (Kyrgyzstan), 171 
Ministry of Health (Tajikistan), 288 
Ministry of Health (Uzbekistan), 422 
Ministry of Higher Education (Uzbeki- 
stan), 418 

Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Material 
Resources (Kyrgyzstan), 164, 171 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kazakstan), 
94 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kyrgyzstan) , 
115,171,188; purged, 189, 192 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Tajikistan) , 
286, 288 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Turkmeni- 



stan), 371; pensions in, 370 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (Uzbeki- 
stan), 466 

Ministry of Irrigation (Turkmenistan), 
330-31 

Ministry of Justice (Kazakstan), 74 
Ministry of Justice (Kyrgyzstan), 171 
Ministry of Justice (Turkmenistan), 320, 
372 

Ministry of Labor (Turkmenistan), 338 

Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare 
(Kyrgyzstan), 171 

Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water 
Resources (Uzbekistan) , 427 

Ministry of National Security (Kazak- 
stan) , 73 

Ministry of Natural Resources Use and 
Environmental Protection (Turkmeni- 
stan), 309 

Ministry of Oil and Gas (Turkmenistan), 
334 

Ministry of People's Education (Uzbeki- 
stan), 418 

Ministry of Security (Tajikistan), 286 

Ministry of Trade (Turkmenistan), 330 

Ministry of Transport and Communica- 
tions (Kazakstan), 66, 70 

Ministry of Transportation (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 165, 171 

Ministry of Water Resources (Kyr- 
gyzstan) , 171 

minorities: German, xxxv; Kazak, xxxv; 
in Kazakstan, xxxv, xlii, lix; Kyrgyz, 
xxxv; in Kyrgyzstan, xxxv, xlvi, xlix, lix, 
112; privileges, liii; Russian, xxxv, xlii, 
xlvi, liii, lxi; Tajik, xxxv; in Tajikistan, 
xxxv, lix, 127, 234, 235-36, 241, 259; 
Turkmen, xxxv; in Turkmenistan, 
xxxv, lvi, lix, 311, 319; Ukrainian, 
xxxv; Uzbek, xxxv, lvi, lix; in Uzbeki- 
stan, xxxv, lxi, 127, 279, 397, 409 

Mins, 392 

Mirsaidov, Shukrullo, 450 
Mitsubishi, 347, 350 

Mobil Oil: investment in Kazakstan, xliii, 
52 

Moin Kum Desert. SeeMoyunqum Desert 

Moldashev, Modolbek, 189 

Moldova: economic relations with 

Uzbekistan, 456 
Mollanepes, 318 
Mongol Empire, 389 



548 



Index 



Mongolia: ethnic groups in, 24; migra- 
tion from, 26-27 

Mongols, 388-89; conquests by, xxxii, 13, 
111, 209, 301, 303, 388, 391; influ- 
ences by, 206 

Mongol tribes: in Kazakstan, 12 

Morrison-Knudson Corporation, 163 

mosques: construction of, 86, 280, 362 

mountains: in Kazakstan, 21; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, xxxi, 119, 226; population 
density in, 226; in Tajikistan, xxxi, 
219-20; in Turkmenistan, 307, 308; in 
Uzbekistan, 401 

Mount Ayrybaba, 307 

Mount Communism, 220 

Mount Lenin, 220 

Mount Shahshah, 307 

Mount Victory. See Pik Pobedy 

Movement for Democratic Reforms 
(Uzbekistan), 450 

Movement for Islamic Revival (Tajiki- 
stan), 275 

Moyunqum (Moin Kum) Desert, 21 

Muhammad II, 388 

Murgap River, 309 

Muruntau Gold Mine (Uzbekistan), 425, 
437 

museums: in Tajikistan, 242-43 

Muslim, Qutaybah ibn, 386 

Muslim Board of Central Asia, 19, 31, 
238, 320, 416; decline of, 240 

Muslim Religious Board (Turkmeni- 
stan), 320 

Muslim Religious Board of Mavaran- 
nahr, 320 

Muslims (see also Islam): deported to 

Kazakstan, 16; in Tajikistan, 233 
Muslims of the Soviet East (periodical) , 41 6 

Nabiyev, Rahmon, 217; in elections in 
Tajikistan, 268, 271; ousted, 269, 278; 
paramilitary forces of, 283-84; as pres- 
ident, 218 

Namangan, Uzbekistan: population in, 
406 

Namangan Province, Uzbekistan: popu- 
lation in, 408 

narcotics: in Kazakstan, 96-97; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 184, 190-91; markets for, 
287-8; production of, 96, 190, 466; 
sales of, 466; sources of, 288; in Tajiki- 



stan, 286-88; in Turkmenistan, 353; 
use of, 97, 466; in Uzbekistan, 465-66 
narcotics addiction: in Kazakstan, 41-42, 
97; in Tajikistan, 249; treatment cen- 
ters, 97, 247, 423; in Uzbekistan, 423, 
466 

narcotics trafficking, xli; control of, 96- 
97, 191, 288, 466; economic impor- 
tance of, 287; in Kazakstan, 96; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 181, 188, 190; routes for, 181; 
in Tajikistan, 249, 278, 287; in Turk- 
menistan, 371; in Uzbekistan, 465-66, 
467 

Narodnaya gazeta (People's Newspaper) , 
276 

Narodnoye slovo (newspaper), 451 
Naryn, Kyrgyzstan: free economic zone 

in, 163, 181 
Naryn River: hydroelectric stations on, 

156, 426 

National Assembly (Turkmenistan). See 

parliament (Turkmenistan) 
National Bank for Foreign Economic 

Affairs (Uzbekistan), 435 
National Bank of Kazakstan, 60; powers 

of, 61 

National Bank of Kyrgyzstan , 159; cre- 
ated, 159; loans outstanding, 160; 
scandals in, 160 

National Bank of Tajikistan, 271 

National Center, 213 

National Commission on Drug Control 
(Uzbekistan), 466 

National Cotton Council of America, 
344 

National Council (Turkmenistan), 356 
National Environmental Action Plan 

(NEAP) (Kyrgyzstan), 125 
national guard (Kyrgyzstan), 184, 188 
national guard (Tajikistan), 283 
national identity: in Kazakstan, 31-36; 
and language, 32-33; promotion of, 
313; in Turkmenistan, 312-13 
nationalism: Kazak, 17, 78-79; Kyrgyz, 
113; Tajik, 233, 236-37; Turkmen, 
312-13; Uzbek, 399 
National Reconciliation Council (Tajiki- 
stan), Hi 

national security (Kazakstan) {see also 
armed forces), 87-97; CIS forces in, 
87; national guard in, 87; role of Rus- 
sian military in, xxxi, 12; Soviet legacy, 



549 



Country Studies 



87 

national security (Kyrgyzstan) (see also 
armed forces), 109, 183-92; external 
guarantors of, xlix; role of Russian 
military in, xxxi, xlix 

national security (Tajikistan) (see also 
armed forces) , 283-88; role of Russian 
military in, xxxi 

national security (Turkmenistan) (see 
also armed forces), 364-73; positive 
neutrality in, 365; role of Russian mili- 
tary in, xxxi, 301, 360, 364-65; Soviet 
legacy, 364; strategic considerations, 
365; threats to, 360 

national security (Uzbekistan) (see also 
armed forces) , 460-68; role of Russian 
military in, xxxi; threats to, 458 

National Security Committee (Kazak- 
stan), 89, 94; privacy violations by, 94 

National Security Council (Kazakstan), 
89, 93; ethnic distribution in, 89 

National Security Council (Kyrgyzstan): 
members of, 186; policies of, 186 

National Security Council (Tajikistan), 
271 

National Security Service (Uzbekistan), 
466, 467 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation 

natural gas, xxxv, 347; earnings from, 
344; exploration, 156, 334; export of, 
xxxix, xl, lv, 180, 279, 333, 342, 344, 
345, 360, 369; extraction of, 333, 334, 
429; free, 338, 342; import of, 56, 155, 
156, 254, 255-56, 262; industry, xliii; 
investment in, Iviii, 55; joint ventures 
in, lvi; in Kazakstan, xliii, 48, 55, 56, 
279; in Kyrgyzstan, 149; as percentage 
of gross domestic product, 334; pipe- 
lines, lv, 55, 347, 348, 359, 360, 361, 
363, 425, 441, 456, 457; processing of, 
333; production, 55, 149, 155, 334, 
425; reserves, liv-lv, lv, lvii, 48, 255, 
329, 334, 425-26; in Tajikistan, 255- 
56, 262; tariffs on, 345; taxes on, 342; 
trade routes for, xl; in Turkmenistan, 
liv-lv, lvi, 156, 262, 279, 301, 329, 333, 
334, 338, 339, 342, 343, 359, 369; in 
Uzbekistan, lvii, 156, 180, 425, 429 

natural resources: foreign development 
of, 45; of Kazakstan, lxi, 12, 44-45; of 
Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 109, 149-50; of Tajiki- 



stan, 205; of Turkmenistan, lxi, 329- 
30; of Uzbekistan, lxi 

Nava'i, Ali Shir, 412 

Navruz spring festival, 31 

Nawoiy Mining and Metallurgical Com- 
bine (Uzbekistan), 437 

Nazarbayev, Nursultan, xli, 11-12; back- 
ground of, 18; economic policy of, 
xliii; economy under, 17; elected, 11, 
20; ethnic background of, 29; foreign 
policy of, xliv, 84; as minister of 
national security, 73; power consolida- 
tion of, 11; rise of, 18-19; support for 
Gorbachev, 18, 19 

Nazarbayev government (Kazakstan): 
economic goals of, xliii; powers of, xli, 
xliv, 72; reform programs of, xliv 

NEAP. See National Environmental 
Action Plan 

NEAP Expert Working Group (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 125 

Nebitdag, Turkmenistan: airport at, 351; 
oil field at, 334 

NEP. See New Economic Policy 

Netherlands: Kazakstan's trade with, 65 

net material product (NMP): agriculture 
as percentage of, 148, 250; construc- 
tion as a percentage of, 253; industry 
as percentage of, 148, 253, 428; of Kyr- 
gyzstan, 148; trade as percentage of, 
343; of Turkmenistan, 329 

Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement 
(Kazakstan), 23, 35, 82; banned, 24; 
protests by, 23-24 

New Countryside policy (Turkmeni- 
stan), 330 

New Economic Policy (NEP): in Kazak- 
stan, 76; in Tajikistan, 215; in Uzbeki- 
stan, 397 

Newmont Mining Company (United 
States): joint ventures in Uzbekistan, 
437, 438 

newspapers (see also media): censorship 
of, 176; in Kazakstan, 81; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 168, 175, 176; languages of, 
81, 176, 177, 215, 276; slander suits 
against, 176; sponsors of, 177; in 
Tajikistan, 276; in Uzbekistan, 443, 
451 

Nine Oghuz, 302 

Niyazov, Begdzhan, 367 

Niyazov, Saparmyrat, xli, 307; back- 



550 



Index 



ground of, 355; cult of personality of, 
353, 358; foreign policy under, Ivi; as 
party chairman, 357; power of, 352 
Niyazov government (Turkmenistan): 
human rights under, 358; powers of, 
xli 

NKK (newspaper), 81-82 
NMP. See net material product 
Noble Drilling (United States) , 347 
Nogai Horde, 13; division of, 13 
nomads: forced settlement of, 14, 45; Ira- 
nian, 385-86; in Kazakstan, 14, 33, 34, 
45; in Kyrgyzstan, 110, 112, 128, 133 
nomenklatura, 446 

Norak (Nurek), Tajikistan, 220; growth 
of, 229 

Norak Reservoir (Tajikistan), 220 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 
458 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO): and Central Asian security, 
xlix; Kazakstan's role in, 83; Partner- 
ship for Peace program, lx, 93, 367, 
461; Russian opposition to, xlix; Turk- 
menistan talks with, 361 

North Kazakstan Province. See Soltustik 
Qazaqstan 

north-south division: in Kyrgyzstan, 128- 
29, 165, 167, 173-74, 177; in Tajiki- 
stan, 264-65; and transportation prob- 
lems, 165, 264-65 
Novoangrenskiy Thermoelectric Power 

Station (Uzbekistan), 431 
Novyy Uzen, Kazakstan: riots in, 18 
Nuclear No n proliferation Treaty, 461 
nuclear weapons: of China, 85; of Kazak- 
stan, xlv, 23, 83-84, 92; radiation from, 
23, 41; testing, xlv, 23, 85, 92 
Nukus, Uzbekistan: industry in, 430 
Nukus Declaration (1995), xli 
Nukus University (Uzbekistan), 420 
Nurek. See Norak 

Nuri, Sayed Abdullo: peace agreement 
with, Hi 

Nurmagambetov, Sagadat, 89, 93 
Nysanbayev, Ratbek hadji, 31 

Office of the Procurator General (Kazak- 
stan), 94 

Office of the Procurator General (Tajiki- 
stan), 272 



Office of the Procurator General (Turk- 
menistan), 371, 372 

Oghuz Turks, 12-13; clans of, 302; con- 
federation of, 302; conquests by, 13, 
301-2; geographic distribution of, 
303-4; language of, 302 

oil, xxxv, 347; demand for, 52; deposits, 
xlii, xliii, xlvi, lv, 48, 51, 157, 255, 329, 
426; exploration, 156, 157; export of, 
xxxix, xl, xliv, 51, 52-55, 65, 279, 345, 
360; extraction of, 333, 334, 429; 
import of, 56, 155, 254, 255-56, 263; 
industry, xliii; investment in, xliii, lv- 
lvi, lviii, 19, 51, 347, 437; in Kazakstan, 
xlii, xliii, xliv, 11, 19, 48, 51-55, 56, 
279; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 149, 154, 155; 
pipelines, xliii, xliv, 52, 86, 360, 457; 
processing, 333; production, 52-55, 
149, 154, 155, 334; refining, 334, 429, 
430; reserves lv; in Tajikistan, 255-56, 
263; tariffs on, 345; taxes on, 342; 
trade routes for, xl; in Turkmenistan, 
lv, lvi, 279, 301, 329, 333, 334, 339; in 
Uzbekistan, lix, 426, 429, 430, 437 

Okarem, Turkmenistan: port of, 351 

Okeyev,T, 135 

Old Uzbek (language). See Chaghatai 
language 

Olmaliq, Uzbekistan: air pollution in, 
404-5; industry in, 430 

Olmaliq Metallurgy Combine (Uzbeki- 
stan), 405 

Oly Majlis. See parliament (Uzbekistan) 
Oman: assistance from, 86; pipeline 

through, xliii 
opera: in Tajikistan, 243 
Operation Provide Hope, 459 
OPIC. See Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation 
Oral (Ural'sk), Kazakstan: established, 

14 

Orazov, Gurban, 354 

Orbita satellite system (Russia), 71 

Organization for Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (OSCE), 76, 179; and 
Central Asian security, xlix; Uzbeki- 
stan in, 458 

Organization of the Islamic Conference: 
in Tajikistan peace talks, 270 

Oriot Khanate, 111 

OSCE. See Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 



551 



Country Studies 



Osh, Kyrgyzstan: ethnic conflict in, 399; 
free economic zone in, 163; industries 
in, 155; narcotics trafficking in, 191; 
roads to, 166; temperatures in, 120; 
Uzbeks in, 113 
Osh-aimagy (Osh-land), 113 
Osh City Council (Kyrgyzstan), 113 
Osh Province, Kyrgyzstan, 113; agricul- 
ture in, 150 
Osh region, xlvi; territorial conflict in, 
461 

Oskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk), Kazak- 
stan: pollution in, 41 

Osmonov, Bekamat, 174 

Otan-Otechestvo (political group) 
(Kazakstan), 79 

Otunbayeva, Roza, 135 

Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion (OPIC) , 460 

Ozal, Turgut, 84 



Pakistan: antinarcotics agreements with, 
97; credits from, 262; economic rela- 
tions with, 260, 262; military training 
in, 367; pipeline through, 347, 350, 
360, 363, 456; relations with, lxi, 277, 
363, 456; roads to, 443; in Tajikistan 
peace talks, 270; television programs 
from, 444; trade routes through, 443 

Pamiri languages, 234 

Pamiri people: repression of, 234; in 
Tajikistan, 234; university for, 246 

Pamir Mountains, 219, 220, 307; climate 
of, 223; Kyrgyzin, 119 

Pamir region: Chinese claim to, 207 

Panjakent, 207 

Panj River (Darya-ye Panj), 219, 220 
Panorama (newspaper), 82 
Pan-Turkism, xxxvi, 394 
Paris Club: investment in Kazakstan, 64 
parliament (Kazakstan): dissolved, 76, 

77; ethnic distribution in, 19, 74; 

power of, xliv; rebellion in, 76; women 

in, 74 

parliament (Kyrgyzstan): Akayev's rela- 
tions with, 116; dissolved, 168; elec- 
tions for, 1 68; reform under, xlviii 

parliament (Tajikistan), 271-72; elec- 
tions to, 271; eligibility for, 271 

parliament (Turkmenistan), 354, 355- 
56; members of, 355; role of, 356 



parliament (Uzbekistan) , 448; deputies 
in, 448; legislation in, 448; role of, 
448-49 

Party for Democratic Development 

(Uzbekistan), 358 
Pasha, Enver, 214 

Pavlodar, Kazakstan: universities in, 37 

Pavlov, Aleksandr, 77 

PDPU. See People's Democratic Party of 

Uzbekistan 
Peace Corps, 459-60 
Peasant Justice Party (Turkmenistan), 

357 

peasants: in Tajikistan, 258; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 314; uprisings by, 211, 214, 216; 
in Uzbekistan, 433; violence against, 
216; wages of, 258 
Peasants' Union (Kazakstan), 78 
Pension Fund (Kyrgyzstan), 146 
pensions: administration of, 43; amount 
of, 146; eligibility for, 146; funding for, 
328; in Kazakstan, 42, 43; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, xlviii-xlix, 146; as percentage 
of gross domestic product, 43; reform 
of, 146; spending on, 328; in Turk- 
menistan, 328, 336, 370 
Pentecostal Church: in Kazakstan, 30 
People's Congress Party (Kazakstan), 35- 
36, 78 

People's Council (Turkmenistan), 353, 
354 

People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan 
(PDPU), 446, 448,449 

People's Front of Tajikistan, 277 

People's Party of Kyrgyzstan, 174 

People's Republic of Khorazm, 396 

People's Unity Party (SNEK) (Kazak- 
stan), xlv, 78 

Peres, Shimon, 457 

perestroika, 168, 306, 399 

periodicals: languages of publication, 
276, 318, 451; in Tajikistan, 276; in 
Uzbekistan, 451 

Persia: Seljuk Turks in, 302; trade with, 
110; wars of, 386 

Persian culture, 208, 209 

Persian language (Farsi), 208, 233, 390; 
influences of, 412; as official lan- 
guage, 387; revival of, 208 

Persian people, 206; marriage with 
Turks, 209 

Persian-Tajik Language Foundation, 276 



552 



Index 



Petropavl (Petropavlovsk) , Kazakstan: 

industry in, 47; universities in, 37 
Petropavlovsk, Kazakstan. See Petropavl 
Pik Pobedy (Mount Victory), 119 
pipelines, xl, 69-70; access to, 52, 65, 69- 
70; from Azerbaijan, 69; construction 
of, xliii, xliv, 360; from Kazakstan, 52, 
55, 69, 350, 425; for natural gas, lv, 55, 
69, 359, 360, 363, 425, 441, 456, 457; 
for oil, xliii, xliv, 52, 69, 86, 360, 457; 
proposed, xliii, 55, 69-70; routes of, 
xliii, 52, 347, 350, 362, 363, 425, 456; 
from Turkmenistan, 69, 348, 350, 359, 
362; from Uzbekistan, 350, 425, 441, 
456 

Piramida radio (communications com- 
pany) (Kyrgyzstan), 177 

police: attrition of, 188; corruption of, 
95, 465, 467; criminal activities of, 95, 
189, 467; inadequacy of, xli; in Kazak- 
stan, xlii, 94, 95; in Kyrgyzstan, 188- 
89; personnel, 467; privacy violations 
by, 94, 191; specialized, xlii; in Tajiki- 
stan, 286; training, 467; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 371; in Uzbekistan, xlii, 467; 
working conditions for, 95, 188-89 

political demonstrations: casualties in, 
16; in Kazakstan, 16; in Kyrgyzstan, 
113-14; in Tajikistan, 218, 268, 275 

political opposition: to conscription, 
212; in Kazakstan, 79; in Kyrgyzstan, 
169; to Soviet rule, 233; suppression 
of, xli, liii, 233, 353, 445; in Tajikistan, 
liii, 268, 277; in Turkmenistan, 357- 
58; in Uzbekistan, 449-50 

political parties (Kazakstan) {see also 
under individual parties) , 77—79; forma- 
tion of, 17-18; opposition, xlv, 11-12, 
78; registration of, 79, 83; representa- 
tion of, xlv; restrictions on, 11-12 

political parties (Kyrgyzstan) (see also 
under individual parties) , 174—75; oppo- 
sition, xlviii; proliferation of, 174 

political parties (Tajikistan) (see also 
under individual parties) , 273-74; oppo- 
sition, 268, 273, 274-75 

political parties (Turkmenistan) (see also 
under individual parties) , 357—58; 
banned, 358; harassment of, 358, 359; 
opposition, 357-58, 359 

political parties (Uzbekistan) (see also 
under individual parties) , harassment 



of, lx, 450, 452; opposition, lx, 447, 
449-50; toleration for, 447 

political power: basis of, xli, 411; in 
Tajikistan, 218; in Turkmenistan, 306; 
in Uzbekistan, 411 

political reform: in Kyrgyzstan, 109; in 
Uzbekistan, 446 

political unrest: in Kazakstan, 18, 23-24, 
35; in Kyrgyzstan, 112, 113-14; by 
peasants, 211, 214; in Tajikistan, 210, 
211, 214, 225, 236, 258, 259, 267; in 
Uzbekistan, 112, 394, 396, 398 

politics: influences on, 206, 353; role of 
religion in, xxxvi, xli; in Tajikistan, 
218,268, 273-75,277 

pollution (see also Aral Sea): air, 404-5, 
422; causes of, xxxv, xlv, 254-55; and 
health problems, 41, 248, 249, 421-22; 
radioactive, xlv; water, 22, 123-24, 310, 
363, 403-4, 422 

Ponosov, Yuriy, liii, 278 

Popular Congress of Kazakstan, 35 

Popular Front (Tajikistan), 285 

Popular Unity Party (Tajikistan) , 275 

population (Kazakstan), xlii, 24; age dis- 
tribution in, 26; density, 11, 24; ethnic 
distribution in, xlii, 27; urban, 24; 
work force, 57 

population (Kyrgyzstan), 126-29; age 
distribution in, 126; ethnic distribu- 
tion in, 126; geographic factors, 127- 
29; in poverty, xlix; religious affiliation 
in, 30; rural, xlvi, 152 

population (Tajikistan), 205, 215, 225- 
28, 234; age distribution in, 226; den- 
sity, 225-26; distribution of, 225, 228; 
ethnic distribution in, liv, 234; growth, 
228, 229; in 1970, 225; in 1989, 225; 
rural, 225, 229-30; sex ratio in, 226; 
under Soviet regimes, 217; urban, 228 

population (Turkmenistan), liv, 311-12; 
age distribution in, 312; density, 311; 
distribution of, 311-12; ethnic distri- 
bution in, 311; in 1993, 311; urban, 
312 

population (Uzbekistan), lvii, 215, 406- 
9; age distribution in, 406, 408; den- 
sity, 409; distribution of, 406; growth, 
lvii, 406, 408; in 1990, 406; projected, 
408; rural, 406; urban, 406 

population statistics (Kazakstan): birth 
rate, xlii, 24, 26, 28; death rate, 24, 26; 



553 



Country Studies 



fertility rate, 26, 40; growth rate, 24; 
infant mortality rate, 23, 40; maternal 
mortality rate, 28; mortality rate, 40 

population statistics (Kyrgyzstan): birth 
rate, xlii; death rate, 126; growth rate, 
xlii, 126; infant mortality rate, 126; life 
expectancy, 126 

population statistics (Tajikistan): birth 
rate, xlii, 225, 226, 256; fertility rate, 
226; growth rate, 225, 226; infant mor- 
tality rate, 223-24, 248-49; life expect- 
ancy, 248; maternal mortality rate, 
223, 248-49; mortality rate, 248; sex 
ratio, 230 

population statistics (Turkmenistan): 
birth rate, xlii, 325; death rate, 325; 
growth rate, 311, 312, 325; infant mor- 
tality rate, 310, 326; life expectancy, 
325; maternal mortality rate, 326; 
mortality rate, 324-25; sex ratio, 311 

population statistics (Uzbekistan): birth 
rate, xlii; fertility rate, 424; growth 
rate, 406; infant mortality rate, 424; 
maternal mortality rate, 424 

postal service: in Kyrgyzstan, 168; in 
Turkmenistan, 351; in Uzbekistan, 443 

poverty: in Kyrgyzstan, xlix, 145, 146; 
percentage of Kyrgyzstan's popula- 
tion in, xlix; in Turkmenistan, 327 

Pravda vostoka (newspaper) , 451 

president (Kazakstan): under constitu- 
tion, 72; direct rule by, 71, 79, 80-81, 
83; election of, 72; powers of, 73, 75, 
77 

president (Kyrgyzstan) , 170-71; as com- 
mander in chief, 186; election of, 170; 
eligibility for, 170; powers of, xlviii, 
170 

president (Tajikistan), 270 
president (Turkmenistan), 354; powers 
of, 355 

president (Uzbekistan), 448, 463 
press {see also journalists; media; newspa- 
pers): censorship of, 81, 176, 276, 451; 
freedom of, 81; in Kazakstan, 81 
prices: for consumer goods, 432; con- 
trols on, 62, 146, 151, 162, 327, 432; 
for cotton, 332, 344, 431; for gold, 
431; in Kazakstan, 62-63; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 112, 146, 151; liberalized, 431, 
432, 434; under Russian Empire, 112; 
in Turkmenistan, 326, 327, 328, 332; 



in Uzbekistan, 431, 432, 434, 451 

Price Waterhouse, 61 

prime minister: of Kazakstan, 72; of Kyr- 
gyzstan, xlviii; of Tajikistan, 271 

prisons: conditions in, 82, 95, 372; cor- 
ruption in, 95, 372; in Kazakstan, 82, 
94, 95; in Kyrgyzstan, 192; political, 
235, 277, 288; population of, 95; prob- 
lems in, 372-73; secret, 288; in Tajiki- 
stan, 235, 277, 288; in Turkmenistan, 
372-73 

privatization (Kazakstan), xliii, 42, 77; of 
agriculture, 46, 60; of businesses, 58, 
59; effects of, 78; and employment, 57; 
of housing, 42, 58; impediments to, 
76; of land, 42, 46, 60; proceeds from, 
60; program, 58-60; vouchers, 58-60 

privatization (Kyrgyzstan), xlvii, xlviii, 
109; of agriculture, 150; goal of, 157- 
58; of land, 150-52; laws, 151-52 

privatization (Tajikistan), li; of agricul- 
ture, 259; of industry, 259; legalized, 
259-60; resistance to, 260; target for, li 

privatization (Turkmenistan), liv, 339- 
40; of agriculture, 330, 339; of busi- 
nesses, 339-40; of land, 339; laws, 339 

privatization (Uzbekistan), 432-34; of 
agriculture, 432, 433-34; of busi- 
nesses, 431, 432, 433; conditions for, 
432; goals of, 432; of health care facili- 
ties, 422; of housing, 431, 432-33; of 
industry, 432; of land, 431; pace of, lvii 

Privatization and Denationalization Law 
(1991) (Kyrgyzstan), 158 

Privatization Commission (Kazakstan), 
77 

Profsoyuz. See State Labor Union 

Progress of the Fatherland Party 
(Uzbekistan), 448,450 

Project Sapphire, xlv 

Promstroybank. See Industrial and Con- 
struction Bank 

Protestantism {see also under individual 
denominations): ethnic affiliations 
with, 30 

Provisional Government (Russia) , 21 2 

publishing houses, 276 

Pulatov, Abdumannob, 450 

Pulatov, Abdurakhim, 450 

purges: in Kazakstan, 17; reasons for, 
233; in Tajikistan, 216, 233; in Uzbeki- 
stan, 397, 399, 414, 415; of writers, 415 



554 



Index 



Qaraghandy coal field (Kazakstan), 44, 
55 

Qarakhanid state, 13, 208; conquests by, 

388; religion in, 13 
Qarluqs, 12-13 
Qarluq state: destroyed, 13 
Qarokul (Kara-Kul) (Lake), 223 
Qizilqum (Kyzyl Kum) Desert, liv, 21 , 

308, 401; expansion of, 309 
Qizilqum, Turkmenistan: natural gas 

deposits in, 334 
Qongrats, 392 

Qoqdumalaq, Uzbekistan: natural gas in, 
426; oil in, 426 

Qoroqalpoghiston Respublikasi, Uzbeki- 
stan. See Autonomous Republic of Kar- 
akalpakstan 

Quickstop markets, lix 

Quqon (Kokand): in Muslim state, 213 

Quqon, Uzbekistan: population, 406 

Quqon Khanate, 14, 209; Kyrgyz in, 111, 
136; Russian annexation, 210, 393- 
94; wars against, 111,112,210 

Qurghonteppa, Tajikistan: population 
in, 228 

Qurghonteppa Province, Tajikistan (see 
also Khatlon Province), 273; popula- 
tion density in, 226 



Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 282 

radio: access to, 71, 229; censorship of, 
267; government control of, 177; in 
Kazakstan, 71; in Kyrgyzstan, 168, 177; 
languages of broadcast, 71, 168, 236; 
in Tajikistan, 229, 236, 265, 266; in 
Uzbekistan, 443 

Radio Almaty (Kazakstan) , 71 

Radio Netherlands, 71 

Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 280 

Rahmonov, Imomali, xli, li; as president 
of Tajikistan, 269, 271 

Rahmonov government (Tajikistan): and 
civil war, Hi; criminals in, 286; econ- 
omy under, 260; powers of, xli; tele- 
communications under, 266 

railroads: xl, liv, 85, 348-49, 438-41, 443; 
construction of, 305, 347; in Kazak- 
stan, 69; Kyrgyzstan, 166-67; in Tajiki- 
stan, 265; in Turkmenistan, 305, 339, 
348; upgrades of, 349; in Uzbekistan, 
394, 438-41 



Rashidov, Sharaf, 398; corruption under, 
398, 399 

Rastokhez (Rebirth) front organization 

(Tajikistan), 267, 275 
Rasulov, Jabbor, 217 

referendum, national (Kazakstan): of 

1995, xliv, 72, 77, 78 
referendum, national (Kyrgyzstan): of 

1994, 169, 171; of 1996, xlviii 
referendum, national (Tajikistan): of 

1994, 271 

referendum, national (Turkmenistan): 
for independence, 307; of 1994, 355 

referendum, national (Uzbekistan): for 
independence (1991), 400; of 1995, 
be, 447 

reform: agricultural, xxxix, 153; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 153 

refugees: in Afghanistan, 232, 281; from 
Basmachi rebellion, 214; in Iran, 280; 
in Kyrgyzstan, xlix, 118, 127, 181; from 
Tajikistan, xlix, 118, 127, 181, 232, 
280, 281; in Tajikistan, 235 

Regar (Tursunzoda) , Tajikistan: alumi- 
num plant at, 1, 224, 229, 253-54; 
growth of, 229 

religion (see also under individual sects): 
controls on, 31, 321; distribution in 
population, 30; in Kazakstan, 19, 30- 
31, 33; in Kyrgyzstan, 117, 135-38; and 
politics, xxxvi; in Tajikistan, 237-41; 
tolerance of, 240; traditional, 33, 136- 
37; in Turkmenistan, 319-21; in 
Uzbekistan, 415-18 

Republican Party (Kazakstan) , 78, 79 

Republican People's Party (Kyrgyzstan), 
174 

Republic National Guard (Kazakstan), 
89 

Respublika (newspaper), 81-82, 176 

Respublika (political group) (Kazak- 
stan), 36, 79; organized, 76 

rice: in Kazakstan, 46 

rivers: in Kazakstan, 21; in Kyrgyzstan, 
119; in Tajikistan, 220-23; in Turk- 
menistan, 308-9; in Uzbekistan, 401 

roads: construction of, 69, 112, 362; 
infrastructure of, 69; in Kazakstan, 66- 
69, 85; in Kyrgyzstan, 112, 166, 181; 
maintenance of, 69; Soviet legacy, 438; 
in Tajikistan, 265; in Turkmenistan, 
348, 349-50, 362; upgrades of, 349; in 



555 



Country Studies 



Uzbekistan, 438, 441-43 

Roghun Hydroelectric Plant (Tajiki- 
stan): construction of, 255, 262; pro- 
tests against, 225, 255 

Romania: relations with, 361 

Rosvooruzheniye. See Russian Arms 
Company 

ruble zone, xxxix; collapse of, 165; mem- 
bership in, 260, 263-64; withdrawals 
from, 161, 260,434, 454, 455 

rural areas: health care in, 324; Kyrgyz 
in, 128; of Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 128, 152; 
living standards in, 229, 326, 327; pop- 
ulation in, xlvi, 152, 225, 228, 229, 
406; under Russian rule, 21 1; in Tajiki- 
stan, 205, 211, 225, 228, 229-30; tele- 
phones in, 444; of Turkmenistan, 324, 
326; in Uzbekistan, 406, 444 

Russia {see also Commonwealth of Inde- 
pendent States; Russian Empire; 
Soviet Union): border patrols of, 282; 
broadcasts from, 177, 266; in Caspian 
Border Patrol, 364; in Caspian States 
Cooperation Organization, 347; in 
caviar cartel, 364; commercial confed- 
eration with Kazakstan and Kyr- 
gyzstan, xlv; commercial treaties with 
Uzbekistan, lx-lxi; in customs union, 
xl, xlvii; dependence on, 182; eco- 
nomic ties with, xl, lvi, 12, 110, 182- 
83, 263-64, 346, 359, 363, 456; ethnic 
groups in, 24, 317; influence of, xlvii, 
12, 80, 81, 206, 395; intelligence coop- 
eration with, 371; invaded by Timur, 
389; military assistance from, 187, 284, 
286, 359, 463; military cooperation 
with, 93, 364-65, 366-68; military pro- 
tection by, xxxi, xlix, 12, 93, 186, 278, 
283-85, 286, 363, 365, 461; military 
training in, 188, 366, 367, 371, 465; 
opposition to NATO, xlix; peacekeep- 
ing forces of, Hi; pipeline through, 
xliii, xliv, 350, 425; Provisional Govern- 
ment of, 212; relations with, xlv, liii, 
lvi, lx, lxi, 12, 86, 182-83, 282, 359, 
453, 455-56; security cooperation 
with, 94, 456; in Tashkent Agreement, 
115; in Tajikistan peace talks, 270; 
trade with, xxxix, xliii, liv, 48, 55, 56, 
65, 110, 160-61, 163, 164, 263, 342, 
343; transportation to, xl; universities 
in, 37 



Russian Arms Company (Ros- 
vooruzheniye) , 369 

Russian Civil War, 213-14; in Tajikistan, 
229 

Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), 
212, 214 

Russian Empire (see also Russia): expan- 
sion of, xxxii, 12; Kazaks under, 129- 
30; Kyrgyz relations with, 111; Kyrgyz 
under, 112, 129-30; occupation by, 
xxxii, 14-15, 112, 209-10, 392-94; 
repression by, 395-96; resistance to, 
14-15, 112, 210, 211-12, 305, 306, 
394; tribes under, 12, 14; Turkmen 
under, 305; Uzbekistan under, xxxii, 
112, 392-94, 395, 396 

Russian Federal Border Service, 285 

Russian language: broadcasts in, 71, 236, 
266; influences of, 411, 413; in Kazak- 
stan, xlii, 17, 32; in Kyrgyzstan, 117; as 
language of instruction, 33, 36, 141, 
244-45, 314; and national identity, 32; 
as official language, 32, 33, 72, 130, 
183, 414; publications in, 177, 276, 
451; in Tajikistan, liii, 205, 235; teach- 
ing of, 17, 322, 323, 413-14, 420; in 
Turkmenistan, 314, 317, 319; in 
Uzbekistan, 398, 414 

Russian Natural Gas Company (Gaz- 
prom) , 55 

Russian Orthodox Church, 30, 136, 238, 
241, 415 

Russian people: citizenship of, 33, 80, 
278, 455; emigration by, xlvi, 1, liii — liv, 
lxi, 26, 91, 118, 127, 154, 183, 184, 
185, 232, 312, 369, 408, 409; ethnic 
conflicts with, 27, 410; geographic dis- 
tribution of, 27, 235, 409; in govern- 
ment, 74, 278; immigration of, 128; in 
Kazakstan, xlii, xlv, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 
26, 27-28, 38, 57, 74; in Kyrgyzstan, 
xlvi, 112, 118, 126, 183; land appropri- 
ated by, xxxv, liv, 14-15, 112; lan- 
guages of, 32; as majority, 27; as 
merchants, 392; as military officers, 
89, 184, 185, 187, 369, 370, 462, 463; 
as minority, xxxv, xlvi, 1, liii, lxi; nation- 
alism of, 19; in parliament, xlv, 19; reli- 
gion of, 30, 136; rights of, 80, 83; roles 
of, 27-28; as slaves, 392; in Tajikistan, 
1, liii, liv, 234, 235, 247, 273, 278; as 
technocrats, xl, xlvi, 1, lxi, 11, 26, 57, 



556 



Index 



91, 118, 154, 183, 233, 234-35, 247, 
257, 359, 430-31; in Turkestan, 212; in 
Turkmenistan, 306, 311; in Uzbeki- 
stan, Ixi, 391-92, 395, 397, 408, 409, 
455 

Russification: of Kazakstan, 35; of Turk- 
menistan, 306; of Uzbekistan, 397, 398 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), 395 
Rustambekov, Janysh, 174 



Saadanbekov, Jumagul, 173 
Safarov, Yaqub, 289 
Safavid Dynasty, 390 
Salikh, Mohammed, 447, 450 
Salimov, Yaqub, 289 

salinization: of Aral Sea, 46, 402; of land, 

124, 224, 309-10, 427 
Salor confederation, 304 
Samanid Dynasty (875-999), 208-9; 

overthrown, 208; Turkic soldiers in, 

387-88 
Samarkand. See Samarqand 
Samarqand (Samarkand), Uzbekistan, 

xxxii, lvii, 207, 386; decline of, 391; 

golden age of, 389; industry in, 430; 

population in, 406; Russian conquest 

of, 393 

Samarqand University (Uzbekistan), 420 
Samoyed tribes, 1 29 
Samsung: in Kazakstan, xliii 
Sanjar, Sultan, 303 

Sarybagysh warrior clan (Kyrgyzstan) , 
132 

Sary Yazy Reservoir (Turkmenistan) , 331 

Sassanian Empire, 208 

Saudi Arabia: economic relations with 
Tajikistan, 260; financial aid to Kazak- 
stan, 30, 86; relations with Turkmeni- 
stan, 360; trade agreements with 
Uzbekistan, 457 

Savings Bank (Sberbank) (Uzbekistan), 
435 

Sberbank. See Savings Bank 
Sberbank (Turkmenistan), 340 
scandals: in Kyrgyzstan, 169, 176, 177 
schools (Kazakstan): elementary, 36, 37; 

enrollment in, 36, 37; language of 

instruction in, 33, 36; number of, 36; 

religious, 30; secondary, 36, 37 
schools (Kyrgyzstan): under Russia, 112; 

schedules for, 140; shifts in, 140; voca- 



tional, 140 

schools (Tajikistan): enrollment in, 244; 
physical plants of, 245; preschools, 
230-31; primary, 244; public, 215, 244; 
secondary, 244; shifts in, 245; voca- 
tional, 245-46 

schools (Turkmenistan): enrollment in, 
322; Islamic curriculum in, 320; num- 
ber of, 322; physical plants of, 323; 
public, 320; religious, 320 

schools (Uzbekistan): construction of, 
419; enrollment in, 419; nutrition in, 
419; physical plant, 419; preschools, 
418-19; regular, 419; shifts in, 419; 
shortage of, 419; technical, 421; voca- 
tional, 419 

Scythians, 110-11 

Seabeco-Kyrgyzstan, 177 

security threats: Afghanistan as, 360, 362; 
China as, 458; Tajikistan as, 360; 
Uzbekistan as, 180 

Seidov, Saparmurad, 371 

Seljuk, 302 

Seljuk Empire, 302; destruction of, 303, 
388; extent of, 303 

Seljuk Turks, 13, 209, 302, 388 

Semey, Kazakstan {see also Semipala- 
tinsk): industry in, 47; pollution in, 41 

Semipalatinsk, Kazakstan {see also 
Semey) , xlv 

Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Prov- 
ing Grounds (Kazakstan), 92 

Senate (Kazakstan), xlv; elections for, 
73-74; members of, 73 

services sector: employment in, 57, 256, 
326; in Kazakstan, 57 

settlement, forced: of nomads, 14; of 
Uzbeks, 216 

Seventh-Day Adventists, 241 

Shakhanov, Mukhtar, 35 

shantytowns: in Kyrgyzstan, 128 

Shatlik, Turkmenistan: natural gas 
deposits in, 334 

Shaybanid Dynasty, 390 

Shaykenov, Nagashibay, 74 

Sherymkulov, Medetkan, 172 

Shishlyannikov, Aleksandr, 278, 284 

Shokhin, Aleksandr, 363 

Shughnon-Rushon (principality), 210 

Shunevich, Vladislav, 367-68 

Shygys Qazaqstan (East Kazakstan) Prov- 
ince, Kazakstan: death rate in, 26 



557 



Country Studies 



Siberia: border with, xlii 
Silk Revolution, 115 

Silk Route, xxxii, lvii, 207, 386; circum- 
vention of, 390 
silk trade, 386 

Singapore: Akayev's visit to, 179 
Skobelev, Mikhail, 305 
slaves: Russian, 392 
Slavic University (Bishkek), 141 
Slovakia: relations with Turkmenistan, 
361 

Slovo Kyrgyzstana (newspaper) , 177 
S.M. Kirov State University (Kazakstan). 

•SeeAl-Farabi University 
smoking: in Kazakstan, 41 
SNEK See People's Unity Party 
Social Democrats of Kyrgyzstan, 174 
Social-Ecological Alliance, 224-25 
Social Insurance Fund (Kyrgyzstan), 146, 

147 

Socialist Democratic Party (Kazakstan) , 
78 

Socialist Party (Kazakstan), 78 

social security (see also social welfare): in 
Kyrgyzstan, xlviii-xlix, 145-47; reorga- 
nization of, xlviii-xlix; in Uzbekistan, 
lvii 

social structure: of Kyrgyzstan , 132-35; 
of Turkmenistan, 312-18 

social welfare (see also social security): eli- 
gibility for, 145-47; in Kazakstan, 28, 
42-44; in Kyrgyzstan, 145-47; pen- 
sions, 42, 328; privatization of, 42; 
reform of, 145-47; Soviet legacy in, 
145, 146; spending on, 146; in Turk- 
menistan, 326-29, 342 

Society for Nature Conservation (Turk- 
menistan), 309 

Soghdiana, 207, 386; relations with 
China, 207 

Soghdian people, 206; religion of, 207 

Solehboyev, Alimjon, 286 

Soltanov, Annamurat, 367 

Soltustik Qazaqstan (North Kazakstan) 
Province, Kazakstan: death rate in, 26 

Songkol (lake), 120 

South Africa: relations with Kyrgyzstan, 
179 

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of 
Sovety Kazakstana (newspaper) , 81 
Soviet Buhkoran People's Republic, 396 
Soviet republics: established, 213, 396 



Soviet State Bank (Gosbank) (Tajiki- 
stan), 260 

Soviet State Bank (Gosbank) (Turkmeni- 
stan), 340 

Soviet Union (see also Commonwealth of 
Independent States; Russia): agricul- 
ture under, xxxv, 11, 215; armed 
forces of, 283, 462; arts under, 242, 
243; control by, xxxii-xxxv, 112; dis- 
solved, 20, 250; economy of, 148-49, 
250; education under, I; energy under, 
254-55; industry under, xlii, 1, 11; 
influence of, xxxii, xl, 1, 212, 411, 413- 
14; infrastructure under, 1; Kazakstan 
under, 11, 15-18, 19; Kyrgyzstan 
under, 112; mining under, 11; nation- 
alities policy of, 236-37; religion 
under, 237-39, 240, 320, 416; resis- 
tance to, xxxv, 15, 18-19, 236, 244, 
267, 398; support for, 19; Tajikistan 
under, 205, 212, 215, 230, 244; trade 
with, 64; tribes under, 12; Turkmeni- 
stan under, 305-6; Uzbekistan under, 
396-98, 411, 413-14; women in, 230 

Soyunov, Nazar, 354 

Stalin, Joseph V., 109; forced collectiviza- 
tion under, 15, 235, 397; Uzbekistan 
under, 397 

Stalinabad. See Dushanbe 

Stan Cornelius Enterprises (United 
States), 437 

START. See Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty 

State Arbitrage Court (Kazakstan), 74 
State Arbitration Court (Kyrgyzstan), 
173 

State Association for Contracts and 
Trade (Uzbekistan), 432 

State Bank for Development (Kazak- 
stan), 61 

State Banking Law (1993) (Turkmeni- 
stan), 340 

State Civil Aviation Agency (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 165 

State Committee for Defense Affairs 
(Kyrgyzstan), 184 

State Committee for Forecasting and Sta- 
tistics (Uzbekistan), 432 

State Committee for Geology and Min- 
eral Resources (Uzbekistan), 437 

State Committee for National Security 
(Kyrgyzstan), 186, 188; privacy viol a- 



558 



Index 



tions by, 191 
State Committee for Television and 
Radio Broadcasting (Turkmenistan) , 
351-52 

State Committee on Environmental Pro- 
tection (Goskompriroda) (Kyr- 
gyzstan), 125 

State Committee on Land Reform 
(Turkmenistan), 339 

State Committee on Land Relations and 
Tenure (Kazakstan), 60 

State Corporation for Specialist Training 
(Turkmenistan), 338 

state enterprises: employment in, 57, 
148, 256, 329, 336; in Kazakstan, xliii, 
57; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvii, xlviii; privatiza- 
tion of, 260, 434; in Tajikistan, 260; in 
Turkmenistan, liv, lv, 329; in Uzbeki- 
stan, 432, 434; work force in, xliii, lv 

State Export and Import Bank (Kazak- 
stan), 61 

state farms. See farms, state 

State Geological Commission (Goskom- 
geologiya) (Kyrgyzstan), 156 

State Labor Union (Profsoyuz) (Kazak- 
stan), 78 

state of emergency: in Kazakstan, 73; in 

Tajikistan, 267 
State Pedagogical Institute (Tajikistan), 

246 

State Property Fund (Kyrgyzstan), 158 
State Railway Administration (Turkmeni- 
stan), 348 

State Television and Radio Broadcasting 
Corporation (Kazakstan), 82 

State Television and Radio Broadcasting 
Company (Tajikistan), 266 

Steppe District, 14 

Stolypin, Petr, 15 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START), 83; Lisbon Protocol of, 83 

strikes: in coal industry, 55, 63; in health 
care, 38; in Kazakstan, 38, 55, 63 

students: demonstrations by, 267; for- 
eign study by, 37 

Subanov, Myrzakan, 186 

subsidies: for food, li, 328, 338; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 146; in Tajikistan, li; in Turk- 
menistan, liv, 328, 338; in Uzbekistan, 
lvii, 434 

Suleymenov, Olzhas, 23, 29-30, 35; polit- 
ical activities of, 35-36, 78, 82 



Sundukly Desert, 308 

Supreme Assembly (Tajikistan), 271 

Supreme Court (Kazakstan), 74, 94; 

appointments to, xliv 
Supreme Court (Kyrgyzstan), 170, 173, 

191; conflicts over, 191 
Supreme Court (Tajikistan), 272 
Supreme Court (Turkmenistan), 354, 

356, 372 

Supreme Court (Uzbekistan), 449 
Supreme Defense Committee, 365 
Supreme Economic Court (Tajikistan), 
272 

Supreme Economic Court (Turkmeni- 
stan) , 372 

Supreme Kenges (Supreme Soviet, 
Kazakstan): under constitution, 72; 
elections to, 72 

Supreme Law (Turkmenistan), 356, 372 

Supreme Soviet (Kazakstan). See 
Supreme Kenges 

Supreme Soviet (Tajikistan), 271-72 

Supreme Soviet (Uzbekistan), ^parlia- 
ment (Uzbekistan) 

Surgut Conference (1994), 363 

Surkhob River, 220 

Svobodnye gory (newspaper), 176 

Switzerland: Akayev's visit to, 179; assis- 
tance from, 125; trade with, 65 

Sydykov, Sheraly, 173 

Syrdariya Hydroelectric Power Station 
(Uzbekistan), 426, 431 

Syrdariya Province, Uzbekistan: saliniza- 
tion in, 427 

Syrdariya (river), 119, 220, 401; demands 
on, 22, 224, 402; transportation on, 70 

TadzhikfiTm (film studio) (Tajikistan), 
243 

Tagibat Party (Kazakstan) , 24 

Taiwan. See China, Republic of 

Tajik: etymology of, 206 

Tajik Air, 266 

Tajikbankbusiness, 260 

Tajikistan International Airlines, 266 

Tajikistan Polytechnic Institute, 246 

Tajikistan State University, 246; enroll- 
ment in, 246; faculty of, 246 

Tajikistan Television Administration, 266 

Tajik language, 205, 233, 235; alphabet 
of, 233, 237, 363; basis of, 1; broadcasts 



559 



Country Studies 



in, 266; as language of instruction, 
244-45; as official language, 232; pub- 
lications in, 215, 276 
Tajik literature, 242 

Tajik people: ancestors of, xxxvi, 205, 
206; ethnic conflicts of, 236, 410; eth- 
nicity of, 1, 207, 233; geographic distri- 
bution of, 127, 228-29, 234, 235, 409; 
as minority, 235, 279, 420; nationalism 
of, 232; percentage in population, 
xxxv, 234, 235; religion of, xxxvi, 208; 
in Uzbekistan, 237, 420 

Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic: created, 
397 

Tajiran, 262 

Talas River, battle of (A.D. 750) , 387 
Talas Valley (Kyrgyzstan) : agriculture in, 

150; population distribution in, 127 
Taldy-Kurgan, Kazakstan. See Taldy- 

qorghan 

Taldyqorghan (Taldy-Kurgan), Kazak- 
stan: universities in, 37 

Tamerlane. SeeT\m\iT 

tariffs: on imports, 431; in Turkmeni- 
stan, 344-45; in Uzbekistan, 431 

Tashkent, Uzbekistan: air pollution in, 
404-5; industry in, lix, 430; popula- 
tion in, 406; Russian capture of, 210, 
393-94; Russification of, 397; super- 
markets in, lix 

Tashkent Agreement, 462; signed, 115 

Tashkent Province, Uzbekistan: popula- 
tion in, 408 

Tashkent State University (Uzbekistan), 
420 

Tatar languages, 236; broadcasts in, 266 
Tatars: in Kazakstan, 27; in Tajikistan, 

235; in Uzbekistan, 409 
Tatars, Crimean: deported to Kazakstan, 
15; migration of, 410; in Tajikistan, 
234; in Uzbekistan, 397, 410 
Tatars, Volga: in Tajikistan, 234 
taxes: on exports, 164; in Kazakstan, 62; 
in Kyrgyzstan, xlviii, 112, 164; modern- 
ization of, lv-lvi, 431-32; reform of, 
62; in Turkmenistan, lv-lvi, 342; in 
Uzbekistan, lix, 431-32, 436, 437, 438 
teachers: attrition of, 37, 140; in Kazak- 
stan, 37; in Kyrgyzstan, 140; number 
of, 140, 230, 322; problems facing, 
322-23; ratio of pupils to, 140, 421; 
salaries of, 37, 421; in Tajikistan, 230; 



training of, 421; in Turkmenistan, 
322; in Uzbekistan, 421 

technocrats: emigration of, 1, Ixi, 26, 91, 
118, 154, 233, 247, 257, 259; Germans 
as, 1, 259; in Kazakstan, 11, 26, 57; in 
Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 118, 154; Russians as, 
xl.xlvi, 1, lxi, 11, 57, 91, 118, 154, 183, 
234-35, 247, 257, 259; shortages of, 
26, 257; in Tajikistan, 1, 233, 247; in 
Turkmenistan, 353; in Uzbekistan, lxi 

Tejen River, 309 

Teke tribes: geographic distribution of, 
304; political power in Turkmenistan, 
353, 354, 355 

telecommunications: development of, 
66; employment in, 57, 148, 230, 336; 
infrastructure, 205, 444, 445; invest- 
ment in, 165, 443; in Kazakstan, 57, 
66, 70-71; in Kyrgyzstan, 165, 167-68; 
Soviet legacy, 167, 438, 443; in Tajiki- 
stan, li, 205, 230, 264-65, 266-67; in 
Turkmenistan, liv, 336, 339, 348, 351- 
52, in Uzbekistan, 438, 443-45 

telephone system: access to, 71, 229; 
breakdowns, 71; cable thefts, 167, 189; 
installation of, 444; international, 71; 
investment in, 167; in Kazakstan, 71; 
in Kyrgyzstan, 167-68, 189; modern- 
ized, li; in Tajikistan, 229, 266-67; in 
Turkmenistan, 352, 363; in Uzbeki- 
stan, 444-45; waiting lists for, 444 

television: access to, 71, 82, 229; censor- 
ship of, 267; government control of, 
177; in Kazakstan, 71, 82; in Kyr- 
gyzstan, 168, 177; languages of broad- 
cast, 71, 168; programming, 177, 280, 
362, 444; in Tajikistan, 229, 265, 266, 
280; in Turkmenistan, 351-52; in 
Uzbekistan, 443, 444 

Tengizchevroil (joint venture), 51,52, 64 

Tengiz oil fields (Kazakstan): invest- 
ment in, xliii, 19, 51, 52, 64 

Ten Years of Prosperity (Turkmenistan) , 
328, 338, 346 

Tereshchenko, Sergey, 76 

Tereshchenko government (Kazakstan), 
76 

Terjuman (Translator) (newspaper) , 413 
textiles: export of, 261, 436; import of, 
343; investment in, 437; in Kyrgyzstan, 
155; in Tajikistan, 253, 261, 263; in 
Turkmenistan, 335, 343; in Uzbeki- 



560 



Index 



stan, 430, 437 
theaters: in Tajikistan, 243 
Tian Shan mountain range, 21, 119, 219, 

401 

Tibet: trade with, 110 

Timur (Tamerlane), 209; invasions by, 
389; rule by, 389-90 

Timurids, 209 

Tobol (Tobyl) River, 21 

Tobyl River. See Tobol River 

Tojikistoni Shuravi (newspaper) , 276 

Tojikistoni Soveti (newspaper) , 276 

Tokharian state, 386 

Toktogol Reservoir (Kyrgyzstan), 156; 
created, 124 

topography: elevations, 21, 119, 219, 
307; of Kazakstan, xxxi, 21; of Kyr- 
gyzstan, xxxi, 119-20; of Tajikistan, 
xxxi, 219-23; of Turkmenistan, xxxi, 
307; of Uzbekistan, 401-2 

Torghay coal field (Kazakstan), 44, 55 

tourism: in Kyrgyzstan, 192; in Tajikistan, 
262; in Uzbekistan, 437 

trade (see also exports; imports), xxxix; 
with Argentina, 345; with Armenia, lv; 
with Asia, 344; attempts to open, 436- 
37; with Azerbaijan, 343, 345; barter, 
lv, 65, 156, 163, 164, 181, 262, 263, 
264, 345, 363, 369, 436; bilateral 
agreements for, 436; with China, xlix, 
84, 163, 181, 182, 385, 386, 345; with 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States, 65, 263; credits, 64; decline in, 
164; deficit, 65, 155, 164, 264, 343, 
435-36; diversification of, 65, 437; 
employment in, 57; with former Soviet 
republics, 342; with Georgia, 343, 345; 
with Germany, 342; with Iran, 345; 
with Italy, 345; by Kazakstan, xliii, 48, 
64-65, 84-85, 163, 164, 342, 343, 363; 
by Kyrgyzstan, xxxix, xlvii, xlix, 65, 
110, 155, 160, 163-65, 456; with Mex- 
ico, 344; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 164; as percentage of net 
material product, 343; reform, 436- 
37; routes, xl, 385; with Russia, xxxii, 
xxxix, xliii, liv, 48, 65, 110, 163, 342, 
392; with Soviet Union, 436; by Tajiki- 
stan, xxxix, 1, 255-56, 259, 261, 262, 
263, 343; tariff agreements in, 344-45; 
total, 163-64; with Turkey, liv, lv, 345; 
by Turkmenistan, xxxix, liv, lv, 255-56, 



259, 301, 330, 342-48, 359, 363; with 
Ukraine, lv, 343; with United States, 
262; by Uzbekistan, xxxix, lviii, lix, lx- 
lxi, 65, 163, 164, 264, 342, 343, 385, 
392, 436-37, 442-43 

Transcaspian Depression, 307 

Trans-Caspian District, 305, 306 

Transcaspian Railroad, 441 

Transoxania, 13 

transportation (Kazakstan), xliv, 66-70; 
air, 70; airports, xlix, 70; construction, 
86; development of, 66; employment 
in, 57, 148, 256; freight, 66; infrastruc- 
ture, 69; passenger, 66; public, 66; rail- 
roads, 66, 69; roads, 66-69; by water, 
70 

transportation (Kyrgyzstan), 109, 165- 
67, 181; air, 167; freight, 166, 167; 
infrastructure, 165-66; international 
integration of, 165; passenger, 166, 
167; public, 166; railroad, 166-67; 
roads, 166 

transportation (Tajikistan), 264-66; air, 
266; barriers to, 264-65; decline in, 
259; employment in, 230; infrastruc- 
ture, 205; international partnerships 
in, 262; railroads, 265; roads, 265 

transportation (Turkmenistan), 348-51; 
and agriculture, 330; air, 348; employ- 
ment in, 326, 336; infrastructure, 348, 
359; railroads, xl, liv, 348; roads, 348, 
362; state control of, liv; waterways, 
348 

transportation (Uzbekistan), 438-43; air, 
442; for exports, 442-43; freight, 438- 
41, 442, 443; infrastructure, 442; pas- 
senger, 438, 441, 442; policy, 442-43; 
privatization in, 434; railroads, 438- 
41, 443; roads, 438, 441-42, 443; 
Soviet legacy in, 438 
Transportes Aereos Portugueses, 266 
Treaty on Joint Measures (1992), 366 
tribes (see also clans): geographic distri- 
bution of, 304; holy (dvlat), 319-20; 
identification with, 313, 314-15; in 
Kazakstan, 12-13; in Kyrgyzstan, 110; 
migrations of, 304; nomadic, 12, 110; 
in politics, 353-54; religions of, 136- 
37; under Russian Empire, 12; under 
Soviet system, 12; in Turkmenistan, liv, 
304, 313,314, 353-54 
Turajonzoda, Hajji Akbar, 240-41, 268; 



561 



Country Studies 



exiled, 241, 269 
Turkestan, Guberniya of: created, 14; 

Kazakstan in, 14; districts of, 210; 

schools in, 211; Russian rule of, 395; 

Russians in, 212; as Soviet republic, 

213; Tajikistan in, 265 
Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist 

Republic. 306 
Turkestan Committee, 212 
Turkestan Military District, 283 
Turkestan Mountains, 219-20; elevation 

of. 219-20 

Turkey: Akayev's visit to, 179; antinarcot- 
ics agreements with, 97, 466; broad- 
casts from, 266, 362; communications 
relavfrom, 445; credits from, 345, 456; 
economic relations with, 346; finan- 
cial aid from, 30; foreign students in, 
456; investment from, li, 362; joint 
ventures with, xlvii, 346; military train- 
ing in, 188; pipeline to, 52, 347, 350, 
360; relations with. lxi. 84. 86. 277, 
362. 456; Salor tribes in, 304; trade 
with. liv. lv, 345, 443 

Turkic Kaganate, 12 

Turkic people (see also Turks): influences 
of. 209; influx of, 208-9, 387-88; mar- 
riage with Persians. 209 

Turkic tribes: influences of, 206; in 
Kazakstan. 12 

Turkification: of Mawarannahr, 387-88, 
389 

Turkish Development and Cooperation 
Agency. 362 

Turkish language, 390 

Turkmen, etvmologv of, 303 

Turkmenbashv. Turkmenistan: oil refin- 
ery, 362; population of, 312; port of, 
351 

Turkmengaz. See Turkmenistan Natural 
Gas Company 

Turkmenistan Air Lines, 351 

Turkmenistan Carpet Production Associ- 
ation, 335 

Turkmenistan Civil Aviation, 351 

Turkmenistan International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 
340 

Turkmenistan Natural Gas Company 

(Turkmengaz), 334 
Turkmenistan State University-, 323, 371 
Turkmen language: alphabet of, 318, 



322, 363; number of speakers of, 317; 
as official language, 313, 318, 323; spo- 
ken, 317-18; teaching of, 322, 323; 
written, 318 

Turkmen nation, 303-5 

Turkmen Oblast, 306 

Turkmen people: families of, 316-17; 
geographic distribution of, 234, 303- 
4, 311, 317-18; history of, liv; kinship 
structure of, 314-16; land of, xxxv; lan- 
guage of, 302; migration of, 303, 304; 
military activities of, 315; military sup- 
port by, 304; as minority, xxxv; 
national consciousness of, 312-13; ori- 
gins of, 302; political organization of, 
315; in rebellion of 1916, 112; religion 
of, xxxvi, 302; separation from Oghuz, 
302-3; social organization of, 313-17; 
in Tajikistan, 234; tribes of, 304; in 
Turkmenistan, 311, 313-17 

Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, 306 

Turks {see also Turkic people): conquests 
by, xxxii; Meskhetian, 399, 410; 
Oghuz, 12-13, 301; Qarakhanid, 208; 
Seljuk, 13, 209, 388 

Turon Depression, 307 

Tursunzoda, Tajikistan. S^Regar 

Tursunzoda, Mirzo, 242 

201st Motorized Rifle Division, 278, 284; 
materiel of, 284 



Uchkorgon Hydroelectric Plant (Kyr- 
gyzstan) , 156 

Ukraine: economic relations with 
Uzbekistan, 456; in Lisbon Protocol, 
83; pipeline through, 350; relations 
with Turkmenistan, 360; security 
cooperation with Kazakstan, 94; as 
Soviet republic, 213; in Tashkent 
Agreement, 115; trade with, lv, 65, 
456; universities in, 37 

L'krainian people: in Kazakstan, 27; in 
Kyrgvzstan, 112; as minority, xxxv; in 
Tajikistan, 234, 247 

Uljabayev, Tursunbai, 217 

Ulugh Beg, 390 

Umayyad Caliphate, 387 

underemployment: in Kazakstan, 57; in 
Tajikistan, 230, 256; in Uzbekistan, 
430 

unemployment, xxxii; age distribution 



562 



Index 



in, 257; benefits, xlix, 43, 147; extent 
of, 43; growth of, 155; in Kazakstan, 
43-44, 57; in Kyrgyzstan, xlviii, xlix, 
109, 147, 155; prevention of, xlviii; 
stigma of, 43; in Tajikistan, 250, 256; 
in Uzbekistan, 430 

Unified Economic Space, 454 

Union of Germans (Kyrgyzstan), 175 

Union Treaty (1991), 20 

United Nations: development support 
from, xli, 124; Kazakstan in, 83; Kyr- 
gyzstan in, 179; observer missions, 
270; peace talks arranged by, Hi, 270, 
283; Tajikistan in, 283; Turkmenistan 
in, 359; Uzbekistan in, 458 

United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988), 467 

United Nations Drug Control Program, 
288, 466 

United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
166 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 281 

United Nations Observer Mission in 
Tajikistan (UNOMT) , lii 

United States: aid from, lxi, 262, 459; 
Akayev's visit to, 179; credits from, 
262, 345; Civil War, 392; economic 
relations with Tajikistan, 260, 262-63; 
foreign students in, 37; investment 
from, li, lviii, 63, 262, 460; joint ven- 
tures with Turkmenistan, 346; rela- 
tions with, 115, 277, 282, 361, 459-60; 
in Tajikistan peace talks, 270; televi- 
sion programs from, 444 

United States Department of Agricul- 
ture, 345 

United States Department of Justice, 467 
United States Department of State, 452 
United States Environmental Protection 

Agency: aid from, 24 
United States Export-Import Bank, 345 
United States Overseas Private Invest- 
ment Corporation, lviii, 262 
United Tajikistan Opposition, lii-liii 
Unity Party. See Birlik Party 
Unity (Agzybirlik) Party (Turkmeni- 
stan), 358 

universities {see also education, higher): 
enrollment in, 36, 37, 246, 323, 419- 



20; ethnic distribution in, 37-38; fac- 
ulty in, 141, 246; funding for, 141; 
graduation from, 244, 321; in Kazak- 
stan, 36, 37; in Kyrgyzstan, 140, 141; 
languages of instruction in, 141; pri- 
vate, 141; programs in, 37; in Russia, 
37; in Tajikistan, 244, 246; in Ukraine, 
37; in Uzbekistan, 419-20 

UNMOT See United Nations Observer 
Mission in Tajikistan 

Ural Mountains, 21 

Ural'sk. See Oral 

uranium: in Kazakstan, 84; in Kyrgyzstan, 
149, 192; in Tajikistan, 1, 254; in 
Uzbekistan, 425, 430 

urban areas: growth of, 229; health care 
in, 324; Kyrgyz in, 128; in Kyrgyzstan, 
123, 128; living standards in, 326, 327; 
migration from, 228; percentage of 
population in, 228, 406; in Tajikistan, 
205, 228-29; telephones in, 444; in 
Turkmenistan, 312, 324, 326; in 
Uzbekistan, 406, 444; water consump- 
tion in, 123 

urbanization: of Kyrgyzstan, 126; of 
Tajikistan, 225, 228-29 

Urganch (Urgench): decline of, 391 

Urgench. See Urganch 

Uroteppa, Tajikistan, 210; population in, 
228 

Uniimqi, China: transportation links to, 
85 

Ustirt Plateau, 308 

Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakstan. See Oske- 
men 

Usubaliyev, T. , 1 74 

utilities: free, 338, 342; in Tajikistan, 338, 

342; in Uzbekistan, 434 
Uygur Khanate, 111 

Uygur people, 181-82; autonomous dis- 
trict for, 175, 182; in China, 126; in 
Kazakstan, 27; in Kyrgyzstan, 126, 175, 
181-82 

Uygurstan, 126 

Uzbekistan Airways, 442, 443 

Uzbekistan International Bank, 435 

Uzbekistan Movement, 450 

Uzbekistan State Oil Company 
(Uzbekneft),437 

Uzbekistan Telecommunications Admin- 
istration (Uzbektelecom), 443-44 

Uzbekistan Telegraph Agency, 451 



563 



Country Studies 



Uzbekiston Adabiyoti va San 1 ati (Uzbeki- 
stan Literature and Art) (newspaper), 
451 

Uzbek khanates, 13, 301, 390-91; raids 
of, 391; weaknesses of, 390 

Uzbek language: alphabet of, 363, 411, 
413; background, 412-13; broadcasts 
in, 266; dialects of, 412; influences on, 
411, 412, 413-14; as language of 
instruction, 323, 420; as official lan- 
guage, 399, 411, 412, 414; publications 
in, 276; purification of, 414, 415 

Uzbekneft. See Uzbekistan State Oil 
Company 

Uzbek people: in armed forces, lx; eth- 
nic conflict by, 236, 399, 410; ethnicity 
of, 1, 207, 233, 410; expansion by, 111, 
209, 390; geographic distribution of, 
127, 235; in Kazakstan, xlii, 27, 453; 
khanates of, xxxii; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 
xlix, 113, 126, 453; as minority, xxxv, 
xlvi, xlix, lvi, lix, 113, 453, 461; nation- 
alism of, 409; in rebellion of 1916, 
112; religion of, xxxvi; in Tajikistan, 
234, 235, 453; in Turkmenistan, lvi, 
311; in Uzbekistan, 409 

Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (Uzbek 
SSR), 397; created, 397 

Uzbektelecom. See Uzbekistan Telecom- 
munications Administration 



Vakhsh River, 220 

Vakhsh River Valley (Tajikistan): 
dammed, 253, 255; industrial develop- 
ment in, 252-53 
Vasilevskoye gold mine (Kazakstan), xliii 
Vecherniy Bishkek (newspaper) 177 
Virgin Lands campaign, 16, 45-46, 217; 

environmental impact of, 23 
Vivtex (United States), 347 
Vneshekonombank (Turkmenistan), 
340 

Voice of Russia, 71 

wages: in agriculture, 63, 327, 337; in 
education, 63; in health care, 38, 63; 
in industry, 63, 337; in Kazakstan, xliii, 
38, 42, 62-63; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvii, 162; 
minimum, 42, 328, 337, 342; maxi- 
mum, 258; monthly, 62-63, 162, 424; 



nonpayment of, xliii, xlvii, 63, 95, 258; 
of peasants, 258; of teachers, 37; in 
Turkmenistan, lvi, 326-27, 328, 337, 
342; weekly, 258; in Uzbekistan, 424 

water: consumption, 123, 224, 279, 309, 
331, 454; disputes over, xxxix, lvi, 224, 
278, 279; as energy source, xlvi; 
exports of, 150; free, 338; for irriga- 
tion, 249, 255, 331; in Kyrgyzstan, xlvi, 
123, 125, 150; management, 125, 403; 
pollution, 22, 41, 123-24, 248, 310, 
325, 403-4, 422; quality, 123, 229, 248, 
404; resources, 123-24, 401; supply, 
123, 153, 229, 248, 325, 327, 401, 404; 
in Tajikistan, 205, 224, 248, 249, 279; 
transportation, 348; in Turkmenistan, 
xxxix, lvi, 279, 325, 327, 338; in 
Uzbekistan, lvi, lviii 

weapons trafficking. See materiel 

welfare. Sensorial welfare 

Western Europe: relations with, 361, 457 

women: abuse of, 231; bride-price for, 
231, 316; education of, 323, 336-37; 
employment of, 57, 134-35, 225, 230, 
231, 317, 336-37; in government, 74; 
health of, 28, 326; in Kazakstan, 28- 
29; in Kyrgyzstan, 134-35; life expect- 
ancy of, 248, 325; literacy rate of, 243; 
marriage of, 231; maternal mortality 
of, 28, 223, 326; maternity benefits for, 
147; as mothers, 28; as percentage of 
population, 230; political influence of, 
134; prisons for, 95; retirement age of, 
328; rights of, 28; roles of, 28, 225, 
317; under Soviet Union, 230; status 
of, 134, 230; in Tajikistan, 225, 230, 
243, 248; in Turkmenistan, 316, 317 

workers: benefits for, 42, 147; education 
of, 57; in Kazakstan, xliii, 17, 42, 57; 
number of, 256, 336; productivity of, 
17, 338; skilled, 254, 430; in Tajikistan, 
254, 256; in Turkmenistan, 314, 336 

workforce: distribution of, 57, 148, 336; 
in Kazakstan, 45, 57; percentage of 
population in, 57; in state enterprises, 
xliii, lv; in Tajikistan, 256-57; in Turk- 
menistan, Iv, 230, 336-38; in Uzbeki- 
stan, 430-31; women in, 57, 230, 336- 
37 

World Bank: aid from, xli, li, 24, 458; 
development support from, xli, 124, 
125, 310; Kyrgyzstan in, 179; Tajikistan 



564 



Index 



in, 283; Uzbekistan in, 458 
World Trade Organization (WTO), 165 
World War II: Kazakstan in, 15; Tajikistan 

in, 235, 252; Uzbekistan in, 397 
WTO. See World Trade Organization 



Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
(China), 85, 179; Uygur people in, 
126, 179 

Yaghnob people: in Tajikistan, 234 
Yangiobod, Uzbekistan: industry in, 430 
Yavan, Tajikistan. &?<?Yovon 
Yedinstvo (Unity) political group (Kazak- 
stan), 79 

Yeltsin, Boris N., 80, 183; support for, xlvi 

Yeniseyan tribes, 1 29 

Yomud tribes: geographic distribution 
of, 304; invasions by, 304-5; political 
power in Turkmenistan, 354 

Yovon (Yavan), Tajikistan: growth of, 229 



Ysyk-K61 basin (Kyrgyzstan): agriculture 

in, 151 
Ysyk-K61 (lake), 119, 120 
yurts, 34, 133 

Yuzhneftegaz oil refinery (Kazakstan), 
xliii 

Yuzhpolmetal, 150 

Zarafshon, Uzbekistan: industry in, 430 

Zarafshon Highway, 442 

Zarafshon Mining Project, 261 

Zarafshon Mountains, 219 

Zarafshon River, 220 

Zavarzin, Viktor, 367 

Zheltoksan (December) (nationalist 

movement, Kazakstan), 78 
Zhezqazghan Nonferrous Metallurgy 

complex (Kazakstan), xliii 
Zoroastrianism, 207, 208, 386 
Zuhurov, Saidomir, 289 



565 



Contributors 



Muriel Atkin is professor of history at George Washington Uni- 
versity. 

Larry V. Clark is professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indi- 
ana University. 

Glenn E. Curtis is senior research analyst for Central Eurasia 
and Central Europe in the Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress. 

Nancy Lubin is president of JNA Associates, Inc., a consulting 
firm specializing in Central Asian studies. 

Martha Brill Olcott is professor of political science at Colgate 
University and senior associate of the Carnegie Endow- 
ment for International Peace. 

Michael Thurman is a Ph.D. candidate in Central Eurasian 
Studies at Indiana University. 

David Tyson is a Ph.D. candidate in Central Eurasian Studies at 
Indiana University. 



567 



Published Country Studies 



550-65 


Afghanistan 


550-98 


Albania 


<SO 44 

JJU 'ri 


A 1 /TOtM O 

•rvlgClld. 


550_5Q 


A n ctr\\ q 
/AilgOld. 


550-73 

JJU— 1 D 


/AlgClllllld 


550-111 


Armenia, Azerbaijan, 




and Georgia 


550-1 60 

JJU — 1U7 


A HCtf oil Q 


550-176 
JJU 1 /o 


A nclri 9 
/\UoUla 


550-175 

J JVJ — 1 / J 


D dllgldUCMl 


550-112 


Belarus and Moldova 


550-170 


Belgium 


JJU Ul) 


JL> Oil V Id 


550-90 




550-168 


Rul oiiriii 
13 Ulgdlld 


550-61 


Burma 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550—166 
J ju— 100 


V^dlllcl OOI1 


55n_i 5Q 

j ju— i jy 


L.nau 


550_77 

JJU— / / 


V^Illlc 


550-60 


China 


550-26 


Colombia 


CCA 1 1 

550-33 


Commonwealth Carib 




bean, Islands of the 


550-91 


Congo 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-69 


Cote d'l voire (Ivory 




Coast) 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 



(Area Handbook Series) 



550-36 


Dominican Republic 




and Haiti 


ccn 

jjU— jZ 


Ecuador 


jjU— ho 


Egypt 


jjU— IjU 


El Salvador 


550-113 


Estonia, Latvia, and 




Lithuania 


550 98 


d uiiopid 


550-167 

J JVJ io / 


x illldllLl 


550_173 

JJU— 1 ID 


vjciiiidiiy 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-87 


Greece 


550 78 

JJU—/ o 


vJUdlcilldid 


550-174 

JJU 1 / i 


VJUlUCd 


550—8? 
JJU— oz 


vjuydiid diiu rjciizc 


550-151 


Honduras 


550-165 


Hungary 


550 91 

J JU— Zrl 


India 


550-1 54 

JJU — ut 


TnHian Orpan 
iiiviidli wCCdil 


550-^Q 

jju — jy 


lllUUHCMd 


550-68 


Iran 


550-31 


Iraq 


550_95 

JJU— Zj 


Israel 


550-182 


Italy 


550-30 


Japan 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-114 


Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 




Tajikistan, Turkmeni- 




stan, and Uzbekistan 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-81 


Korea, North 



569 



550-41 


Korea, South 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 


CCA CQ 


Laos 


cca ^ 1 


Saudi Arabia 


550-24 


Lebanon 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-38 


Liberia 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-85 


Libya 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-86 


Somalia 


cca a c 


Malaysia 


jjU-93 


South Africa 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-95 


Soviet Union 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-179 


Spain 


550-76 


Mongolia 


550-96 


Sri Lanka 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-27 


Sudan 


c ca £ A 

550-64 


Mozambique 


CCA /IT 

550-47 


Syria 


550-35 


Nepal and Bhutan 


550-62 


Tanzania 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-80 


Turkey 


C C f\ A O 

550^+8 


Pakistan 


CCA *7 A 

550-74 


T T _ J _ 

Uganda 


550^6 


Panama 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-156 


Paraguay 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-42 


Peru 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-72 


Philippines 


550-99 


Yugoslavia 


550-162 


Poland 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-160 


Romania 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 



570 



PIN: 075865-000 



